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Scholars have argued that athletics are utilized by universities to advertise their 
school to all individuals (Collins, 2012; Dwyer, Eddy, Havard, & Braa, 2010; Toma & 
Cross, 1998; Washington & Ventresca, 2004; Weaver, 2010).  Expectedly, university 
officials are willing to contribute resources in orde  to develop an effective athletics 
program to establish an institution’s legitimacy among other universities (Collins, 2012; 
Toma & Cross, 1998; Washington & Ventresca, 2004). One tactic employed by schools 
focuses on the process of athletic association reclassification into the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association (NCAA) from other member associations (e.g., National Association 
for Intercollegiate Athletics). Officials consider this move due to the NCAA’s identity as 
the premiere intercollegiate athletic association. As such, studies on college movement 
recognized that universities are more likely to move to the NCAA if other universities 
with shared characteristics have reclassified in order to become legitimate among peers 
(Smith, Williams, Soebbing, & Washington, 2013; Washington, 2004; 2004-05). 
However, research has not been conducted to estimate the quantity and duration of a 
potential 'reclassification' effect.  The purpose of this dissertation is to determine if a 
change in athletic association will increase the number of application receives after 
reclassification.  The dissertation analyzes this penomenon through the movement of 
former NAIA member schools from 1959 to 2012 to the NCAA. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 According to Washington and Patterson (2011), one of the prevalent theories in 
management literature as well as in sport management literature is institutional theory.  
Specifically, sport management scholars have concentrat d on the concept of 
isomorphism, which is the pressure to adopt structues, services, or forms within an 
organizational field (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008).  Isomorphism studies within sport 
management include works reviewing the influence pressure from Sport Canada for 
National Sport Organizations to change (Slack & Hinings, 1994), the formalization 
within a Canadian amateur ice hockey organization (Stevens & Slack, 1998), the low 
percentage of black coaches in college sports (Cunningham, Sagas, & Ashley, 2001), and 
the relationship between the status of soccer clubs in the English Premier League and 
their website design (Lamertz, Carney, & Bastien, 2008).  However, Washington and 
Patterson (2011) argued sport management scholars should explore other institutional 
theory concepts such as the diffusion of innovation studies, distinctions between early 
and late adopters, a focus on the organizational field, and the adoption of rationalized 
myths by formal organizations (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
Meyer & Scott, 1983; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983).  Washington and Patterson (2011) also 
identified sport management researchers have conducted fewer studies on the 
institutionalization of sport organizations and specifically legitimacy.   
Successful organizations often obtain legitimacy among rival firms through 
affiliation (Oliver, 1997).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) detailed organizations competing 
for vital resources and power need institutional legitimacy to achieve prosperity.  For 
universities, school officials institute programs that will allow the institution to mimic 
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and surpass other universities in order to attract students.  One specific program utilized 
for this purpose is intercollegiate athletics.  According to several researchers (Collins, 
2012; Toma & Cross, 1998; Washington & Ventresca, 2004), university officials 
contribute significant resources to create an effectiv  athletics program with the goal of 
establishing an institution’s legitimacy among peer universities and subsequent 
generation of significant increases in alumni donations, game attendance, and student 
body population (Collins, 2012; Toma & Cross, 1998; Washington & Ventresca, 2004).  
Through athletic contests, university decision makers create an effective marketing tool 
that allows the institution to alter its perception and acquire legitimacy within its 
organizational field (Tomasini, 2005).  
Affiliation in college sports focuses on the associations universities have among 
other institutions within the organizational field of intercollegiate athletics.  This 
organizational field is comprised of the largest and popular athletic association governing 
bodies: the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the National 
Association for Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA).  Both organizations compete over 
symbolic resources and legitimization through the acceptance of field participants that are 
needed for survival (Washington, 2004).  These elemnts are essential for these firms 
compared to material and tangible resources since both organizations institute different 
strategies to acquire environmental resources (Galvin, 2002).  Finally, both athletic 
associations conduct what is known as institutional str tegy, which describes “patterns of 
actions that are concerned with managing the institutional structure” of membership and 
standards of practice (Lawrence, 1999, p. 162). 
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Similar to the associations, each university prepars  specific institutional 
strategy to manage its standards of practice.  Collins (2012) identified this practice as an 
athletics strategy and is implemented to manage a university’s athletic affairs.  
Specifically, athletic departments will develop certain courses of action to execute their 
various sport program initiatives.  Projects included in an athletics strategy involve the 
addition or removal of a program, the hiring and firing of coaching staffs, the 
construction of new or the renovation of existing facilities, the decision to affiliate with a 
particular conference, and the reclassification of a university to a different level of 
athletic competition (Collins, 2012).  Through the contribution of resources, university 
administrators have a distinct appreciation for intercollegiate athletics as it serves as a 
form of advertising that has the ability to reach a broader base of individuals and achieve 
sport success (Weaver, 2010).  As a return on investment, officials believe the university 
will receive improved media coverage that will increase awareness among other 
institutions and attract a higher student population (Collins, 2012; Toma & Cross, 1998; 
Washington & Ventresca, 2004).  Many researchers recognized a prominent athletic 
campaign can be utilized as an advertisement for potential applicants (Dosh, 2012; Goff, 
2000; Weaver, 2010). As a successful team becomes better known, incoming students 
may be more inclined to apply and enroll at the institution for their academic pursuits. 
This increase (i.e., Flutie Effect) exists temporarily but has provided substantial 
applications and enrollment figures to institutions (Hansen, 2011).   
Typically, athletic success is synonymous with many of the universities 
associated with the NCAA and Division I (Getz & Siegfried, 2010; McCormick & 
Tinsley, 1987; Mixon & Hsing, 1994; Mixon & Ressler, 1995; Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 
    
4 
 
2004). For teams without a great history of athletic success, the novelty of athletic 
achievement becomes a cost-effective marketing instrument that encourages many 
individuals to view the institution differently and potentially encourage students to apply 
and enroll (Tomasini, 2005).  Several recent examples of studies following the Flutie 
Effect examined these outcomes after the successes of Butler University, George Mason 
University, and Northwestern University during their men’s basketball and football 
seasons (Baker, 2008; Dosh, 2012; Selingo, 1997).  With multiple schools attaining this 
phenomenon, one can argue that university officials concluded that an investment of 
resources towards athletics in order to achieve performance goals would be a sound 
strategy to capture similar gains in student body population.   
Based upon the gains at these schools, many university officials could also 
logically assume that other changes in an athletic strategy could achieve a similar result.  
One area in particular is a university’s affiliation with an athletic association.  Past 
research noted that schools consider changing athletic affiliations in order to improve 
their institution’s legitimacy (Smith, Williams, Soebbing, & Washington, 2013; 
Washington, 2004; 2004-05).  Specifically, university officials believe by aligning with 
the NCAA, the institution will improve its perception among other firms and allow for an 
increase in new students (Keller, 2004; Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).  Historically, 
movement between associations has occurred at a steady pace since the 1950s when both 
the NCAA and the NAIA established themselves as the premiere intercollegiate sport 
associations in the United States (Washington, 2004; 2 04-05).  Therefore, the purpose of 
the dissertation is to first review the history of university movement from the NAIA to 
the NCAA with respect to the NAIA’s legitimacy withn the organizational field of 
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intercollegiate athletics.  Second, the dissertation analyzes one potential consequence of 
university movement, a temporary increase in applications.  Specifically, the dissertation 
explores if an increase in applications (i.e., Reclassification Effect) can be obtained and 
for how long for schools transitioning from the NAIA to the NCAA.   
Background of the Problem 
According to Getz and Siegfried (2010), the NCAA has tr ditionally been 
acknowledged as a prestigious college sports association due to its affiliation with 
prominent universities.  However, in the mid-20th century, the NCAA faced strong 
competition from the NAIA (Smith, 1987; 2000).  A group of smaller colleges in 1937 
founded the NAIA due to the colleges’ concerns with the NCAA (Wilson, 2005).  Many 
decision makers from these institutions felt they would not be considered for postseason 
competition in the NCAA’s sponsored championships in relation to their much larger 
peers.  As such, these smaller colleges decided to form their own college athletic body, 
first as a basketball centered organization, later evolving into an intercollegiate athletic 
association that sponsored multiple sports (Hoover, 1958). 
The NAIA was able to differentiate from its NCAA counterpart by developing 
relationships with colleges that were traditionally not viewed as a prototypical NCAA 
member.  Schools identified as teaching colleges, liberal arts colleges, and historically 
black colleges and universities (HBCUs) were classified as smaller colleges and did not 
have a proper designation within the NCAA (Washingto , 2004).  By supporting 
universities with these characteristics, the NAIA provided an alternative organization that 
would suit the respective needs and visions of the smaller school (Smith, 1988).  With a 
sizeable population of smaller schools, this strategy allowed the young organization to 
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establish itself as a legitimate association within intercollegiate sports.  The NAIA’s 
obtainment of legitimacy matches Scott’s (1995) argument where firms must meet “a 
condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, or consonance with relevant 
rules or laws” (p. 45).  In addition, the NAIA used the power of affiliation as a means to 
accrue its legitimacy within the organizational fied (Oliver, 1997).  As such, the NAIA 
was able to establish a substantial niche within intercollegiate athletics while 
emphasizing a decentralized management approach opposed to the NCAA’s centralized 
governing methodology (Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005). 
The NAIA and the NCAA continually implemented measures in order to attract 
members and maintain their respective legitimacy.  Specifically, both organizations faced 
mimetic pressures in order to adapt in the ever changing world of intercollegiate athletics.  
In 1957, for example, NCAA officials agreed to reorganize its firm into a revolutionary 
two division structure that allowed the organization t  provide services to schools the 
NCAA often ignored in the past (Falla, 1981).  This structure called for the separation of 
many of the original members of the NCAA, which consisted of the large universities in 
the U.S., from the smaller colleges and universitie (Falla, 1981; Wilson, 2005).  
Ironically, these divisions were to be called the University Division and the College 
Division.  According to Washington (2004), the NCAA’s decision to officially designate 
the College Division was an attempt to solicit smaller colleges in the NAIA to join the 
NCAA.  Furthermore, the College Division also provided the NCAA a way to accept 
HBCUs into membership (Katz, 1990; & McLendon, 1988).  
Although the two divisional structure was successful, the NAIA and the NCAA 
still maintained relatively similar membership counts (Wilson, 2005).  By 1966, 
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membership in the NAIA grew to 517 members while th more established NCAA, in 
comparison, possessed 536 members (Washington, 2004-05).  The organizations would 
continue to engage in a membership stalemate until 1973 when the NCAA began 
discussions for a new reorganizational effort.  It was at this time that NCAA officials 
agreed to a second reorganizational effort, establihing the current three division structure 
(Washington, 2004-05).  Unlike the prior reorganization effort, the NAIA viewed this 
new initiative by the NCAA as a direct threat to the values and goals maintained of the 
NAIA (Wilson 2005).  Specifically, NAIA officials viewed Division III as a direct 
competitor since the NCAA adopted many of the philosophies that the NAIA maintained 
at the time.  Furthermore, many NAIA members were entic d by the financial 
commitment that the NCAA made to support both Division II and Division III (“Football 
Rights Fees Announced”, 1976; Washington, 2004-05).   
Legitimacy and College Movement 
With increased financial support and the NCAA’s establishment as the premiere 
college sports association, many NAIA members began to change their athletic affiliation 
and reclassify to the NCAA (Smith, 1988; Washington, 2004).  According to Wilson 
(2005) as well as the NAIA website (“About the NAIA”, n.d.), the NAIA lost over 250 
members between 1973 and the present time either to defection to the NCAA or removal 
of sports programs.  During this same time period, Washington (2004) calculated that the 
NCAA added nearly the same amount of schools the NAIA had lost.   
According to Land (1977) and Washington (1999), memb r schools from both 
organizations held the NCAA in higher prestige as the organization still associated with 
large universities.  On the other hand, the NAIA maintained its association with many 
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smaller schools and conceptually maintained an identity as a lower-order organization 
(Land, 1977; Washington 1999).  As more institutions viewed both organizations in this 
way, the schools started to analyze their own legitimacy and determine if their affiliations 
were altering the perception of their university.  Thus, many small schools were 
presented with the choice to join a prestigious organization (i.e., the NCAA) or maintain 
the less admired image of a smaller college (i.e., th  NAIA) (Washington, 2004-05).   
Both Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004; 2004- 5) have argued the use of 
social identities has influenced the decision to reclassify from the NAIA to the NCAA.  
For example, officials from Northeastern Oklahoma St te University (NOSU) of 
Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and Southeastern Oklahoma State University (SOSU) of Durant, 
Oklahoma, decided to transfer their athletic association membership to the NCAA 
(“SOSU Leaves NAIA for NCAA”, 1994).  Within, both schools noted their decision to 
move into the NCAA was related to the high number of schools within their area and 
conference choosing to also move into the NCAA.  This example highlights the influence 
social identities (e.g., conference alignment, geographical location, and competition 
within sport) have on the decision to align with the NCAA in an attempt to acquire 
legitimacy within intercollegiate athletics. 
Several researchers examined the influence social identities have on athletic 
affiliation reclassification over the last three decades (Smith, 2011; Smith et al., 2013; 
Washington, 2004-05; Weaver, 2010).  For instance, Washington (2004-05) noted NAIA 
universities reclassifying to the NCAA between 1973 and 1999 departed from the NAIA 
due to the organization’s declining legitimacy. Furthe more, these member schools 
analyzed their involvement with the fleeting association and if continued association 
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could cause implications to their own organizational identity.  Washington (2004-05) also 
showed that many NAIA members moved due to certain shared characteristics with 
departed institutions such as past NAIA conference association or HBCU designation.  
Smith et al. (2013) further acknowledged other identiti s influence reclassification 
including women-only college designation and geographical locations as defined by the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).   
Along with shared characteristics, Smith (2011) noted NAIA member schools left 
the organization for the NCAA due to the perceived b nefits the association could 
provide their institution.  Through an analysis of the institution’s archetype, or 
description of the meaning of an organization (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Ranson, 
Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980), Smith (2011) discovered NAIA members left the 
organization due to its current standing within the organizational field in comparison to 
the NCAA.  Specifically, the universities included in the study noted the NCAA created 
additional opportunities for recruiting students to their school as many recruits appeared 
to be unaware of the NAIA (Smith, 2011).  Based on Smith’s (2011) findings, it appears 
university officials assume a reclassification from the NAIA to the NCAA will raise 
awareness for the university, conforming to a rationalized myth of intercollegiate sports.  
Meyer and Rowan (1977) defined rationalized myths as “practices and procedures 
defined by prevailing rationalized concepts of organiz tional work and institutionalized 
in society” (p. 340).  By adopting a rationalized myth, an organization can increase its 
legitimacy as well as its survival prospects within the organizational field (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). 
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The Benefits of Sports 
While officials consider reclassification strategies through this philosophy, 
several researchers have not confirmed if actual results match the perceived benefits. 
Tomasini (2005) examined the economical differences from 27 institutions that 
reclassified from either Division II or Division III to the Football Championship 
Subdivision (FCS) of Division I between 1993 and 1999 and found reclassification did 
not result in a significant increase in revenue or game attendance.  Frieder (2007) 
similarly analyzed financial data of 29 schools moving from either the FCS to the 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) of Division I or from Division II to the Division I-FCS.  
The results of the study showed while revenues increased for most schools, the financial 
gains were offset by increased expenditures due to the reclassification (Frieder, 2007). 
Dwyer, Eddy, Havard, and Braa (2010) tracked the reclassification efforts of one 
Rocky Mountain Region institution in 2002 from Division II to Division I.  According to 
Dwyer et al. (2010), the administrators of the university believed the move would 
increase revenue, exposure, fan support, and admissions.  However, the study noted the 
school saw decreases in all these areas after the univ rsity’s reclassification.  Weaver 
(2010) analyzed the reclassification strategy of two North Carolina universities to 
determine if their respective moves were beneficial to their institutions.  His study found 
the movement for one of the schools did not meet the expectations of the administrators 
while the second university received acclaim that could not be obtained previously 
(Weaver, 2010).   
While these studies show mixed to negative results after reclassification, there are 
limitations that have not been addressed in prior wrks.  First, research on 
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reclassifications has only focused on a small sample of institutions that have reclassified 
over a short period of time (Frieder, 2007; Tomasini, 2005).  Second, many studies 
focused on interorganizational reclassification (i.e., Division I-FCS to FBS; Division III 
to Division II; Division II to Division I-FCS; etc.) (Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010) 
and, thus, ignored the potential impact that can be generated from the reclassification of 
athletic associations.  
Finally, while Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004-05) identified prominent 
characteristics that have influenced college reclassification, neither study analyzes the 
specific reclassification destination and if certain characteristics can influence the move.  
For example, both NOSU and SOSU noted their reasoning for joining Division II was 
due to the high number of institutions participating  Division II football within their 
geographic location in comparison to NAIA member schools (“Solon: Oklahoma Schools 
Should”, 1999).  Thus, it would be more beneficial for schools to analyze the aims and 
scope of each of the NCAA divisions to determine which level would work best for an 
institution’s athletic affairs in order to obtain the assumed benefits branding and outreach 
(Dwyer et al., 2010; Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).   
Statement of the Problem  
University officials will more likely consider reclassification into the NCAA 
based on social characteristics in order to conform t  rationalized myths for the 
accruement of legitimacy within the organizational field (Keller, 2004; Smith, 2011; 
Weaver, 2010).  This rationale is based under the beli f that NCAA affiliation is 
considered to be a societal mandate that allows for the accruement of legitimacy.  
Furthermore, an institution can improve its image within the public eye through the 
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NCAA’s branding and outreach since sports are viewed as an effective advertising 
vehicle (Smith, 2011; Tomasini, 2005; Weaver, 2010)). Thus, university officials could 
utilize a reclassification effort to bring awareness to the university as it conforms to the 
generalized beliefs of the organizational field of intercollegiate athletics.  Furthermore, 
the reclassification could also allow for a temporary increase of student applications and 
enrollment as well as increased financial standing a d emotional support (Keller, 2004; 
Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).   
Despite this logical progression, limited research exists to confirm that a 
university’s reclassification from one athletic association to another will generate these 
desired results (i.e., reclassification effect). Past studies show institutions conducting a 
reclassification effort based upon the perceived benefits enjoyed mixed results and have 
been limited to the qualitative and case study methodologies.  Further, these studies 
analyzed the outcomes of reclassification based on the views of stakeholders involved in 
the process.  Although these perspectives can prove certain elements to be true or false, 
they do not acknowledge or monitor the activity of other similar schools that may or may 
not be considering a similar movement strategy.  As such, this dissertation will conduct 
an empirical analysis on the likelihood of a university transitioning from the NAIA to 
either NCAA Division II or Division III based on a school’s social identities.  
Furthermore, this dissertation will analyze the movement of universities formerly 
associated with the NAIA from 1959 to 2012 to become a member of the NCAA 
determine if athletic affiliation has a significant impact on the number of applications that 
a school receives.  




 Traditionally, researchers identify intercollegiate thletic success as advertising 
vehicle for institutions. These include McCormick and Tinsley (1987) who noted that 
schools participating in big-time athletic conferenc s foresee a 3% increase in the average 
SAT scores for entering freshman. Mixon and Ressler (1995) estimated out-of-state 
applications for each round a university advances to in he NCAA Men’s Basketball 
Tournament. Finally, Pope and Pope (2009) discovered th  long term success of football 
and basketball teams increase the quantity of applications by 2-8% for Top 20 football 
schools and Top 16 basketball schools. While athletic success is proven to attract 
students, research is limited on measuring other athletic department events and its effects 
on the student body population.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify and u erstand the rationale for 
universities to consider a transitional move from the NAIA to the NCAA in an attempt to 
acquire legitimacy through an analysis of social identities.  Institutions that have 
considered this move have based their decision on the rationalized myth that the NCAA 
is the premiere intercollegiate athletic association (Getz & Siegfried, 2010; Falla, 1981).  
University officials conduct an organizational change process of social mobility which 
Rao, Davis, and Ward (2000) noted analyzes the firm’s environment for potential 
alterations to its identity.  In terms of affiliation, universities associated with the NAIA 
may determine that association with the organization is a detriment to their own identity 
and choose to depart for the NCAA, which is established as the premiere intercollegiate 
athletic association within society.  According to Rao et al. (2000), if organizations share 
social characteristics with prior defectors, there is a greater possibility of a firm’s 
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defection to enhance the firm’s identity.  Theoretically, this is a possible argument for 
NAIA member schools to depart for the NCAA. 
Furthermore, many of these institutions operated under the possible assumption 
that through NCAA affiliation, the school will see an increase in student applications.  In 
order to determine if college movement can generate a potential Reclassification Effect, 
this dissertation will analyze the methodology behind the aforementioned Flutie Effect as 
well as other variations of its methodology such as the Novelty Effect of professional 
sports stadiums and arenas (e.g., Clapp & Hakes, 2005; Coates & Humphreys, 2005; 
Leadley & Zygmont, 2006; McEvoy, Nagel, DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005; Noll, 1974). 
The belief new stadium construction increases attendance is similar to a university’s 
belief that athletic association reclassification ca  raise university awareness to attract 
students and establish the university’s legitimacy mong its peers.  Because of these 
similarities, this dissertation develops a parallel m thodology to measure the effect of a 
reclassification effort from the NAIA to the NCAA 
Research Setting 
 To provide a more comprehensible outline of this dis ertation, it is important to 
discuss the specific aspects of the population.  The population for this dissertation will 
involve the membership of the NAIA from 1959 to 201.  This time period is important 
for this dissertation as it includes activity of NAIA schools both before and after the 
NCAA’s reorganization effort in 1973.  NAIA membership records were obtained 
directly from the NAIA and confirmed through the Integrated Postsecondary Education 
Data System (IPEDS).  According to the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES), the IPEDS database provides basic data on postsecondary education in the U.S. 
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in order to describe and determine trends in terms of the number of students enrolled, the 
number of faculty and staff employed, the number of degrees earned, and the total 
amount of dollars expended (“About IPEDS”, n.d.”). 
Research Questions 
The general research questions for this dissertation include the following: 
1: Does the history of the NAIA provide a rationale for the change in membership 
with respect to the organization’s/association’s legitimacy? 
2: Do particular social identities predict the likelihood that NAIA schools will 
transition from the NAIA to the NCAA Division II orfrom the NAIA to NCAA 
Division III? 
3: Does a transition from the NAIA to the NCAA Division II or III lead to an 
increase in applications?  If so, how long does thi“Reclassification Effect” last? 
Summary 
The overall purpose of this dissertation is to examine the history of movement 
from the NAIA to the NCAA, with relation to the NAI’s legitimacy, and the potential 
benefits a university may receive after reclassifying.  To research this potential effect, 
this dissertation analyzes the history of movement b tween the NCAA and the NAIA.  
According to Washington (2004-05), many NAIA member schools departed the 
association for the NCAA due to the perceived declining legitimacy of the NAIA.  Smith 
(2011) elaborated that university officials believed association with the NCAA would 
allow the school to take advantage of the organization’s brand to assist in recruiting 
efforts.  Tomasini (2005) also noted successful athletic programs have the ability to 
generate increases in alumni donations, gate attendance, game revenue, and student 
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enrollment.  As such, university officials contribute resources into their athletic programs 
with the belief the institution will receive notoriety among their peers.  Currently, limited 
research proves these accusations to be true or false.  As such, this dissertation will 
conduct an empirical analysis on the likelihood of a Reclassification Effect from the 
NAIA to a specific NCAA division.  Furthermore, this dissertation will also analyze the 
application data of all institutions associated with the NAIA and NCAA to determine a 
school’s athletic association can contribute to the number of applications that a school 
receives as well as overall student body enrollment. 
Justification and Significance 
University officials long held that an institution’s identity should be developed in 
order to create value and achieve legitimacy among their peer institutions through NCAA 
affiliation (Dwyer et al., 2010).  Specifically, “proponents of intercollegiate athletics 
assert a symbiotic relationship exists between athletics and academics, with universities 
benefitting economically by participation in intercollegiate athletics” (Tomasini, 2005, p. 
9). As such, universities should see increases in alumni donations, attendance at sporting 
events, public perception and prestige, visibility, and applications and enrollment because 
of the increased exposure related to the reclassification efforts (Beyer & Hannah, 2000; 
Goff, 2000; Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).  However, the moves by past institutions have 
not met those expectations (Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010) as decision makers did not 
account for the increased costs of reclassification.  Opposed to the cost of reclassification, 
this study will help schools considering reclassificat on if a temporary increase in 
enrollment can be achieved and for how long this will occur. This research will allow 
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decision makers to properly frame their university’ strategy to meet its respective goals 
with an understanding of the intercollegiate athletic nvironment. 
In addition, through a historical analysis of NAIA membership, this dissertation 
will detail the organizational field alterations tha  caused several institutions to depart the 
NAIA for the NCAA.  This analysis will provide a nec ssary historical background to 
identify how the rationalized myths of the intercollegiate athletic organization field were 
established.  Specifically, the historical analysis can determine how association with the 
NCAA became the societal mandate for intercollegiate athletics.  Past research also 
analyzed reclassification to the NCAA from a general st ndpoint without specific 
divisional classification.  University officials build their institutional strategy through 
firmly established goals and consider associations that will allow the university to reach 
those goals (Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010). This research will remind decision 
makers to analyze the best possible location for thei respective institution. 
Finally, this study will also closely examine the NCAA’s transition procedures for 
schools. Smith et al. (2013) noted many institutions applying to the NCAA have 
undertaken drastic changes to their athletic departmen s. While the process can be unique 
for each university, this research will provide theNCAA with further analysis to alleviate 
potential complications during the transition process such as issues with educational 
compliance and other transitional requirements.  For the NAIA, this research can identify 
areas the organization will need to improve upon to enhance its overall image.  With 
information on the probability of movement and actul results, the NAIA could alter their 
by-laws and rules to better accommodate their current membership and attract new 
schools to join the association.  Furthermore, the historical analysis of the NAIA displays 
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several events that were detrimental to the associati n nd how decision making can be 
approved for the association when faced with similar challenges.  
Limitations 
 The limitations for this dissertation are based on the utilization of governmental 
data acquired from the IPEDS database.  Because this information is collected by a third-
party, the accuracy of the data may be called into question.  Specifically, there may be 
errors in the numbers reported in the data as well as the potential for missing data on 
certain variables needed for the analysis.  In addition, the historical section of this 
dissertation cannot be fully validated due to the failure of the NAIA organization to 
preserve much of its documents.  According to Hoover (1958), Land (1977), and Wilson 
(2005), much of the early records of the NAIA were lost to a fire in 1943.  Furthermore, a 
complete file of data was lost during the process of m ving the executive offices from the 
campus of Pepperdine University in Los Angeles, California to Kansas City in 1957 
(Hoover, 1958).  In the end, information contained in the historical portion of this 
analysis required the use of newspaper articles and available primary data from the 
NAIA.  
Delimitations 
 The considerations for delimitations for this dissertation involve the boundaries of 
historical research for the NCAA.  Information regarding the NCAA throughout the 
historical portion of this dissertation is utilized only through the engagement of conflict 
with the NAIA.  While this conflict does include information on specific watershed 
moments for the NCAA, a historical analysis of the organization is not included in this 
dissertation.  Furthermore, previous research on college movement has examined the 
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movement from the NAIA to the NCAA from a general me bership basis (e.g., Smith et 
al., 2013; Washington, 2004; 2004-05).  This dissertation considers the movement of 
universities from the NAIA to the NCAA based upon their choice of NCAA divisional 
hierarchy through the use of mixed methodology involving both historical analysis and 
quantitative methods.  However, past studies (e.g. Dwyer et al. 2010; Smith, 2011; 
Weaver, 2010) have utilized qualitative methodology to understand the university’s 
decision to move into the NCAA.  While this particular type of research analysis has its 
advantages, it was not utilized for this study due to the potential for variability among 
results for the Reclassification Effect. 
Organization of the Study 
This dissertation is organized into eight chapters. Following the introduction, the 
second chapter is a review of literature on the topics of legitimacy, institutional strategy, 
diffusion, social identity theory, and social mobility.  Chapter 3 reviews the literature on 
college movement as well as an analysis of studies similar to the Reclassification Effect.  
Chapter 4 describes the data used in this research and includes a description of the 
conceptual models that will be estimated and the methodologies that will be employed to 
accomplish the research objectives. Chapter 5 contains the results of the historical 
analysis of the NAIA to communicate the various reasons and the context for why 
schools considered reclassification following the process established by Seifried (2010) 
regarding historical research in sport management. Chapter 6 consists of a descriptive 
analysis of the model’s results.  Chapter 7 provides a detailed analysis of the statistical 
findings within the theoretical framework provided in Chapters 2 and 3.  Finally, this 
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dissertation will conclude with Chapter 8, which involves a summary of the work and 
offers future topics or points of emphasis to study.
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Chapter 2 – Searching for Legitimacy 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the conceptual basis for university 
movement into a new athletic association.  First, the chapter will provide a brief overview 
of the concept of legitimacy and its relation to the institutional strategy of membership 
organizations.  This examination will be followed by a discussion on the diffusion of 
practices within an organizational field as well as the institutional isomorphism that 
causes organizations to consider change.  From this analysis, organizations appear to 
review their own identities to rationalize their decision to alter their affiliations.  Thus, 
this section will also provide an analysis of the social identity theory and its potential to 
cause movement of organizations.  Finally, this discus ion will conclude with a brief 
discussion on the movement of universities from the NAIA to the NCAA in order to 
maintain legitimacy through social identity theory and diffusion.   
Many schools associated within the NAIA chose to depart the organization for 
more lucrative opportunities provided by the NCAA (Smith, 2011).  While each 
university maintained its own reasons for departing he NAIA, the overall movement 
between associations highlights the relationship that organizations have with affiliations.  
Affiliations provide firms with opportunities to focus on broad interlocks and networks 
amongst firms (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999).  Furthermo e, organizations are able to craft 
an identity through affiliation.  According to Ashforth and Mael (1989), firms place 
themselves into groups based upon certain characteristics to create value for both the 
organization and affiliated grouping.  These established affiliations would then provide 
firms with the opportunity to achieve legitimacy while causing the diffusion of practices 
and crafting institutional strategy throughout larger organizational fields.   




The concept of legitimacy within the organizational theory literature can be 
defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).  In other words, organizations 
cannot simply acquire or possess legitimacy but rather firms must meet “a condition 
reflecting cultural alignment, normative support, o c nsonance with relevant rules or 
laws” (Scott, 1995, p. 45).  This concept differs sub tantially from two other closely 
related terms, status and reputation.  Status is “a socially constructed, intersubjectively 
agreed-upon and accepted ordering or ranking” of social actors (Washington & Zajac, 
2005, p. 284).  Benjamin and Podolny (1999) noted that status rankings can be based on 
the esteem that an individual or organization has trough their affiliation or adoption of 
certain practices, values and traits.  In comparison, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) (cf. 
Ferguson, Deephouse, & Ferguson, 2000; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005) 
defined reputation as “a generalized expectation about a firm’s future behavior or 
performance based on collective perceptions (either dir ct or, more often, vicarious) of 
past behavior or performance” (p. 59-60). 
These three concepts are very similar in nature and h ve been used 
interchangeably by society at large concealing the diff rence of the terms (Higgins & 
Gulati, 2003).  This confusion is not uncommon since all three can focus on cultural 
factors in organizational life; all suggest that an organization can garner resources by 
conforming to social norms; and all emphasize that objective performance criteria may 
not be the best judge of the social signals of the world (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  
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As such, literatures on the concepts share the social perception of conformity as being a 
central determinant of organization success.  However, according to Deephouse and 
Suchman (2008), legitimacy is fundamentally dichotomous from both status and 
reputation since legitimation is “a question of ‘sati ficing’ to an acceptable level, and the 
absence of negative ‘problems’ is more important than the presence of positive 
achievements” (p. 60).  Meyer and Rowan (1977) explained that legitimacy is 
fundamentally non-rival, meaning positive feedback nd confidence creates win-win 
situations of mutual affirmation among legitimate actors.  Legitimacy is homogenized as 
it produces a herd-like conformity along an organiztion’s rationalized myths established 
as legitimacy-defining (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  Finally, legitimacy is political in 
nature since it can be linked to authoritative figures. 
Status, on the other hand, is fundamentally ordinal a d categorical meaning that it 
that varies less within one particular group and more across multiple groups (Deephouse 
& Suchman, 2008).  Deephouse and Carter (2005) noted this distinction allows for the 
creation of empirical separations between the different tiers of an industry (i.e. upper-, 
middle-, and lower-status tiers). Furthermore, status supports group rivalry because 
groups will compete for status through solidarity displays, collective mobility projects, 
and out-group ostracism.  Individuals will tend to m ve between groups primarily 
through sponsorship instead of competitive performance (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  
Thus, status can cause segregation between lower- and higher-status groups.  
Specifically, a lower-status organization may mimic the elements of the higher-status 
group in hopes of gaining their acceptance.  However, th  higher-status organization may 
decide to remove themselves from that particular elem nt due to the invading lower-
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status group, making status a self-aware process.  Finally, status is fundamentally 
honorific because it reflects cultural capital and habitus and elicits deference and tribute 
(Bourdieu, 1986).  According to Washington and Zajac (2005), “status generates social 
esteem and special, unearned (i.e. non-merit based) benefits known as privileges, which 
are granted to and enjoyed by high-status actors in a social system” (p. 284).  Thus, the 
concept of status implies the potential to validate or revoke an organization’s level of 
status through the acceptance or rejection within a high-status social group (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008). 
In relation to status and legitimacy, reputation involves “an explicit extrapolation 
from past to future behavior” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 61).  Reputation often 
expands past an organization’s product or service to include characteristics such as being 
a tough competitor, a good place to work, or an enviro mentally sensitive manufacturer 
among others (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Washington & Zajac, 2005).  Furthermore, 
the measurement of reputation is conducted on a continuous measure.  Social actors are 
typically placed on a continuum from best to worst and are ranked on their current 
standing (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  Since a firm’s reputation is contingent on its 
relative standing, an organization can benefit substantially from the errors of its 
competition.  Reputation also encourages firms to differentiate from their competitors in 
order to distinguish themselves from the competition or by advancing its claims to 
uniqueness.  Possibly the biggest distinction betwen r putation, status, and legitimacy is 
that reputation is fundamentally economical in nature (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  
“Reputation becomes an input into potential exchange partners’ expected utility 
functions” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 62).  In other words, any firm considering 
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engaging in affairs with another firm will review that organization’s reputation to 
determine if it is a feasible venture.   Several scholars noted that a favorable reputation 
can be considered a strategic competitive advantage that firms can utilize (Barney, 1991; 
Deephouse, 2000). 
While status and reputation do share elements with legitimacy, most organizations 
see legitimacy as an effective method to accrue stability within their respective industry 
(Thomas & Lamm, 2012).  As such, organizations desiring to achieve legitimacy often 
focus their efforts towards two basic perspectives.  The first perspective is to create an 
institutional view that emphasizes how societal beliefs can become embedded within the 
organization.  Broadly, an institutional view stems from a set of ideas, beliefs and actions 
used by society that are taken for granted by an organization (Jennings, Greenwood, 
Lounsbury, & Suddaby, 2013).  The other perspective is a strategic one that emphasizes 
how legitimacy can be managed in order to obtain organizational goals (Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008).  Through these two perspectives, many scholars explained that several 
dimensions exist for organizations to achieve legitimacy in multiple ways.  Stryker 
(1994) noted conceptual differences between the consent of rules, the approval of rules, 
and the cognitive orientation to rules.  Specifically, legitimacy can only be established if 
individuals consent to certain rule making authorities, the power of the rule itself, and the 
validity between the two (Stryker, 1994).   
Aldrich and Fiol (1994) distinguished between cognitive and sociopolitical 
legitimacy by stating: 
Cognitive legitimation refers to the spread of knowledge about a new 
venture…sociopolitical legitimation refers to the process by which key 
stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or government officials 
accept a venture as appropriate or right, given existing norms and laws (p. 648). 




The sociopolitical category has been expanded to provide three sub-dimensions of 
legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive (Suchman, 1995).  Pragmatic legitimacy 
“rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences” 
and involves the direct exchange between the organization and its interested constituents 
to assess their belief about whether the organization is working in their collective best 
interests or not (Suchman, 1995, p. 578).  Moral legitimacy is defined as the organization 
doing what society at large viewed as the right wayof doing business (Cashore, 2002).  
Finally, cognitive legitimacy combines society’s ability to comprehend and take elements 
for granted for an organization to obtain legitimacy opposed to any form of formal 
evaluation (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Cashore, 2002).  Furthermore, Suchman (1995) 
elaborated further on these dimensions by establishing a specific typology containing 12 
different legitimacy sub-types, which are defined in Table 2.1.  
 While these dimensions are fairly defined, there exist two persistent areas of 
confusion.  First, the term normative legitimacy has conflicting definitions in its 
sociological and organizational institutionalism usage.  Suchman (1995) noted in general 
sociological usage, normative legitimacy has congruence with normative culture, which 
is society’s assessment of what is good and bad.  In comparison, normative legitimacy in 
the organization institutionalism literature is often equated with normative isomorphism, 
which does review if elements are right or wrong but more from a professional context 
opposed to a world view (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  As such, there has been 
movement within the institutional theory literature to avoid the term normative 
legitimacy when referring to professions that seek to influence many different dimensions 
of legitimacy (Greenwood, Suddaby, & Hinings, 2002; Suchman, 1995).  Further, as  
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Table 2-1 - Sub-Types of Legitimacy 
Dimension Sub-Type Definition 
Pragmatic 
Exchange 
Support for an organizational policy based on a 
policy’s expected value to a particular set of 
constituents. 
Influence 
Support for an organization not necessarily because 
of belief of favorable exchanges but rather due to the 
firm’s responsiveness to larger interests of 
constituents. 
Interest 
Support for our best interests at heart and shared 
values such as honesty, decency, trustworthiness, 
and wisdom. 
Character 
Support for an organization’s character in the face of 
isolated failures, miscues, and reversals. 
Moral 
Consequential 
Organizations should be judged by what they 
accomplish. 
Procedural 
Organizations should implement socially accepted 
techniques and procedures. 
Structural 
Organizations should adopt structural characteristics 
within a specific morally favored taxonomic 
category. 
Personal 
Organizations should embrace the charisma of 
individual organizational leaders. 
Cognitive 
Predictability 
Organizational activity will prove to be predictable, 
meaningful, and inviting. 
Plausibility 
Organizational activity will furnish plausible 
explanations for the organization and its endeavors. 
Inevitability 
Organizational activity will inevitability operate in a 
desirable, proper and appropriate manner. 
Permanence 
Organizational activity will become desirable, 
proper, and appropriate in itself. 
 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008) noted, professional legitimacy should refer to any efforts 
to enhance legitimacy through professional endorsement while normative legitimacy 
“should refer to legitimacy referred to any audienc (including but not limited to 
professional) on primarily normative grounds” (p. 53). 
 A second area of confusion is centered on the taken-for granted rationality within 
cognitive legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  While it is not debated that this component 
is important to an organization’s legitimacy, the real issue comes with the measurement 
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of the component.  One common method in several studies to determine a measurement 
of taken-for-grantedness (i.e., an absence of questioning) is to count the number of 
organizations or the number of media articles with greater numbers establishing greater 
legitimacy (Archibald, 2004; Carroll & Hannan, 1989).  Deephouse and Suchman (2008) 
argued this approach may be beneficial to emerging industries, organizations, or practices 
but does have issues with more established ones.  I terms of the establishment of an 
industry, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argued that a population count becomes 
decoupled from taken-from-grantedness because this lement for existing firms can 
“reduce the legitimacy of entrepreneurship more than it reduces the legitimacy of 
consolidation” (p. 54).  With regards to media articles, the complete absence of press 
coverage may be due to a subject’s blending within the cultural landscape or that the 
subject is no longer seen as a newsworthy item to cover (Itule & Anderson, 1994; 
Shoemaker, 1996). 
 Since legitimacy is based on the perceived actions of an organization (Suchman, 
1995), one must identify who is subject to social acceptance by others.  Johnson (2004) 
elaborated that a subject of legitimation can be “an act, a rule, a procedure, a routine, a 
distribution, a position, a group or team, a group’s status structure, teamwork, a system of 
positions, an authority structure, an organization, organizational symbols, an 
organization’s form, practices, services, programs, a regime, a system of power, and a 
system of inequality (to name a few)” (p. 10-11).  This definition can be attributed to 
several things.  First, legitimacy is a social construct and can emerge from a relation to 
other laws, rules, norms, values, and cognitive frameworks within a larger social network 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  Second, legitimacy is subjective in nature and can be 
    
29 
 
sought, gained, and defended in the face of competition (Suchman, 1995).  Finally, 
organizations can be either passive or active when att mpting to become legitimate.  
Recent examples of this passive or active nature include European business schools who 
created legitimating agencies that accredit their institutions (Durand & McGuire, 2005) 
and the Big Five (at the time of study, currently Big Four) accounting firms who actively 
created a legitimate multidisciplinary practice while adapting it for common use 
(Greenwood et al., 2002).   
 In comparison, sources of legitimacy are both internal and external audiences that 
observe organizations and make assessments about a firm’s legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 
1998).  Originally, Meyer and Scott (1992) believed two basic groups had “the capacity 
to mobilize and confront the organization” in terms of authority over acceptable cultural 
theory (p. 201-202).  The first of these groups were those who “have standing and 
license, derived from the organization’s legitimating account itself” (Meyer & Scott, 
1992, p. 202).  Deephouse and Suchman (2008) noted the best examples of this group are 
state governments since these organizations tend to buffer themselves as a legitimate 
organization.  The second groups are external forces who have collective authority over 
what can be acceptable theory within a specific industry (Meyer & Scott, 1992).  For 
example, the American Institute of Certified Public A countants (AICPA), which is a 
member association for the accounting industry, acts s a legislative body by establishing 
profession ethical standards and U.S. audit guidelines (“About the AICPA”, n.d.).   
Based on Suchman’s (1995) definition, legitimacy must be established by a 
“socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574).  
However, similar to the discussion on subjects of legitimation, this definition does not 
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limit the number of potential sources of legitimacy.  In order to determine who has 
collective authority over legitimation, one must pro erly focus attention to the research 
question in mind.  As an example, Suddaby and Greenwood (2005) argued what 
determines a professional accounting or law organization within the United States is 
based on a narrowly drawn social system.  On the otr hand, an examination of 
legitimacy for the global energy industry can be reviewed through state and federal 
regulators, industry analysts, political activists, and popular opinion (Robertson & 
Krauss, 2010). 
In addition to authoritative bodies, society-at-large can be a source of legitimacy 
for organizations.  Both Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Strang and Soule (1998) 
discussed the connotation between cognitive legitimacy and mimetic isomorphism and 
noted that as more organizations adopted a specific practice, the more widespread its 
acceptance and greater its legitimacy.  Baum and Powell (1995) identified the media as a 
rich indicator of society-wide legitimacy.  According to Deephouse (1996), both 
journalistic efforts and mass communications both reflect and influence of the general 
public, whether it is broadcasted in a positive or negative light.   The opposite would have 
occurred if the media covered the same organization in a negative light.  Thus, 
Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argued “the media should rightfully play a dual role in 
legitimacy research, serving both as an indicator of legitimation by society-at-large and 
as a source of legitimacy in their own stead” (p. 56).   
Beyond the society-at-large and the media, a third source of legitimacy can derive 
from interorganizational relations.  According to Galaskiewicz (1985), an organization 
can only become legitimate when it associates with other legitimate firms.  Through 
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affiliation with more legitimate associations, organizations can establish a better social 
standing.  Singh, Tucker, and House (1986) supported this rationale with a statistical 
analysis of the legitimacy of a voluntary social service organization in the City of 
Toronto, Ontario, Canada based on its listing in the community directory in Metropolitan 
Toronto; its registry with Revenue Canada as a bona fide charity; and its endowment with 
a large and interorganizationally embedded board of directors.  Later studies would 
confirm that charitable donations, interlocking directorships, and strategic alliances with 
prestigious partners are also important sources of interorganizational legitimacy (Cohen 
& Dean, 2005; Deeds, Mang, & Frandsen, 2004; Washington, 2004; 2004-05). 
While these sources of legitimacy have their benefits, all three sources share 
interrelated issues.  First, many common sources of legitimacy are themselves an 
organization.  As an example, the AICPA may make decisions on the accounting 
profession but also must seek acceptance from the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) for policies issued (“The Laws that Govern”, 2013).  Media stories 
discussing the legitimacy or de-legitimacy of an organization are produced by 
organizations that themselves are seeking legitimacy in their own right (Hirsch, 1977).  
Therefore, “the granting of legitimacy is as amenable to organizational analysis as is the 
pursuit” (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 56).  Second, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) 
asked if there exists a legitimate source of legitimacy.  To elaborate, Jepperson (1991) 
noted certain crime elements such as fraud, bribery, and political corruption can be 
institutionalized without being legitimate. Within some social systems such as criminal 
cartels or government officials, forms of crime can be accepted as legitimate from a 
pragmatic standpoint due to their usefulness; a cognitive viewpoint because the crime 
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could be taken-for-granted; and even a moral narrative based on a sense of ethical 
permission (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  For example, both Pfizer Pharmaceuticals 
and Johnson & Johnson were forced to pay a combined total of $130 million in fines in 
the United States in 2012 due to participation in a bribery and kickback program in 
foreign countries (Clarke, 2012).  While considered illegal activity in the U.S., many 
foreign countries consider bribery an ethical pursuit d ring business affairs.  Finally, 
there are issues with the nature of legitimacy assessm nt that sources make as to either 
grant or withhold legitimacy.  While Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Galaskiewicz (1985) 
acknowledged the presence of an endorsement can imply su port for legitimacy, this 
explanation does not answer what the absence of an endorsement means for a firm.  As 
an example, an unregistered non-profit organization could possibly be viewed as 
illegitimate within the organizational field that requires non-profit firms to register with 
their respective state and registration is open to all (Baum & Oliver, 1991; 1992). 
Many studies proposed different ways for firms to accrue legitimacy.  Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) suggested the technical efficiency and conformity of institutional myths 
are often precursors to legitimacy.  Deephouse (1996) tested this theory through the 
conformity and efficiency of a bank’s legitimacy through the lens of regulators and their 
interest in the stability in the banking system.  He discovered only conformity had a 
positive effect on an organization’s legitimacy in the eyes of the media since they 
assumed the regulators to both a leader and a recorder f the public’s norms and values 
(Deephouse, 1996).  Glynn and Abzug (2002) also found the conformity in organizational 
names increased the firm’s understandability to a wide range of business and non-
business audiences.  These studies and other similar findings reinforce Suchman’s (1995) 
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belief that the best way for organizations to gain legitimacy is to conform to their 
respective environment.  However, there is a possibility for a firm to earn legitimization 
through manipulation (Suchman, 1995).  As an example, Elsbach (1994) discovered cases 
of firms that failed to incorporate other legitimate organizations or make reference to the 
institutional environment as superior to accounts that deny responsibility.   
While there are substantial benefits to obtaining legitimacy, several researchers 
have also acknowledged potential consequences to it acquisition.  Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) were the first to recognize that the attainme t of legitimacy can enhance an 
organization’s survival.  However, Suchman (1995) argued the strategic view of an 
organization could be manipulated in order to achieve the firm’s desired goals.  
Furthermore, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggested that “legitimacy affects the 
competition for resources” (p. 201).  Several researchers have tested hypotheses that 
predict how various types of legitimacy can affect performance measures such as the 
value of initial public offerings (IPOs) (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Deeds et al., 2004; Higgins 
& Gulati, 2006; Pollock & Rindova, 2003), stock prices (Zuckerman, 2000), stock market 
risk (Zuckerman, 2000), and stakeholder support (Choi & Shepherd, 2005).  Because of 
the potential of consequences, organizations must prepare an effective strategy in order to 
achieve legitimacy. 
Institution 
 Before describing an organizational strategy to attain legitimacy, the dissertation 
must first define an institution and explain the inst tution within the identified research 
setting.  Meyer and Rowan (1977) briefly defined an institution as the adoption of taken-
for-granted rationalized myths.  However, this definition was more of an assumption by a 
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reader than an actual description by Meyer and Rowan (1977) (Greenwood, Oliver, 
Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008).  Thus, the term institution has provided researchers confusion 
to its actual definition leading to several interprtations.  Greenwood et al. (2008) noted 
old institutional theory has referred to institutions as individual organizations such as 
prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages.  Haase and Krücken (2011) 
described a second institution definition used in old institutional theory as sectors.  For 
example, all schools and other organizations related to education would comprise the 
education sector.  Hirsch (1975) provided a third definition for institution as the major 
agencies of the political economy.  For example, th Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are state agencies that 
oversee the pharmaceutical and broadcast industries respectively.  Because of the 
ambiguity of the term institution, several scholars (Greenwood et al., 2008, Haveman & 
David, 2008; Scott, 1995) have requested that institutional theorists develop a universal 
definition of institution which will remove the confusion scholars may have. 
 From this perspective, several researchers establihed new institutional theory that 
has expanded on the definition for the term institution.  According to Greenwood et al. 
(2008) an institution refers to “more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behavior 
that is underpinned by normative systems and cognitive understandings that give 
meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-reproducing social order” (p. 4-5).  
Jennings et al. (2013) defined institution as “the routinized, taken for granted sets of 
ideas, beliefs, and actions used in society, which in ludes both formal and informal 
institutions, and macro and micro institutional patterns” (p. 2).  The importance of these 
definitions in comparison to those prior is that boh Greenwood et al. (2008) and Jennings 
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et al. (2013) incorporate elements from other areas of institutional theory.  Specifically, 
the presence of coercive, mimetic, and normative pressure as well as the desire to achieve 
legitimacy stretches beyond a single firm or entity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977).  This perception leads organizations t  adopt practices society deems as 
taken-for-granted and considers legitimate. 
While both definitions are similar, the present dissertation adopts the Jennings et 
al. (2013) definition due to its identification of macro and micro institutional patterns.  
This term is important as the organizational field identified within this dissertation, 
intercollegiate athletics, encompasses the overall nature of college sports and the firms it 
comprises.  Furthermore, scholars defining an institution within intercollegiate athletics 
have focused mainly on interest-based associations (Wa hington, 2004-05).  This 
definition for an institution within intercollegiate athletics is similar to the Hirsch (1975) 
description of institutions as governing bodies.  However, both Hirsch (1975) and 
Washington (2004-05) definition of an institution limits the taken-for-granted element 
impact provided by society.  Thus, the present dissertation incorporates the definition 
developed by Jennings et al. (2013) and defines an institution within the organizational 
field of intercollegiate athletics as the overall governance of college sports.   
Institutional Strategy 
 Past studies by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Scott (1995) showed one of the 
core insights of institutional theory lies with the d velopment of practices and processes 
for legitimacy within an institution.  Traditionally, many institutional practices were 
adopted by firms based upon external definitions of legitimacy (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  
However, many firms today compete for legitimacy in the marketplace.  Lawrence (1999) 
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refers to this process as institutional strategy.  Specifically, an organization develops 
“patterns of organizational action concerned with the formation and transformation of 
institutions, fields and the rules and standards that control those structures” (p. 167).  
Firms engaged in institutional strategy are not necessarily out to acquire or maintain a 
competitive advantage based on existing structures.  Rather, an organization is more 
concerned with the preservation of institutional stndards and rules in order to gain a 
favorable set of conditions.  Furthermore, institutional strategy requires that firms possess 
the ability “to articulate, sponsor and defend particular practices and organizational forms 
as legitimate or desirable, rather than the ability to enact already legitimized practices or 
leverage existing social rules” (Lawrence, 1999, p. 163).   
 Similar to other forms of organizational strategy, institutional strategies can 
deliberately develop as an intended plan or can occur through happenstance as an 
emergent strategy (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Rerup & Feldman, 2011).  According to 
Quack (2007), a deliberate institutional strategy allows an organization to consciously 
modify its own institutional rules and position in order to position its firm in a favorable 
strategic position.  In comparison, an emergent institutional strategy involves recognition 
of an organizational action pattern that can affect or influence an institutional structure 
while maintaining an association with their goals and objectives (Lawrence, 1999).  
Based on these two rationales, Lawrence (1999) developed two generic institutional 
strategies: 1) initiatives to set membership rules and 2) procedures to establish standards 
of practice (Washington, 2004-05). 
 The need to establish membership rules stem the afor mentioned normative 
pressures of professionalization (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  According to Lawrence 
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(1999), “the empirical phenomenon of professionalization is a member of a larger set of 
strategies that deal with issues of membership and meaning in collectives” (p. 171).  
These membership strategies can include the rules of membership as well as their 
meaning within an institutional community.  Furthermore, the definition of membership 
rules can delineate the exclusionary boundaries of institutional membership and the space 
that members can operate.  As such, it would be the best interests of the association to 
restrict admission to a firm if legitimacy is positively related to the group’s exclusivity.  
Lawrence (1999) noted an organization’s membership rules could be explicit, such as the 
AICPA’s rules for membership (“About the AICPA”, n.d.), or implicit, similar to the 
requirements for joining a fraternity or sorority. 
 In relation to membership strategies, standardization strategies involve the 
institutionalization of practices, products or services based on the assessment of value 
beyond practical ability through social or cultural mechanisms (Selznick, 1996).  These 
plans are focused on “the establishment of technical, legal, or informal standards that 
define what is ‘normal’ for a practice, product, or service, either through regulation (e.g., 
Montagna, 1990; Potter, 2005) or through the enactmen  of less formalized norms or 
standards (e.g., Baron, Dobbin, & Jennings, 1986; Etzion & Ferraro, 2010)” (Lawrence, 
1999, p. 177-178).  The pressures to standardize can often involve the development of 
coercive or mimetic pressures that can force organizations to comply with established 
industrial standards.  As an example, Slack and Hinings (1994) observed that 
governmental agencies and other regulatory bodies can mandate rules and regulations 
that must be followed in order to receive state and federal funding.  The need for external 
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resources can cause firms to immediately adopt the rules prescribed by the leading actors 
within the organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 Many organizations and associations created standardization rules and barriers to 
entry.  Some of the most commonly researched, however, are interest associations 
(Washington, 2004; Washington & Ventresca, 2004).  According to Galvin (2002), 
interest associations “compete over symbolic resources and legitimization (such as 
acceptance by field participants that are needed for membership or survival) more than 
material resources, and therefore, may compete diffrently for environmental resources 
than other organizations” (p. 677).   Furthermore, interest associations are key actors in 
constructing the logics and meanings within an organizational field (Washington, 
Forman, Suddaby, & Ventresca, 2005).  Thus, if a change within the organizational field 
does occur, it is possible that an interest associati n would face the pressure to adopt new 
practices and innovations.  
As time progresses and innovations spread through an organizational field, they 
evolve into a ‘taken-for-granted’ form and are established as acceptable norms 
(Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).  Furthermore, these innovations serve as baselines that 
firms must establish within their organization in order to appear legitimate to others.  The 
established baseline allows for social identities to be created both within an industry and 
among competitors.  Several researchers demonstrated he spread of practices through 
mobility “can shape the composition of fields and fuel path creation by promoting new 
kinds of forms” (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008, p. 664).  However, counter-mobility 
can also be created, causing powerful organizations o limit the impact an innovation has 
on an industry.  Thus, the adoption of new practices s dependent upon a competitor’s 
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ability to mobilize and acquire sufficient resources (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008).  
Due to the power that firms and associations can hold, it is vital for organizations to 
develop a social identity among rivals in order to mimic and/or immobilize the spread of 
a practice. 
Social Identity Theory and Mobility 
According to social identity theory, an individual person can often relate with 
others based on the social characteristics that each person possesses (Tajfel & Turner, 
1985).  Through these characteristics, people will attempt to classify one another into 
various categories defined by prototypical ideals created within society (Turner, 1985).  
Through the classification process, an individual has the opportunity to segment the 
social environment into groups defined by their respective identities.  More importantly, 
this internal division provides the ability to define one’s self within the social 
environment by creating their own personal identity.  This identity is a self-categorization 
that includes one’s personal attributes (e.g., abilities, attributes, psychological traits, 
personal interests) as well as a particular group one has a desire to join (Ashforth & Mael, 
1989).  As such, individuals craft their personal social identity or “self-image derived by 
actors when they categorize themselves as members of a collectivity or occupants of a 
role” (Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003, p.797).  Thus, social identification can be labeled as 
“the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human aggregate” (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989, p. 21).  Through one’s social identity, individuals maintain the ability to 
define themselves based on personal characteristics (Turner, 1982). 
According to Fink, Parker, Brett, and Higgins (2009), individuals will also 
identify with organizations that share the attributes hey assign to their own self-concepts.  
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Mael and Ashforth (1992) noted by recognizing organiz tions with similar 
characteristics, one can often discover a sense of b l ngingness to a group or association.  
As an example, fans of the National Football League’s (NFL) Pittsburgh Steelers are 
typically blue-collar workers and can identify with t e Steelers’ history as a hard-working 
team with a priority on defense (Howard, 2011).  In comparison, individuals who follow 
the NBA’s Los Angeles Lakers enjoy the team’s histor cally flashy nature as well as the 
many celebrity fans who sit at courtside (“Top 10 Celebrity Lakers Fans”, 2007).  By 
associating with a particular group, individuals often perceive that members of the 
organization can interact with fellow members while remaining distinct from members of 
rival firms (Turner, 1985).  In other words, an association’s members can easily identify 
with other individuals they recognize as belonging to (the in-group) while distancing 
themselves from groups in which they do not belong a d consider rivals (the out-group).  
This methodology is further enhanced by the development of positive and negative 
stereotyping between the in-group(s) and the out-group(s) respectively (Washington, 
2004-05). Following the example of the Steelers and the Lakers, the fans of these teams 
distance themselves from fans of the Baltimore Ravens and the Boston Celtics 
respectively due to their perceived differences (Aschburner, 2010; “Steelers-Ravens 
Cream of the Crop”, 2012). Through the creation of rivalry, an organization can establish 
both stability and legitimacy that can be utilized to assess prospective members seeking 
access into the group.   
 Opposed to the individual level, Turner (1982) advanced social identity theory by 
studying how identities could function at the group level.  Specifically, Turner (1982) de-
stigmatized an individual’s behavior in order to enha ce an organization’s shared 
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behavior.  This advancement led to the creation of self-categorization theory, recognizing 
methods where individuals become integrated into groups and explains groups in terms of 
structure and functioning of the social self-concept (Turner, 1985; Turner & Oakes, 
1986).  Furthermore, Turner and Oakes (1986) noted: 
The social identity concept is a specification of that psychological representation 
of the whole and the self-categorization theory offers a detailed predictive 
explanation of just how the feat is accomplished, how individual psychology 
processes can produce more than just individual behavior and how a science of 
the individual need not be individualistic. (p. 250). 
 
In other words, self-categorization evaluates peopl within the group in relation to how 
the group behaves as a whole.  Turner and Oakes (1986) emphasized the advancement of 
social identity theory toward a group dynamic “to demonstrate concretely the predictive 
empirical power of the concept” (p. 242).   
 From this concept, many scholars argued the characteristics of an organization in 
and of itself are a form of social identification si ce firms have a uniqueness that is built 
around certain ideals and characteristics (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Ashforth & Mael, 
1989; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996).  As such, the 
organization potentially molds its own identity through its mission and vision statements 
while also obtaining the characteristics of many memb rs found within the group 
(Ashforth, 2001).  As an example, the overall mission for The Louisiana State University 
(LSU) is “to be a leading research-extensive university, challenging undergraduate and 
graduate students to achieve the highest levels of intellectual and personal development” 
describes an overall organizational identity (“LSU Mission Statement”, 2012, para. 3).  
Similarly, the purpose for The Ohio State University (OSU) is “to advocate the well-
being of the people of Ohio and the global community through the creation and 
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dissemination of knowledge” (“The Ohio State University”, 2013, para. 4).  Both mission 
statements can be further enhanced by the various fac lty and staff hired as well as the 
students enrolled at each respective university through the advancement of research and 
teaching efforts.  This example shows that groups can establish multiple personalities that 
stem from their individual members defined by task interdependencies or shared 
characteristics (Washington, 2004-05).   
Past research has shown that organizations with multiple identities that 
concentrate on the management of one particular identity will establish conflict within the 
organization overall (Pratt & Foreman, 2000).  On the other hand, organizations 
possessing multiple dynamic characteristics can functio  harmoniously when 
organizations belong to either a lower-order or higher-order category that is 
institutionalized in a formal social system and with cross-cutting demographic categories 
(Ashforth, 2001).  Turner (1985) defined cross-cutting groups as a collection of actors 
who are categorized by the same social membership but may not necessarily interact with 
other members.  As an example, Washington (2004-05) identified race as a cross-cutting 
demographic since it can pierce through other social categories such as class and party 
affiliation.  In comparison, both higher-order and lower-order categories are encoded 
social groups that are characterized by distinct roles, interdependencies, and interactions 
(Washington, 2004-05).  An individual from New York City would be a member of a 
lower-order category compared to people from the State of New York or the United 
States.  In terms of a university, faculty members as ociated with a Kinesiology 
Department would be considered a lower-order category while the college it is associated 
with (i.e., College of Education or College of Human Sciences) is a higher-order listing.   
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Nevertheless, the relationship between in-groups and out-groups is bound to cause 
conflict which can result in the possible defection of members (Washington, 2004-05).  
As an example, an in-group member could view the departures of fellow members to a 
rival firm as an issue with the specific association and desire a defection of their own.  
According to Washington (2004-05), “the discrepancy is derived from the fact that the 
focal organization’s identity might be linked to the behavior of a peer (defection from an 
association) that is different from the focal organiz tion’s behavior” (p. 34).  When 
individuals and organizations become engaged in idetity conflict, Rao et al. (2003) 
identified three specific strategies that members can implement when they feel that their 
social identity is threatened.  They termed these strategies social creativity, social change, 
and social mobility.  Social mobility describes an actor’s ability to exit the in-group and 
join an out-group (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000).  Social reativity describes an 
individual’s ability to creatively alter characteristics to make the in-group seen more 
favorably to others.  Finally, social change is defin d as the strategy “where actors 
compete directly with the out-group to alter the relative status of both groups through 
collective action” (Rao et al. 2003, p. 813). 
Of the three strategies, several researchers suggested social mobility strategies are 
preferred when a change in group membership is possible (e.g., Ellemers, Spears & 
Doosje, 1997; Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, & Hodge, 1996).  Social mobility is a form of 
organizational change that utilizes elements from the organization’s environment to 
influence the identity of the organization (Rao, Davis, & Ward, 2000).  Organizations 
considering social mobility face potential threats to their identity that emanate from the 
in-group when fellow members defect to an out-group.  These ties should insulate an 
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organization from the effect of identity-discrepancies but can cause an organization to 
consider enhancing its own identity to match the former in-group member (Rao et al., 
2000).  Thus, any ties between in-group and out-group members as well as defectors 
could exacerbate the effect on identity-discrepancies.  Furthermore, if an organization has 
more ties with out-group members and defectors, there is a greater possibility of a group 
defecting from its in-group, utilizing social mobility as an identity-enhancement strategy 
(Rao et al., 2000). 
According to Taylor and McKirnan (1984), organizations can develop a need to 
associate with institutions that are more prominent and stable.  This movement can be 
conducted in two different forms.  First, organizations requesting membership in a 
particular institution will mold their own personal characteristics to match the current 
members of that institution and disassociate with other organizations that possess their 
former characteristics (Goffman, 1963).  This strategy is primarily conducted by 
organizations formed along linguistic, cultural, and other modifiable dimensions (Hogg & 
Terry, 2000; Taylor & McKirnan, 1984).  Second, organizations can adopt the 
characteristics of the institution’s members while maintaining their prior associations.  
Groups formed on the basis of sex, race, and other inva iant characteristics often engage 
in this type of social mobility (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Taylor & McKirman, 1984). 
Group members can, therefore, utilize defections as an identity-discrepant cue to 
determine if a positive social identity can be maint i ed.  Furthermore, Washington 
(2004-05) suggested “the accumulation of identity-dscrepant cues makes social identity 
salient and activates the concern of decision makers in the focal organization” (p. 36).  In 
other words, decision makers may have to reconsider their institutional strategy and 
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incorporate a defection based-approach on social mobility in order to protect the 
organization’s legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
 According to social identity theory, individuals and organizations characterize 
themselves with other groups based on certain elements that comprise their social identity 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  For colleges and universitie , these identities can range from 
geographic location and proximity to other schools; religious affiliation; private 
classification; and majority composition of student body (Smith et al., 2013; Washington, 
2004; 2004-05).  Through the proper affiliation, an organization can achieve an 
unprecedented level of legitimacy in relation to their competitors.  As an example, the 
Southeastern Conference (SEC) accepted Texas A&M University and the University of 
Missouri from the Big XII Conference (Big XII) into their organization in 2011 (“SEC 
Accepts Missouri”, 2011; “Texas A&M Officially Joins”, 2011).  An organization’s 
affiliation can also cause the diffusion of practices since rival firms will attempt to mimic 
innovations in order to achieve similar success.  Many of these organizations choose to 
conform to their peers due to the societal pressure from within their respective 
organizational field (Oliver, 1997).  The move by the SEC to allow Texas A&M and 
Missouri created a chain reaction among the NCAA conferences competing in the 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) [i.e., the American Atlantic Conference (AAC); the 
Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC); the Big Ten Conference (Big Ten); the Big XII; 
Conference USA (C-USA); the Mid-American Conference (MAC); the Mountain West 
Conference (MWC); the Pacific-12 Conference (PAC-12); and the Sun Belt Conference 
    
46 
 
(Sun Belt)] to consider their own expansion efforts due to the success of the SEC and the 
isomorphic pressures within the organizational field (Williams & Seifried, 2013). 
In essence, as Knoke (1985) noted, legitimacy gives an organization the right to 
exist.  Further, legitimacy is based on the perceived actions of an organization from an 
outside perspective (Suchman, 1995) and viewed as the “social acceptance” by other 
organizations (Yang, Su & Fam, 2012 p. 41).  The ned for social acceptance through 
affiliation also requires organizations to adapt to the technical and societal pressures of an 
organizational field (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008).  Several schools competing in 
intercollegiate sports often feel this pressure to move into higher divisions (i.e., Division I 
Football Championship Subdivision; Division II; Division III) or larger conferences in 
order to obtain social acceptance.  Past examples of NAIA to NCAA movement include 
Northeastern Oklahoma State University, Southeastern Oklahoma State University 
(“SOSU Leaves NAIA For”, 1994), Western Washington U iversity (“Washington 
Colleges Could Leave”, 1991), and the University of Wisconsin of Platteville (Leitner, 
1990).  Movement also occurs within the NCAA itself with the recent examples of the 
University of Utah’s transferring its membership from the MWC to the PAC-12 in 2010 
(“Utah Excited by Pac-10”, 2010), Appalachian State University transitioning from 
Division I FCS to compete in the Sun Belt in 2014 (“Appalachian State to Join”, 2011), 
and the University of New Orleans returning to Divis on I by joining the Southland 
Conference (an FCS conference) in 2013 after an initial drop to Division II (“New 
Orleans to Join”, 2012).   
Furthermore, competition plays a vital role as firms will attempt to acquire 
resources, power, and legitimacy with the hope of becoming the dominant organization 
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within the field (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  The NCAA and the NAIA continually 
viewed each other as competitors and sought numerous ways to attract universities to 
their organization.  One of the ways that organizations attempt this is to mimic society’s 
view of what a legitimate organization is within the specific industry (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).   As firms embrace established ideals and develop an industry’s rationalized 
myths, organizations will face coercive, mimetic and normative pressures to remain more 
homogeneous to other institutional structures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  Both the 
NAIA and the NCAA appear to have faced isometric pressures from one another as well 
as other related organizations within intercollegiate thletics (i.e., the AAU; the AIAW; 
and the U.S.O.C.).  As such, both organizations created policies to encourage schools to 
join their organization such as the addition of HBCUs as full-time members and the 
sponsoring of women’s championships (Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005). 
Organizations faced with the issues of staying institutionalized while also 
attempting to become a legitimate firm may consider nstitutional strategies with preserve 
institutional standards and rules.  A firm developing a new institutional strategy seeks to 
create a new innovation that will allow the organiztion to earn legitimacy within its 
organizational field as well as maintaining a competitiv  advantage over rivals through its 
innovation opposed to existing structures.  Thus, the desire for legitimacy often leads to 
the diffusion of new practices that are validated within the organizational field.  As an 
example, the NAIA’s establishment of the National Invitational Basketball Tournament 
(NIBT) was a means for the organization to maintain its goals of facilitating 
championship play for smaller colleges and universiti s (Stooksbury, 2010).  As the event 
proved successful, the organizational field would then be filled with competitors hosting 
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their own tournaments (i.e., the National Invitational Tournament (NIT) and the NCAA 
University/Division I Men’s Basketball Tournament).   
Organizations also take notice of discrepant cues that impact their respective 
industry.  Washington (2004-05) discussed the impact of defection from an affiliation and 
how a firm’s identity could be impacted.  Defection is an important identity discrepant 
cue for organizations to consider if they fear that a particular affiliation is distorting their 
legitimacy within the organization field.  When organizations are faced with this issue, a 
social mobility strategy may be instituted in order to follow past defectors that share 
similar characteristics to their new affiliation. These specific identities can be cross-
cutting demographic characteristics (Ashforth, 2001; Turner, 1985) or based on higher- 
and lower-order grouping (Washington, 2004-05).  Nevertheless, either identity grouping 
could encourage a firm to join a new affiliation with the hopes of maintaining their own 
social identity and organizational legitimacy.  For the athletic associations, both the 
NAIA and the NCAA marketed their membership efforts toward specific characteristics 
the universities maintained.  As time progressed, both the NCAA and the NAIA would 
share practices and innovations in order to maintain their standing with their competitor 
(e.g., the NIBT and the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament; HBCUs as full members; 
sponsoring women’s championships). This competition led to an altering institutional 
strategy that impacted both membership groups for many years to come. 
As facilitators of governance within intercollegiate athletics, both the NAIA and 
the NCAA altered their institutional strategies based upon measures that society deemed 
legitimate with the goal of attaining new members.  Schools were also influenced by 
defectors that shared characteristics and left one association in the hope of achieving 
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legitimacy.  Much of the decision-making from the associations created a tumultuous 
period for many schools desiring both their legitimacy among their peers but also their 
social identity.  Thus, several schools chose to move from the NAIA to the NCAA based 
on prior defectors leaving the NAIA and/or the overall decline of the NAIA (Washington, 
2004-05).  In addition, many schools believed a move t  a new association would create 
an increase in student applications as well as increased exposure for the university’s 
brand (Dwyer, Eddy, Havard, & Braa, 2010; Weaver, 2010).  As such, NAIA members 
were enticed to join the NCAA due to the perceived alue derived from prior defectors 
and societal views.  These views were derived from the NCAA’s changes to its 
institutional strategy inviting schools traditionally identified through NAIA 
characteristics as well as the benefits received by current NCAA members.  
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Chapter 3 – The Novelty of College Movement 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the methodological basis for university 
movement into a new athletic association.  First, the chapter will analyze previous college 
movement studies that were based on social mobility and legitimacy and address their 
limitations with respect to determining the quantitative benefits of measuring freshmen 
applications.  This discussion will be followed by a discussion of prior research on the 
Flutie Effect and its’ impact on applications through athletic success.  Many of the 
studies focused on this phenomenon narrowly focus on an athletic contest or 
championship as a basis for research.  This focus limits the possibility of events outside 
of competition that may impact applications.  Finally, this chapter will discuss the 
similarities between the diffusion of university movement from the NAIA to the NCAA 
and the diffusion of stadium construction in order to establish legitimacy and a social 
identity as framed in the previous chapter. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, social mobility reviews po sible determinants of 
movement from one group to another group (Smith, Williams, Soebbing, & Washington, 
2013). Inter-group movement can cause damages to the status of remaining group 
members due to the visibility that comes with social mobility (Greve, 1995). As a result, 
Rao et al. (2000) stated defections by in-group members to out-groups who share similar 
identities create a discrepancy between an organization’s need for positive social identity 
and the realities of the world.  Furthermore, decision makers of an organization are likely 
to believe their affiliation with the in-group is in jeopardy as well as the organization’s 
own social identity.  When faced with this threat, an organization’s leadership often relies 
on certain identity-discrepant cues which assist decision makers as to whether to leave an 
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in-group for an out-group (Washington, 2004-05).  The firm’s response to these cues is 
likely to be affected by its ties to in-group and out-group members as well as the 
affiliations of defectors to in-group members and the organization (Rao et al., 2000). 
College Movement 
Washington (2004) utilized the concepts from Rao et al. (2000) to explore the 
evolution of the NCAA in response to the organizational field changes caused by the 
NAIA.  Specifically, Washington (2004) noted the NCAA adopted the “Sanity Codes” 
and reorganized to create the College Division in order to contend with the increasing 
presence of the NAIA.  As such, Washington (2004) separated the NCAA based on two 
periods: (1) the Emergence and Dominance of the NCAA (1906-1952) and (2) the 
Institutional Strategy of the NCAA (1952-2004).  These designations were vital to the 
study as Washington (2004) hypothesized the NCAA focused on specific schools for 
membership prior to 1952, allowing the NAIA to thrive.  The specific school 
characteristics were designated based on identifiers such as liberal arts colleges, HBCUs, 
and teachers’ colleges.  In order to test his hypothesis, Washington (2004) conducted a 
longitudinal logistic regression analysis of 549 colleges, representing the population of 
schools founded prior to 1905. According to the results, Washington (2004) argued that, 
before 1952, schools classified as liberal arts schools, HBCUs, and teachers’ colleges 
were less likely to make a transition to the NCAA because of the NCAA’s decision to 
rank these institutions as lower-order organizations.  However, after 1952, colleges with 
these designations transitioned into the NCAA after th  creation of the College Division 
and a small college tournament.   
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Washington (2004-05) expands on this work where he hypothesized that “prior 
defectors belonging to lower-order categories and cross-cutting social categories 
simultaneously increase the probability that the focal organization will join the rival 
group” (p. 37).  From a higher education perspectiv, colleges and universities often 
categorize themselves with other institutions (i.e., public/private, religious affiliation, size 
or enrolment) to compete for state and federal funding (Liefner, 2003). Ashforth and 
Mael (1989) identified this tactic as “fruitful applications to organizational behavior” (p. 
20) as it incorporates individual ideals into organiz tional virtues of social identity theory 
progressed by Tajfel (1978, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1985) and Turner (1975, 1982, 1984, 
1985) with stronger purpose towards the organization.  Washington (2004-05) reviewed 
the status of 500 colleges and universities that were members of the NAIA from 1973 to 
1999 and conducted a logistic regression to determine if social identities influence 
college movement.  Of the 500 colleges, 255 schools cho e to leave the NAIA for the 
NCAA (Washington, 2004-05).  According to the result , Washington (2004-05) 
suggested that “multiple social identities can be simultaneously salient” (p. 48).  
Specifically, his analysis proved that schools within a particular NAIA athletic 
conference did transition to the NCAA following a fellow NAIA school as well as 
schools classified as HBCUs.  In addition, the study also noted that schools that 
maintained large student populations and offered more sports programs were more likely 
to relocate to the NCAA. 
Smith et al. (2013) expanded on the Washington (2004-05) study by addressing 
two of its limitations.  First, Washington (2004-05) only reviewed the movement of 
NAIA member schools as of 1973 without consideration of schools that became NAIA 
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members after 1973.  More importantly, however, wasthe instability and definition of 
conference association, an identity that Washington (2004-05) utilized for concentrated 
geographic areas.  According to Smith et al. (2013), conference affiliation “does not 
account for various geographical factors that may influence the choice that universities 
can make to move associations” (p. 24).  Thus, instead of conference affiliation, Smith et 
al. (2013) examined each NAIA member’s geographical region based on the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) classifications in an effort to evaluate the 
decision to conduct social mobility. Smith et al. (2013) also incorporated other social 
identities such as women’s institution designation, religious affiliation, and the Carnegie 
Foundation size classification (i.e., very small, small, medium, or large college).  The 
results show schools located in the New England and Rocky Mountain regions would be 
more likely change affiliations when similar institu ons within close proximity decide to 
change.  These results reflect the sentiment shared by Northeastern Oklahoma State 
University (NOSU) and Southeastern Oklahoma State University (SOSU), who 
transitioned to the NCAA after other schools in their r gion also moved (“SOSU Leaves 
NAIA For”, 1994).  On the other hand, institutions i  the Southeast and Mideast regions 
would be less likely to change affiliations.  Finally, schools with a religious affiliation, 
designated as women’s institutions, or classified as a small or medium school would also 
be more likely to move to the NCAA. 
Smith (2011) studied nine universities moving from the NAIA to the NCAA 
based on an organization’s archetype, or the description of the meaning of an 
organization (Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Ranson, Hinings, & Greenwood, 1980).  
Through qualitative analysis, Smith (2011) discovered several institutions on a 
    
54 
 
reorientation organizational track chose to leave the NAIA due to its deteriorating 
reputation.  Smith (2011) explained these schools maintained a ‘schizoid’ position with 
regard to athletic affiliation due to their fears of the NAIA label.  Hingins and Greenwood 
(1988) described the ‘schizoid’ position as an organiz tion adopting two different design 
structures but having no clear conclusion as to which structure to choose.  In addition, 
several of the university officials claimed branding was a significant piece to leaving the 
NAIA for the NCAA.  The decision makers from these universities noted the NCAA 
brand created additional opportunities for the recruiting of institutions considering a 
move to the NCAA as many potential recruits appeared to be unaware of the NAIA.  
Smith (2011) argued university officials believed a move to the NCAA will establish 
legitimacy for the school while also increasing student enrollment.  This analysis echoes 
the remarks made by William Jewell College President David Sallee and Azusa Pacific 
University Athletic Director Bill Odell when both institutions chose to relocate to the 
NCAA in 2011 after many years as NAIA members (Palmer, 2011).   
Interestingly, several studies discovered such perceived benefits may not be 
realized with a move to the NCAA.  Tomasini (2005) examined the economic differences 
that may occur following a reclassification from eith r Division II or Division III to 
Division I-AA.  The study analyzed 27 institutions that reclassified to Division I from 
1993 to 1999 and reviewed if the university received higher donations to the university 
general fund; higher attendance at home football games; higher freshman applications; 
and higher undergraduate enrollment.  According to Tomasini (2005), the reclassification 
effort did not result in a significant positive increase in any of these areas in the first three 
years following a university’s reclassification.  In addition, the study also suggested that 
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“schools that reclassified to Division I-AA remained similar to schools in Divisions II 
and III in the variables studied” (Tomasini, 2005, p. 14).   
Frieder (2007) conducted a study on schools reclassifying from either Division I-
AA (now Division I-FCS) to Division I-A (now Division I-FBS) or from Division II to 
Division I-AA.  From 1993 to 2003, 11 institutions made the transition from the FCS to 
the FBS and 18 schools moved from Division II to Division I-FCS.  According to Frieder 
(2007), many of these schools considered reclassification due to three perceived benefits: 
(1) an increase in overall revenue; (2) an increase in applications, academic pool, and 
greater diversity; and (3) an increase in reputation and prestige, “as the perceived quality 
of an institution’s academic program is often tied to the success on its athletics program” 
(p. 7).  The study collected financial data from each institution that reclassified from the 
NCAA Archives as well as the annual Graduation Rate Report and the annual Equity in 
Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA) data.  Frieder (2007) showed revenues did increase for 
each institution, but the increase was offset by a substantial increase in expenses and 
creating a net loss after reclassification.  Division II schools moving to Division I-FCS 
saw a greater financial net loss than school moving from the FCS to the FBS.  Finally, 
Frieder (2007) could not suggest a considerable measur ment for nonfinancial benefit 
from reclassification. 
Dwyer et al. (2010) studied the strategic management d cisions and stakeholder 
perceptions of a university reclassifying from Divis on II to Division I through a mixed-
methodological case study.  The Dwyer et al. (2010) study utilized a medium-sized 
public university with approximately 12,500 total students located in the Rocky Mountain 
Region of the U.S. that made the transition to Division I in 2002.  Data was collected 
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from undergraduate students and alumni through questionnaires and semi-structured 
interviews.  According to the interviews, the administrators of the university cited the 
chance to increase revenue, exposure, fan support, and admissions were the perceived 
benefits to be gained with reclassification.  However, the athletic department saw a 
budget deficit from 2004 to 2006 because of the increased expenses.  The university did 
enjoy a gain in attendance from 2002 to 2005, but this was followed by three years of 
decline.  Dwyer et al. (2010) concluded the results of the quantitative analysis showed 
that both current students and alumni have an apathetic to slightly favorable opinion of 
the athletic department and its move to Division I athletics. 
Weaver (2010) similarly conducted a case study to study the reclassification 
efforts of two institutions: (1) the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG), a 
large public university; and (2) Elon University, a small private college.  UNCG moved 
from Division III to Division I in 1991, while Elon University transitioned from the 
NAIA to Division II to Division I in 1997 (Weaver, 2010).  Both of these schools were 
chosen for this study due to four factors: (1) both universities were located in North 
Carolina; (2) many decision makers involved in the transition are still with their 
respective university; (3) both schools have been in Division I for more than five years; 
and (4) up to 20 years of historical data on reclassification could be obtained for each 
school.   
Through a historical analysis of documents as well as semi-structured interviews, 
Weaver (2010) adopted a case study methodology as well as Pettigrew’s (1987) 
contextualist model of change to analyze the impact that reclassification had on the 
university.  Pettigrew (1987) noted that change incorporates the process, content, and 
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context and should be studied as a “multilevel analysis” over a long period of time (p. 
51).  According to Weaver (2010), both UNCG and Elon administrators believed the 
transition to Division I would establish legitimacy for each respective institution.  
However, UNCG’s move to Division I was not as beneficial as decision makers hoped in 
1991.  Specifically, many critics of the move still found it to be controversial and debate 
the decision to this day.  In comparison, Elon University officials felt the move to 
Division I would alter the university’s identity inrelation to its peers.  Fortunately, the 
transition to Division I helped Elon become one of the “best private schools along the 
Eastern seaboard” (Keller, 2004, p. 2). 
These studies on college movement all highlight the rationale as to why 
administrators consider a reclassification effort.  Many officials believe movement to a 
higher division or better athletic association will improve the university’s identity among 
its peers, as an athletic department is viewed as a medium for attracting recognition both 
locally and nationally (Dwyer et al., 2010).  Specifically, “proponents of intercollegiate 
athletics assert a symbiotic relationship exists bewe n athletics and academics, with 
universities benefitting economically by participation in intercollegiate athletics” 
(Tomasini, 2005, p. 9).  As such, the university should see increases in alumni donations, 
attendance at sporting events, public perception and prestige, and visibility (Beyer & 
Hannah, 2000; Goff, 2000; Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).  In addition to sport related 
benefits, university officials expect to see a signif cant increase in applications because of 
the increased exposure related to the reclassification efforts. 




 As noted earlier, university officials view intercollegiate athletics as a vehicle of 
promotion for their university (Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010).  They believed a 
successful sports program is beneficial to the univers ty because it can increase alumni 
donations, game attendance, gate receipts, and student applications and enrollment 
(Eitzen, 1997; Tomasini, 2005).  In regards to student applications and enrollment, 
university officials base a potential increase on the actual increase that Boston College 
(BC) saw in 1985.  During the 1984 football season, the BC Golden Eagles would finish 
with a record of nine wins and two losses and compete in the Cotton Bowl against the 
University of Houston (“1984 Boston College Eagles”, 2010; Sami, 1985).  However, BC 
earned acclaim on a national level as the university had nine of its games broadcasted on 
national television (Oslin, 2004).  One specific contest presented BC as a national 
university when it competed against the University of Miami on November 23, 1984 
(Oslin, 2004).  The game was highly competitive andwas decided on a last-second Hail 
Mary pass from Golden Eagles Quarterback Doug Flutie to Wide Receiver Gerard Phelan 
(“College football’s best”, 2002; Hansen, 2011; McDonald, 2003).  Based on the team’s 
success and national exposure, Flutie was able to capture multiple individual player 
honors including the coveted Heisman Trophy (Battist , 2006; Sami, 1985).   
After Flutie graduated from college, BC saw a significant increase (i.e., 30%) in 
freshman applications over the next two years (Marklein, 2001).  According to Tomasini 
(2005), college administrators from across the country believed the increase was directly 
related to the success of the BC football team.  Since many scholars consider the success 
of the athletic program as a form of advertising, the increase enjoyed by BC has been 
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effectively called the “Flutie Effect” (Castle & Kostelnik, 2011; Collins, 2012; Hansen, 
2011; Litan, Orszag, & Orszag, 2003).  While this effect is named after Flutie, the 
rationale behind the trend can be traced back to 1901, when admission trends were 
affected by athletic contest results between Harvard and Yale (Clotfelter, 2011).   
More recent examples of the Flutie Effect have alsobeen claimed.  In 1995, for 
instance, the Northwestern University Wildcats football team would win the Big Ten 
Conference championship and attend the Rose Bowl for the first time in 47 years versus 
the University of Southern California (USC) Trojans (Friend, 1996).  While the Wildcats 
would fall to the Trojans (41 to 32) (“High Scoring Bowls”, 1996), Northwestern 
experienced a 30 percent increase in applications in 1997 (Selingo, 1997).  In 2005, 
George Mason University was chosen as for an at-large selection for the NCAA Division 
I Men’s Basketball Tournament as an eleventh seed prior to advancing to the Final Four 
(“Florida’s Outside Shooting”, 2006; “Larranaga Signs Extension Through”, 2006).  
According to Baker (2008), George Mason saw a 10 percent increase in freshman 
applications in 2006, with 17 percent from students from out-of-state, and a 40 percent 
boost in out-of-state applications in 2007.  Finally in 2010 and 2011, Butler University 
advanced to the national championship game in the Division I Men’s Basketball 
Tournament (Dosh, 2012).  According to Dosh (2012), Butler experienced a 41 percent 
increase in applications after the 2010 tournament.  As the phenomenon between athletic 
success and an applications increase became apparent, Tomasini (2005) noted the need to 
create a successful athletic program explains why university stakeholders desire to place 
their school in the best possible position to receive these benefits.  Arguably, this 
rationale could explain the efforts by many universitie  considering reclassification.   
    
60 
 
The seminal work on the Flutie Effect can be traced to McCormick and Tinsley 
(1987).  The study analyzed if the presence of big-time athletics had an impact on the 
academic quality of incoming freshman.  To properly measure academic quality, the 
researchers utilized Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) for students applying to college in 
1971.  The study analyzed 150 schools based on the status of their athletic program and 
conference association.  Specifically, McCormick and Tinsley (1987) designated schools 
from the ACC, SEC, Southwestern Conference (SWC), Big Ten, Big Eight Conference, 
PAC-10 and schools considered as a major independent (i.e., the University of Notre 
Dame; the University of Pittsburgh; and The Pennsylvania State University) as big-time 
athletic schools (n = 63).  The results showed high profile athletic schools saw a 3 percent 
increase in the average SAT scores for entering freshman in comparison to the other 
schools in the study.  In addition, McCormick and Tinsley (1987) noted schools with a 
high winning percentage among their conference rivals will marginally increase the 
average SAT scores for incoming students. 
While McCormick and Tinsley (1987) reviewed the quality of applications, they 
also noted increases in the quantity of out-of-state resident applications for schools were 
identified by division level.  Utilizing human migration theories, Mixon and Hsing (1994) 
measured potential determinants for students to enrll i  institutions outside of their state 
of residence.  The study analyzed several characteristics of universities including the total 
enrollment of the university, the non-resident tuition expense, the institution entrance 
difficulty, and the division of NCAA athletic participation.  Using a tobit regression 
model of 220 institutions in 1990, Mixon and Hsing (1994) noted participation in big-
time athletics (i.e. Division I-FBS; Division I-FCS; Division I) attracts more non-resident 
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students than any other NCAA division or athletic association. Mixon and Ressler (1995) 
expanded this research by analyzing 156 NCAA Division I schools participating in the 
Men’s Basketball tournament from 1978 to 1992.  After controlling for similar variables 
as Mixon and Hsing (1994), Mixon and Ressler (1995) found that, for the schools that 
participated in the Division I basketball tournament would receive an increase of out-of-
state applications of approximately 6 percent for each round a university advances in the 
tournament. 
Murphy and Trandel (1994) also considered athletic success but instead of 
basketball, football records were analyzed.  Specifically, their study analyzed schools 
who competed in Division I football and who were members of one of the six major 
conferences from 1978 to 1987: (1) the ACC; (2) the Big Eight; (3) the Big Ten; (4) the 
PAC-10; (5) the SEC; and (6) the SWC.  These confere ces contained a total of 55 
schools.  The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model in this study utilized 
variables to measure the number of freshman applications received based on the within-
conference winning percentage of a university’s football team.  Other variables controlled 
for included the number of high school graduates in an institution’s state; the per capita 
income of an institution’s state; the cost of tuition; and the average salary paid to a 
university’s full professors (lagged for one year).  The model also contained fixed effects 
to capture unmeasurable university characteristics that did not change during the years 
analyzed.  According to the results, for each 25 percent increase in winning percentage 
among football conference opponents, the university would receive a 1.3 percent increase 
in freshman applications (Murphy & Trandel, 1994).  In other words, universities playing 
    
62 
 
in one of the six major conferences will play approximately eight conference games each 
year and will see a slight increase in freshman applications for each win they secure.   
Instead of regular season victories, Toma and Cross (1998) analyzed the effect 
winning a national championship in football or men’s basketball has on the quantity of 
undergraduate applications received by a Division I institution.  The study reviewed 
application data for 11 different institutions that won the Men’s Basketball Championship 
and 13 institutions that won the Football National Title from 1979 to 1992.  For each of 
these schools, admissions data were collected for the three years before the national 
championship season and three years after the championship season (Toma & Cross, 
1998).  Of the 16 national championships acquired in football during the sample period, 
14 showed an increase in the number of applications, seven saw an increase of 10 percent 
or more, and two schools (i.e., University of Miami (FL) in 1987 and the Georgia 
Institute of Technology in 1990) had an increase of 20 percent or more.  In addition, 14 
of the 16 schools maintained their application increase over three years, with 13 
experiencing an increase of 7 percent or more (Toma & Cross, 1998).  Only the 
University of Alabama (1979) and Clemson University (1981) did not see a significant 
improvement in admissions after winning a football n tional title immediately or three 
years after.  For basketball national championships, only two schools (i.e., the University 
of Michigan in the Fall 1990 admission cycle; Georgetown University in the Fall 1985 
admission cycle) saw an application increase of over 10 percent the year after the 
championship season.  However, three years after a championship proved to increase the 
number of applications for 10 of the 13 schools (Toma & Cross, 1998). 
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Mixon, Trevino, and Minto (2004) revisited the relationship between SAT scores 
and college football success by replicating Murphy and Trandel’s (1994) study with an 
updated data series on football winning percentages from 1990 to 2000 and the median 
SAT score of a university’s 2001 freshman class.  The schools included in this sample (n 
= 68) were from the ACC, Big Ten, Big XII, Big East, C-USA, MWC, PAC-10, and SEC 
conferences as well as the University of Notre Dame. Th  model utilized by Mixon, 
Trevino, and Minto (2004) is similar to Murphy and Trandel’s (1994) model, but includes 
variables to determine the percentage of faculty holding a Ph.D. degree and a private 
school designation.  The results of the model supported the findings of McCormick and 
Tinsley (1987), Murphy and Trandel (1994), and the viewpoint of college administrators 
(Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010).  Specifically, “by succeeding on the playing field, a 
university is able to increase the quality of its incoming freshman class (i.e., increase 
median SAT scores)” (Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004, p. 423).    
Instead of focusing on one specific sport, Pope and Pope (2009) showed success 
in multiple sports could increase applications and e rollment for a university.  In 
addition, this study analyzed enrollment data over 20 years, nearly double the time period 
most other studies have analyzed.  To measure the athletic success in football, Pope and 
Pope (2009) collected the Associated Press (AP) college football rankings for teams 
finishing in the top 20.  For basketball, the study based success on a team’s qualification 
to the NCAA Men’s Basketball Tournament, advancement to the Sweet Sixteen and Final 
Four, and winning the national championship.  In terms of collegiate data, the researchers 
obtained college-level data from the Thomson Corporati n, the publishers of Peterson’s 
Guide to Four Year Colleges, on 332 schools that participated in Division I basketball or 
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Division I-FBS football from 1983 to 2002.  Other variables collected include the average 
nine-month full-time professor salary and total annual cost of attendance at each school.  
Finally, SAT scores were derived from the College Board’s Test-Takers Database, an 
SAT score database.  Pope and Pope (2009) found the long term success football and 
basketball teams increases the quantity of applications to a school by 2 to 8 percent for 
Top 20 football schools and Top 16 basketball schools.  In addition, the study also noted 
private schools saw a two to four time increase in application rates after sports success 
compared (Pope & Pope, 2009).  Furthermore, applications received by the institutions 
are comprised of both low and high SAT scoring students, providing the potential for 
schools to improve their admission results (Pope & Pope, 2009). 
Hansen (2011) argued the increase in national media exposure and athletic 
success would have a significant impact on both recruiting and enrollments for colleges.  
To review this phenomenon, Hansen (2011) analyzed Texas Tech University in 2008 
during one of its most successful football seasons as a setting for the study.  The Red 
Raiders finished the season with an 11 win and 2 loss record and qualified for the AT&T 
Cotton Bowl Classic against the University of Mississippi (“2008 Texas Tech Red 
Raiders”, 2010).  Similar to BC, Texas Tech had a dramatic last-second victory over rival 
and the top ranked football team in the nation, the University of Texas at Austin (Hansen, 
2011). 
 Hansen (2011) conducted a qualitative study with the utilization of questionnaires 
to 75 students that were first enrolled at Texas Tech University from 2009 to the fall of 
2010.  In addition, the study acquired enrollment application data from 2007 to the fall of 
2010 to assess any trends.  Participants were asked to discuss the factors that played a 
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role in their college choice decisions.  According to the results, students attending Texas 
Tech were influenced by other factors (i.e., academic programs, academic reputation, and 
campus facilities) as opposed to the successful 2008 football season.  However, 
approximately 33 percent of respondents noted that iconic athletic moments helped with 
their decision to apply to the university.  Finally, 43 percent of survey respondents noted 
a positive influence of having a Division I athletics program and 25 percent by having a 
winning football team (Hansen, 2011).  Hansen (2011) concluded that collegiate athletic 
success has an effect on the college choice decisions of students but not a significantly 
larger role than traditional college choice factors. 
To this point, many of the studies conducted on the pot ntial of the Flutie Effect 
centered on the success of Division I schools.  It was not until Castle and Kostelnik 
(2011) and Krenz (2011) that research would be conducte  on programs from other 
NCAA divisions.  Castle and Kostelnik (2011) investiga ed the impact athletic success 
has on the quantity of freshman applications and the quality of enrolled freshmen at 14 
Division II institutions.  The 14 schools utilized in this study were associated with the 
Pennsylvania State Athletic Conference (PSAC) from 1995 to 2004.  The schools were 
studied based on their success for the Sports Academy Directors’ Cup, which is awarded 
to the university in each NCAA Division as well as the NAIA that exhibits the highest 
overall intercollegiate athletic success by the National Association of Collegiate Directors 
of Athletics (NACDA), and the Dixon Trophy, which is similar to the Sports Academy 
Directors Cup but only awarded to a school in the PSAC (Castle & Kostelnik, 2011).  
Following a similar model as Murphy and Trandel (1994), this study indicated a strong 
correlation between overall athletic success and the quantity of freshmen applicants.  
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Specifically, the rankings of the 14 universities in the Dixon Cup Standings showed that 
applications did increase for the higher ranked schools.   
Similar to Hansen (2011), Krenz (2011) studied the impact of winning a Division 
II national championship in football at the University of Minnesota-Duluth (UMD) in 
Duluth, Minnesota.  In 2008 and 2010, the UMD Bulldogs captured its first two national 
championships in football, defeating Northwest Missouri State University in 2008 (21 to 
14) and Delta State University in 2010 (20 to 17) (Luther, 2011; “Minnesota-Duluth 
Wins First”, 2008).  Krenz (2011) conducted a qualitative study to obtain the opinions, 
beliefs, and understandings of employees of UMD.  The staff members were asked 
questions related to the 2008-09 football season in order to gather information and 
perceptions on how success in sport affects the university and its stakeholders.  The 
Chancellor of the university, Head Coach of the football program, Athletic Director, 
Assistant Athletic Director, Head Athletic Trainer, an Admissions Officer, and an 
Academic Officer were the seven university staff memb rs interviewed.  According to 
their comments, the staff members agreed a national championship changes the 
perception and belief of the campus and students ca be recruited and acquired easier 
(Krenz, 2011).  Furthermore, the respondents noted th  exposure on a national stage for 
football helped create publicity for the university as a whole. 
While much research on the Flutie Effect was conducted within the last 30 years, 
many studies only analyzed a successful athletic program based on individual and team 
results.  Although the basis of the phenomenon is derived from on-the-field or on-the-
court success, an athletic department can achieve succe s in a multitude of ways.  
According to Collins (2012), “an institution’s decision to implement an athletics strategy 
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generally represents some form of organizational chnge: change in the structure of the 
athletics department (e.g., staffing and sport sponorship), change in conference 
membership, or change in the level of athletics competition (p. 4).  The decisions made 
for these specific changes can affect stakeholders of the university as well as create 
significant consequences on organizational culture, institutional mission, and academic 
reputation (Collins, 2012).   
Although the Flutie Effect may be limited in this respect, many scholars have 
established variations of this methodology to analyze the effects of other phenomenon.  
One of the most common areas studied under this methodology is the increase of 
professional sport game attendance after the construction of a new stadium.  This 
phenomenon is known as the Novelty Effect and is analyzed from an event study 
standpoint within economic literature (e.g., Clapp & Hakes, 2005; Coates & Humphreys, 
2005; Leadley & Zygmont, 2006; McEvoy, Nagel, DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005; Noll, 
1974).  While the seminal work on the Novelty Effect was prepared by Noll (1974), 
Coates and Humphreys (1999) introduced the age of the stadium in the current year as 
well as a dummy variable for the first ten years a team has occupied the new stadium to 
measure the actual length of a Novelty Effect.  These dummy variables would be altered 
to capture each year within the first ten years (i.e., Year One variable, Year Two variable, 
etc.) (Coates & Humphreys, 2005).  Although the use of age variables is not unique to 
Novelty Effect studies, the present dissertation argues the measurement of age utilized by 
Coates and Humphreys (2005) can capture a Reclassific tion Effect for athletic 
association affiliation through the length of NCAA membership. 




University officials may operate under the belief that athletic association 
reclassification can improve the legitimacy of the university and attract high school 
graduates to apply and enroll at their institution.  Past research demonstrated that certain 
social characteristics will increase the probability of a school transitioning to the NAIA to 
the NCAA (Smith et al., 2013; Washington, 2004-05).  However, these studies only 
considered a general move to the NCAA and a specific D vision transition.  Many 
university officials consider the general NCAA’s branding and outreach opposed to the 
specific divisional level as beneficial to the insttution (Dwyer et al., 2010; Smith, 2011; 
Weaver, 2010).  Specifically, university officials proclaimed a move to the NCAA will 
increase their legitimacy and identity among other institutions in order to attract new 
students (Keller, 2004; Smith, 2011; Weaver, 2010).  However, minimal work examines 
the quantity and duration of this possible benefit.  Therefore, this dissertation examines a 
university’s movement from the NAIA to the NCAA and its potential effects on the 
university.  This study utilizes an econometric model mirroring specific variables utilized 
in past Flutie Effect and Novelty Effect studies to determine the longevity of a 
Reclassification Effect on applications based upon a social mobility strategy to improve a 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine a university’s movement from the 
NAIA to the NCAA and its potential effects on the university.  In order to study this 
phenomenon, this dissertation first provides a historical analysis of the NAIA since its 
inception in 1937 to the present day.  Next, the dissertation explores the likelihood of 
university movement from the NAIA to the NCAA Division II or Division III based upon 
a university’s social identities through a logistic regression model.  Finally, the present 
work incorporates both Flutie Effect and some novelty ffect methodology to create a 
Reclassification Effect model to determine if an increase in applications can be achieved 
based upon an athletic association reclassification. 
Historical Research Design 
This dissertation utilizes a historical analysis developed by Booth (2005) and 
Seifried (2010) to help understand the membership history of the NAIA from 1936 to 
2012 for better comprehension regarding a potential Reclassification Effect.  Step one of 
the historical research method required the pursuit and acquisition of those documents 
and artifacts connected to this time period (i.e., 1936 to 2012).  Within reasonable limits, 
a wide range of primary sources and secondary sources were collected.  Primary 
documents used to support the pursuit of organization l legitimacy by the NAIA included 
NAIA yearbooks, reports, letters or correspondence with organizational officials, and 
items from the NAIA News.  
Secondary sources incorporated into this review included a variety of history 
books, academic articles, reviews of research, and newspaper articles from national 
media publications such as The New York Times, Kansas City Star, Christian Science 
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Monitor, and St. Petersburg Times in addition to a variety of other local newspapers.  
Media publications are important because Baum and Powell (1995) highlighted the media 
as one agent because of their ability to comment publicly on organizations and their 
practices as being with or against social norms. Negative coverage or promotion possibly 
may signal a lack of merit regarding the organization’s actions toward their strategic 
objections (Drori & Honig, 2013) as well as the organization not becoming socially 
accepted and possibly on par with industry peers (Baum & Powell, 1995; Deephouse & 
Suchman, 2008).  Finally, Deephouse and Suchman (2008) argued the media is 
frequently believed to be a legitimate source of information.  Important media such as 
major newspapers and television networks are frequently targeted and solicited by 
organizations as a strategy to provide them help when maintaining or establishing 
legitimacy (Boyle, 2001). Overall, every attempt was made to collect data from those 
secondary sources utilizing primary sources; further, a wide range of sources is presented 
because all accounts must remain suspect until corrob ated by other sources.  
Step two calls for an historical criticism to test the reliability of sources and 
compare observations.  Step two certifies the authenticity of primary and secondary 
sources towards the preparation of accurate conclusions.  The historical criticism is 
necessary because it serves to establish the credibility of sources both internally and 
externally to help avoid selection and use of some data to favor a specific hypothesis. 
Internally, the dissertation addressed the accuracy of the data collected and looked for 
gaps in the provided explanations.  The internal criticism also attempted to consider the 
author or speaker’s intended audience and his/her reputation as an expert or non-expert.  
The external criticism involved examining how the primary and secondary sources 
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collected their information and if that information appeared falsified in any way.  In 
essence, the dissertation sought to establish reliability and validity through asking 
questions such as: 1) who created the source; 2) their relationship to the information 
presented; 3) and how the information was collected.  Checks for trustworthiness also 
occurred through examining the authenticity of documents.  As an example, the 
dissertation analyzed the date of work and the temporal arrangement of events presented 
in the sources used.  Reliability also received attention from attempts to choose 
documents/documentation as close to the event(s) as possible. Finally, the dissertation 
looked to see if local or national social, economic, religious, and political conditions 
prejudiced the information used.  
The dissertation followed step two by analyzing andinterpreting the evidence 
collected in order to establish a relationship betwe n the NAIA membership history and a 
larger theme or themes found which focused on organizational legitimacy.  The 
dissertation sought to prevent a poor logical analysis through categorizing data and 
embracing the constructionist approach as their epist mology.  Booth (2005) described 
constructionists as seeking to analyze patterns, trends, and other events through history to 
construct an ‘informed’ narrative regarding a phenomenon, organization, or individual.  
Further, as constructionists, the dissertation organized a narrative through embracing the 
“concepts and theories of others as tools to propose and explain relationship between 
events” (Booth, 2005, p. 6). To aid, a detailed outline and timeline was prepared to 
identify, organize, and criticize the various interconnecting themes emerging from the 
topic in the fourth and final step.  An ex post facto interpretive lens was used to consider 
how the NAIA took the path that it did and that theoretical lens, unveiled itself to be 
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concentrating on organizational legitimacy through the various institutional strategies 
employed. 
Model One Research Design 
To investigate the effect a university’s social identities have on the likelihood of 
university movement, this dissertation will examine th  initial movement of schools from 
the NAIA to the NCAA.  NAIA membership will be examined from 1973 to 2012.  This 
time period is particularly useful since it encompasses the NCAA reorganizational effort 
to create Divisions II and III (Falla, 1981).  If a school decides to reclassify into another 
NCAA division, return to the NAIA or another athletic association, or drop its athletic 
program altogether, the school will be removed from the sample.  Smith, Soebbing, and 
Washington (in press) noted schools associated with the NAIA shared many similarities 
with schools aligned with Division II and III.  In addition, Divisions II and III are 
considered since many schools were enticed by the NCAA financial support (“Football 
Telecasts and Revenue Spread Wide”, 1976; Washington, 2004-05). Division I is not 
considered because of the lack of similarities betwe n NAIA member schools and 
Division I schools.  The annual membership records for the sample years were obtained 
directly from the NAIA.1  University identities such as location, public/private 
distinction, HBCU designation, women’s college designation, religious affiliation, and 
revenue generating sport offerings were collected from the various university websites 
                                                 
1 Smith et al. (2013) collected the membership list from Chad Waller and the NAIA 
Membership Services Department.  This dissertation utilized the same list and would like 
to thank Mr. Waller and his staff for their help in providing the NAIA membership for 
the time period. 
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and other university publications (e.g., yearbooks, newspapers, annals, etc.) as well as the 
Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS).   
According to the National Center for Education Statis ics (NCES), IPEDS “is a 
system of interrelated surveys that gathers information from every college, university, 
and technical and vocational institution that participates in the federal student aid 
programs” (“About IPEDS”, n.d., para. 1).  This database provides basic data on U.S. 
postsecondary education in order to describe and determine trends in terms of the number 
of students enrolled, number of faculty and staff employed, number of degrees earned, 
and the total amount of dollars expended (“About IPEDS”, n.d.”).  Schools participating 
in or are applicants for participation in any federal student financial aid program (e.g., 
Pell Grants and federal student loans) are required to complete an IPEDS survey annually 
according to Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965.  Information from this 
database has been previously utilized by Smith et al. (2013) in terms of regional 
definitions as well as serving as a confirmation secondary source on identity verification.  
The IPEDS database has also been used in many studies such as ones analyzing college 
quality (Black & Smith, 2004), cost differences betw en for-profit and non-profit 
universities (Laband & Lentz, 2004), educational costs and student engagement (Pike, 
Smart, Kuh, & Hayek, 2006), minority college enrollment and attainment (Backes, 2012; 
Hinrichs, 2011), and part-time faculty effects on graduation rates (Jacoby, 2006). 
 The unit of observation is a university-year.  This unit of observation is in 
accordance with the IPEDS database, which is sorted by the academic year.  The IPEDS 
database was analyzed for NAIA member schools based upon the NAIA listing.  Any 
institution that merged with another school, changed its name, or closed was identified to 
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ensure that no double counting occurred within the data set.  Furthermore, the sample 
does not include any international universities along with any U.S. institutions not 
included in the IPEDS database.  The collection of data for this dissertation is consistent 
with the methods used by Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004; 2004-05).  The data 
set includes 22,367 university-year observations from 1973 to 2012. 
Dependent Variable 
Colleges and universities that were members of the NAIA during the sample time 
period were included in the data set one year afterdeparting the NAIA for Division II or 
Division III.  This inclusion allows for the simulation of movement by one institution 
after similar universities accomplished reclassification.  After one year in the NCAA, the 
observed university will no longer be present in the sample. A university’s movement to 
either Division II or Division III was observed through the use of 1/0 dichotomous 
variable. The value of one indicates that an observed university left the NAIA in the 
current year, while zero signifies that the university tayed in the NAIA.   This variable 
serves as the dependent variable in the logistic regression model utilized for Model One.   
Independent Variables 
 In their analysis of organizations moving from one stock exchange (e.g., the 
NASDAQ) to another stock exchange (e.g., the New York Stock Exchange), Rao et al. 
(2000) argued defections constituted an identity-discrepant cue for remaining 
organizations within a particular in-group to consider a move to an out-group.  Both 
Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004; 2004-05) utilized Rao et al.’s (2000) 
theoretical framework when interpreting certain identity-discrepant cues that influence a 
university to defect from an in-group (e.g., the NAIA) and join an out-group (e.g., the 
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NCAA).  If a university decides to change its affiliation with one particular group, this 
change may influence other universities to reconsider their own relationship within the 
association and possibly defect to the out-group as well.  As a result, this dissertation 
incorporates the identities utilized in both Smith e  al.’s (2013) and Washington’s (2004; 
2004-05) research with some alterations to specific ategories such as religious affiliation 
and sport offerings.  Furthermore, two different models are estimated in order to 
differentiate between schools making an initial movement to Division II or Division III. 
 The first identity is the geographic location of the university.  Washington (2004-
05) considered a school’s conference affiliation within the NAIA as a definition of its 
geography.  Smith et al. (2013) altered this approach by utilizing the eight IPEDS 
definitions for geographical regions.  The regions are classified as (1) New England; (2) 
Mid-East; (3) Great Lakes; (4) Plains; (5) Southeast; (6) Southwest; (7) Rocky Mountain; 
and (8) Far West.2  Table 4.1 identifies the states included in each specific region.  These 
regions will be classified as an indicator variable for the specific region that the school is 
located (e.g., New England region).  In addition, a count variable will be included to 
determine the number of universities in an observation’s region that moved to either 
NCAA division in the given year (e.g., # of schools from university’s region to Division 
II; # of schools from university’s region to Division III).  Finally, an interaction variable 
will also be utilized that will compare the eight geographic regions with the two count 
variables (e.g., New England Region*Region School # to Div. II; New England 
Region*Region School # to Div. III).  A positive and significant parameter on the  
                                                 
2 The IPEDS database identifies a ninth region for U.S. Service schools.  For the purposes 
of this dissertation, schools coded with this frequncy were removed from the sample. 
    
76 
 
Table 4-1 - IPEDS Regions 
Region States 
New England Region Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont 
Mid-East Region Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryl nd, New 
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania 
Great Lakes Region Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin 
Plains Region Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, 
North Dakota, South Dakota 
Southeast Region Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia 
Southwest Region Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas 
Rocky Mountains 
Region 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming 
Far West Region Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, 
Washington 
 
interaction variable will indicate that the more universities located in the observed 
university’s region that choose to move to either Division II or Division III, the more 
likely it is for the observed university to move into a specific division in the given year.  
 The second social identity is religious affiliation.  Both Smith et al. (2013) and 
Washington (2004-05) incorporated religious affiliat on within their study based upon 
Garg, Rasheed, and Priem’s (2005) belief that schools with a religious affiliation are 
similar to “the business-format of franchising where schools receive a basket of ‘goods’ 
such as approaches and procedures that are implemented” (p. 31).  Steensland, Park, 
Regnerus, Robinson, Wilcox, and Woodberry (2000) cautioned researchers how to 
categorize and study religious groupings.  Specifically, Steensland et al. (2000) argued 
religious denominations should be grouped according to their affiliation within six 
nominal categories opposed to each denomination’s specific ideology.  This process 
avoids any potential historical, terminological, and taxonomical inaccuracies that may 
occur while also focusing on concrete religious tradi ions (Steensland et al., 2000).   
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The misclassification of religious affiliation may have resulted in the mixed 
results reported by both Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004-05).  Specifically, 
Washington (2004-05) noted schools with religious affili tion (e.g., Baptist, Methodist, 
and other religious affiliations) were less vulnerable to the pressure to change athletic 
affiliation after previous institutions defected from the NAIA to the NCAA.  Smith et al. 
(2013) showed different results, noting religious affili tion had no significant impact on 
the likelihood of movement.  However, Smith et al. (2013) classified religious affiliation 
in general terms (i.e., coding 1 for affiliation, 0 otherwise) despite attempts “to aggregate 
the denominations to larger and generalized categori s” (p. 31).  This dissertation 
attempts to correct the religious affiliation indicator variable by grouping schools 
according to Steensland et al.’s (2000) six nominal categories: (1) Mainline Protestant; 
(2) Evangelical Protestant; (3) Black Protestant; (4) Roman Catholic; (5) Judaism; and (6) 
Other (e.g., Mormon, Jehovah’s Witness, Muslim, Hindu, and Unitarian).  Table 4.2 
provides a full listing of denominations within each nominal category.  
 Based on these categories, the religious affiliation will have three variables.  First, 
an indicator variable will be utilized to distinguish universities with religious affiliation 
under one of the six groupings with zero as a designation for schools with no affiliation 
(e.g., Mainline Protestant).  The second variable wi l be a count variable (e.g., # of 
Religious Grouping to Division II; # of Religious Grouping to Division III) that is equal 
to the number of universities from the observed university’s religious grouping that 
moved to the NCAA in a given year.  Finally, an interaction term (Religious Grouping*# 
of Religious Grouping to Division II; Religious Grouping*# of Religious Grouping to 
Division III) will be used to compare the indicator and count variables. 
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 Table 4-2 - Religion Classifications 
Religion Group Denominations 
Catholic Roman Catholic 
Mainline 
Protestant 
American Baptist Churches in U.S.A., American Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, American Lutheran Church, Episcopal Church, Evangelical 
Lutheran, Lutheran Church in America, Presbyterian Church in U.S.A., 
United Methodist Church, United Presbyterian Church in U.S.A., 
American Reformed, Baptist (Northern), Christian Disciples, First 
Congregationalist, Disciples of Christ, Evangelical Reformed, First 
Christian Disciples of Christ, First Church, First Reformed, Friends, Grace 
Reformed, Hungarian Reformed, Latvian Reformed, Moravian, Quaker, 
Reformed, Reformed Church of Christ, Reformed United Church of 
Christ, Schwenkfelder, United Brethren in Christ, United Church of 
Canada, United Church of Christ, United Church of Christianity 
Evangelical 
Protestant 
American Baptist Association, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 
Southern Baptist Convention, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, 
Advent Christian, Amish, Apostolic Church, Apostolic Christian, 
Assembly of God, Bible Missionary, Brethren Church, Brethren-
Plymouth, Brother of Christ, Calvary Bible, Chapel of Faith, Charismatic, 
Chinese Gospel Church, Christ Cathedral of Truth, Christ Church Unity, 
Christ and Missionary Alliance, Christian Cavalry Chapel, Christian 
Methodist Episcopal, Christian Reformed, Christ in Christian Union, 
Christ in God, Churches of God, Church of Christ, Church of Daniel’s 
Band, Church of God of Prophecy, Church of Prophecy, Church of the 
First Born, Church of the Living God, Community Church, Community of 
Christ, Covenant, Dutch Reformed, Evangelical Congregational, 
Evangelical Covenant, Evangelical Free Church, Evangelical Methodist, 
Evangelical United Brethren, Faith Christian, Faith Gospel Tabernacle, 
First Christian, Four Square Gospel, Free Methodist, Free Will Baptist, 
Full Gospel, Grace Brethren, Holiness Church of God, Holy Roller, 
Laotian Christian, Living Word, Macedonia, Mennonite, Mennonite 
Brethren, Missionary Baptist, Missionary Church, Mission Covenant, 
Nazarene, Non-Denominational, Pentecostal, Pentecostal A sembly of 
God, Pentecostal Church of God, People’s Church, Pilgrim Holiness, 
Primitive Baptist, Seventh Day Adventist, Swedish Mission, Triumph 
Church of God, The Way Ministry, Wesleyan, Wesleyan Methodist-
Pilgrim 
Black Protestant African Methodist Episcopal Church, African Methodist Episcopal Zion 
Church, African Methodist, Disciples of God, Federat d Church, 
Pentecostal Apostolic, Zion Union, Zion Union Apostolic, Zion Union 
Apostolic-Reformed 
Other Christadelphians, Christian Scientist, Church of Jesus Christ of the 
Restoration, Church Universal and Triumphant, Jehova ’s Witness, 
Latter-Day Saints, Mormon, True Light Church of Christ, Worldwide 
Church of God, Christ Church Unity, Eden Evangelist, Mind Science, 
New Age Spirituality, New Birth Christian, Religious Science, Buddhism, 
Hinduism, Islam, Eastern Orthodox 
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 The third identity relates to the HBCU designation.  Both Smith et al. (2013) and 
Washington (2004; 2004-05) included this characteris ic n their research.  This 
characteristic is important since both the NAIA and the NCAA previously focused on the 
admission of HBCUs at specific points in time.  Stooksbury (2010) noted the NAIA’s 
admission of HBCUs came after the NCAA criticized the NAIA for its rule banning 
African-Americans from participating in the NIBT inthe 1940s.  By the 1950s, the NAIA 
abolished the rule and slowly began accepting HBCUs as full members (Wilson, 2005).  
As the NAIA grew, the NCAA altered their policies in order to attract HBCUs including 
the creation of the College Division (Falla, 1981; Washington, 2004).  Furthermore, 
several studies (Katz, 1990; Katz & McLendon, 1988; Spreitzer & Snyder, 1990) 
explained sports play a predominant role in African American culture.  As such, Smith et 
al. (2013) noted a move to the NCAA from the NAIA could allow an HBCU to 
potentially gain exposure and attract new students to it  institution.  An indicator variable 
(BCU) is included that takes the value of one if the university is an HBCU and zero 
otherwise.  In addition, there is a separate count variable (e.g., # of BCU to Division II; # 
of BCU to Division III) signifying the number of HBCUs that moved to each respective 
division in a given year.  Finally, there is an interaction variable (HBCU*# HBCU to 
Division II; HBCU*HBCU to Division III) combining the HBCU indicator variable with 
the HBCU count variables in a given year. 
The fourth identity involves schools classified as private.  Prior studies on college 
movement did not test if the private school designatio  influences the likelihood of 
reclassification.  Instead, Smith et al. (2013) created a count variable for the number of 
public schools to control for the movement of public schools that were not classified as 
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an HBCU, women’s college, or affiliated with a religion.  This variable was created since 
most schools maintaining these characteristics are private institutions.  However, some 
institutions can be classified as private schools without possessing any additional identity.  
Thus, the dissertation will control for private institutions by creating an indicator variable 
for schools designated as private (PRIVATE).  This indicator variable takes the value of 
one if the university is private and zero otherwise.  In addition, there is a separate count 
variable (e.g., # of Private Schools to Division II; # of Private Schools to Division III) 
signifying the number of private schools that moved to each respective division in a given 
year.  Finally, there is an interaction variable (e.g., PRIVATE*# Private to Division II; 
PRIVATE*Private to Division III) combining the private school indicator variable with 
the private school count variables in a given year. 
 Size classification based upon the classifications designed by the Carnegie 
Foundation is the fourth social identity.  According to the foundation, the Carnegie 
Classification “has been the leading framework for recognizing and describing 
institutional diversity in U.S. higher education” and “has been widely used in the study of 
higher education…as a way to represent and control for institutional differences” (“About 
Carnegie Classification”, n.d., para. 1).  Smith et al. (2013) noted the Carnegie 
Classification system has 18 different size classifications based upon the length of degree 
programs (i.e., two-year or four-year schools); if the university is private or public; and if 
a university is considered a residential or commuter niversity.  To reduce the number of 
classifications, Smith et al. (2013) aggregated the Carnegie Classification system into 
four specific categories: (1) very small or small; (2) medium; (3) large or very large; and 
(4) not classified by Carnegie. This dissertation adopted Smith et al.’s (2013) groupings 
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to indicate the size of universities moving to eithr Division II or Division III because of 
the assumption the Carnegie Classification is relatively consistent over time.  Very few 
universities move between classifications in a short pe iod of time (e.g., University A 
moving from a “small” classification to a “medium” classification”).  
Similar to the previous independent variables, there is an indicator variable for 
each of the aggregate Carnegie classifications (e.g., Medium).  There is also a count 
variable (e.g., # of Schools from Size to Division II; # of Schools from Size to Division III) 
equal to the number of universities joining either division based upon the observed 
university’s size classification in a given year.  Finally, there is an interaction variable 
showcasing the interaction between the indicator and count variables for all size 
categories (e.g., Medium University*# of Medium Schools to Division II; Medium 
University*# of Medium Schools to Division III). 
 The sixth social identity is a university’s sponsorship of revenue generating 
sports.  Traditionally, scholars argued only two revenue generating sports exist within 
intercollegiate athletics: (1) football and (2) men’s basketball (Fulks, 2011; Kahn, 2007).  
However, some universities generate revenue and profits fr m sports traditionally viewed 
as non-revenue generating.  For example, the University of Connecticut (UConn) 
consistently generates revenue from its women’s basketball program (Eaton-Robb, 2011); 
Louisiana State University (LSU) sponsors a profitable baseball team (Louisiana 
Legislative Auditor, 2012); and the University of Minnesota (UM) generates profits from 
its men’s hockey team (Mullen, 2010).  The NCAA also continues to expand its 
broadcast coverage for many sport championships it sponsors (“NCAA, ESPN Agree”, 
2011).  Due to the success and growth of women’s basketball, baseball, and men’s 
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hockey, many universities have added these sport prgrams hoping to achieve similar 
success.  As such, this dissertation includes indicator variables for five potential revenue 
generating sports: (1) football; (2) men’s basketball; (3) women’s basketball; (4) 
baseball; and (5) men’s hockey.  Count variables ar also used to show the number of 
schools sponsoring one of these sports and moving to Division II or III in the given year 
(e.g., # of Schools with Football to Division II; # of Schools with Football to Division 
III ).  Finally, an interaction variable combines the indicator and count variables for all 
five respective sports (e.g., Football*# of Schools with Football to Division II; 
Football*# of Schools with Football to Division III). 
Control Variables 
In order to control for time-based effects, the dissertation establishes a control 
variable representing each year of the sample setting (TREND).  The year 1973 will take 
a value of one.  TREND will continue to increase until it reaches the year 2012 and takes 
a value of 40.  Both Clapp and Hakes (2005) and McEvoy et al. (2005) used a similar 
trend variable to control for the overall popularity for the years included in their 
respective studies.  For the purpose of this dissertation, TREND controls for the expected 
upward trend of movement during the time period analyzed (1973 – 2012).  
The dissertation also monitors the effect NAIA leadrship may have on the 
likelihood of movement within the observed year.  During the time period analyzed, six 
individuals served as the NAIA Executive Secretary/CEO.  A. O. Duer was Executive 
Secretary from 1949 to 1975.  Duer retired in 1975 and was replaced by Harry Fritz.  
Fritz would stay on as leader until 1986, when he was removed from office.  Jefferson 
Farris was named NAIA Executive Secretary/CEO in 1986 and served until 1990.  After 
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Farris stepped down, James Chasteen took over as CEO in 1991.  In 1996, Chasteen was 
removed from office, and Steve Baker was appointed CEO.  Baker stepped down in 
2006, and Jim Carr took over as NAIA CEO and continues to serve as of 2014.  Each 
leader will have a variable that takes on a value of one for each year of his respective 
tenure and zero otherwise.  For example, schools who were affiliated with the NAIA 
during Duer’s tenure as Executive Secretary (DUER) takes a value of one from 1973 to 
1975 and zero for all other years. 
Model and Estimation Technique 
 Logistic regression is a regression analysis that is used for the prediction of a 
particular outcome.  Abraham and Ledolter (2006) noted the dependent variable is 
dichotomous and takes two distinct values: (1) yi = success, coded as 1; and (2) yi =
failure, coded as 0.  The outcome yi is assumed to have a Bernoulli distribution with the
following success and failure probabilities: 
  = 1 = 			
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Logistic regression projects the success probability as a function of the severity of 
independent variables.  Due to the nature of the dichotomous dependent variables, it is 
erroneous to utilize a standard linear regression mdel (i.e. yi = β0 + β1Xi1 + … + βpXip + 
εi) with binary response data (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006).  A linear model allows for 
response estimates to be outside of the range of zer  to one.  Furthermore, Marx (2012) 
noted the normal error distribution is no longer valid since only two different errors are 
possible with a binary response variable.   
 The probabilities of π (xi) are parameterized as: 
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According to Abraham and Ledolter (2006), “the probabilities are nonlinear functions of 
the parameters β” (p. 345).  However, through a log transformation, the nonlinear 
function can appear as a linear model.  It can be shown as: 
 %	 # 		1 − 			$ = 	& +	&' +⋯+	& ' +	( (4) 
 
Geaghan (2012) positioned the log transformation of the original probabilities results in a 
ratio known as the log odds.  This ratio compares th  probability of an occurrence to the 
probability of its nonoccurrence and is referred to as the odds of occurrence (Marx, 
2012).   The odds of occurrence can take on values between zero and infinity.  For 
example, if π = 0.5, the odds are even and an event can either occu r not occur.  If π = 
0.8, then an event is four times more likely to occur than its nonoccurrence.  The log 
odds, or logit, assumes a linear function and shows that the regression coefficients 
represent a change in the odds (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006). 
 An alternate function that transforms a probability π into a quantity from zero to 
infinity is a probit, which is the inverse of the distribution function Φ of the standard 
normal distribution (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006).  A linear regression can be used to 
model the effects of covariates on the probit as follows: 
 )*		 = 	Φ,	 = 	& +	&' +⋯+	& ' +	(	  (5) 
 
 	 = 	Φ& +	&' +⋯+	& ' +	( (6) 
 
According to Maddala (1983), the difference between a logit and a probit model is that a 
probit regression will generally have flatter tails than a logistic regression.  In other 
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words, there is not much difference between the two functions except when probabilities 
are very close to either zero or one (Abraham & Ledolt r, 2006). Since there will be very 
little qualitative differences in the conclusions of logistic and probit models, this 
dissertation will utilize a logistic regression model as this model is consistent with the 
previous research examining university movement (Smith et al., 2013; Washington, 
2004; 2004-05). 
Furthermore, previous sports research has been condu ted utilizing logistic 
regression by examining the likelihood of a university receiving an invitation to the 
NCAA men’s basketball tournament (Washington & Zajac, 2005); a university’s 
adoption of a sports program (Washington & Ventresca, 2004); a professional sports 
team winning a game (Taylor & Trogdon, 2002); and a co ch being dismissed from 
his/her job (Frick, Barros, & Prinz, 2010).  The general logistic regression models are:  
 %	 # 	-.	1 − 	-.	$ = 	& +	&' +	&.'.	-. +	( (7) 
 
 %	 # 	-/	1 − 	-/	$ = 	& +	&' +	&.'.	-/ +	( (8) 
 
where π (xi) is the probability of a school moving from the NAIA to the NCAA Division 
II (πD2) or Division III (πD3) ; β0 is a constant; β1 is the set of coefficients for explanatory 
variables Xi1 that do not change over time; β2 is the set of coefficients for explanatory 
variables Xi2 (π) that do change with time; and εi is an error term.  The results from this 
logistic regression model will indicate if the independent variables are likely to cause a 
change in the dependent variable. 




Two potential estimation issues exist that could affect the accuracy of the results.  
The first is multicollinearity, and it occurs when two independent variables are very 
highly correlated (Geaghan, 2012).  Schroeder, Sjoquist, and Stephan (1986) noted no 
statistical test can determine if multicollinearity is a problem.  In order to avoid this 
potential issue, a careful model specification is necessary (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006).  
Since multicollinearity occurs between two or more correlated variables, one simple 
solution would be to remove a variable that is correlated (Geaghan, 2012).  This action 
would create a reduced model with a subset of the original variables while reducing the 
correlated variables (O’Brien, 2007).  A second soluti n would be to increase the sample 
size in the hope that additional data will bring out the differences in variables and reduce 
the correlation (Grewal, Cote, & Baumgartner, 2004; Mason & Perreault, 1991).  
Because of the large sample size utilized in this analysis, multicollinearity is not expected 
to be a problem with the exception of the interaction variables.  However, the inclusion of 
these variables is essential to examine the interaction effects (Price & Wolfers, 2011).  
Thus, similar to Smith et al. (2013) and Washington (2004; 2004-05), the present 
dissertation will contain interaction variables despite concern for multicollinearity. 
 The second estimation issue deals with the standard errors of the data.  In a 
general panel regression model, one assumes that errors can occur at either the firm level 
or the time level (Thompson, 2011).  Many studies adjust standard errors for correlation 
for one of these items but not across both.  Thompsn (2011) argued, however, that 
simultaneously clustering both firms and time will lead to significantly more accurate 
inference in panel data.  Because the data set for this dissertation is comprised of many 
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universities over a period of time, some unobserved heterogeneity that is similar within 
each university’s observations is present. As a result, the standard errors of the logistic 
regression model are clustered by university.  
Model Two Research Design 
 From 1973 to 2012, 248 institutions made the initial move from the NAIA to 
Division II while 229 schools moved to Division III.  The schools that proceeded with 
this action believed that the move would increase their overall applications.  As such, this 
dissertation investigates if a university reclassification from the NAIA to the NCAA has a 
significant effect on applications.  To analyze the Reclassification Effect, a panel 
regression model was implemented on application data collected by IPEDS for all 
schools that maintained an association with the NAIA since the organization’s inception 
in 1937.  Current and former NAIA member schools are chosen for this analysis in order 
to test if schools joining the NCAA from the NAIA does impact the benefits received 
through a reclassification or if the defector is stll imilar to their NAIA counterparts.  
Completed IPEDS surveys from these schools can be obtained from 1984 to 2012.  While 
IPEDS records were not collected before 1984, the model will account for schools that 
moved between 1937 and 1983 through an independent variable that accounts for the age 
a university has been associated with the NCAA.  Similar to Model One, the unit of 
observation for Model Two is a university-year in accordance with the IPEDS database.  
The sample will not include any international universities as well as any U.S. institutions 
that were not included in the IPEDS database.   




The natural logarithm of the total number of applications (LN_APP) received by a 
university in the current year is the dependent variable for Model Two.  Similar to Pope 
and Pope (2009), the dissertation uses log total applications as opposed to total 
applications utilized in Murphy and Trandel (1994) to avoid the significant overweight of 
large schools compared to small schools.  The natural logarithm will also transform the 
model into an intrinsically linear model (Geaghan, 2012).  
Independent Variables 
In order to measure the Reclassification Effect, the dissertation utilizes two 
distinct independent variables.  The first variable is the length of NCAA membership for 
a university as well as its affiliated division in the observed year (NCAA_AGE; 
D2_AGE; D3_AGE).  The second variable is a dummy variable that indicates the first 
five years (RANGE5) and first ten years (RANGE10) of NCAA affiliation.  Similar to 
Coates and Humphreys (1999; 2005), an additional dummy variable indicates that the 
observed year is one of the first ten years.  In other words, if a university is in its first 
year of NCAA membership in the observed year, the dummy variable, YEAR1, takes on 
the value of one in the observed year and zero for all subsequent years. 
Control Variables 
 Many studies on the Flutie Effect (McCormick & Tinsley, 1987; Mixon & Hsing, 
1994; Mixon & Ressler, 1995; Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004; Murphy & Trandel, 
1994; Pope & Pope, 2009) and the novelty effect (Baade & Dye, 1990; Baade & 
Sanderson, 1997; Coates & Humphreys, 1999; 2005; Leadley & Zygmont, 2006; Noll, 
1974) established specific control variables related to two or more separate categories 
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(e.g., university and city specifics for Flutie Effect; city and franchise characteristics for 
novelty effect).  Similar to these studies, the dissertation classified independent variables 
based upon two distinct categories: (1) athletic department specific and (2) university 
specific. 
The first category of control variables relate to the athletic department of a 
university.  Similar to Coates and Humphreys (2005) and McEvoy et al. (2005), a 
squared term for the age of association (NCAA_AGE2, D2_AGE2, and D3_AGE2) is also 
created in order to determine if a curvilinear relationship exists.  Further, all universities 
with an athletic program share the penultimate goalof “providing an environment where 
all student-athletes can pursue their athletic endeavors” (“Mission Statement: South 
Georgia”, 2007, para. 1).  Athletic departments attempt to ensure that their teams and 
student-athletes are in a position to compete and potentially win championships.  As 
noted in Chapter 2, many athletic departments make the decision to either leave the 
NAIA for the NCAA or stay with the NAIA and maintain their current social status 
(Smith, 2011; Washington, 2004; 2004-05).  However, a reclassification from the NAIA 
to the NCAA requires schools to meet certain conditions for each respective division 
before committing to the move (NCAA Division II Manual, 2011a; NCAA Division III 
Manual, 2011b).     
According to the NCAA Division II Manual (2011a), Bylaw 20.10.3 states 
institutions affiliated with Division II must sponsor a minimum of five men’s sports and 
five women’s sports, with at least two team sports for each gender, or four men’s sports 
and six women’s sports.  In comparison, Bylaw 20.11.3 of the NCAA Division III 
Manual (2011b) mentions schools associated in Division III must provide athletic teams 
    
90 
 
in at least five NCAA sponsored sports for men and five for women with at least one 
sport occurring each season if the institution has enrollment of 1,000 students or less.  For 
institutions with enrollment above 1,000, they are required to have at least six NCAA 
sponsored sports for men and six for women (NCAA, 2011b).  The NCAA also places 
additional restrictions on each division such as the prohibition of athletically based 
financial aid for student-athletes in Division III schools (NCAA, 2011b) and the 
distribution of financial aid at Division II that is equivalent to a set number of full 
scholarships (NCAA, 2011a).  Because of the variability between Division II and III, the 
model controls for the number of sports offered by a given institution in the current year.  
 Comparable to previous Flutie Effect (e.g., Murphy & Trandel, 1994; Toma & 
Cross, 1998) and novelty effect (e.g., Clapp & Hakes, 2005; Coates & Humphreys, 2005; 
Leadley & Zygmont, 2006; McEvoy et al., 2005) studies, the dissertation controls for the 
athletic success certain sports provide universities on the field or on the court.  
Specifically, this dissertation creates an indicator variable to control for the observed 
institution’s achievement of a title (e.g., division, conference, and/or national) in three 
sports: (1) football; (2) men’s basketball; and (3) women’s basketball.  Many of the Flutie 
Effect studies examined football exclusively (Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004; Murphy & 
Trandel, 1994); men’s basketball exclusively (Mixon & Ressler, 1995); or a combination 
of the two sports (Pope & Pope, 2009; Toma & Cross, 1998).  Women’s sports, 
specifically women’s basketball, have not been considered as a source for a potential 
increase in applications.  Thus, the championships earned by a university’s women’s 
basketball program are included in the model. 
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The second category of control variables relate to the university itself.  The 
dissertation utilizes some of the social characteristics identified in Model One in this 
study examining determinants of applications.  Recall these identities are private school 
designation (PRIVATE), women’s only institutions (WOMENS), HBCUs (BCU), 
geographic regions (NE, ME, GL, PL, SE, SW, RM, FW), and religious affiliations 
(CATH, M_PROT, E_PROT, and OTH_REL).  Past studies have only considered if an 
institution is private or public (Mixon & Hsing, 1995; Mixon, Trevino & Minto, 2004) 
without consideration of other identities attracting dividuals to a university.   
The dissertation also controls for the age of each university contained in the 
sample (AGE_UNIV).  In addition, past work on the Flutie Effect has not identified the 
various degree programs offered by an institution each year.  Because of the variability 
among schools, however, one may find controlling for the number of all potential degree 
programs offered at a university to be impractical.  Instead, this variable is 
operationalized by an indicator variable for schools with a graduate school program 
(GRAD) since the dependent variable is total applications (graduate and undergraduate) 
for a university in the observed year.  
A university’s quality is also analyzed in the model.  Both Buss, Parker, and 
Rivenburg (2004) and Sumaedi, Bakti, and Metasari (2011) based the quality of an 
institution on its tuition prices, noting higher tuition costs provided a higher quality 
education.  Previous Flutie Effect studies have shown inconsistency in their utilization of 
tuition costs.  Mixon and Hsing (1995) analyzed the non-resident tuition for public 
schools and tuition for all students within private colleges while Murphy and Trandel 
(1994) only included in-state tuition.  Pope and Pope (2009) included the cost to attend 
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school from a general standpoint but utilized it as a log variable.  Based on these 
examples, this dissertation utilizes the tuition costs for out-of-state residents as it mirrors 
the costs for private schools.  The variable will indicate which quantile a university’s out-
of-state tuition costs in the observed year (QT_UGRAD). The dissertation will determine 
if a school’s undergraduate out-of-state tuition expense falls within the Top 90th 
(QT_UGRAD=1), Top 75th (QT_UGRAD=2), Top 50th (QT_UGRAD=3), Top 25th 
(QT_UGRAD=4), and Top 10th Quantiles (QT_UGRAD=5).  For example, a school that 
has out-of-state tuition costs between $15,707.50 and $21,344.00 in 2012 falls within the 
Top 25th Quantile of undergraduate tuition expense.  This quantile range is also utilized to 
determine a school’s graduate out-of-state tuition expense (QT_GRAD) if a school has a 
graduate school program. 
Another common control variable found in Flutie Effect studies is the student-
faculty ratio (SF_RATIO) (e.g., Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004; Tucker, 2004).  
According to Tucker (2004), this ratio is a university’  student enrollment divided by the 
number of faculty working at the same school in the current year.  This variable is 
believed to be important to potential students as alower student-faculty ratio is perceived 
to equate to a higher quality of instruction and attention provided to each student which 
may affect total applications (Finn, Pannozzo, & Achilles, 2003; Mitchell, Bradshaw, & 
Leaf, 2010).  Finally, the dissertation includes a variable for schools that have adopted 
the Common Application during the time period analyzed.  The Common Application is a 
non-profit organization “provid[ing] a common, standardized first-year application form 
for use at any member institution” (History, n.d., para. 1).  The Common Application was 
originally designed by private schools but allowed public institutions to join in 2001 
    
93 
 
(History, n.d.).  Since its inception in 1975, the organization has 517 members (History, 
n.d.).  Because of the Common Application growth, the dissertation includes an indicator 
variable to identify schools imploring this new technology according to a membership 
listing provided by the Common Application organizat on.  This variable takes the value 
of one in the observed year if the university has the common application and zero in the 
observed year if it does not utilize the Common Application.  The dissertation anticipates 
that, due to common applications, a positive and significant coefficient on CMAPP 
reflects an increase in the number of total applications. 
Model and Estimation Technique 
The standard linear regression assumptions specify that the errors εt (t = 1, 2, …, 
n) in the regression model yt = β0 + β1Xt1 + β1Xt1 + … + βpXtp + εt are uncorrelated and/or 
independent.  According to Abraham and Ledolter (2006), this assumption may be 
unreasonable if a regression model is estimated for panel series data.  Panel data are data 
where multiple cases are observed over multiple timperiods (“Data and Statistical 
Services”, 2007).  Observations become available at equally spaced time periods such as 
months, quarters, or years.  Both Abraham and Ledolt r (2006) and Marx (2012) noted 
correlations among observations k periods apart are referred to as autocorrelations.  All 
correlations among observations one step apart (i.e., the lag 1 autocorrelations) are the 
same and can be expressed as: 
0	(, (. = 0	(., (/ = ⋯0	(1,, (1 = ⋯0	(2,, (2 = 	3 (9) 
 
Correlations must fall between -1 and +1, and the parameter is restricted to the absolute 
value of ø less than one.  The autocorrelations of observations k steps apart are: 
0	(, (4 = 0	(., (4. = ⋯0	(1,4, (1 = ⋯0	(2,4, (2= 	34 (10) 




Marx (2012) noted the autocorrelation of error terms is dependent upon two factors: (1) 
they are dependent upon the time lag between the obs rvations; and (2) they decrease 
exponentially with the time lag.  Abraham and Ledolter (2006) highlighted that the time 
index can be removed because of the autocorrelation dependence on time and can be 
written as: 
5 = 	0	(1,, (1 = 3, 5. = 	0	(1,., (1 = 3., … , 54= 	0	(1,4, (1 = 34	 (11) 
 
The autocorrelations describe the autocorrelation function which is viewed as a function 
of the lag k.  Abraham and Ledolter (2006) observed ρ0 = 1 and ρk = ρ–k and show the 
autocorrelation function needs to be shown only for nonnegative k’s.  This alignment of 
the autocorrelation function of errors shows a first-order autoregressive model with 
exponential decay (Marx, 2012).  Specifically, if an observation is far from the next 
observation, the autocorrelation will be weak.  If ø is large and close to one in absolute 
value, then the exponential decay will be slow even if rrors are farther apart (Abraham 
& Ledolter, 2006).   
The specific panel regression model utilized in this dissertation is: 
 %6_8986%1 = 	& +	&6:1 +	&.;<=>1 +?&/<06641
@
4A
+ 1 (12) 
 
where APP_TOTALit is the total number of applications received by university i in year 
t; ADit represents a vector of athletic department control variables for the university and 
year such as number of sports programs and championships won; UNIVit is a vector of 
university specific control variables including the age of the university in years; and 
NCAAkit is a set of dummy variables taking on a value of one if university i in year t is in 
its kth year of NCAA affiliation.  β1, β2, and β3 are parameters to be estimated and eit is
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the disturbance term.  If β3 is statistically significantly different from zero, then a school’s 
athletic association would have influence on the applications at a university.   
Estimation Issues 
Model Two has estimation issues to consider.  The first is autocorrelation, which 
indicates that errors at adjacent time periods are co related (Marx, 2012).  According to 
Abraham and Ledolter (2006), “many business and economic data are positively 
autocorrelated” (p. 179).  Essentially, models with positive errors in a prior time period 
will imply a similar positive error for the current time period.  Thus, the errors may not 
be independent as assumed in standard regression but instead autocorrelated.  To test for 
potential autocorrelation, a Durbin-Watson test must be implemented (Marx, 2012).  The 
null hypothesis of the Durbin-Watson test is the model has no first order autocorrelation 
(H0: ϕ = 0) and is based upon the following model: 
 :B =	Σ1 −	1,.Σ	1.  (13) 
 
When the Durbin-Watson test statistic is approximately 2, the model will accept the null 
hypothesis.  However, when the Durbin-Watson test statistic is smaller or larger than 2, 
then autocorrelation exists within the model (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006). 
 According to Marx (2012), a model with first order autocorrelation must have an 
estimate of ϕ, which is unknown in an OLS model.  To estimate ϕ, the autoregressive 
approach called Iterative Yule-Walker can be implemented.  This method alternates an 
estimation of β using generalized least squares with an estimation of ϕ using the Yule-
Walker equations applied to the sample autocorrelation function (Abraham & Ledolter, 
2006.).  Marx (2012) noted the method starts by ignoring autocorrelation and fitting a 
least squares estimate of β. Next, ϕ is estimated from the sample autocorrelation functio  
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of the OLS residuals by using the Yule-Walker equations (Abraham & Ledolter, 2006.).  
Then, the model et = ϕ et-1 + at is fit using standard linear regression with no intercept 
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Chapter 5 – The History of the NAIA 
The Inception Period (1935 – 1945) 
At the 1936 Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) basketball tournament, Dr. Joseph 
Reilly, athletic director of the Kansas City Athletic Club, formally voiced his frustration 
over the loss of the annual event in Kansas City during 1934.  Specifically, Reilly noted 
that Kansas City lost the event when it was in the process of constructing Municipal 
Auditorium (i.e., a state-of-the-art facility capable of holding 9,960) through support 
from the Works Progress Administration (Wilson, 2005).  Second, the loss of the AAU 
event evoked considerable lamenting from basketball enthusiasts in the Kansas City who 
regularly attended and followed the tournament Wilson (2005).  The AAU tournament 
was after all front page news annually in Kansas City and a source for promotion to those 
outside the Kansas City region about the city (Stooksbury, 2010). Third, Reilly changed 
the conversation by contacting Kansas City Star sports editor C. E. McBride to discuss 
the possibility of a college-only tournament that could be developed for Kansas City 
(Hoover, 1958; Stooksbury, 2010).  McBride referred Dr. Reilly to Emil S. Liston, the 
basketball coach and athletic director for Baker University, a small college located 50 
miles southwest of Kansas City (Wilson, 2005).  At the 1936 AAU Tournament, Liston 
also maintained similar frustrations about the AAU’s lack of competitive balance for 
colleges and the loss of that event for Kansas City (S ooksbury, 2010).  Professionalized 
business teams comprised of older and more experienc d players often dubbed as 
“basketball tramps” by the Kansas City Star dominated the event in recent years 
(Stooksbury, 2010; Wilson, 2005). 
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With the support of Reilly, Liston contacted Kansas City business owner George 
Goldman of Goldman’s Jewelry Company to determine hs interest in the potential 
college-only basketball tournament for 1937 (Stooksbury, 2010).  At the time, Goldman 
was a manager/investor of the Municipal Auditorium and immediately interested in the 
prospect of hosting the college-only tournament (Stooksbury, 2010).  During a meeting 
with Reilly and Liston, Goldman learned that neither ad financing or organizational 
support for the tournament.  Furthermore, Liston desired for the tournament to be open to 
colleges of any size, including ones that were traditionally considered too small to be 
included in national affairs (Stooksbury, 2010).  Liston’s plan of starting with 16 teams as 
a trial tournament and then expanding to 32 in order to create a “true national clearing 
house of collegiate basketball” was also explained along with the fact that it would be an 
amateur event heavily influenced by the inventor of basketball, Dr. James Naismith 
(Stooksbury, 2010, p. 10).   
Dr. Naismith was well established within the region after completing his medical 
degree in Denver and moving to the University of Kansas in 1898 (“The History of 
Basketball”, 1971).  While at Kansas, he was presented with countless endorsement 
opportunities.  However, Dr. Naismith turned down all but one of these opportunities as 
he felt that the game of basketball should be used for teaching instead of profiteering 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  Dr. Naismith became highly involved with the formation of the new 
college-only tournament because of his friendship with Liston.  According to legend, 
Naismith, Liston, and Kansas City businessman Frank Cramer of Cramer Sports 
Medicine met at Liston’s home and discussed the design of the tournament as well as 
how to gain fan support (Henry, 1994).  At this meeting, all these men agreed that money 
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should be as far away from athletes as possible (Stooksbury, 2010).  Specifically, Dr. 
Naismith publically stated that “no one should seek financial reward for their athletic 
accomplishments” (Stooksbury, 2010, p. 11).  Upon hearing the news about Dr. 
Naismith’s participation and interest with this tournament, Goldman allowed Liston and 
Dr. Reilly to utilize the Municipal Auditorium free of charge (Wilson, 2005).  However, 
attendees of the event would be asked to volunteer to save on labor costs.  Further, 
participating colleges would have to cover their own travel expenses but would have their 
food and lodging expenses covered by tournament proceeds (Stooksbury, 2010; Wilson, 
2005).  Finally, Goldman agreed to underwrite the loca  costs of the tournament until 
revenue can be generated (Wilson, 2005). 
With these financial guarantees, Liston began heavily promoting the event in an 
attempt to attract teams for March 1937.  For example, Liston maintained contact with 
coaches of conference champions or high finishers from Missouri, Kansas, Illinois, South 
Dakota, Iowa, Indiana, and Oklahoma (Wilson, 2005).  In order to produce the most 
attractive tournament, Liston only sought championship teams in the Midwest 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  Despite this potential limitation, Liston assured Kansas City 
enthusiasts that the tournament would be entertaining and that solid teams would be 
invited to compete for the first collegiate basketball championship (“Expect 16 Teams”, 
1937).  Further, Liston stated: 
“The colleges are ready to establish a clearing house for basketball.  Now, it is up 
to Kansas City.  The colleges are taking the chance.  They are coming in here at 
their own expense, and now if Kansas City wants the tournament it is up to the 
fans.  We have national championships in track, boxing, wrestling, swimming and 
virtually every other sport.  There isn’t any reason why we shouldn’t have a real 
national champion in basketball” (“Expect 16 Teams”, 1937, para. 4). 
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Unfortunately, two issues surfaced quickly as the March 9 to 12 tournament dates 
approached.  First, as Liston began assessing interest in the tournament, he became 
dissatisfied with the quality of teams (Stooksbury, 2010).  In order for the tournament to 
be successful and prompt future commitments, Liston knew he needed high-quality 
teams.  Second, Municipal Auditorium would not be available for the number of nights 
required to host a 16-team tournament because Goldman reserved March 12 for a grand 
tennis exhibition that featured a match between the No. 1 ranked tennis player Ellsworth 
Vines and former amateur champion Fred Perry (Hoover, 1958; Stooksbury, 2010).  In 
essence, it was not feasible to have a 16-team tournament cross over the tennis event. 
Appropriately, Liston announced that the initial colege-only tournament would be cut 
from 16 to eight teams just three days before the start of the event (“Champions are set”, 
1937; Stooksbury, 2010).  In an article in the Kansas City Journal-Post, Liston stated the 
following: 
“We can cover the field with eight just as well as we could have with 16.  They 
are all champions with the exception of St. Benedict’s, and the records show that 
St. Benedict’s to be about the best independent college team of the season” 
(“Champions are set”, 1937, p.  11A). 
 
The 1937 eight-team tournament was comprised of schools from Missouri 
(Central Missouri Teachers College); Kansas (Baker University, St. Benedict’s College, 
and Southwestern College); Iowa (Morningside College, Luther College); South Dakota 
(South Dakota Wesleyan College); and Arkansas (Arkansas State Teachers College) 
(Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).  After the third day, Central Missouri Teachers College of 
Warrensburg, Missouri, defeated Morningside College of Sioux City, Iowa, in the 
tournament finals to become the first college-only tournament champion (Hoover, 1958; 
Wilson, 2005). 
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When the tournament was completed, Liston and the ot r participating coaches 
were enthusiastic about this event despite the disappointing $700 in gate receipts and $28 
in profit generated (Hoover, 1958; Stooksbury, 2010).  However, coaches from around 
the country began contacting Liston to inquire about entry into next year’s basketball 
tournament based on the great experience the first tournament attendees received 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  With increased curiosity, Liston began conducting meetings with 
various coaches and administrators to discuss plans for the 1938 tournament to be 
branded – the National Intercollegiate Basketball Championship Tournament (NIBT) 
(Hoover, 1958; Stooksbury, 2010).   
Liston also headed to Denver for the 1937 AAU tournament to give more college 
coaches information about the burgeoning event to be held in Kansas City (Wilson, 
2005).  Ironically, the AAU placed college teams in a separate bracket after responding to 
the long-time demands by the college coaches (Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).  However, 
Liston concluded small colleges did not have a future with the AAU tournament and 
wanted provide these institutions with an outlet for wider recognition (Hoover, 1958).  
There also was no other national basketball tournament for college and university teams 
since neither the National Invitational Tournament (1938) nor the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association Tournament (1939) were established (Wilson, 2005).   
After collaborating with coaches and administrators in Denver, Liston started to 
create a 16-member Board of Management that was comprised of athletic directors and 
basketball coaches (Wilson, 2005).  Hoover (1958) noted the executive officers 
represented a wide geographic range across the Unitd States and Liston served as the 
board’s chairman (see Table 5.1).   
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Table 5-1 - 1938 NAIB Board of Management 
Board Member Position School 
Emil S. Liston Athletic Director Baker University 
Eugene Eberhardt Athletic Director Oregon State Normal University 
John Bunn Basketball Coach Stanford University 
Forrest Cox Basketball Coach University of Colorado 
S. M. Clark Athletic Director New Mexico Normal University 
Al Baggett Athletic Director West Texas State Teachers College 
Henry P. Iba Athletic Director Oklahoma A & M 
Pat Mason Athletic Director Rockhurst College 
R. G. Rogers Basketball Coach Morningside College 
W. B. Woodson Athletic Director Arkansas State Teachers College 
Arthur “Dutch” Lonborg Basketball Coach Northwestern University 
Roy E. Tillotson Athletic Director Franklin College 
A. F. Rupp Basketball Coach University of Kentucky 
Roy Clifford Basketball Coach Western Reserve University 
Max E. Hannum Basketball Coach Carnegie Institute of Technology 
Clair F. Bee Athletic Director Long Island University 
 
In one of his first acts as chairman, Liston drafted a bulletin to the other board members 
that outlined his vision for the future of the NIBT (Stooksbury, 2010).  The bulletin stated 
the following: 
“This is an open National Intercollegiate Championship Tournament.  No rules of 
eligibility have been set up, other than the teams which enter will represent 
standard institutions of college or university rank and will be governed by the 
rules of eligibility in their respective conferences…The tournament is sponsored 
by no individual and no organization; but by the colleges and universities 
interested; this is an attempt to establish a natiol clearing house for university 
basketball.  Conferences that object to participation in a tournament under other 
than college or university management should be informed that this tournament is 
controlled by a board of management entirely of college and university men…No 
one will make any money out of this tournament. In the event that the receipts 
amount to more than the local expenses, said amount will be placed in a reserve 
fund under the control of the board of management. It is the desire of the 
chairman of the board of management that this reserv  fund be built up to a sum 
to enable it to act independently in future years (E. S. Liston, personal 
communication, 1937). 
 
 Based on a personal letter from Liston to Dr. Naismith (October 12, 1939), there 
were 16 districts set up to represent schools potentially invited from these areas.  As more 
teams became interested, the field expanded from the original eight-team format to a full 
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32-team tournament in 1938 with schools located as far away as Oregon and Virginia 
traveling to the 1938 tournament (Wilson, 2005).  The 1938 championship also 
demonstrated the close relationship between Liston and Dr. Naismith as the tournament 
champion would receive the Maude Naismith Trophy, named after Dr. Naismith’s wife 
(Hoover, 1958).  The Kansas City Times also reported that the winning team’s members 
would receive miniature diamond studded gold basketballs while the second place team 
would receive a trophy from the Kansas City Chamber of Commerce as well as miniature 
gold basketballs (“Pair Teams Today”, 1938).   
 The success of second Kansas City event sparked tremendous excitement about 
the future of basketball among coaches across the nation.  After the completion of the 
1938 NIBT, the Metropolitan Basketball Writers Association began their efforts to 
provide a “world series” for basketball (“National Cage Meet Opens”, 1938).  This event 
was held in New York’s Madison Square Garden and was called the National Invitational 
Tournament (NIT) (Stooksbury, 2010).  Six teams were invited to compete with Temple 
University winning the first NIT (“Owl Cagers are Honored”, 1938).  However, the 
schools invited to the NIT were much larger (i.e., Bradley University; Long Island 
University; New York University; Oklahoma A&M University; Temple University; and 
the University of Colorado) compared to the NIBT competitors (“National Cage Meet 
Opens”, 1938).  Thus, the NIBT provided a niche because regardless of size postseason 
competition emerged for coaches and players to put their philosophies and abilities to the 
test (Stooksbury, 2010). 
 Quickly after seeing the success and attention generated by the NIBT and NIT, 
the NCAA sought to establish its own eight-team national tournament for colleges 
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associated with major conferences such as the Big Ten Conference and Pacific Coast 
Conference as well as certain schools the NCAA deemed as independent (“Court Title 
Tourney Planned”, 1938; “Big Ten Still Spurns”, 1938).  The 1939 NCAA tournament 
(i.e. the first) was divided among three locations: Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; San 
Francisco, California; and Evanston, Illinois.  Teams located in the Eastern United States 
met in Philadelphia for the first two rounds while schools in the Western United States 
competed in San Francisco (Stooksbury, 2010).  After winning the Western Region, the 
University of Oregon defeated The Ohio State University (OSU), 46 to 33 in the 
inaugural title game held in Evanston, Illinois (Snider, 1939).  In a short time, college 
basketball went from having no national championship tournament to having three. 
 The 1939 NIBT proved to be a major success as morethan 30,000 fans packed the 
Municipal Auditorium for the duration of the event more than 7,000 fans turning out to 
see San Diego State University take on Southwestern College of Kansas in the 
championship (Stooksbury, 2010).  As the fourth NIBT approached, Liston began 
working on the idea of expanding the event (Wilson, 2005).  During the fall of 1939, for 
instance, Liston published a circular entitled Intercollegiate Basketball which would 
serve as the official publication of an organization that would expand past the annual 
tournament (Hoover, 1958).  In the publication, Liston set forth objectives of this 
proposed organization.  Further, Liston wanted Dr. Naismith to be included in the 
development of the organization as much as possible.  In a letter to Dr. Naismith, Liston 
shared his excitement regarding the success of the 1939 tournament: 
Dear Dr. Naismith,  
 
Enclosed is information relative to the organization of the National Association of 
Intercollegiate Basketball.  This organization is going forward rapidly and as you 
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will note the organization convention will be held in Kansas City, March 8, 9, 10 
just at the beginning of the championship tournament.  The official name of the 
tournament is the National Intercollegiate Basketball Championship Tournament. 
 
The 1939 tournament was a success in every way.  Repres ntative teams were 
selected from twenty one different states.  Sportsmanship was fine, the officiating 
considered by coaches and spectators to be the best ver seen in that number of 
games.  The games for the most part were closely contested, very few lop-sided 
scores.  Such scores usually resulted in the latter part of the game after the team 
had cracked. … 
 
The tournament attracted more national attention tha e 1938, more newspapers 
covered the tournament.  The increased publicity was noticed particularly on the 
West Coast, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and in the south. 
 
The teams were selected by committees in each of the district[s] and there were 
sixteen districts last year.  It is felt that by having thirty-two districts as the 
organization of the National Association of Intercollegiate Basketball calls for, 
there will be more general interest and more widely scattered areas represented.  
The teams in some instances were selected by elimination tournaments.  There 
will be more of these this year. (Liston, E. S., personal communication, October 
12, 1939). 
 
Liston hoped to have the 78-year old Dr. Naismith at the 1940 tournament.  On 
November, 28, 1939, however, Dr. Naismith passed away nine days after suffering a 
massive brain hemorrhage (Stooksbury, 2010).  His son, Jack Naismith, appeared at the 
1940 tournament in his father’s place and went on to state “The National Intercollegiate 
Tournament most nearly carries on with the dream Dr. Naismith had for the game of 
basketball” (Stooksbury, 2010, p. 47). 
 After the death of Dr. Naismith, the official development of the National 
Association of Intercollegiate Basketball (NAIB) moved quickly.  However, many 
organizations were rather displeased with the rapid growth of the NAIB.  The AAU did 
not appreciate the NAIB drawing teams away from its annual events while the NCAA 
refused to acknowledge the NAIB’s existence as a riv l association (Stooksbury, 2010). 
Arguably, the biggest conflict came from Edward J. Hickox, the Secretary-Treasurer of 
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the National Association of Basketball Coaches (NABC).  Hickox believed that the 
NAIB’s goal was to create a divisive league of coaches and warned members about 
encouraging or aiding a movement that would weaken th  NABC (Hoover, 1958).  The 
irony behind Hickox’s letter is that Liston himself was a founding member of the NABC 
and did not receive a copy of this letter (Stooksbury, 2010).  Some members of the NAIB 
presented a copy of Hickox’s letter to Liston, who t en wrote a carefully worded 
response.  Liston stated: 
“The National Association of Intercollegiate Basketball membership is 
institutional, not individual….[it] is not a “divisve” organization….[it] has not, 
through its membership or through representatives of it  membership, sought to 
discourage or alienate members of the National Associati n of Basketball 
Coaches or any other organization or individual memb rs of such organization” 
(Liston, E. S., personal communication, January 13, 1940). 
 
Hoover (1958) noted the issues between Liston and Hickox were ultimately cleared and 
Hickox became a charter member of the coaches’ association sponsored by the NAIA. 
 As the 1940 NIBT approached, Liston called the first general session of the 
Organizing Convention of the NAIB into order.  The m eting was held on March 10, 
1940, in the Phillips Hotel in Kansas City (Wilson, 2005).  Prior to this meeting, a 
constitution committee was already at work drafting a document for the upstart 
organization (Hoover, 1958).  After three sessions ver 26 hours, the meeting attendees 
ratified the NAIB constitution (Stooksbury, 2010).  In addition to the constitution, a 
Nominating Committee was charged with drawing up a list of four Executive Committee 
members and six officers (see Table 5.2.). 
 The collective committee members agreed that the best way to govern the 
tournament was to get coaches from across the nation ctive in the decision-making  
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Table 5-2 - 1940 NAIB Executive Committee and Officers 
Member Position School 
Emil S. Liston Executive Secretary Baker University 
Morris H. Gross President San Diego State University 
E. F. Kimbrell First Vice President Westminster College 
Louis E. Means Second Vice President Beloit College 
Flucie L. Stewart Third Vice President Appalachian State College 
C. E. Miller Fourth Vice President Baltimore University 
Al Baggett Executive Committee West Texas State College 
Raymond W. Hanson Executive Committee Western Illinois State Teachers 
College 
Charles Dee Erickson Executive Committee Washburn College 
Charles R. Davies Executive Committee Duquesne University 
 
process by continually cycling positions of authority (Wilson, 2005).  Thus, the 
committee members decided a new president would be elected each year during the 
NAIB annual convention held before the NAIB Tournament and that the prior year’s 
president would be a member of the Executive Committee for one year (Stooksbury, 
2010; Wilson, 2005).  However, the NAIB’s Executive S cretary had the real power in 
the beginning (Stooksbury, 2010).  For example, as Executive Secretary Liston 
maintained the duties of organizing the NIBT and contr l over the tournament’s overall 
direction. 
 Within the constitution, the founders of the NAIB set forth four purposes and a 
rationale for the organization.  The rationale and purposes were as follows: 
“Fundamentally, the National Association of Intercollegiate Basketball 
believes in the socializing values of intersectional and national competition.  
In the development of such a program … the responsibility for the 
management and control rests with the administrators of college basketball. 
NAIB believes that such a program is compatible with a well-rounded, sound, 
educational program.  Such a program administered through the NAIB 
organization is without the dangers of commercialization by private 
promotion. 
 
1. To foster an appreciation of intercollegiate basketball and an acceptance of the 
responsibility for its growth and development. 
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2. To establish uniformity in the game through district meetings and 
intersectional play culminating in a national championship tournament. 
3. To encourage district organizations, to foster clini s and other similar 
meetings for the good of the game. 
4. To serve member institutions through the office of the Executive Secretary-
Treasurer, which office shall act as a clearing house for helpful information 
and service” (Hoover, 1958, p. 50). 
 
Finally, the NAIB tournament expanded the number of districts from 16 to 32 in order to 
secure a wider representation (Hoover, 1958).  Each district contained a District 
Committee, whose duties were to recommend representative eams from their district and 
serve as liaison personnel.   
 To coincide with the 1941 tournament, the Junior Chamber of Commerce in 
Kansas City sponsored the first “Tip-Off” banquet for approximately 125 members of the 
NAIB and other guests (Hoover, 1958).  This inaugural affair gradually expanded to 
include all 32 teams in the tournament as well as their coaches and managers (Wilson, 
2005).  Along with the banquet, committee members discussed how to strengthen the 
current 32 district organization.  According to Hoover (1958) and Wilson (2005), the 
district system was a key building block of the NAIA structure and proved to be of great 
importance and concern throughout the organization’s history.   
 In the early years, the NAIB annual meeting had real d cision-making 
responsibilities.  For instance, according to Wilson (2005), the delegates sent to the 
annual meetings were required to participate in the decision-making process. However, if 
a school did not send a representative, it would be bound by the decisions of those 
schools that did send representatives.  Hoover (1958) showed evidence of this practice 
after the third annual meeting in 1942 when a constitutional change was passed and went 
into effect immediately.  This constitutional amendment incorporated the amount of 
    
109 
 
annual membership dues ($10 per school) to be paid at the beginning of the NAIB’s 
fiscal year (Hoover, 1958).  The only other noteworthy action from these early meetings 
discussed the election of the District Chairmen: 
“The District Chairmen shall be elected by members of the association within the 
district unless there are less than six members theein.  The election shall be 
annually, prior to April 15.  The president of the association shall, on April 15, 
appoint district chairmen in districts having less than six members” (Hoover, 
1958, p. 53). 
 
Now no longer just a tournament, the NAIB was an athletic association that 
competed against the NCAA for members.  While the NCAA focused primarily on large 
universities, Liston and the NAIB wanted to provide a place for smaller colleges within 
the collegiate sports scheme.  Small schools within the NCAA had desired more 
recognition in the 1930s (Wilson, 2005).  Evidence of these claims exists through a 
charter developed for the smaller schools.  For instance, Forbes (1955) argued that 
smaller schools can have a special role within the NCAA.  He stated: 
“Unlike the powerful “big time” universities, they are relatively free from 
pressure of bowl games, highly competitive schedules, and other external forces.  
Freedom from these obligations should permit the small colleges to take the 
leadership toward improving intercollegiate sports and point out the philosophic 
concepts in relation to general education, if they would but acknowledge and act 
upon their convictions” (p. 202). 
 
However, the NCAA had multiple definitions of a small school and could not reach a 
consensus on a program for these institutions.  Liston appeared to recognize this situation 
and wanted the emerging NAIB to fill this void but by early 1943 World War II began to 
disrupt life profoundly for NAIB.  
World War II resulted in a near cessation of activities for the NAIB as well as 
other intercollegiate activities because limitations on gasoline halted travel to Kansas 
City, many student-athletes volunteered to leave school for the war, and the availability 
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of potential volunteers decreased (Wilson, 2005).  Expectedly, many NAIB schools 
discontinued their active membership while many of the remaining members expressed 
difficulty in paying member fees (Hoover, 1958).  Specifically, no surviving records 
indicate that an annual meeting occurred in the spring of 1943 despite several indications 
the basketball tournament would proceed as scheduled (Hoover, 1958).  However, a new 
set of officers was elected prior to the 1943 event which the Kansas City’s media boasted 
as the classiest event in the NAIB’s six year history (Stooksbury, 2010).  In the end, 
Southeast Missouri would go on to win the NIBT in an all-Missouri contest with 
Northwest Missouri State, 34 to 32 but that would be the last until after the war (Smith, 
1944).   
The Postwar Period (1945 – 1952) 
By the spring of 1945, there were indications that e United States and its allies 
held the upper hand and victory was only a matter of time.  Thus, life began to return to 
normal for U.S. citizens and sporting events returned to area of prominence.  
Accordingly, the NAIB made plans for a return of the NIBT in March of 1945.  However, 
there was some work ahead for the young organization.  First, the organization would 
have to deal with delinquent membership.  From 1942 to 1945, several NAIB member 
schools did not pay their association dues nor have active affiliation during some of the 
critical war years (Hoover, 1958).  In order to re-enlist those colleges, the membership in 
attendance of the 1945 annual meeting felt the proper a proach was one of education 
rather than assign penalties (Wilson, 2005).  In essence, the attending members 
recognized the extraordinary conditions based on the war and refused to allow these 
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circumstances to effect the growth of the NAIB or the positive approach they supported 
for smaller collegiate institutions. 
Many universities saw athletic programs as a luxury item and could not justify 
their existence in the ration-based economy of the war (Stooksbury, 2010).  In addition, 
universities also faced the possibility of closing their doors forever.  College-aged 
students had trouble affording the cost of tuition and were not attending higher education, 
forcing many universities to consider closing their doors (Stooksbury, 2010).  However, 
help came in the form of the U.S. Armed Forces.  In December 1942, the U.S. Armed 
Forces announced plans to utilize college facilities in order to train over 250,000 young 
men in a uniform-and-pay system (“New Army, Navy College”, 1942).  Over 350 
colleges and universities participated in this program and saw an influx of new students 
whom had their tuition paid for by the Armed Forces (“Students Urged to Stay”, 1942).  
The Armed Forces involvement allowed smaller colleges to maintain many of their 
programs and ensured that college-life was renewed to an extent.  Although the students 
were going to become servicemen and often wore military uniforms to class, the recruited 
soldiers were allowed to join student organizations a d participate in athletics such as 
basketball (Stooksbury, 2010).   
As Liston and the NAIB began restoring order in 1945, intercollegiate sports, and 
specifically college basketball, faced a substantial issue in regards to gambling.  In 1944, 
Kansas coach Dr. Phog Allen and Liston were involved in a public feud regarding 
gambling in college sports.  According to Stooksbury (2010), their disagreement centered 
on the ability of gamblers to infiltrate college basketball.  Dr. Allen voiced that gambling 
could threaten the integrity of college sports.  Upon making these claims, Allen provided 
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a telegram to Ned Irish, the acting president of Madison Square Garden in New York, 
that included the name of at least one basketball player who allegedly ‘sold out’ to 
bookies during a basketball tournament in 1943 (“Allen Furnishes Data”, 1944).  Dr. 
Allen did not publicly reveal the name of the player but provided several insightful 
thoughts on the state of affairs: 
“I have obtained much information from coaches who told me things honestly and 
frankly, but who now refuse to take responsibility for their statements.  My 
motive for releasing any information on gambling is no reflection on your 
efficient promotional venture of basketball.  My desir  is to awaken the college 
presidents of America to their responsibility in providing a source of power in 
fighting these professional gambling rodents.  Nothing Irish or any coach or 
promoter can do will stop the gamblers.  Only the college presidents can stop it by 
appointing an absolute czar such as baseball has in Judge [Kenesaw] Landis” 
(“Allen Furnishes Data”, 1944, para. 5-6). 
 
Liston, however, felt that these charges showed a deplorable lack of faith in the American 
youth and meager confidence in the authority of coaches (“Allen Furnishes Data”, 1944).   
Unfortunately, Dr. Allen’s fears were confirmed in 1945.  According to The 
Tuscaloosa News, five basketball players from Brooklyn College in New York willingly 
accepted $1,000 from bookies Harry Rosen and Harvey St mmer to throw a basketball 
game against the University of Akron (“Scandal Brings Major Problem”, 1945).  Dr. 
Allen continued to blame the athletic directors, coaches, and faculty representatives for 
failure to protect college athletics from gambling (“Athletic Chiefs Blamed”, 1945).  He 
also stated: 
“Intelligent people have known all along that big-time gamblers were getting to 
college basketball players in the East.  Instead of facing the facts and acting, our 
national athletic bodies, to save face, have been meting and denying that these 
conditions exist when every well-informed person knew better” (“Athletic Chiefs 
Blamed”, 1945, para. 3). 
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Dr. Allen continued to urge the public that a college czar is necessary in order to deter 
any future offenses.  The NCAA responded with a released statement on January 13, 
1945 condemning the presence of gambling in college basketball but placing much of the 
blame on the media (Stooksbury, 2010).  Further, an NCAA resolution encouraged its 
member schools to bar gamblers from contests, to discontinue the issuance of predication 
charts, and to stop the publication of odds by newspapers (Stooksbury, 2010).  The NAIB 
Executive Committee also took action by drawing up resolutions that clarified the NAIB 
was against all organized gambling on sporting events a d that the organization had no 
affiliation or desire to aid organized gambling (Hoover, 1958). 
Kansas City Star sports editor C.E. McBride defended the NAIB and the NIBT 
noting that scandals similar to this do not occur within the new organization and smaller 
schools.  In an editorial, McBride (1945) wrote: 
“The hush-hush policy with regard to basketball gambling as exposed recently in 
New York never has had many seconds in this corner…But the hush-hush flag 
hasn’t been run up in this corner, and now, with our city teeming with college 
basketeers and their coaches, may be a likely time to dig into the subject again… 
Kansas City long has been a thriving center of basketball and not yet have we had 
to cope with a betting scandal.  Or any other kind of a basketball scandal.  We 
don’t want to start now.  This may not be taken to mean that there is any special 
reason for an article such as this.  As far as we know, there isn’t, but where there 
are bookmaking and betting there always is the chance, and because of that it is 
up to every player and every coach and more than tht, every patron of the game, 
to be on his guard to protect the sport if occasion hould arise. …Mr. Emil S. 
Liston of Baker University is your working head.  He is as splendid a college 
coach and as fine a representative as you could have n med.  He stands for all that 
is good and sporting in college athletics and is firm against all else.  As long as all 
of you connected with the tournament rally around your leader and keep the good 
name of the game and all college sports ever in mind, there isn’t likely to be any 
scandal attached” (para. 1-4). 
 
With encouragement from the Kansas City Media, Liston aimed to persevere through 
both national obstacles and his own health problems in order to produce a quality NIBT 
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in 1945 (Stooksbury, 2010).  Since travel restrictions were still in place from the war as 
well as issues with delinquent membership, Liston and the Executive Committee agreed 
to limit the NIBT field to 16 teams (Hoover, 1958).   
The 1945 Annual Meeting also saw discussions for holding a smaller basketball 
tournament in Kansas City to act as a preseason tip-off event.  According to Hoover 
(1958), two of these programs were held in December 1945.  The financial arrangement 
for these preseason events was similar to that of the NIBT.  Team expenses at the 
tournament site were paid from gate receipts while t e teams themselves were reimbursed 
for their travel expenses as much as possible after tournament expenses had been paid 
(Hoover, 1958).  This tournament was designed to be a four-team event and would later 
be called “tip-off tournaments” (Wilson, 2005).  The participating teams for the first “tip-
off tournament” were defending NIBT champion Loyola University; NIBT runner-up 
George Pepperdine University; West Texas State Teachers College of Canyon, Texas; 
and Valparaiso University of Valparaiso, Indiana.  The tournament netted each 
participating school $275 in addition to its expenses (Hoover, 1958).  Proving to be a 
successful venture, the NAIB continued to sponsor future “tip-off tournaments” in 
succeeding years but moved such events to a specific member’s campus instead of the 
Kansas City neutral court (Wilson, 2005). 
As new business ventures started to become available, the NAIB began to show 
signs of professionalization but the NAIB’s instituonalization paled in comparison to 
explosive growth and the mushrooming of governmental agencies (Wilson, 2005).  One 
of the key reasons was the NAIB was purely run by volunteers.  However, at the 1945 
Annual Meeting, the NAIB agreed to pay Liston $500 in the 1945-46 fiscal year to serve 
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as the organization’s executive secretary (Hoover, 1958).  For the 1946-47 fiscal year, the 
NAIB agreed to raise Liston’s salary to $2,000 and expand his position to a half-time 
position (Wilson, 2005).  Hoover (1958) noted that the proceedings from the 1946 
Annual Meeting indicated the salary increase was commensurate with the amount of time 
that could be devoted to the Executive Secretary position.  Liston also had openness to 
his expanded role since his health issues limited his abilities as a coach (Wilson, 2005).  
Yet, Liston declined a larger salary increase for two reasons: (1) he was receiving 
disability payments from insurance policies and thus felt financially secure; and (2) he 
wanted the NAIB to have some economic freedom since the organization was still in its 
infancy.  The Executive Committee was impressed with Liston’s selfless act and decided 
to provide him with a car allowing Liston to operate easily despite his health problems 
(Wilson, 2005).  As time passed, Liston resigned from his position at Baker University, 
and the Executive Committee offered him a 10-year trm working full time as the 
Executive Secretary at $4,000 per year and increasing to $4,500 in 1948 and $6,000 in 
1949 (Hoover, 1958).   
Next, two issues arose as the NAIB was returning to form.  The first dealt with 
teams participating in the NIBT who were not members of the NAIB.  Since the event’s 
inception, NAIB membership was not a requirement to participate in the NIBT (Hoover, 
1958).  However, if non-member schools participated in the NIBT, they were required to 
pay an entrance fee not required by NAIB members.  Originally, this fee was $25; 
however, NAIB active members wanted to see this fee to increase to $50 (Hoover, 1958).  
In essence, NAIB members were becoming agitated about outside institutions playing in 
the NIBT because they could ultimately steal the show (Wilson, 2005).  Therefore, the 
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members attending the 1946 Annual Meeting agreed to an increase in non-member entry 
fees and would consider future increases at the next annual meeting (Hoover, 1958).  In 
1950, the executive Committee agreed to prohibit any non-NAIB members from 
participating in the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).   
The other main issue involved how NAIB tournament tams were selected. Some 
of the district committees responsible for picking the teams had several institutions 
worthy of entry into the NIBT; thus, some districts implemented a district playoff to 
determine their representative (Wilson, 2005).  However, not all districts prepared 
playoffs for their teams, upsetting members in highly competitive districts.  These 
members proposed at the 1945 Annual Meeting that all district representatives should 
have to qualify for the NIBT through a district playoff (Hoover, 1958).  A committee was 
established to study this proposal and they found that problems varied greatly between 
districts so no general plan could be recommended.  Instead, they suggested plans should 
be worked out in each specific district and publicized before the season starts in order to 
eliminate any misunderstanding about how the district determines their champion 
(Hoover, 1958). 
The 1945 NIBT proved to be a successful return for the NAIB, and discussions 
began for the 1946 tournament about the number of teams it should include.  At the time 
of the 1945 tournament, most members believed another 16-team tournament would be 
conducted in 1946 and in future years until U.S. travel restrictions were removed 
(Hoover, 1958).  However, Liston and other NAIB lead rs believed it was time to return 
the NIBT to a 32-team format and this was discovered through direct contact with each 
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district chairman (Hoover, 1958; E. S. Liston, personal communication, January 20, 
1946; Stooksbury, 2010).   
Expectedly, Liston promoted the 1946 NIBT would have  strong level of 
competition and create a star-studded affair.  Two of the top offensive players were 
reported to play for the NIBT title.  The first was the 7’1” Elmore Morgenthaler of the 
New Mexico School of Mines.  During the 1946 season, Morgenthaler was the nation’s 
second highest scorer with 22 points per game (Stooksbury, 2010).  In addition, Eastern 
Kentucky University was invited to the NIBT and led by forward Fred Lewis who 
averaged 21.5 points per game (Stooksbury, 2010).  The 1946 tournament also included 
many marquee teams such as Indiana State Teachers College; Arizona State University in 
Flagstaff; Louisiana Polytechnic Institute; and the University of Houston.  As news 
continued to accumulate about the ‘celebrity’ of the ournament field, Kansas City 
residents showed their support for the 1946 NIBT through record advanced ticket sales 
(Stooksbury, 2010).   
The 1947 NIBT can be summarized by its eventual champion, the Marshall 
University Thundering Herd.  According to Stooksbury (2010), the Herd was overlooked 
by Kansas City sports fans as they were believed to be ne of the 16 teams that would 
make a short visit to Missouri.  These enthusiasts, however, were unaware of the Herd’s 
high powered offense that averaged 80 points per game during the regular season 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  In the opening round, the Herd shocked the Municipal Auditorium 
attendees when they defeated the Wisconsin State Techers College 113 to 80 despite a 
tournament record 56 points from the losers’ Nate Delong (Wilson, 2005).  Interestingly, 
the newly installed electronic scoreboard had issue ke ping up with the score as it was 
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only able to display two figures (“A Bead on Basket”, 1947).   After their victory, 
Marshall became the odds-on favorite to win the tournament.  The success of the Herd in 
the 1947 NIBT Championships attracted many Kansas City fans and achieved a sell-out 
crowd for the championship game along with record profits (Stooksbury, 2010). 
As the NAIB tournament returned to its state before the war, the Naismith family 
and Liston entered into negotiations about the Maude Naismith Championship Trophy 
given to the winner of the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  The Naismiths still maintained an 
interest in the success of the NAIB tournament after th  death of Dr. Naismith and 
expressed a desire to change the name of the championship trophy (Hoover, 1958).  At 
this time, there was a backlog on orders for awards.  This backlog was a substantial carry 
over from the war as trophies were not available for purchase (Hoover, 1958).  Thus, the 
physical Maude Naismith Trophy was not distributed to the winners of the NIBT since 
1942.  Through correspondence with Liston, Jack Naismith formally requested and 
authorized a change in the name of the trophy from the Maude Naismith Trophy to the 
James Naismith Trophy (Hoover, 1958).  Honoring these wishes, the NAIB officially 
made the change and retroactively awarded past NIBT winners with the James Naismith 
Trophy as far back as 1943 (Wilson, 2005).  Once trophies would be available for 
purchase, the NAIB would utilize money that was rese ved for these awards (Hoover, 
1958). 
With a successful 1947 NIBT, the NAIB was now setting ts sights on 
international competition and the 1948 Summer Olympics (Stooksbury, 2010).  The 
NAIB had an interest in the possibility of gaining recognition for the winner of the NIBT 
as a possible representative in the Olympics (Hoover, 1958).  Liston diligently worked on 
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convincing the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) to grant the NAIB champion a 
place in the USOC’s amateur tournament to decide the 1948 U.S. Olympic basketball 
team (Stooksbury, 2010).  In a letter to Pepperdine U iversity basketball coach Al Duer, 
Liston wrote that his hard work paid off as the NAIB was invited to the USOC’s 
qualifying playoff program (personal communication, August 3, 1947).  The proposed 
tournament was scheduled in March 1948 in New York and would include eight teams in 
two brackets:  a college bracket consisting four college and university teams (two NCAA 
finalists, the NIT winner, and the NIBT winner) and an independent bracket comprised of 
three AAU teams and the Young Men’s Christian Association champion (“American 
Olympic Committee”, 1947).  Once winners emerge from each bracket, the Olympic 
Committee would fill the 14 man roster with seven college players and seven 
independent team members (“Top Amateur Cage Teams”, 1948).  
The University of Louisville captured the 1948 NIBT title, defeating the John 
Wooden coached Indiana State Teachers College 82 to 70 and thus, Louisville traveled to 
New York to participate in the Olympic Trials (Wilson, 2005).  For Louisville to have 
representation on the U.S. squad, it would have to compete against the University of 
Kentucky, the Eastern NCAA champion; Baylor University, the Western NCAA 
champion; and New York University, the NIT runner-up (Grimsley, 1948).  NYU was 
invited to the trials since Saint Louis University, the winner of the 1948 NIT crown, 
withdrew for academic concerns (“Billikens Pass up U.S. Olympic Trials”, 1948).  The 
independent bracket saw the National AAU Champion Phillips Oilers from Bartlesville, 
Oklahoma; National AAU Runner-up Denver Nuggets from Denver, Colorado; AAU 
representative Oakland Bittners from Oakland, California; and National YMCA 
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Champion Prospect Park from Brooklyn, New York (“Top Amateur Cage Teams”, 1948).  
Despite its impressive showing in the NIBT, Louisville would fall to its home-state rival, 
the University of Kentucky, 91 to 57 (“Kentucky, Baylor Win Olympic Trials”, 1948; 
Hoover, 1958).  Kentucky would ultimately advance to the final round of the trials before 
falling to the Phillips Oilers 53 to 49 (“Fourteen Named as Olympic Cagers”, 1948). 
Although Louisville did not win the Olympic trial tournament, it was considered a 
major success for an NAIB institution was allowed to participate in the trials.  The 
NCAA felt it should be the only intercollegiate athletic association for consideration for 
Olympic events and did not want to compete with the NAIB or any other college 
organization (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  Days before the scheduled Olympic trial, 
the NCAA almost got its wish.  On March 4, 1948, Liston had received a letter from 
Louis G. Wilke, Chairman of the 1948 Committee, stating that a protest had been made to 
prohibit the NAIB tournament winner from competing i  the Olympic qualifying 
tournament (Hoover, 1958).  The protest was started by Olympic Committee member 
Harry D. Henshel after he was informed of schools bycotting the NAIB tournament 
because of the NAIB’s rule in regards to prohibiting African-American players from 
competing (“Olympic Committeeman Suggests U.S. Trials”, 1948). 
According to Wilson (2005), the NAIB by-laws did not include any 
discriminatory provisions; however, tournament officials had instituted an informal rule 
against African-American participation when the NAIB was established.  The informal 
rule was first acknowledged in the 1946 tournament when Morningside College of Iowa 
had a black forward named Rosamond Wilson on its roste  (Katz & McLendon, 1988).  
In that tournament, Wilson was forced to stay on bech and serve as his team’s manager 
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(Wilson, 2005).  Pepperdine University basketball coach and the 1947 President of the 
NAIB Al Duer had urged Liston to abolish the discrimination policy and viewed it as 
shameful and undemocratic (Wilson, 2005).  Liston responded supportively to Duer’s 
request but was aware of the obstacles trying to change the views of others.  According to 
Katz and McLendon (1988), Duer discussed the change t the 1947 NAIB tournament 
with some of the Southern leaders of the organization.  However, these efforts did little to 
affect the Southern regions’ attitudes towards African-American participation.    
The North, on the other hand, started to take moral stands against discrimination.  
With Jackie Robinson’s historic participation with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947, the 
New York district took a moral stand against the NAIB’s prohibitive rule (Stooksbury, 
2010).  Manhattan College of New York had earned th right to represent the New York 
district at the 1948 NIBT (“Manhattan Quits over No- egro”, 1948).  However, the 
school declined the opportunity because of the rule barring African-American players 
despite not having any African-Americans on their tam (“Manhattan Quits over No-
Negro”, 1948; Stooksbury, 2010).  In a telegram to Liston, Manhattan College Athletic 
Director Brother Eusebuis voiced his concerns: 
“Manhattan College administration directs me to withdraw our consent to 
participate in the NAIB tournament unless rule quote colored players not eligible 
unquote appended to rule #2 is eliminated.  Unless thi  action is officially 
published as a change and given same prominent as original eligibility rules we 
cannot participate” (B. Eusebuis, personal communication, March 2, 1948). 
 
As the media began picking up this story, Liston informed The New York Times that “our 
executive committee will discuss the situation here Saturday night at the regular meeting 
before the tournament starts” (“Olympic Committeeman Suggests U.S. Trials”, 1948, 
para. 4).  Current NAIB President Joe Hutton also acknowledged: 
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“We do have a rule barring Negros from competition, but it has been in existence 
as long as [the] NAIB.  So far as I can recall, it has never been an issue in the 
selection of teams for Kansas City competition” (“Olympic Committeeman 
Suggests U.S. Trials”, 1948, para. 8). 
 
Despite Hutton’s statements, NAIB New York District Chairman and University 
of Buffalo basketball coach Mal Eiken emphasized that no team from his district would 
be sent to the NIBT unless the rule was rescinded (“Olympic Committeeman Suggests 
U.S. Trials”, 1948).  Along with Manhattan College, other schools from the area 
condemned the 1948 tournament including Long Island U iversity and Siena College 
(“Negro Ban Hurts NAIB Tourney”, 1948).  However, Siena College Athletic Director 
Mauris Fitzgerald was advised that 32 college members w re going to be polled to 
determine if the rule should be repealed (“Olympic Committeeman Suggests U.S. Trials”, 
1948).  According to Hoover (1958), Liston polled the Executive Committee by wire for 
a vote on this problem.  By a vote of seven to two, the committee repealed the ban on 
African-American players (“NAIB Tourney Lifts Ban”, 1948).  While this poll was 
conducted, Liston urged Manhattan College to reconsider its invitation decline (Wilson, 
2005).  Manhattan choose to attend after the rule was rescinded making it as far as the 
quarterfinals in the 1948 NIBT (Wilson, 2005). Further, because of the NAIB’s quick 
action to repeal the rule, the USOC retained the original tournament as planned (Hoover, 
1958). 
The first African-American to participate in the NIBT was Clarence Walker, a 
reserve guard for the Indiana State Teachers College (Wilson, 2005).  At the time, the 
Indiana State Sycamores was coached by future hall of fame coach John Wooden.  In his 
first year, Wooden led the Sycamores to a 17-8 record and earned a bid into the NAIB 
tournament during the 1946-47 season (Stooksbury, 2010).  However, Wooden was 
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aware of the NAIB’s rule regarding African-American players.  Liston contacted Wooden 
personally about his invitation to the 1947 NIBT, but Wooden politely declined the invite 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  The next season, Wooden led th Sycamores to a 23-6 record and 
earned another invite to the NAIB tournament.  Wooden again declined Liston’s 
invitation unless the rule regarding African-American players was rescinded (Stooksbury, 
2010).  After the Executive Committee lifted the ban, Liston again called Wooden to 
invite him to the tournament.  However, this time Wooden accepted the invitation to 
compete in the NIBT because of the potential to advance the progress of integration. 
On March 9, 1948, the Sycamores faced St. Francis College of Lorretto, 
Pennsylvania, in the opening round of the tournament.  Indiana State had little trouble 
defeating St. Francis College, but the importance of this contest came at the midpoint of 
the first half.  Walker entered the game with a 25 to 11 advantage to the delight of the 
Kansas City crowd (Stooksbury, 2010).  According to the Kansas City Call, Walker 
played a total of 20 minutes and contributed a field goal and a free throw to help Indiana 
State defeat St. Francis, 72 to 40 (“Coach Praises Player”, 1948).  Wooden also 
commented: 
“Walker is a good boy and a good player. He plays much better than he has in this 
first game. But he was somewhat tense. He’ll make it all right. He didn’t know 
that he was going along with the team until two days before we left home. He had 
not had any practice for two weeks because we did not k ow if he would be 
permitted to play in the tournament” (“Coach Praises Player”, 1948, para. 5). 
 
The decision to lift the African-American ban became one of the biggest highlights for 
the young NAIB.  The following year, Liston did receive a few angry comments from 
critics, but several African-American players came with their teams from San Jose State, 
Portland University, and Lawrence Tech of Detroit (Katz & McLendon, 1988). 
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 The post-war period proved to be very successful for the NAIB.  Unfortunately, 
this new organization would also have to deal with tragedy when Emil S. Liston suffered 
a fatal heart attack at his home in Baldwin, Kansas on October 26, 1949 (Hoover, 1958).  
More than 1,000 people crowded the First Methodist Church in Baldwin to pay their 
respects to Liston and his family (Stooksbury, 2010).  With respect, the Baker University 
News-Bulletin provided a tribute in the form of an editorial praising Liston’s work with 
smaller colleges (Hoover, 1958). 
After Liston’s death, the Executive Committee convened for two days to discuss 
the future of the NAIB (Stooksbury, 2010).  At this meeting, the committee decided that 
current association president Gus Miller would handle most of the decisions and work as 
the Executive Secretary until an official one could be selected (Hoover, 1958).  For their 
search to replace Liston, Miller and four other committee members chose to limit 
candidates to college men who were familiar with the organization and seek the men 
instead of receiving applications (Wilson, 2005).  This committee screened the applicants 
and brought their findings to the Executive Committee meeting in Kansas City on 
November 27, 1949 (Hoover, 1958).  At the meeting, the search committee recommended 
that former NAIB President and Pepperdine basketball co ch A. O. Duer take over as the 
Executive Secretary of the NAIB (Stooksbury, 2010).  After extensive discussion, Duer 
accepted the position under the provision that no new projects would be undertaken until 
Duer became acclimated as Executive Secretary (Hoover, 1958).  Duer had become close 
with Liston when he was serving as a district chairm n and as NAIB President during the 
1946-47 season.  In addition, Duer enjoyed experience organizing basketball tournaments 
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like the Los Angeles National Collegiate Championship  – an 8-team Christmas holiday 
tournament (Stooksbury, 2010).   
 As Duer began his new position, the NAIB started to consider broadening its 
scope.  A member at the 1949 Annual Meeting had suggested that additional sports be 
regulated under the NAIB (Hoover, 1958).  In the past, Liston responded favorably to the 
suggestion and formed a committee to study the possibility of adding additional sports 
(Wilson, 2005).  The members at the meeting also considered creating their own All-
America basketball team.  Since 1940, the NAIB had been naming All-American teams 
but those teams were only comprised of players from tournament teams (Wilson, 2005).  
The committee created to study this issue developed procedures whereby players would 
select an all-opponent team.  The only stipulation was the players selected had to 
represent a member institution of the NAIB (Hoover, 1958). 
 The NAIB also began discussion regarding organization-specific eligibility rules 
at this time. For instance, before 1949, the organization did not have any eligibility rules 
or standards other than those created by individual conferences or universities (Hoover, 
1958).  A committee was formed to study the possibility of having a code for 
participation in the national tournament (Wilson, 2005).  Should any standards be 
adopted, they would only be applied to the national tournament and not to regular season 
play of the member schools (Hoover, 1958).  After taking a year to study the eligibility 
problems, the committee proposed that transfer students had to reside in their new school 
for 18 weeks in order to become eligible for the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  This new rule 
meant that a transfer student needed to begin in the fall quarter or semester at their new 
school to be able to play basketball in March. 
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 The NCAA was also wrestling with eligibility issues along with financial aid 
concerns.  The growth in popularity of college football around the 1920s concerned 
NCAA officials that enforcement would be a difficult problem to solve (Lazaroff, 2007).  
In 1946, NCAA delegates similarly met in Chicago for a special conference (Wilson, 
2005).  Delegates at this meeting drafted the “Principles for the Conduct of 
Intercollegiate Athletics” (Falla, 1981).  It defined amateurism, required athletes to meet 
the same academic standards as non-athletes, provided rules for offering financial aid to 
athletes, and prohibiting officials representing a member institution from soliciting 
attendance in exchange for financial inducement (Wilson, 2005).  Originally, this 
document started as a questionnaire to NCAA member schools but overwhelming support 
from members allowed the NCAA to adopt the document as Article 3 to the NCAA 
Constitution in 1948 (Falla, 1981).  When this document was approved, the NAIB 
endorsed the Sanity Codes and went on record to do everything possible to further this 
idea (Hoover, 1958). 
The Sanity Codes allowed the NCAA to regulate its member schools by 
establishing a three-member Constitutional Compliance Committee and implement 
penalties for violations.  Interestingly, the only penalty that the NCAA utilized for 
violations was expulsion (Falla, 1981; Wilson, 2005).  By 1950, the Committee found 
seven institutions (i.e., the University of Virginia; the University of Maryland; Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University; Virginia Military Institute; The Citadel; 
Boston College; and Villanova University) in violation of the Sanity Code and brought 
motion to terminate the membership of these schools before the NCAA Convention in 
1950 (“Sanity Code Vote”, 1950).  However, in a seven hour uninterrupted session, the 
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NCAA could not acquire the necessary two-thirds of member votes to expel the schools 
(Fleisher, Goff, & Tollison, 1992). 
 After the vote in 1950, many schools within the Southern and Southwestern U.S. 
were determined to reduce the NCAA’s enforcement and return power back to individual 
universities (“Fight on NCAA Said”, 1951).  According to Falla (1981), the Sanity Code 
raised “the consciousness of everyone connected with intercollegiate sports, but as a 
practical instrument of regulation, it is a failure” without enforcement (p. 134).  At the 
1951 NCAA Convention, NCAA members voted to eliminate the Sanity Code with a 
vote of 130 for and 60 against (“NCAA Votes to Kill”, 1951).   
The need for the NCAA to provide regulation was important since college sports 
faced another gambling scandal.  Three players fromthe City College of New York 
(CCNY), winners of the 1950 NIT and 1950 NCAA Tournaments, admitted to accepting 
$1,500 per game to fix three games played in Madison Square Garden (“Scandal Rocks 
Cage Game”, 1951).  In addition, reports also surfaced that three members of the 1948-49 
University of Kentucky basketball team accepted $500 bribes to shave points in a 1949 
NIT game (“Scandal Reaches Kentucky”, 1951).  Both of these scandals were 
instrumental on many colleges choosing to de-emphasize sport, the main focus of the 12-
Point Code (“NCAA Plans New Policy”, 1951). 
Although the NCAA faced much scrutiny regarding gambling, the NAIB did not 
have as many issues.  The NAIA was not involved in many gambling issues due to its 
high sensitivity toward the issue (Wilson, 2005).  In 1946, the NAIB passed a resolution 
against organized gambling.  By 1950, Kansas State Teachers College basketball coach 
Gus Fish began offering statistical services to NAIB schools through wire services 
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(Wilson, 2005).  While this service provided valuable information, the NAIB was 
concerned that organized gamblers could use this information if it was improperly 
handled.  This fear also prompted the NAIB to exclude the University of Nevada from the 
1950 NIBT (“Nevada Dropped from NAIB List”, 1950).  The University of Nevada 
accepted $1,000 from Las Vegas gambler L.B. Binion to help pay for travel expenses to 
get to Kansas City (“Nevada Dropped from NAIB List”, 1950).  This association led 
Duer and the Executive Committee to exclude the school from the tournament (Wilson, 
2005). 
While organized gambling was a problem for college sports, there were positive 
developments allowing the NAIB to grow.  For instance, in January 1950, a new monthly 
magazine, the NAIB News, had its first issue published and distributed to NAIB members 
throughout the school year (Wilson, 2005).  According to Hoover (1958), the magazine 
was developed by the office of the Executive Secretary and edited by him until a 
Publicity Director was hired by the NAIB.  It was expected to be a monthly publication 
but only five issues appeared in 1950 (Wilson, 2005).  The NAIB also established the 
“NAIB-E.S. Liston Memorial Scholarship”, a $300 cash award provided to a worthy 
basketball player (Hoover, 1958).   
Prior to the 1951 Annual Meeting, the Executive Committee received letters from 
several individuals encouraging the NAIB to broaden its scope (Hoover, 1958).  This 
enthusiasm reached its apex as the Executive Secretary was asked to poll the membership 
by mail for their reaction to expansion and authorized the Executive Committee to 
proceed with expansion when feasible (Wilson, 2005).  Most of the enthusiasm seemed to 
exist for track and field.  District 10 planned to h ld a track meet in the spring of 1951 at 
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Kansas State Teachers College in Emporia, Kansas (Hoover, 1958).  There NAIB 
officials saw the event as a trial run for sponsoring a national championship in track and 
agreed to underwrite $400 for the meet that turned out to be a success with regard to 
participation, interest, and profit (Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).  Because of this success, 
plans were conducted to hold the NAIB’s first national track and field, golf, and tennis 
championships at Abilene, Texas on June 6 and 7, 1952 (Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).  
The Expansion Period (1952 – 1958) 
Many members were enthusiastic with these latest developments and continued to 
push for the NAIB’s expansion.  By 1952, the NAIB was represented all across America 
with over 400 members (Stooksbury, 2010).  At the 1952 Annual Meeting, members 
brought to the floor a suggestion that the name of the organization should be changed in 
order to reflect this new scope (Hoover, 1958).  Many ideas had surfaced but suggestions 
were narrowed to only two options.  The first was the National Association of 
Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) while the other was the National Association of 
Intercollegiate Sports (NAIS) (Hoover, 1958).  After deliberation, the convention agreed 
to send these two recommendations to all members for a v te.  The result was a landslide 
victory (Wilson, 2005).  On October 1, 1952, the organization once known as the 
National Association for Intercollegiate Basketball officially became known as the NAIA 
(Stooksbury, 2010). 
The 1952 Annual Meeting also altered the annual membership fees.  Instead of 
assessing a $10 flat fee, the NAIA decided to create a sliding scale from $10 to $50 based 
on the enrollment of the member school to become effective during the 1952-1953 school 
year (see Table 5.3).  The dues were based upon the enrollment for the 1953-1954 school 
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year and no member that was delinquent in its payment of dues would be permitted to 
vote or participate in any tournament activities.   
Table 5-3 - 1953 NAIA Annual Membership Dues 
College Enrollment Annual Dues 
350 to less $10.00 
350 to 500 $15.00 
500 to 1000 $20.00 
1000 to 1500 $25.00 
1500 to 2000 $30.00 
2000 to 3000 $35.00 
3000 to 4000 $40.00 
4000 to over $50.00 
 
Since the organization was considering expansion, this move was made to boost revenue 
and likely offset any cost increases (Wilson, 2005).  The organization also agreed to alter 
its voting policies.  In earlier meetings, each memb r in attendance would be able to vote 
on matters but the new policy required the district o vote on behalf of their members 
(Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).   
Perhaps the most important business of the 1952 meeting involved the question of 
African-American colleges.  After the NAIB removed the restrictions on African-
American players participating in the NIBT, many African-Americans sought further 
representation by pushing for black colleges to participate in either the NIBT or the 
NCAA Tournament.  According to Crowley (2006), the NCAA had no specific 
regulations that prohibited black colleges from becoming members while the NAIB 
altered its by-laws to allow African-American participation.  At the 1950 NABC Annual 
Convention in New York City, Howard University basketball coach Eddie Jackson, 
Virginia State College coach Harry Jefferson, and North Carolina College coach John 
McLendon brought forth an official petition for black schools to enter either the NCAA 
Basketball Tournament or the NIBT (Katz, 1990).  After arguing their case, The 
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Pennsylvania State University head coach and NABC President John Lawther agreed to 
place its concerns before the NABC Executive Committee (Katz, 1990).  Once 
discussions were complete, Lawther told the three coaches that “Our committee has 
approved your petition unanimously.  We feel that such a step is long overdue and your 
schools must be included if basketball in America is to be truly American” (McLendon, 
1979, p. 7). 
 In 1951, an official forum known as the National Athletic Steering Committee 
(NASC) was created in order to create an organization l focus for all black colleges 
(Katz, 1990).  The NASC’s purpose was to study the problems of segregation and 
discrimination within intercollegiate athletics (Wilson, 2005).  In order to combat these 
problems, the primary goal for the NASC was to get a black college into either the NAIB 
or the NCAA national championship (Stooksbury, 2010).  According to Katz (1990), the 
NCAA was receptive of the NASC’s program but had issues fitting black colleges into its 
membership.  After hearing this news, McLendon (1979) declared:  
“[The NCAA] had no championship apparatus which would accommodate black 
colleges. In fact, the organization argued that they had no way to include any 
‘small’ colleges at all, as it arbitrarily regulated all black schools to small college 
status. Along with this, the NCAA voiced the fear fns may not accept or 
appreciate the kind of game you play…your coaches may not be competent 
enough” (p. 8). 
 
While the NCAA dismissed these schools as small and insignificant, the NAIB was 
becoming open and receptive to the thought of historically black colleges participating in 
the NIBT.  
 On June 5, 1951, Central State College of Ohio applied for admission to the 
NAIB (Wilson, 2005).  Duer initially responded positively to the school’s application for 
membership but was later cautious of the move afterlearning that “yours [Central State 
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College of Ohio] was a colored college” (Katz & McLendon, 1988, p. 14).  At this point 
in time, desegregation had not occurred in the U.S., and Missouri, a former slave state, 
still maintained separate-but-equal racial laws (Wilson, 2005).  The complexity of 
inviting historically black institutions into the NAIA and NIBT prompted Duer to discuss 
this matter thoroughly with the Executive Committee (Katz & McLendon, 1988).  The 
Athletic Director of Central State Mack Greene challenged Duer to apply the NAIA’s 
Code of Ethics which includes a clause against all prejudice (Wilson, 2005).  Duer would 
meet with Greene in Cincinnati in January 1952 at the NCAA annual meeting, which was 
held concurrently with the NASC’s first meeting.  Duer informed Greene that Central 
State was accepted as a full member of the NAIA and would be eligible for the Ohio 
District playoffs two months later (Wilson, 2005). 
 When all members learned of Central State’s acceptance, roadblocks began to 
emerge.  The Ohio District chair, Don Renninger of Findlay College, ruled Central State 
ineligible to participate because he claimed to have no record of Central State’s approval 
to participate (Wilson, 2005).  When Duer confirmed Central State’s membership, 
Renninger threatened to resign if his ruling was not upheld (Katz & McLendon, 1988).  
Duer backed off on his pursuit temporarily but retuned to the matter at the annual 
convention.  On March 12, 1952, the Executive Committee approved that all colleges for 
African-Americans meeting the required standards to be eligible for full membership in 
the NAIA (“Negro Schools In”, 1952).  According to the Kansas City Star, “Negro teams 
now may play in district playoffs where such participation is possible” (“Negro Schools 
In”, 1952, para. 2). In order to accommodate the black colleges, a new district-at-large 
(District 29) was established for all NASC members in the NAIB (Wilson, 2005).  The 
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creation of District 29 essentially turned the newly created NASC basketball tournament 
into a district playoff for the African-American schools with the winner earning a spot in 
the NIBT (Katz & McLendon, 1988).   
 The 1952 NIBT was the last tournament without representation from black 
colleges.  Southwest Missouri State University captured the Naismith Trophy over 
Murray State University 73 to 64 (“Missouri Boys Annex Crown”, 1952).  The event 
again proved to be very successful as advance ticket sal s for the 1952 event rivaled the 
1950 tournament’s figure of 58,000 (“NAIB Meet Opens Today”, 1952).  After the 
tournament, Duer successfully put pressure on Kansas City businesses to open up to 
black teams and told Kansas City that if they stillwanted the NIBT in the Municipal 
Auditorium, they would have to embrace integration (Wilson, 2005).   
Over the course of 1952, 36 black institutions would join the NAIA as the first 
members of the new District 29 (Wilson, 2005).  Many of these schools participated in 
separate tournaments in order to qualify for District 29’s official playoff, the NASC 
Tournament.  According to the Washington Afro-American, Florida A&M College; 
Bethune-Cookman College; Virginia State College; Philander Smith College; Tennessee 
A&I State University; North Carolina College at Durham; Southern University; and 
Lincoln University of Missouri competed in a regional tournament to qualify in February 
1953 (“First Round Cage Pairings”, 1953).  Tennesse A&I would go on to win this 
qualifying tournament as well as the NASC Tournament hosted on its campus for a bid to 
the 1953 NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  According to Wilson (2005), when the Tennessee A&I 
Tiger took the floor in Kansas City, the team was greeted with a cheering crowd.  Central 
State Athletic Director Mack Greene was in the stands for Tennessee A&I’s game and 
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was delighted the crowd welcomed the Tennessee team d spite its “extra protective 
cutaneous pigmentation” (Katz & McLendon, 1988, p. 17).  This response worked to the 
benefit of Tennessee A&I as the Tigers defeated Geneva College in the opening round in 
overtime 89 to 88 and St. Benedict’s College in the second round 79 to 56 (Wilson, 
2005).  However, Tennessee A&I’s run would end in the quarterfinals against East Texas 
State (72 to 67) (Wilson, 2005).  In the end, Southwest Missouri successfully defend its 
title, defeating Hamline University 79 to 71 in what was considered the best event to date 
(“Springfield State Wins”, 1953).   
After the 1953 NIBT, many NAIA schools began scheduling interracial games for 
the following season.  White schools such as Peru State College of Nebraska; Eastern 
New Mexico College; Southwest Missouri State University; and Culver-Stockton College 
would play games against historically black institutions like Kentucky State University; 
Fisk University; and Central State College of Ohio (Wilson, 2005).  In addition, 
Tennessee A&I was invited to participate in the St. Paul, Minnesota, Christmas 
Tournament.  Since the integration plan was going well, NAIA President A. G. Wheeler 
appointed a Select Committee on Integration in order to integrate the District 29 teams 
toward each team’s respective regional district (Katz & McLendon, 1988). 
 While integration was a primary concern during 1953, the NAIA continued to 
focus on other issues.  For example, the NAIA was concerned with the eligibility of its 
members when the Presidents’ Advisory Committee (PAC) proposed that new members 
applying for membership must maintain membership in their regional accreditation 
agency (Hoover, 1958).  While this recommendation was meant for future members, the 
policy was not made retroactive so not to deter curent members that are either not 
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accredited or in the process of accreditation (Wilson, 2005).  Representatives from the 
American Association for Health, Physical Education, a d Recreation (AAHPER) were 
also in attendance.  According to the NAIA News, plans were initiated “to work out an 
affiliation of our two organizations which would bea great step toward bringing athletics 
and physical education back into mutual understanding and administration” (NAIA News, 
1953, p. 6).    
Professionalism was also a matter of great concern in 1953 for all amateur 
organizations.  After its annual convention, the AAU altered its rule on professionalism 
to where a professional athlete could regain his/her amateur status after a five-year 
waiting period (“Better Athletes is Olympic Aim”, 1953).  However, the athlete cannot 
regain his amateur status in the sport the athlete was paid money (“Better Athletes is 
Olympic Aim”, 1953).  The USOC, in attendance at the meeting, also agreed to the 
AAU’s definition and altered its rules accordingly.  On the other hand, the AAU’s new 
definition put both the NCAA and the NAIA at odds.  Specifically, the NAIA decided if a 
player became a professional in one sport, he would stil  be considered an amateur in all 
other sports (Hoover, 1958).  According to Wilson (2005), “a professional career in one 
sport was like an outside job and did not logically ffect any other sport” (p. 39).  The 
NCAA, however, would not follow suit until the 1970s. 
Next, the NAIA established the National Association of Intercollegiate Athletic 
Coaches (NAIAC) in order to discuss problems peculiar to the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  
The NAIAC’s membership included coaches from all sports.  This association 
differentiated itself from other coaching organizations because many of the other 
coaching groups were for specialized coaches working in one specific sport/domain 
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(Hoover, 1958).  NAIA coaches were typically employed in multiple positions similar to 
former Executive Secretary Emil Liston (Baker University’s football, basketball, and 
baseball coach as well as Athletic Director) and current Executive Secretary A. O. Duer 
(George Pepperdine University’s basketball coach and Athletic Director) (Wilson, 2005).  
Therefore, they encountered unique problems and experiences that were different from 
those coaches at larger universities.   
Little substantive action took place in 1954.  The only noteworthy item from the 
1954 NAIA Annual Meeting was the adoption of a two-year suspension for schools 
failing to participate in the national basketball tournament after declaring its intention to 
participate (Hoover, 1958).  By 1955, the NAIA implemented new measures to help with 
its growing membership numbers.  According to Wilson (2005), membership during the 
1950-51 school year was 314 schools and averaged 10 schools for each of the 32 districts.  
By 1955, the membership count escalated to 437 (14 schools per district) and would 
stabilize over the next decade (Wilson, 2005).   
The fastest growing and largest district was District 29 (i.e., the district-at-large 
for historically black colleges).  Recognizing this trend, Duer and the Executive 
Committee agreed to provide District 29 with two entries into the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  
One of these entries would qualify through the NASC Tournament while the other would 
be selected as an at-large team (Hoover, 1958).  This idea essentially created a new 
district (District 6) for all the Southern historically black schools in 1956 (Wilson, 2005).  
Two years later, District 6 itself was split into two separate districts (i.e., District 6A for 
Southeastern institutions and District 6B for all Southwestern schools) (Wilson, 2005).  
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Overall, this arrangement assured three black colleges an opportunity to participate in the 
NIBT and demonstrated the value of black colleges to the NAIA. 
Also at the 1955 NAIA Annual Meeting, Duer called for a vote on two items that 
he began campaigning for in 1953 (Wilson, 2005).  First, Duer wanted to apply the 
NAIA’s current standards of eligibility for all levls of competition (Hoover, 1958).  At 
the time, both the NAIA and the NCAA had standards of eligibility only for post-season 
play and national tournaments (Wilson, 2005).  The proposal passed at the 1955 meeting 
and provided the NAIA with actual enforcement over ‘eligibility’ violators.  In 
comparison, the NCAA held little enforcement power and a problematic eligibility 
certification process (Falla, 1981).  For example, once an NCAA athlete had his academic 
progress certified, typically in the fall semester, he athlete could compete in sports for 
the entire year without attending a class (Falla, 1981).  Duer’s second issue involved 
problems with transfer students from junior colleges.  He recommended an 18-week 
resident requirement be implemented for transfer students, who were defined as students 
“who had not been graduated by the junior college from which they came” (Hoover, 
1958, p. 100).  A third item at the 1955 NAIA Meeting called for district basketball 
playoff games to be held on the home courts of participants (Hoover, 1958).  This rule 
adoption was a measure that presumably would try to educe the possible costs of outside 
gym rental and enhance the proceeds available to send teams to the NIBT (Wilson, 2005). 
In the end, all three items were approved.  
By the 1956 Annual Meeting, many delegates wanted to expand the NAIA’s 
sports offerings which were limited to basketball, track and field, tennis, and golf 
(Hoover, 1958).  The first NAIA Track and Field Championship took place in 1952 and 
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was met with great fanfare.  Abilene Christian University proved to be an early dominant 
force in track and field, winning the 1952, 1954, and 1955 events and taking second in 
1953 (“Abilene Christian First”, 1955; Wilson, 2005).  While track and field proved to be 
a success with the addition of tennis and golf as supplementary events, the delegates at 
the 1956 NAIA Convention decided to sponsor national ch mpionships in wrestling, 
swimming, cross-country, and baseball (Hoover, 1958).   
Also previously absent from the formal conversation and NAIA was football, 
despite the great interest in that activity from its membership.  According to Wilson 
(2005), the NAIA began publishing detailed statistic  for the sport before voting to 
sponsor an official national championship.  In 1956, the NAIA became the first national 
collegiate athletic organization to directly sponsor a postseason football game (Hoover, 
1958).  The delegates dubbed the first postseason event the Aluminum Bowl, and it was 
to be held on December 22, 1956, in Little Rock, Arkansas (Hoover, 1958).  Little Rock 
was chosen as the site because it was not in close pr ximity to any major NCAA bowl 
game; was home of the 35,000 seat War Memorial Stadium; and was far enough south to 
get fair weather in December (“Aluminum Bowl Game to be”, 1956). The practice of 
providing for a national championship differed significantly from the NCAA as the 
organization only sanctioned postseason bowl game co petition opposed to a postseason 
playoff.  
Many schools hoped to impress the NAIA selection committee for an invite to the 
first Aluminum Bowl (“Westminster Seeking Bid”, 1956; “Mighty Bears Push Toward”, 
1956).  The selection committee was composed of the curr nt NAIA President, 
immediate past president, the current NAIA First Vice-President, and a representative 
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from the Aluminum Bowl Association (Hoover, 1958).   After deliberation, the NAIA felt 
the two best teams in the nation were Montana State University and the St. Joseph’s 
College of Collegeville, Indiana (“St. Joseph’s Meets Montana”, 1956).  The NAIA 
expected to have a crowd between 15,000 and 25,000 for the game (“Aluminum Bowl 
Game to be”, 1956).  Interestingly, the game was also to be televised by the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) (Hoover, 1958).  However, th  event was less than stellar as 
the Aluminum Bowl ended in a scoreless tie and was pl yed in the rain on a muddy field 
(“Montana Bobcats Tie”, 1956).  Both Montana State nd St. Joseph’s shared the 
Aluminum Bowl trophy and title as co-champions (“Montana Bobcats Tie”, 1956).  The 
weather caused the attendance to drop to 8,000 (“NAIA Official Outlines Bowl Game”, 
1957).   
The next year, the NAIA decided to move the football g me from Little Rock to a 
new site (“NAIA Official Outlines Bowl Game”, 1957).  According to Hoover (1958), 
the decision to move the event was due to the unsettled conditions surrounding the racial 
integration of the City of Little Rock and the NAIA’s support of its historically black 
members.  After the decision to move the game, Duer laid out a basic outline for any city 
considering hosting the game.  This outline stated that the city would need: 
1. A stadium capable of seating 18,000-20,000 persons to help pay the “the 
game’s expenses.” 
2. A sponsor for the television rights which run about $25,000. 
3. Satisfactory weather conditions. 
4. A general interest in the NAIA’s level of collegiate athletics (“NAIA Official 
Outlines Bowl Game”, 1957, para. 9). 
 
Many areas were considered for the second NAIA football championship. Competing 
cities included Memphis, Tennessee; Odessa, Texas; Sacramento, California; and St. 
Petersburg, Florida (“NAIA Official Outlines Bowl Game”, 1957).  Duer originally 
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entered into negotiations to have the Aluminum Bowl in Memphis, but those talks broke 
down the NAIA chose to move the game to St. Petersburg (Putnam, 1957; “Small 
College Bowl Will Not”, 1957). 
 St. Petersburg was excited to host the 1957 Alumin Bowl, but decided to hold 
a contest to change the name of the event (“Latest Entry; Satellite Bowl”, 1957).  The 
contest saw 1,973 entries with the winner receiving a  all-expense paid vacation to 
Havana, Cuba (“Latest Entry; Satellite Bowl”, 1957).  After reviewing the submissions, 
the St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce and the NAIA agreed to alter the Aluminum 
Bowl name to the Holiday Bowl (Hoover, 1958).  The inaugural Holiday Bowl was 
played at Stewart Field and saw Pittsburg State College of Kansas compete against 
Hillsdale College of Michigan (“Pitt Teacher Club Arrives”, 1957).  In front of a crowd 
of 7,500 and a CBS nationally televised audience, Pittsburgh State would hold-off a 
Hillsdale comeback and win the second annual NAIA National Championship 27 to 26 
(“Pittsburgh 27-26 Victor”, 1957). 
 After having to move the game once, Duer wanted th Holiday Bowl at one 
permanent site (Putnam, 1957).  With the first St. Petersburg event proving to be a 
financial success, it seemed to be a great location for future years (“Integration Issue May 
Force”, 1957).  Unfortunately, racial tension again became an issue for the NAIA.  
According to St. Petersburg Independent Sports Editor Jeff Moshier, integration could 
have forced the NAIA to move its football championship again (“Race Issue Held 
Periling”, 1957).  For instance, the fans in attendance at the Holiday Bowl were surprised 
African-Americans participated for both teams in the first Holiday Bowl and an African-
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American cheerleader worked for Hillsdale College (“Integration Issue May Force”, 
1957).  More specifically, Moshier commented: 
 “While this might appear bigoted to many, the fact remains that St. Petersburg of 
all the  
large cities in Florida probably maintains the strongest front against integration, 
notwithstanding that as a resort city the bulk of its population no doubt is native 
of north of the Mason-Dixon line. Strong criticism can be expected from the 
segregationists and unless an agreement is reached to draw the color line a 
cleavage in the ranks of the city’s more prominent business and civic leaders 
might result if an effort is made to repeat an integrated game.  And it is unlikely 
that the NAIA will be interested in returning now tha  the integration issue has 
been raised” (“Race Issue Held Periling”, 1957, para. 8-9).  
 
Despite Moshier’s prediction, Richard A. Parker, chairman of the Holiday Bowl 
Committee believed “there is absolutely no reason why e won’t have the Holiday Bowl 
here next year” (“Race Issue Held Periling”, 1957, para. 3).  Parker was correct on his 
assessment as the Holiday Bowl would stay in St. Petersburg until 1960. 
Along with adding new sports, the critical 1956 Annual Meeting saw legislation 
that streamlined the district committees’ voting representation along with the opportunity 
to gain athletic insurance coverage (Hoover, 1958). In 1954, catastrophic insurance was 
made available to the member schools; however, starting in fall 1956, three levels were 
offered to the members to provide for a wider coverag  of events (Wilson, 2005).  The 
highest plan would “cover any intercollegiate sport, including football”, and would have 
“the insurance company pay all costs for any accident to the insured” (Hoover, 1958, p. 
105).   
The 1957 Annual Meeting created a new Faculty Athletic Chairmen Committee 
(Hoover, 1958).  Under Perry Mitchell of Central Washington State College (Ellensburg, 
Washington), the Faculty Athletic Chairs worked on eligibility issues and academic 
standards (Hoover, 1958).  According to Wilson (2005), the presence of this committee 
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“provided a deterrent to any temptation the athletic directors might have had to water 
down academic standards” (p. 44).  Finally, a special meeting of selected college 
presidents, athletic representatives, coaches, and Executive Committee members was 
called with the aim to revise the NAIA’s Aims and Objectives (Wilson, 2005).  After the 
meeting was completed, a 14-point set of Aims and Objectives was drawn up and sent to 
all member schools for feedback (Hoover, 1958).  Once revisions were received, the 
group would reconvene at the 1957 Annual Meeting and incorporate the members’ 
feedback into a revised proposal (see Appendix 1).   
 By 1957, the NAIA was a thriving organization with the addition of the new 
sports and the active engagement of its membership at annual meetings.  However, 
Wilson (2005) noted Duer and the NAIA felt they were under constant attack from the 
NCAA during this time.  At the NCAA Convention in January 1956, the NCAA decided 
to set up a small college basketball tournament beginning in 1957 to rival the NAIA 
(Falla, 1981).  For instance, many believed this new tournament would eventually “kill 
off the NAIA tournament” (“Fans, Officials Satisfied with Present”, 1956, para. 8).  
Furthermore, it was arranged so that the new small college tournament would have no 
relation with the much larger university championship or encourage any form of playoff 
between them (“NCAA Meet Disbands”, 1956; “NCAA to Split Tourney”, 1956).  
Interestingly, the institutions would be able to declare which tournament they want to 
participate in and NAIA schools were invited to declare their allegiance to the NCAA a 
year in advance if they planned to switch (“NCAA Meet Disbands”, 1956).   
Upon hearing about this possibility, Duer attended the NCAA Convention to 
make a strong pitch for the NAIA and about the proposed split.  Specifically, Duer stated: 
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“We feel that athletics throughout the nation will be hurt by this move. It’s 
difficult for us to understand why the NCAA, after 15 years, suddenly becomes 
interested in the small colleges, particularly in the basketball tournament area.  
We are at a critical time now maintaining our athletic programs.  Many small 
schools are in danger of losing football because of lack of support.  We can’t see 
why you don’t show interest in this situation, rather than setting up a duplicating 
activity” (“NCAA to Split Tourney”, 1956, para. 9 and 10).  
 
According to Katz and McLendon (1988), Duer also wrte to a friend that: 
“Everyone here knew for sure that the aim of this move of the NCAA was to put 
us out of business…My good friend, Mr. [Walter] Byers [NCAA president] has 
put us Number 1 on his wanted list and makes no secret he is after our scalp” (p. 
26-27). 
 
After the NCAA’s decision, the NAIA started actively campaigning to strengthen its 
membership, which was comprised of 465 colleges at the ime (“NAIA Fighting against 
NCAA”, 1956).  Duer and the Executive Committee began sending brochures to NAIA 
members that included clippings and excerpts from various sports writers and college 
officials criticizing the NCAA decision (“NAIA Fighting against NCAA”, 1956).  The 
booklet included a statement from Duer that read “The reported prediction of the 
decrease of NAIA finds it in the healthiest [sic] position in its history” (“NAIA Fighting 
against NCAA”, 1956, para. 7). 
 According to Katz (1990), the NCAA became threatened by the NAIA’s success 
at integrating the historically black institutions i to the NIBT and into the greater 
organization.  Before the NAIA, the NCAA was uncertain with how to effectively deal 
with the black colleges because the organization viewed these schools as small and 
insignificant (Crowley, 2006).  The NAIA’s suspicions became more pronounced when 
the NCAA set up a regional tournament involving four black colleges – Florida A&M 
University; Tuskegee University; North Carolina A&T State University; and Lincoln 
University (Wilson, 2005).  Crowley (2006) noted the four-team tournament was 
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scheduled at Tuskegee University and purposefully involved the addition of Lincoln 
University as an outside competitor.   
 Unfortunately for the NAIA, many of the historically black schools disagreed 
about which path would be best for their future. For example, Central State Athletic 
Director Mack Greene urged many of the black colleges to establish and maintain dual 
membership if possible with the NAIA and the NCAA so they could attend the national 
tournament of their choice (Wilson, 2005).  On the other side, former North Carolina 
College and current Tennessee A&I basketball coach John McLendon and Texas 
Southern University basketball coach Alexander Durley called for a loyalty pledge 
among the black schools associated with the NAIA (Katz & McLendon, 1988).  Their 
message included the opportunities the NAIA provided these institutions such as African-
Americans on committees and having an opportunity to compete on an equal basis 
(Wilson, 2005).  Because of this strong message, many of these colleges decided to stay 
associated with the NAIA (Katz, 1990).  One of the well-known examples of loyalty 
came from Hillsdale College.  Hillsdale was a dual member before the 1957 season and 
was penalized for its participation in the NAIA National Championship game by the 
NCAA (“Quits NCAA for Play”, 1957).  Hillsdale Athletic Director and Coach Frank 
Waters decided to withdraw the school’s affiliation with the NCAA instead of facing the 
NCAA’s penalties because of the NCAA’s alleged tolerance of a black school ban in 
1954 (“Quits NCAA for Play”, 1957). 
To further support or reinforce the NAIA against the NCAA the NAIA sought out 
partnerships with other outside organizations.  As an example, in 1958, the NAIA began 
an association with both the National Federation of State High School Athletic 
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Associations (NFHS) and the National Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA) to 
better manage the NAIA’s sponsored sports (Wilson, 2005).  The three organizations 
formed a close working relationship and termed themselves the National Alliance of 
Athletic Associations (NAAA) (Hoover, 1958). For instance, the NAIA Football 
Advisory Committee and the NAIAC voted to make the NAAA rules for football the 
official rules for the NAIA sponsored bowl game (Wilson, 2005).  Before this ruling, all 
schools at the college level played under the rules originally set up by the NCAA 
(Hoover, 1958). 
Finally, after operating in the offices of George Pepperdine University in Los 
Angeles since 1949, the NAIA officially moved its executive offices to Kansas City in 
the summer of 1957 (Wilson, 2005).  NAIA officials desired a move to stabilize the 
association and its impending conflict with the NCAA.  In essence, the move was vital 
because it provided better service to over 400 members (Hoover, 1958).  In addition to 
the new locale, Duer decided to staff a full-time Director of Publicity as well as 
additional office workers (Hoover, 1958).  With the expansion into new sports, NAIA 
officials believed the organization was establishing itself as one of the premiere 
intercollegiate sports associations in the U.S. 
The Establishment Period (1958 – 1962) 
 According to Land (1977), NAIA officials focused much of their attention in 
1958 on four general areas:   
“(1) clarification of policies; (2) improvement and expansion of national 
championship events programs; (3) the folly of expanding institutional athletic 
programs at the cost of complete loss of educational purpose or significant 
dilution of purpose; and (4) affiliation with other o ganizations” (p. 33). 
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Again, the biggest threat to the NAIA at this time was the creation of the NCAA’s 
College Division.  The success of the College Division basketball tournament in 1957, 
held in Evansville, Indiana, led the NCAA to sponsor a cross-country championship meet 
in 1958 and to provide small colleges more representatio  on rules committees (“NCAA 
Council Report Warns Tougher”, 1959; “NCAA Meeting Winds Up”, 1958).  However, 
the NCAA did not view the addition of the College Division as the suggested act of war 
nor did it intend to fight with the NAIA over dual memberships (“NCAA Denies ‘War’ 
with NAIA”, 1958).  NCAA Executive Director Walter Byers further elaborated on this 
with the following: 
“Almost 200 smaller institutions have become members of the NCAA during the 
past seven years which seems to be positive proof that the NCAA provides 
services and benefits which they can’t find anywhere else.  We do not conduct 
membership drives or solicit members and we are really proud and grateful that 
our membership has increased by 88 percent during th s period” (“NCAA Denies 
‘War’ with NAIA”, 1958, para. 3). 
 
While the NCAA was trying to promote the positives of the College Division, NAIA 
officials still feared that NCAA wanted to lure away NAIA members by providing them 
with a more known alternative (“NCAA Council Report Warns Tougher”, 1959; Wilson, 
2005).   
Another one of Duer’s fears focused on how the natio l sports scene was 
evolving toward a product focused on the glamour and excitement of “big time” 
programs (Land, 1977, p. 34).  In much of his commentary, Duer wanted the NAIA to 
resist this trend and instead focus on the concept of an “educationally integrated athletic 
program” (Wilson, 2005, p. 46).  Duer articulated his concerns in the first expanded 
edition of The NAIA News as he wrote about the principles he supported.  Within Duer 
stated: 
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“The basic aim to which we must hold if we are to be worthy of leadership in 
intercollegiate athletics is that our program must be based squarely on sound 
educational policies and be an integral part of the total educational offering of 
member institutions rather than a separate commercial or promotional adjunct.  
The acceptance of this aim is and must continue to be the distinguishing quality of 
our program and its test of membership.  The acceptance of this concept serves as 
a real base for the development of the athletic program of an institution.  
However, this concept is contrary both to the present tr nd in the development of 
intercollegiate athletics nationally and also is in d rect conflict with the major 
trends of our society” (Duer, 1958, p. 3). 
 
 Duer’s message to the membership was a part of one of th  significant 
developments from the 1958 annual meeting: the expansion of The NAIA News as the 
official source of news for NAIA members (Land, 1977).  The NAIA News aw its 
publication schedule changed to quarterly issues from a periodical basis because of 
members’ desires for an expanded NAIA. Specifically, The NAIA News was to expand its 
content and volume (Wilson, 2005).  According to Land (1977), the expanded magazine 
had three purposes:  
(1) to present news of interest to the members;  
(2) to serve as an organ for exchange of ideas for imp ovement of techniques; and 
(3) to give constant interpretation and motivation t  the philosophy, aims, and 
objectives of the NAIA (p. 35). 
 
 The formation of the NAAA proved to be a significant step for football coaches as 
the rules of the game were finally established and unified (Land, 1977).  Specifically, 
over 11,000 football teams at different levels of cmpetition were now playing with 
similar rules because of the previously aforementioned alliance between the NJCAA, 
NFHS, and NAIA. Those rules provided benefits such as alliance representation; free 
substitution, which allowed a more efficient utilization of players; the use of freshman 
players; uniform officiating; consistent athletic performance; and knowledgeable 
spectators (Land, 1977).    
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The 1958 Holiday Bowl championship game saw an expansion in presentation as 
the NAIA implemented a four team playoff for its football national championship, 
something the NCAA would not implement until 2014 (“2 Grid Play-offs to Precede 
Bowl”, 1958).  The playoff system was implemented in accordance with the NAIA’s 
tradition that champions must prove their right to itles on the playing field (“2 Grid Play-
offs to Precede Bowl”, 1958).  St. Petersburg was encouraged by the success of the prior 
bowl game and the playoff was announced as a mechanism to enhance the event.  In 
January 1958, city leaders formed a group known as the Committee of 100 in order to 
study the construction and financing of a new sport facility centered on the Holiday Bowl 
(Bothwell, 1958).  Committee Chairman Richard Parker declared: 
 “We believe that the future of that game (Holiday Bowl) will depend upon our 
ability to  
supply a stadium.  We have a year to put it across. But the year after that we’re 
going to need a stadium.  I think it’s going to be one of the most important 
projects this city will ever see” (Bothwell, 1958, para. 3). 
 
The concern for a new stadium can also be attributed to comments from CBS.  According 
to Walter Ramseur, St. Petersburg Chamber of Commerce President, an NAIA official 
had informed him that CBS was in favor of televising the Holiday Bowl, but did not like 
the Stewart Field background of traffic and landscape (Bothwell, 1958).  CBS also noted 
it preferred to broadcast the game from Al Lang Field, a baseball stadium, since it had 
better television accommodations (“Council Okays Lang Site”, 1958).  After deliberation, 
the council unanimously approved hosting the Holiday Bowl and agreed the baseball 
diamond would not be damaged by the football contest (“Council Okays Lang Site”, 
1958). 
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 By November 1958, the NAIA selection committee chose Northeastern Oklahoma 
State College of Tahlequah, Oklahoma; Gustavus Adolphus College of St. Peter, 
Minnesota; St. Benedict’s College of Atchison, Kanss; and Arizona State College of 
Flagstaff, Arizona as the top four teams for the inaugural playoffs (“NAIA Selects 
Playoff Teams”, 1958).  On December 6, 1958, Northeast rn Oklahoma was paired with 
St. Benedict’s in Tulsa while Arizona State met Gustavus Adolphus in Tucson (“4 NAIA 
Clubs Clash”, 1958).  Both Northwestern Oklahoma and Arizona State won their semi-
final contests and earned a chance for the NAIA Nation l Championship (“Holiday Bowl 
Foes Get Here”, 1958).  Once the contestants were determined, 3,000 fans purchased 
tickets for the Holiday Bowl on December 20, 1958 (“3,000 Holiday Tickets Sold”, 
1958).  While initial sales were strong, some 3,500 seats remained available for the 
stadium that could host 10,000 (“Suncoast Blackout Set”, 1958).  Due to the decline in 
ticket sales, Eugene Dodson, the general manager of Station WTVT of Tampa, 
announced the Holiday Bowl was going to be blacked out for anyone within a 150 mile 
radius of St. Petersburg (“Suncoast Blackout Set”, 1958).  Although the game was not 
shown to St. Petersburg residents, the 1958 Holiday Bowl emerged as a successful event 
as Northeastern Oklahoma State defeated Arizona State 19 to 13, becoming the third 
NAIA National Champion in football (“Lumberjacks Determined to Return”, 1958).  
Both Arizona State head coach Max Spilsbury and Northwestern Oklahoma State head 
coach Harold Stratton suggested the increase in stature of small college football through 
the playoff was exciting. Further, Spilsbury also stated: 
“I suppose a lot of people who have been watching the pros and major colleges 
play all season didn’t think much of a small college game on television.  But I’m 
sure we gave them a good show.  I think we certainly brought credit to NAIA 
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football [sic]. The boys on both teams played their arts out” (“Lumberjacks 
Determined to Return”, 1958, para. 7-8). 
 
While the Holiday Bowl was praised by the competing coaches and the NAIA deemed 
the playoffs successful, the NCAA was not content with one of the invited participants.  
An 18-man NCAA Advisory Council placed Gustavus Adolphus, a dual member of 
NCAA and NAIA, on probation for one year for competing in the non-NCAA certified 
playoff game against Arizona State (“NCAA Puts Cincy and Holiday”, 1959).   
 As the NAIA was expanding, the organization became difficult to manage and 
caused Duer to continually contact members to make sur  all affairs were in order.  
According to Land (1977), each member of the Executive Committee was given the 
responsibility of regulating selected committees in Table 5.4.  This approach taken by 
Duer highlights what is arguably the strength of the NAIA:  its “grassroots decision 
making” organizational structure (Land, p. 40).  The NAIA governance structure 
represented an extensive democratic process.  Leaders were provided with multiple  




John Longfellow Finance, International Affairs, Swimming 
Ross Merrick International Affairs, Professional Education, President’s 
Advisory 
John Knight Special Redistricting, Golf 
Francis Hoover Statistical, Television, Historical 
A. W. Mumford Faculty Athletic, Redistricting 
Leo Nicholson Hall of Fame, Special Awards, Track and Field, Conferences 
Al Buckingham Cross Country, Wrestling 
Cliff Aultman Tennis, NAIAC 
Jess Hawthorne Baseball, Research 
Volney Ashford Independent Colleges, Football 
W. L. Zorn Necrology 
E. D. Fish Basketball, All-American awards 
Ray Hanson Membership (chairman) 
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opportunities to evaluate last year’s programs, to unify thinking on major problems, and 
to promote the unity of policies and practices in support of the stated aims and objectives 
of the NAIA (Land, 1977).   
 The attendees of the 1959 Annual Meeting discussed everal significant items 
vital to the health of the NAIA.  First, the NAIA faced pressures from the NCAA when 
the NAIA desired for another chance to represent the United States in the Olympics 
(Wilson, 2005).  The NCAA was in a long-standing conflict with the AAU and the 
USOC over who would be the official administrative body for the various sports 
programs of amateur standing (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  In 1959, the AAU and 
the NCAA had two rival interpretations over “amateurism.”  As noted earlier, the AAU’s 
interpretation was no professional athlete, regardless of sport, would be allowed in any 
amateur participation (Hoover, 1958; Land, 1977).   The Executive Committee voted to 
adopt the AAU’s definition and planned to phase in the rule by 1962 (Wilson, 2005).  
The delay in adoption occurred because Duer realized th re may be some issues with 
current students and decided to have those individuals finish their eligibility before 
having to conform to the new rules (Duer. A. O., personal communication, June 29, 
1959). 
 Another issue that concerned the NAIA was the question of conflicting events.  
Many NCAA events were scheduled at the same time as NAIA events (Land, 1977).  
Because some of the members maintained a membership in both organizations due to the 
NCAA’s College Division, schools would often wait until the last minute to decide which 
postseason event would provide the most benefit (Wilson, 2005).  For the NAIA, delays 
in playoff decisions by dual members resulted in a we kening of its playoff events and 
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damaging of public relations and potential income earn d (Land, 1977).  The Executive 
Committee did not take the severity of this issue light y and adopted the following policy 
in order to mollify the dual membership conflict: 
 POLICY: 
 
That all member institutions of NAIA shall, by reason of their membership, be 
assumed to be in full support of the total program of NAIA. 
 
That an institution which is determined by their district committee to be worthy of 
or qualified for participation shall be expected to support the NAIA program. 
 
If an institution determines they do not wish to participate in any post-season 
competition in a given sport or in all sports, they must inform the district 
chairman in writing well in advance of the beginning of the selection process.  
Otherwise, they will be assumed to wish to be considered for participation.  
Member institutions have full right to decide not t participate in either district or 
national tournaments and meets and no penalty will be given according to this 
paragraph. 
 
If such an institution participates in a conflicting tournament or meet, either in 
date or in fact, the following penalty shall be imposed: 
1. The institution shall be suspended from all district and national events. 
2. They shall be ineligible for participation in statistical service of NAIA. 
3. They shall lose their right to vote on district or national issues. 
4. They shall be ineligible for consideration of any me ber of their staff to 
serve on district or national committees during their p riod of suspension 
(NAIA, 1959, p. 13). 
 
A follow-up enforcement policy was also crafted conurrently to provide the Executive 
Committee a realistic method to deal with the dual membership problem: 
 ENFORCEMENT POLICY: 
 
1. Power to enforce this policy and to mete our suspenion and penalties for 
infraction shall be vested in the Executive Committee of NAIA, who shall 
take such action as they deem wise after consultation w th the district 
committee in which the institution holds membership and an opportunity has 
been given the institution involved to justify its action. 
2. Normal penalty for infraction of this policy shall be for a one-year period.  
However, lesser or greater penalties may be imposed a  the situation demands 
(NAIA, 1959, p. 14-15). 
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While creating the policy was a relatively simple process, the NAIA realized the 
dual membership problem was more complex.  According to Land (1977), the conflict 
was not a simple matter of an individual school looking for the best opportunity.  Quite 
often, entire conferences had belonged to the NCAA.  Under NCAA rules, conference 
champions were required to play in the NCAA playoffs (Wilson, 2005).  With both the 
NAIA and the NCAA placed pressure on individual schools, dual membership did not 
appear to be a viable action.  Instead, both associati ns now wanted full commitment 
from schools.  Duer summed up his beliefs by arguin: 
“The pledge has not functioned properly. Membership does obligate a school for 
its support.  We must face this fact. We are in serious trouble all along the line if 
we do not. 
This purposed policy will cause serious thinking on decisions this fall in 
membership. We must state a policy that is fair and considerate. This does not 
affect dual membership except in dual participation in conflict. We are coming to 
have more and more conflict” (NAIA, 1959, p. 16). 
 
The new NAIA dual membership policy did not take long before it would be used.  
During the Annual Meeting, District 26 committee mebers recommended Belmont-
Abbey College be sanctioned with a one year suspension for competing in the NCAA 
basketball tournament instead of the NAIA District 26 playoff tournament (Land, 1977).  
The Executive Committee concurred with the district chairmen and placed Belmont-
Abbey on suspension for one year starting on March 15, 1959 (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1959). 
 Along with the amateurism issue, eligibility continued to be a concern for all 
athletic associations.  A great deal of discussion at the 1959 meeting dealt with two 
specific areas.  The first issue concerned the “normal progress” rule.  The Executive 
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Committee agreed an interpretative statement would need to be added to the rules and 
standards to better clarification.  The statement rads: 
“A student must maintain a cumulative grade point aver ge required to remain in 
good standing as set forth by the official catalog or by the registrar if the 
provisions for good standing are not contained in the catalog. This interpretation 
does not change any provision as contained in the rule as written” (NAIA 
Executive Committee, 1959, p. 14). 
 
The second concern, the transfer rule, was also a major concern for both the NAIA and 
the NCAA.  Texas A&M University head football coach Jim Myers and Texas Christian 
University Athletic Director L. R. Meyer called for an NCAA investigation after several 
students left their respective schools in 1959 to transfer to the University of Kansas 
(“Coach Jim Myers Says Colleges”, 1959).  Meyer commented on the transfer matter: 
“We need to stop this jumping around. We must have some rules with teeth in 
them. Only the Southwest Conference and the Pacific Coast limit a transfer to two 
years of varsity competition after he has laid out a year.  The other conferences – 
one is the Big Eight of which Kansas is a member – take a transfer, have him wait 
a year, then give him three years of varsity football.  In other words, he loses 
nothing by transfer” (“Coach Jim Myers Says Colleges, 1959, para. 4). 
 
The NAIA also had rules in place to regulate transfers by implementing an 18-week 
waiting period.  However, the delegates at the 1959 meeting further sought to clarify the 
rule. 
“For purposes of interpretation:  the 18-week transfer rule means 18 calendar 
weeks.  A fraction of a week is to be considered as a whole week.  The 18 weeks 
period begins with the first day of classes. The athlete is eligible on the Monday 
noon following the 18 weeks. If the 18 weeks period is completed at the end of 
the spring term or semester, the student is eligible for any athletic competition 
which is an extension of the spring term or semester” (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1959, p. 14). 
 
Both of these rules were to be applied to all athletes and institutions throughout the 
regular season requiring a great deal of investigation and bookkeeping for the NAIA 
(Land, 1977).  In the end, the NCAA rules were lessrestrictive because they only verified 
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eligibility at the time of post-season competition while the NAIA rigorously confirmed 
the eligibility of its players throughout the entire school year and to file eligibility forms 
before enlisting any athlete in any sport season (La d, 1977).  
The NAIAC also grew during this period as coaches started taking an active role 
in the organization of sporting events (Wilson, 2005).  By 1959, the NAIAC was 
segmenting for individual sports similar to other coa hes’ associations within the other 
athletic associations.  However, NAIAC advertised the individual sport segmentation as 
allowing coaches to belong not only to the broader body of the NAIAC but to a specific 
sport section to help govern its officers and national championship contests (Wilson, 
2005).  The Executive Committee went on record supporting the NAIAC reorganization 
by stating: 
“We urge sports advisory committee members to be members of the NAIAC 
scene and to be active.  As sports board members and/or chairmen of sports 
advisory committees, end their terms of office, these two positions should become 
one and the same” (NAIA Executive Committee, 1959, p. 15). 
 
 Next, racial integration was still a concern for bth the nation and the NAIA.  By 
1959, Districts 6 and 29, both at-large districts, had a combined 60 schools (Land, 1977). 
While the organization was the forerunner in intercollegiate integration, many African-
American schools still had difficulty integrating within their geographical region 
(Wilson, 2005).  In both the North and South, to varying degrees, resistance to integration 
continued.  The integration issue was discussed at leng h at the 1959 meeting with the 
Executive Committee recommending the best way to start would be to have six states 
(i.e., Delaware, Maine, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Missouri, and the District of Columbia) 
absorb some of the black colleges since these states appeared to be the most ready for 
integration (Land, 1977).  Additionally, the committee felt the national office should 
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instigate these moves instead of the individual institutions (NAIA Executive Committee, 
1959).  The NAIA’s plan, as proposed by Duer, would involve three measures.  First, the 
NAIA would set up plans moving black schools into the regular district in which they fell 
geographically (Land, 1977).  Next, the NAIA would ai  these schools by scheduling 
games with white schools during the regular season.  Fi ally, the problem of a 
redistricting will be studied to identify a specifi cause as to why some districts have 
resisted integration (Land, 1977).  Unfortunately, formalized segregation would continue 
in the NAIA until 1967 when as many as 53 NAIA schools remained in the at-large 
district (Katz & McLendon, 1988). 
An assessment of the finances occurred at the 1959 meeting, which prompted 
some important reaction from the membership.  Specifically, it was determined that the 
organization depended upon three major sources of inc me: (1) the gate receipts from the 
NIBT; (2) the income from the football playoffs and bowl game; and (3) dues from 
member institutions (Land, 1977).  For the 1958-59 fiscal year, the NAIA’s projected 
income was $40,000 (NAIA, 1959).  Of that amount, $18,000 was derived from dues 
from 465 members; $14,000 from NIBT revenues; $3,000 from football receipts; and 
$5,000 from district playoff events (Wilson, 2005).  With an established budget of 
$42,000, it was calculated that member dues only comprised 44% of the budget necessary 
for administration (Land, 1977).  More than half of the operating budget was dependent 
on items that could fluctuate from year to year.  The Executive Committee concluded the 
current budget was not a sound fiscal policy and decided to increase membership dues 
(Land, 1977).  Duer reached out to all members to inf rm them that the fee increase could 
help the NAIA have approximately 75% of its operating budget from stable income and 
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bring in $28,000 annually (A. O. Duer, personal communication, March 31, 1959; see 
Table 5.5). 
Table 5-5 - 1959-60 NAIA Annual Membership Dues 
College Enrollment Annual Dues Proposed Dues 
Up to 500 $25.00 $35.00 
501 to 1000 $35.00 $50.00 
1001 to 1500 $40.00 $60.00 
1501 to 2000 $50.00 $70.00 
2001 to 2500 $55.00 $80.00 
2501 to 3000 $55.00 $90.00 
3000 and over $60.00 & $70.00 $100.00 
 
 When the 1959-1960 school year began, the NAIA saw several activities come to 
fruition.  The biggest addition was the inclusion of a soccer championship as the NAIA’s 
tenth sponsored championship in 1959 (Wilson, 2005).  The soccer committee, in 
November 1959, selected Pennsylvania State College at Slippery Rock as the site for the 
first soccer tournament (Land. 1977).  After this event, the soccer committee was already 
hard at work aligning teams into areas, appointing area chairmen, and planning to select 
an All-American soccer team in 1960 (Wilson, 2005).  The success of the event also 
encouraged Howard University of Washington, D.C. to express its interest in hosting the 
1960 tournament (“Soccer”, 1960). 
 The second year of the NAIA football playoffs proved to be more successful than 
the first.  Opposed to neutral sites, the playoff games would be played on the home 
campuses of two of the competing teams (Land, 1977).  Lenoir-Rhyne College hosted 
Southern Connecticut State College in Hickory, North Carolina, in the eastern playoff 
while the prior year’s runner-up Hillsdale College would travel to Kingsville, Texas, to 
face Texas College of Arts and Industries in the western playoff (“Preliminaries Set for 
Holiday Bowl”, 1959).  According to Land (1977), both events were “characterized by 
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outstanding co-operation from the two schools and the Chambers of Commerce and 
special citizens groups (p. 56-57).  Both home teams dispatched their opponents and met 
in the third annual Holiday Bowl held again in St. Petersburg at Al Lang Field (“Small 
Colleges Battle for National”, 1959).  Although the athletic affair was another 
accomplishment, issues still lingered in regards to a new stadium in St. Petersburg.  The 
NAIA and the Holiday Bowl Committee reached an agreem nt for the bowl to remain in 
St. Petersburg and a new stadium must be ready for the 1960 season (“Bowl Officials 
Query Fate”, 1959).  However, many voters within the St. Petersburg committee were not 
willing to spend public tax dollars on a new facility despite pleas from Duer (“Bowl 
Officials Query Fate”, 1959).  As a result, in April 1960, the NAIA suffered a major blow 
to its prestige and visibility when CBS announced that it was not going to broadcast the 
1960 Holiday Bowl (Wilson, 2005).  CBS executive William MacPhail wrote Duer to 
inform him that the Holiday Bowl would not be shown due to the network’s new policy 
to reduce the number of bowl games televised as well as the NAIA’s inability to secure 
ample sponsorships and better facility (W. MacPhail, personal communication, April 8, 
1960).   
 The primary theme for the 1960 Annual Meeting focused on the integration of 
intercollegiate athletics within the total educational program of NAIA member 
institutions and not on football (Land, 1977).  Duer emphasized this theme as he wrote: 
“Every decision we make every policy we adopt during this week must be 
examined in the light of our major aim that the NAIA program be an integral of 
the educational program of our member institutions, rather than to become a 
separate commercial or promotional adjunct” (Duer, 1960, p. 3). 
 
One particular group shared Duer’s views and began asserting themselves in the athletic 
domain. Specifically, a collection of university presidents began gathering for meetings 
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in Boston that were in conjunction with the Association of American Colleges (AAC) 
and the American Association of College Teacher Education (AACTE) (Land, 1977).  
University presidents from all across the country shared a great concern over the 
intrusion of money into college athletics (Wilson, 2005).  Administrators openly 
questioned their place when financial aid for athletes was steadily climbing while gate 
revenue staggered (Land, 1977).  Two practices that were common solutions with this 
problem were also discussed.  First, institutions providing subsidies to one or two sports 
(normally football and basketball) were using those sports as publicity attractions at the 
expense of less popular sports (Land, 1977).  The outcome of this activity decrease 
subsidies to those sports or saw them dropped by the college if they did not produce 
income (Wilson, 2005).  Second, the presidents ident fi d the growing trend for 
institutions to seek financial support from booster clubs and alumni for the purpose of 
building their program (Land, 1977).  While the practice was permitted, the presidents 
feared that a loss of control could surface to the existence of outside money (Wilson, 
2005).  The NAIA Executive Committee also echoed this warning and denounced these 
practices (“Presidents’ Advisory Committee Reports”, 1960).  
The amateurism battle once again emerged at the 1960 Annual Meeting.  In 1959, 
Dr. Ross Merrick, NAIA Executive Committee Member, and Duer attended meetings 
between the AAU and the USOC to seek representation for the NAIA on Olympic 
committees that the NAIA sponsored (Land, 1977).  Both Duer and Merrick were 
informed the USOC would be unlikely to grant the NAIA any representation on Olympic 
committees until the NAIA changed its amateur rule (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  
One year earlier, Duer was also removed from the Olympic Basketball Committee after 
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serving for eight years (Wilson, 2005).  Olympic officials told Duer that his position on 
the committee was an NCAA position, not an NAIA one (Land, 1977).  Duer’s removal 
left the NAIA without any representation on the Olympic committee and hurt its chances 
to have participation in the basketball trials in 1960.  Based on these events, Duer 
discussed at the annual meeting changing the NAIA deadline for compliance with the 
amateur rule from 1962 back to an effective date of September 1, 1960 (Land, 1977). 
The Olympic Basketball Committee met twice to discuss if the NAIA had the 
right to participate in the basketball trials (Wilson, 2005).  The NCAA challenged the 
committee to not allow the NAIA to participate (Land, 1977).  However, the NAIA’s 
working relationship with the AAU as well as its pledge to conform to the Olympic 
amateur rule was enough to fight off the NCAA’s petition.  At first, the committee 
recommended the Olympic trials include two AAU teams, two NCAA teams, one armed 
forces team, and one NAIA team (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  However, the NCAA 
objected to this plan, arguing that it should have small college representation.  As a 
compromise, the NCAA suggested one small college team comprised of six NCAA and 
six NAIA players could be included in the Olympic trials (Wilson, 2005).  The NAIA did 
not prefer this arrangement and offered an alternative plan for eight teams to participate 
in the Olympic trials.  This plan included three teams from the AAU, three from the 
NCAA (two from the University Division and one from the College Division), one from 
the armed forces, and one from the NAIA (Land, 1977).   
Once this decision was made public, the USOC called n immediate meeting to 
discuss the NAIA participation in the basketball trials (Land, 1977).  NCAA Executive 
Officer Walter Byers walked out of this meeting and threatened to withdraw all NCAA 
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teams from the trials if the NAIA were allowed to participate (Wilson, 2005).  After the 
meeting, AAU officials advised the NAIA Executive Committee that the NAIA would 
have greater success gaining representation on the Olympic committee if the NAIA 
changed its date of compliance with the amateur rule before the meeting of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1961 (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  The 
AAU feared that the NAIA’s right to membership within the USOC would be challenged 
unless the NAIA was in full conformance with the amateur rule.  Thus, at the 1960 
Annual Meeting, the NAIA members were polled for a vote on this issue (Land, 1977).  
In a relative landslide, the membership voted to change its amateur rule (Wilson, 2005). 
The NAIA was allowed to compete in the Olympic Trials nd fielded a team of 
all-stars in order to have representation in the 1960 Olympics (Land, 1977).  The NAIA 
all-star team was scheduled to face the NCAA Nationl Champion, the OSU Buckeyes, 
in the opening round of the trials in Denver (Meakins, 1960).  The Buckeyes’ roster 
included All-American and National Basketball Association (NBA) bound John 
Havlicek, Larry Zeigfried, and Jerry Lucas (Land, 1977).  Despite their talented roster, 
the NAIA All-Star team would rally to defeat the Buckeyes 76 to 69 (Wilson, 2005). The 
NAIA team would then go on to lose its second game to the AAU’s Peoria Caterpillars, 
89 to 68, and fall in the third place game to the Goodyear Wingfoots, 88 to 77 (Wilson, 
2005).  Although no NAIA players were selected to the Olympic team, upsetting Ohio 
State proved to be a better prize for the NAIA (“NAIA 4th in Olympic Cage Trials”, 
1960).  For instance, Duer expressed his excitement by s ating: 
“I am sure you were all thrilled at the tremendous accomplishment in our All-Star 
team winning over Ohio State. You cannot image the shock and dismay on the 
faces of the NCAA leaders, nor the elation on the part of the AAU and armed 
services people in that we had proven our right to participate and supported their 
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insistence upon our being allowed this privilege” (A.O. Duer, personal 
communication, April 6, 1960, p. 1). 
 
The success at the 1960 Olympic Trials also interesingly added more turmoil to the 
continuing conflict between the NCAA and the NAIA.  The NAIA rightfully earned the 
privilege to participate but they also instigated an  compounded the conflict.  As an 
example, after the victory over Ohio State, an advertisement was published in The NAIA 
News that provided a subtle gesture.  The advertisement was as follows: 
WHAT MAKES A CHAMPION? 
 
A champion proves his right to the title by meeting all comers and proving his 
worth on the field of battle.  That’s why in all ten NAIA championship events 
those who seek championships must prove their claims on the playing field. 
 
A champion also is a leader. He is always at the front of the pack, setting the pace. 
 
As an organization, NAIA believes its record qualifies it for the title of champion 
of smaller college athletics. It has been the leader in very advance in athletics for 
the college of non-major status.  First in national championship events, first in 
dealing with the problems unique to the non-major college, and, most importantly, 
first in urging educational responsibility in athletic programs, making them truly a 
part of the total college program. 
 
A champion is always out front, leading.  That’s where NAIA is. That’s where 
NAIA intends to stay (“What Makes a Champion?” 1959-60). 
 
 As 1961 approached, the controversy regarding the over commercialization of 
sport remained prevalent throughout the United States in higher education (Land, 1977).  
The debate centered on how higher education and athletics could coexist. Further, 
according to Land (1977), “the major shift within athletic competition toward building 
powerful teams with which to attract the communities and alumni and generate publicity 
was now being seriously challenged” (p. 74).  Many of the leading educators of the time 
voiced their disapproval. 
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“The enthusiastic spectators at school and college contests rarely realize how 
corroding is the spirit generated by their zeal for winning teams. One has to visit 
high school after high school, as I have done in recent years, to see how much the 
public is to blame for some of the troubles that plgue our public schools. Time 
and again, at the end of a visit, after discussing curriculums and teaching 
problems, the superintendent would say to me, “We haven’t yet talked about my 
chief problem, which, to be quite frank, is the record of the high school teams. 
Let’s face it – what this city demands is that I get coaches whose teams will win, 
or out I go. 
 
I have said the disease of overemphasis started in the colleges. Many institutions 
of higher learning continue to be the chief offenders. As the former president of 
one of the country’s largest universities had said, “Without a doubt, American 
intercollegiate athletics have gotten out of hand. They have become infested with 
commercialism and professionalism, sapping a considerable degree the fine ideals 
they exemplify (Conant, 1961, p. 51-52). 
 
While these viewpoints were shared by many professors, the Soviet Union dominance at 
the Olympic Games in Rome also caused many other American citizens to argue for more 
focus on athletics in schools and that colleges should embrace them to fight against 
communism (Land, 1977).  From this rationale, the NAIA was under attack on one hand 
for not having sufficient rules and regulations to keep athletics from being 
overemphasized in the colleges. However, on the othr the NAIA could have been 
viewed as unsupportive against communism. 
    With Duer’s support, the NAIA responded by endorsing a three-year study to 
determine solutions to the problems of intercollegiate athletics (Land, 1977).  This project 
was estimated to cost $50,000 and would be funded through foundation grants (NAIA 
Presidents’ Advisory Committee, 1961).  Other suggestions urged for a university 
president be included on the NAIA Executive Committee (NAIA Presidents’ Advisory 
Committee, 1961).  This suggestion led the organization to elect Dr. Morton C. 
Cunningham, president of Fort Hays State College in Hays, Kansas, to the Executive 
Committee (NAIA, 1961).  Further recommendations included the support of workshops 
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to be held in all 32 districts within the next two years to identify and address any major 
problems confronting NAIA members (NAIA Presidents’ Advisory Committee, 1961). 
 Redistricting once again became a concern in 1961 but did not provide any major 
resolution or permanent change.  Both District 19 (Alabama and Mississippi) and District 
24 (Kentucky) raised strong concerns about their current alignments (Land, 1977).  At the 
time, District 19 maintained six NAIA members and only three were able to participate in 
competitions (NAIA Executive Committee, 1961).  District 24’s main problem involved 
the travel to district playoffs, which averaged 1,400 miles per round trip (Land, 1977).  
The district chairmen considered the playoff an undesirable choice and could not see it as 
successful with such travel likely.   
 In terms of sports, the 1960-61 fiscal year appeared to have been one of the best 
years for the NAIA.  While the Holiday Bowl lost its elevision contract, the game was 
still considered “a tremendous spectacle of high-level sportsmanship and high-caliber 
play” as Lenoir-Rhyne beat Humboldt State of Arcata, C lifornia 15 to 14 (“Humboldt 
State Loses 15-14”, 1960; Land, 1977, p. 83).  However, the game was not without 
controversy.  On the eve of the contest, Humboldt Sta e President Cornelius Siemens 
protested the segregation practices implemented in St. Petersburg when five black players 
on the Humboldt squad were forced to stay in a different hotel than their white teammates 
(“Segregation Issue Pops on Eve”, 1960).  Siemens also noted he would recommend 
future Holiday Bowl games be played in integrated cities (“Segregation Issue Pops on 
Eve”, 1960).  Duer also felt pressure from Florida A&M head coach Jake Gaither with 
regard to inviting historically black colleges to the Holiday Bowl following a letter he 
wrote to Gaither (“May Drop Ban on Negros”, 1960).   
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“[A&M is] definitely not under consideration as a possible playoff entrant [in this 
year’s Holiday Bowl contest].  While we feel that there is a definite place for a 
Negro school in our championship picture, we do not feel that St. Petersburg is 
ready for a ball game that will send a white school against a colored one.  It is our 
intention, however, perhaps in 1961 or 1962, to bring about such a contest, 
making our championship a completely democratic one.  I look forward to the 
time when the NAIA football program will be as integrated and truly represented 
as are all of our other athletic programs” (“NAIA May Withdraw Ban”, 1960, 
para. 3-4, 6-7). 
 
In the end, the 1960 Holiday Bowl was the last for St. Petersburg (“City Loses Holiday 
Bowl Game”, 1961).  Racial tension and the inability to build a new football-only 
stadium terminated the contract (Beck, 1961).  The Ex cutive Committee decided to 
move the game from St. Petersburg to Sacramento, California, and change the name to 
the Camellia Bowl at the 1961 Annual Meeting (“City Loses Holiday Bowl Game”, 
1961; Land, 1977).  The Camellia Bowl was played at Hughes Stadium, and publicity 
was strong for the 1961 contest (“Camellia Bowl Football Today”, 1961).  According to 
Land (1977), the game was televised in six different gions and broadcasted on the radio 
by 40 stations. 
 Much of the problems discussed between the Executive Committee and the 
District chairmen before the 1961 NIBT focused on the NAIA’s continued rivalry with 
the NCAA and especially the NAIA’s perceived lack of prestige (Land, 1977).  During 
their meeting in 1961, the chairmen placed Prairie View College and MacMurray College 
on a one-year probation for participating in the NCAA small college tournament instead 
of the NAIA tournament (NAIA Executive Committee, 1961).  However, these 
punishments appeared to be given at an irregular rate.  According to Wilson (2005), four 
other schools committed similar rule violations as Prairie View and MacMurray but were 
not placed on probation.  The reason for this discrepancy rests with the lack of 
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recommendations from district chairmen about these schools in violation (Land, 1977).  
This situation demonstrated both the strengths and weaknesses of the NAIA as a grass-
roots organization.  In order to clarify the responsibilities of the district committee 
members, a set of duties was adopted in 1961 that included attending meetings; 
marketing the NAIA; visit schools; and provide advisory for their assigned committees 
(Land, 1977). 
 One of the biggest gains of the 1961 sports year was the Pepsi-Cola Company’s 
pledge to provide financial assistance to teams participating in the national championship 
in baseball and golf (“Pepsi-Cola Company to Assist NAIA”, 1961).  While this 
sponsorship was helpful, the expansion program was beginning to prove to be a serious 
financial burden for the NAIA (Land, 1977).  In an ddress at the Annual Meeting, Duer 
stated the following: 
“We have a budget which is far beyond our income on dues (about $25,000 per 
year).  Our experiences in our two income sports (football and basketball) have 
been good over the past two years, so we have been abl  to meet our budget of 
$55,000.  Travel is increasing by leaps and bounds.  Our college presidents have 
recommended that we increase our dues by 50%.  They have said , If you will 
build a program that is defensible, make studies to de ermine what that is, then 
have the courage to support it, we will see you get th  money for the 
organization” (NAIA, 1961, p. 8). 
 
After Duer’s comments, the members in attendance would agree to another dues increase 
of 50% (NAIA, 1961). 
 The battle for control over amateur sports once again returned in 1962; however, 
the conflict was largely between the AAU and the NCAA and their fight over which 
organization would be the official administrative body for the various sports programs of 
amateur standing (Land, 1977).  AAU National Presidnt N. J. Barack charged the 
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NCAA with “plotting to take over control of all amateur athletics” (“N.C.A.A. ‘Plotting’ 
Charged by A.A.U.”, 1961, para. 1).  Barack would further state: 
“The N.C.A.A. negotiated in bad faith with the A.A.U. for sixteen months.  The 
N.C.A.A. was plotting to take over control of all am teur athletics at a time when 
its special committee resisted A.A.U. efforts to resolve the difference. Up until 
now the N.C.A.A. has had a full-time job policing its own members. Now it wants 
to control all amateur athletics, college and non-cllege, at a time when colleges 
must face up to charges of serious over-commercialization in athletics” 
(“N.C.A.A. ‘Plotting’ Charged by A.A.U.”, 1961, par. 3-4). 
 
The dispute between the AAU and the NCAA can be linked back to April 1960 when the 
NCAA ended its alliance with the AAU do to its inconsistency, poor administration, poor 
foreign travel arrangements, and failure to cooperate (“NCAA Council Urges Colleges”, 
1961).  This squabble focused on international jurisdiction on basketball representation 
on the Federation of International Basketball (FIBA) where the AAU controlled with two 
delegates (“N.C.A.A. ‘Plotting’ Charged by A.A.U.”, 1961).  However, the NCAA not 
only proposed a United States Basketball Federation to govern the sport but also wanted 
to sponsor teams in track and field for the Olympics and other foreign competition 
(“N.C.A.A. Accused of ‘Power Grab’”, 1961).  Although USOC President Avery 
Brundage warned that the international body would not certify a coaches’ organization or 
a collegiate group, the NCAA refused to back down (Duer, 1962a).   
By December 1961, the NCAA was urging its member schools to boycott any 
AAU events unless colleges were given more say in amateur sports (“N.C.A.A. Council 
Urges Colleges”, 1961).  In addition, the NCAA enlisted the NFHS to help with the 
NCAA’s drive for power and proposed to the USOC that high schools should have a 
higher vote count (“A.A.U. Wins Point in N.C.A.A. Battle”, 1961).  The USOC denied 
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this request, but offered the NCAA its own vote increase to have equal footing with the 
AAU (“A.A.U. Wins Point in N.C.A.A. Battle”, 1961). 
The NAIA observed the conflict between the AAU and NCAA over amateur 
athletics with great concern.  Duer especially was concerned about the outcome and 
desired “a strong and democratic national administration of sports be developed which 
will assure that we [the NAIA] uphold national prestige in all national competition” 
(“NAIA Asks Voice in Amateur Field”, 1962, para. 2).  Duer’s biggest fear was the 
NAIA would not get fair representation in international competition.  He stated “we [the 
NAIA] are not concerned with having a major influenc  in these inter-organizational 
matters, but do strongly feel we have a right to direct representation on these bodies, not 
through another organization. Representation through another organization is 
unacceptable” (“NAIA Asks Voice in Amateur Field”, 1962, para. 7).  The NAIA was 
also troubled with the NCAA’s attempt to run amateur athletics and discouraged when 
NCAA established new coaches’ federations in track and field, gymnastics, and 
basketball (“NAIA Asks Voice in Amateur Field”, 1962).   
As the 1962 Annual Meeting approached, Duer and other NAIA officials 
pondered the question of a strong and democratic national administration of sports.  Thus, 
the Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) and the Ex cutive Committee adopted the 
following position and presented it to Brundage: 
1. NAIA continue its position in the protection and promotion of amateurism in 
athletics; 
2. Continue to work for the best interests of American amateur athletes; 
3. Support those organizations as are legally constituted with authority which is 
recognized by international bodies; 
4. Earnestly beseech both major athletic bodies to reslv  their differences in the 
interest of our national prestige and unity (Duer, 1962a, p. 3). 
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The NAIA members also adopted an official position of support for the AAU with ideas 
about how to plan for the future (NAIA, 1962; Wilson, 2005).    
The Olympic relationship issue continued as the USOC conducted its quadrennial 
meeting in December 1962 in Washington, D.C. (Land, 1977).  Duer was asked by the 
USOC to supply evidence to support the NAIA’s right to Class B membership within the 
USOC (Wilson, 2005).  Duer’s testimony produced enough solid evidence illustrating 
why the NCAA was a realistic threat to the USOC.  The NCAA continued to insist that 
no other collegiate association should have any repres ntation on the Olympic committee 
except the NCAA (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  The NCAA also reaffirmed its 
commitment to the NFHS by proposing to give them “full representation” on the 
executive board of the Olympic association as well as representation on many of the 
Olympic sports committees while denying it to the NAIA (Washington & Ventresca, 
2008).  Based on the NCAA testimony, the NAIA and the AAU now became allies and 
served to protect the current Olympic practices (Wilson, 2005).  Additionally, this 
alliance reignited the intense feud between the NCAA and the NAIA (Duer, 1962a) 
 One week after the meeting in Washington, D.C., FIBA representative Lou Wilky 
was appointed to resolve the issue of the United States Olympic basketball committee 
(Land, 1977).  Delegates from the NCAA, AAU, NJCAA, Jewish Welfare Organization 
(JWO), NFHS, YMCA, armed services, and the NAIA had f iled to resolve their 
differences before Wilky (Duer, 1962b).  After a heated debate, Wilky proposed a 
proportional representation that would resolve the issue for the 1964 Olympics (Wilson, 
2005).  His plan called for seven representatives apiece from the AAU and the NCAA; 
three representatives each from the NAIA and the YMCA; two representatives each from 
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the JWO and the NFSHSAA; and one representative each from the NJCAA, the Army, 
the Navy, and the Marines (Duer, 1962b). 
 Duer also acknowledged the NIBT experienced an increase in attendance over the 
previous year by 4,000 (Duer, 1962a). Further, the 1962 NIBT had “the strongest 
competition, finest teams, greatest enthusiasm by the people and best attendance” (Land, 
1977, p. 109).  Westminster College of Pennsylvania e tered the championship game as 
the top ranked team (“Westminster Eying NAIA Championship”, 1962).  However, they 
would fall to Prairie View A&M University of Texas 62 to 53 behind All-American 
Zelmo Beaty’s 28 points (Prairie View Tops NAIA”, 1962).  Track and field 
championships were held for the fifth consecutive year at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and 
grossed over $16,000 over the two night event (Land, 1977).  In addition, the Bowling 
Proprietors of America (BPA) pledged $25,000 a year to sponsor bowling as an NAIA 
sport (Wilson, 2005).  The first championship was held in April 1962 and was won by 
Gannon College of Pennsylvania (Wilson, 2005). Overall, Duer assessed for 1962 that 
“The National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics has, without a doubt, just 
completed the best year of its existence, from every method of measurement and 
observation” despite its problems and a $2,275.26 deficit (Duer, 1962a, p. 3).   
The Conflict Period (1962-1966) 
 By the fall of 1962, the battle for amateur sports escalated substantially.  
According to Land (1977), the NCAA refused to cooperat  with the U.S. State 
Department when the State Department sponsored a U.S. tour with the Russian basketball 
team playing against the top college teams.  The AAU was in charge of the tour and 
asked the colleges to participate in the event in November 1962 (“Bickering to Hurt 
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America”, 1962).  However, NCAA President Walter Byers stated college rules forbid 
teams to participate in any contest before December 1 (“Move to Organize Better US”, 
1962).  Byers further stated: 
“I cannot [sic] accept placing the blame for the timing of the Russian trip on the 
State Department.  It is another example of poor management of the AAU.  It 
would take a convention to change our rules to let ur teams play in November, 
and the AAU didn’t ask us in time for the conventio” (“Move to Organize Better 
US”, 1962, para. 7-8). 
 
The NCAA would not allow any of its athletes to compete on this tour and even 
threatened certain athletes with ineligibility in all their member schools if players 
accepted an invitation (NAIA, 1963).  The AAU still acted as the official sanctioning 
body for all meets involving non-collegiate athletics while the United States Track and 
Field Federation (USTFF), the NCAA track and field fe eration, sought control of 
amateur track and field events (Land, 1977).   
 At its twenty-sixth annual meeting, the NAIA spent a great deal of time 
determining its position with this conflict.  In a statement adopted at the Annual Meeting, 
the NAIA stated the following: 
“The NAIA does not seek more power or control.  All the NAIA wants is that 
athletes of our 463 member institutions who are of suf icient quality to win gold 
medals in international competition to have an opportunity to compete” (“NAIA 
Asks for Senate Inquiry”, 1963, para. 4). 
 
As noted earlier, Duer and other NAIA officials were committed to having a strong and 
democratically administered amateur governing body that would be fair to all parties 
supporting amateur sport (Wilson, 2005).  Appropriately, NAIA supported the AAU as it 
defended the NAIA against the constant challenge from the NCAA (“NAIA Refuses to 
Join NCAA”, 1963). Further, the NAIA would seek a full Senate investigation of all 
agencies and associations involved in the administration of amateur athletics in the 
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United States (“NAIA Asks for Senate Inquiry”, 1963).  Land (1977) argued this request 
was not a “spur of the moment decision”; rather a last-resort effort derived from 
circumstances from as far as 1948.  
 President John F. Kennedy became concerned with the volatile relationship 
among the amateur organizations and appointed Attorney General Robert Kennedy as an 
arbitrator to resolve this dispute in October and November 1962 (Wilson, 2005).  
Originally, Attorney General Kennedy expressed confidence that progress had been made 
and felt the AAU and the NCAA would find a way to resolve their differences (Sheehan, 
1962).  However, after a three-hour meeting, Attorney General Kennedy did little to end 
the dispute (Sheehan, 1962).  According to Falla (1981), an agreement was reached 
between the AAU and the NCAA but was renounced two weeks later by the AAU.  A 
second attempt by Kennedy to mediate the conflict was achieved but, again, the AAU 
repudiated the agreement (Falla, 1981).  Wilson (2005) argued that during these 
discussions, the NAIA viewed the NCAA as a bully trying to get its way. 
 After the Attorney General’s negotiations fell through, President Kennedy 
appointed General Douglas MacArthur to arbitrate the differences between the AAU and 
the NCAA (“Arbitrator Role Given MacArthur”, 1962).  General MacArthur was familiar 
with Olympic conflicts as he brokered an earlier conflict in 1928 when he was the head of 
the American Olympic Committee (Wilson, 2005).  While both sides approved General 
MacArthur as an arbitrator, it would take nearly 14 months to reach an agreement.  
According to Falla (1981), three key points emerged from the MacArthur arbitration.  
First, immediate amnesty would be granted to all athletes previously disqualified for 
Olympic consideration for competing in unsanctioned events (Falla, 1981, p. 87).  
    
173 
 
Second, the AAU and the USTFF would get equal representation (three members each) 
on the newly formed Olympic Eligibility Board in order to make eligibility 
determinations (Wilson, 2005).  Finally, an “athletic congress” would be created and 
made up of representatives of all major amateur sport  b dies to work out a permanent 
plan (Falla, 1981).  Under the MacArthur plan, the USTFF would have jurisdiction over 
high school and college track athletes while the AAU had authority over non-student 
athletes (Wilson, 2005).  The agreement was designed as a temporary solution for the 
1964 Olympic Games but would need to be readdressed aft r the Olympics (White, 
1964).  After the agreement, General MacArthur warned all parties with the following: 
“I am reluctant to believe that either of these groups directly or indirectly, intend 
to abrogate their given word to the detriment of their country and the athletes 
whose activities they control. Should either do so, it would indicate an 
irresponsibility in the exercise of authority which would well merit the 
condemnation of every sportsman, and indeed, every pat iotic American” 
(“MacArthur Tells Feuding Track Bodies”, 1963, para. 10-11). 
 
 While the dispute over the control of amateur athletics was one of great concern, 
the NAIA and the NCAA battled in other areas.  According to Land (1977), the continued 
conflicts over dual membership and conflicting events reached new heights. By 1963, 
about one-third of the 463 member schools of the NAIA in 1963 maintained membership 
with the NCAA (“Small School Ruling Group Says”, 1963).  In addition, the NCAA 
College Division created championships in basketball, cross-country, golf, tennis, track 
and field, and wrestling (Land, 1977).  Thus, the severity of the disputes would only 
escalate as the NCAA announced its intentions to host several of these events 
simultaneously with the established NAIA championship events (Wilson, 2005).  In order 
to mollify the dual membership conflict while strengthening its hand over the NCAA, the 
Executive Committee passed the following action: 
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“If any conference with more than 50 percent [sic] membership in the NAIA 
pledges or sends a team to a conflicting event, all members of that conference will 
be immediately declared ineligible to participate in all NAIA events” (“NAIA 
Acts to Strengthen Hand”, 1963, para. 3). 
 
This action was primarily aimed for participation in the NIBT.  The Executive Committee 
also passed another action that would extend to other sports.  It stated: 
“If any team [in the NAIA] plays more than 25 percent [sic] of its football or 
basketball games against teams officially classed a in the major level of 
competition, that team will be ineligible for NAIA district or national 
competition” (“NAIA Bans NCAA Events”, 1963, para. 3). 
 
The NAIA generally classified major schools as schools contained in the Associated 
Press (AP) Poll (“NAIA Acts to Strengthen Hand”, 1963).  Land (1977) noted a third 
action was passed but was less effective due to the difficulty of interpretation and severity 
of the penalty.  It read: 
“The NAIA Executive body interprets the sponsoring of NCAA College Division 
events by a member of NAIA to be in direct conflict wi h the best interests of the 
NAIA program and shall be in violation of NAIA policy. Violation of this policy 
shall subject the institution to a 2 year suspension penalty from the NAIA 
program” (Land, 1977, p. 125). 
 
All three of these moves were designed to gain complete allegiance of all intercollegiate 
programs to NAIA members and their rules and standards (Wilson, 2005). This strategy 
believed to be critical to the NAIA in order to maintain a strong organization and retain 
its members. 
 The Executive Committee also implemented rules that strengthened the 
interpretation and enforcement of the NAIA’s eligibility rules (Land, 1977).  Many of the 
problems centered on misunderstandings on the part of some conferences and institutions. 
According to Land (1977), some members chose to interpret the rules to mean they 
should be followed in only the sports they wished to qualify for national events.  By 
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September 1963, the Executive Committee rejected this argument and clarified the rules 
as follows: 
“All NAIA institution members must abide by all eligibility rules for every sport 
in which they sponsor a team. Member institutions are responsible to certify that 
all athletes participating in all sports in which intercollegiate competition is 
sponsored by the institution are eligible according to all NAIA rules and 
standards” (Land, 1977, p. 126). 
 
In regard to penalties for violating this policy, the Executive Committee stated that “the 
use of an athlete, with full knowledge, who is known to be ineligible by NAIA rules will 
thereby rule the institution ineligible to participate in all district and national events 
sponsored by NAIA” (Land, 1977, p. 126).   
 In spite of these issues, Duer (1963a) continued his efforts to promote unity 
among the NAIA members. According to Land (1977), the number of institutions 
maintaining membership with NAIA had remained consta t.  During the 1962-63 fiscal 
year, 229 member institutions and over 3,000 athletes participated in national events 
(Land, 1977).  Duer and the Executive Committee viewed these numbers as an indication 
that the NAIA was growing in strength each year in comparison to the NCAA College 
Division.  To continue its growth, the Executive Committee declared that non-accredited 
colleges would be given a two-year period to achieve regional accreditation and maintain 
a probationary membership with the NAIA until accreditation was complete (NAIA 
Executive Committee, 1963).   
While there were problems throughout the 1962-63 fiscal year, Duer (1963b) 
proclaimed the 1963-64 fiscal year as a banner year for the NAIA.  He based his 
assessment on the following highlights: 
1. More athletes participated in the program than in any other year in the history 
of the organization. 
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2. The NAIA gained in stature with other national organiz tions as sports leaders 
both nationally and internationally. 
3. The public image of NAIA became clearer during the year as a result of the 
national conflict. 
4. The organization grew stronger in a period of the greatest confusion and 
conflict in the history of amateur athletics because it took a firm stand on 
issues and demonstrated uncompromising sincerity of purpose. 
5. There was increased participation in all areas of the membership, including 
the national coaches’ association, the committee work, and attendance at the 
annual meeting. 
6. Public interest in and support of individual and team participation in the 11 
national championship events exceeded that of any other year (Duer, 1963b, p. 
3). 
 
On the other hand, Duer was very quick to criticize th  NCAA by calling the entire 
amateur system in the U.S. a farce (“NAIA Executive Highly Critical”, 1963).  Duer 
accused the NCAA of being immoral and of conducting u der-the-table methods to 
achieve their goals (“Amateur Standings Given a Lamb sting”, 1963).  Duer continued 
his attacks on the NCAA with: 
“We’re more on the side of the AAU because we think the NCAA is engaged in a 
sheer power grab. We feel that if colleges are permitted to continue on their 
present course, our whole amateur structure may scrmble. It’s not just the matter 
of athletic scholarships, which Avery Brundage (presid nt of the International 
Olympic Committee) objects to so strenuously. It’s the way colleges to after top 
athletes.  In this mad scramble to be big time [sic], ethics are forgotten. Talented 
athletes are recruited and subsidized in every violation of our amateur codes. It’s 
done undercover. This corrupts our young athletes and produces our sports 
scandals.  I don’t think we have even scraped more than the surface of our 
scandals” (“NAIA Executive Highly Critical”, 1963, para. 6-9). 
 
 The conflict continued throughout 1963 and into 1964 as the NCAA continued its 
campaign to become the sole amateur sports organization (Land, 1977).  The AAU and 
the NAIA remained united against the NCAA’s efforts and created a tentative agreement 
with the NCAA to coexist for the 1964 Olympic Games in Tokyo.  The Olympic 
basketball trials were scheduled to take place at St. John’s University in Brooklyn in 
April 1964 (“Format for Picking Olympic”, 1963).  Eight teams with 12 players per team 
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competed in a single-elimination tournament with a consolation bracket.  Of the eight 
teams, three would come from the NCAA; two from the AAU; two from the armed 
forces; and one from the NAIA (“Adopt New Plan to Pick”, 1964).  After the trials were 
completed, the Basketball Committee and the Olympic coach selected the best players 
from the 96-player field to comprise the 12-player Olympic roster (“Format for Picking 
Olympic”, 1963).  In comparison, the U.S. Track and Field Committee invited the first 
six place winners in each of the 17 events on the programs of the NCAA Championships 
and the National AAU meet (“Format for Picking Olympic”, 1963).  However, the Track 
and Field Committee reserved the right to invite additional qualifiers from both the 
NCAA College Division and the NAIA ranks (“Format for Picking Olympic”, 1963). 
 While there were agreements to coexist, the NAIA and the AAU worked together 
to combat the NCAA.  The AAU Executive Director Colonel Don Hull was invited to 
attend the NAIA’s Annual Meeting in March 1964 (Land, 1977).  Hull accepted the 
invitation and provided the following: 
“I want to say definitely the Amateur Athletic Unio of the United States is 
fighting no one. Our job is to try to bring everyone together on a platform of 
eligibility, picking national teams, and national and international members, and 
when we send the United States teams into internatio l competition…you must 
follow established procedures.  The procedures will be changed as soon as the 
desires are changed, but no one group, no matter how well financed, can hit 
somebody over the head in the international group and t ke over” (NAIA, 1964, 
p. 9). 
 
According to Land (1977), several NAIA leaders asked Hull to make a statement that 
would be helpful in the overall picture.  He responded by offering: 
“I think to continue the same strong course you have t ken is the main and best 
thing to do.  If all of us keep always in mind that we are working for the good of 
the youth of this country, we will have no problems…You are a strong 
organization and I predict you will grow stronger” (NAIA, 1964, p. 9). 
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After discussing recommendations with the AAU, the NAIA first petitioned the USOC 
for equitable representation on the various Olympic committees (see Table 5.6).  Second, 
the NAIA requested more interpretation of amateurism and the clarifying the definition of 
the amateur athlete.  At the 1964 Executive Committee Meeting, the Executive 
Committee issued the following statement: 
“In order to properly control completion under the NAIA program, only the 
amateur athlete is eligible to participate.  An amateur is a player who engages in 
athletic contests for educational values, personal ple sure, satisfaction, and for the 
love of the sport; not for monetary or material gain to himself” (p. 8). 
  
Table 5-6 - NAIA Representation Request to the USOC 
Board of Directors Six members 
Increased Voting Strength 50 votes 5 delegates 
Representation on the following Olympic sports committees 
Baseball 4 
Basketball (Men’s) 1 
Basketball (Women’s) 5 
Cycling 1 
Gymnastics 3 
Soccer Football 3 
Swimming (Men’s) 4 
Swimming (Women’s) 1 
Tennis 2 
Track and Field (Men’s) 5 




The committee further identified several items that would cause an athlete to lose his 
amateur standing.  An athlete would lose his amateur status if he: 
“received money in any form beyond the actual expense of participating; signed a 
contract with any professional team; participated in an athletic event as a member 
of a professional team; coached an organized team or individual for pay beyond 
actual expense; exploited athletic ability through ex ibition, radio, or television 
appearances for pay; or received remuneration for the use of his name or picture 
to promote a product or enterprise” (Land, 1977, p. 138). 
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The Executive Committee concluded this meeting by reite ating that once an amateur 
becomes a professional in one sport, he becomes a professional in all sports (NAIA 
Executive Committee, p. 8).  These acts allowed the NAIA to continue its position of 
support for the AAU as well as gaining the recognitio  and privileges the NAIA has 
sought since its inception. 
 While the AAU and the NCAA were meeting with General MacArthur, the NAIA 
petitioned the USOC for greater representation in those sports that NAIA sponsors 
championships (Land, 1977).  At its meeting in Novemb r 1963, the USOC announced it 
would broaden its representation for all-policy-making groups.  Thus, the USOC would 
allow the NAIA three representatives on the USOC board: Duer; Cliff Aultman of 
Geneva College, Pennsylvania, the 1963-64 NAIA President; and Dr. Jesse Hawthorne of 
East Texas State College, the 1964-65 NAIA President (Wilson, 2005).  In addition, the 
NAIA was able to increase its voting power within the USOC when it earned its request 
for 50 votes as well as an increase in representatio  from one member to five (“NAIA 
Authorized to Name 3”, 1964). 
 Although the USOC provided some good news, the Executive Committee’s 
actions and penalties enacted in 1963 for participation in conflicting events did little to 
solve the dual membership problem (Land, 1977). According to Wilson (2005), Duer had 
difficulty understanding why some representatives of the NAIA member institutions did 
not share the same dedication to do whatever it took t  enhance the NAIA’s quality and 
prestige.  At the 1964 Annual Meeting, Duer stated the following about the “vacillation” 
among NAIA members: 
“I say to you that I am discouraged at the reasoning of some about dual 
membership. This is your responsibility and if you cannot see that dual 
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memberships are going to weaken our organization and take away from you what 
you have sacrificed to gain, you are not reasoning and facing the facts. You are 
asking organizations to “bid” for your participation and support. Yet you take 
little or no responsibility for making any program what you want it to be. If you 
are thinking this way, without loyalty to any organization or cause, I would not 
place much value on your membership or leadership. I tell you this very frankly” 
(p. 3). 
 
Much of the dual membership concerns came from District  6A and 29, those districts 
comprised of predominately historically black schools (Wilson, 2005).  Both districts 
originally pledged their regular season champion to the NIBT while their end-of-season 
tournament champion went to the NCAA College Division Championship (Land, 1977).  
However, District 29 only sent its tournament champion to the NCAA Tournament in 
1963 while ignoring its pledge to the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  Because of this action, the 
Executive Committee ruled that “if a team is selected for the NAIA tournament in Kansas 
City and does not come to the tournament, they will subject to penalty as provided by the 
constitution” (Land, 1977, p. 140). Still, this act proved to be difficult for the districts-at-
large since many of the black schools were not placed in their geographic location 
districts.  Again, the lack of integration and the unwillingness of some regions/states to 
embrace historically black schools damaged the NAIA’s commitment from those 
institutions.  
 Following a difficult year financially in 1963, the NAIA recorded a net profit of 
$31,765 in 1964 (NAIA, 1964).  This financial success was helped again by a 
sponsorship from the BPA of $22,000 for a bowling championship and the 
aforementioned increase in member fees (Land, 1977).  However, BPA sponsorship 
would end after this year (NAIA Executive Committee, 1964).  Land (1977) noted that 
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the insurance plan with the Mutual of Omaha would be renewed to help reduce those 
concerns for the 25 year old association.    
At the 1964 Olympic Trials, the NAIA again fielded an All-Star team to compete 
against three NCAA teams, two AAU squads, and two Armed Forces teams for 
basketball representation (“Two Rockhurst players on NAIA”, 1964).  After all the 
rosters were announced, Duer again attacked the NCAA’s claim to represent small 
colleges since it only had one player from the College Division playing on an NCAA All-
Star roster (Wilson, 2005).  However, they were defeated in the semi-finals of the 
Olympic trials by the NCAA Reds squad (“Final Game Tonight for Olympic”, 1964).   
After the completion of the trials, two players from the NAIA squad had 
impressed Oklahoma State and U.S. Basketball coach Henry Iba:  Lucious Jackson of 
Pan American College and Willis Reed of Grambling (Wilson, 2005).  After deliberating 
with the 20-man selection committee, Jackson was the only player chosen to represent the 
NAIA on the Olympic squad (Padwe, 1964).  According to Wilson (2005), the NCAA 
petitioned to keep Reed off the squad and was succesful.  The U.S. Olympic team would 
capture the Gold Medal with Jackson’s help in the 1964 Olympics Tokyo (“Tokyo 
Olympics Cloaked in Red”, 1964).  Reed would get some measure of revenge as he was 
named the NBA Rookie of the Year after the Olympics (“Willis Reed Named Rookie”, 
1965).  Also at the games, Florida A&M track star Robert Hayes laid claim to the title 
“world’s fastest human” after winning the Gold medal in the 100-meter dash with a then 
Olympic-record of 10-seconds flat (“Hayes Equals World Record”, 1964).  Dr. Jesse J. 
Hawthorne of East Texas State College, the NAIA President, also attended the Olympic 
Games in Tokyo and represented the NAIA (Hawthorne, 1964-65). 
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Despite the NAIA’s success at the 1964 Olympics, the NCAA College Division 
continued to schedule events on the same days as NAIA ational Championships in 
basketball, football, swimming and wrestling as well as regional meets in golf and tennis 
(Land, 1977).  To make matters worse, two of these events were scheduled at NAIA 
member institutions – wrestling at Colorado School of Mines and swimming at Illinois 
State Normal University (Wilson, 2005).  Perhaps the most significant development, 
however, involved a new policy approved in November 1964 by the NCAA council: 
boycotting any track and field meet not sanctioned by the USTFF (“NCAA Will Curb 
Track Activities”, 1964).  According to Smith (1964), this policy was actually proposed 
back in January 1963 with some NCAA members withholding their undergraduate 
athletes from AAU meets and denying the AAU use of their campus facilities.  The 
aforementioned arbitration hearings led by General MacArthur put an end to that practice 
(Smith, 1964).  However, with the Olympics completed, the NCAA council reinstated the 
boycott.  NCAA President Robert F. Bay summarized the NCAA’s viewpoint with the 
following: 
“College athletes may compete in any open meet which extends them an 
invitation and which obtains a USTFF sanction…There is nothing in the NCAA’s 
stand which questions or takes away the AAU’s authority r right to sanction 
open competition or which would result in limiting anyone’s competition in 
indoor meets this winter… 
All the NCAA is saying is that the educational insttutions of the United States 
have the right and obligation to sanction the forms of athletic competition in 
which their student-athletes engage…If the AAU persists in misleading claims 
that it is the only amateur organization which can s ction open track 
competition: if it pressures indoor meet promoters not to seek USTFF sanction 
under threat of losing AAU sanction, the resulting denial of competition to 
collegians will be the direct responsibility of the AAU… 
It is difficult for our college and university administrators to see how anyone can 
construe this as an ‘NCAA boycott’” (“NCAA Will Curb Track Activities”, 1964, 
para. 6-10). 
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The AAU was outraged by this measure and harshly criticized the NCAA for 
implementing a boycott that was “unnecessary and unwarranted” (“College Group’s 
Track Ban”, 1964).  AAU Executive Director Col. Hull a so stated “this threatened 
NCAA action will harm athletes, the sport of track and field and will probably decimate 
the nation’s future international track teams” (“College Group’s Track Ban”, 1964, para. 
5).  Hull continued his allegations by suggesting: 
“If this edict is abjectly followed, athletes will be denied the opportunity to take 
part in the traditional indoor meets. They may be forced into competition under 
the sanction of the unrecognized federations and thereby lose their eligibility to 
represent their country in international competition, including Olympic Games. 
The AAU…cannot bow to this or any threat by the NCAA, which is just one of 
many sports organizations in these United States” (“College Group’s Track Ban”, 
1964, para. 9-10). 
 
 At the annual conference in December 1964, the AAU hardened its stance on the 
NCAA and threatened to withdraw its own approval of any meet which also requests 
sanctions from the USTFF (Grayson, 1964).  In a released statement, the AAU stated: 
“For 76 years the AAU has recognized the right of an educational institution to 
compete among themselves without the necessity of an AAU sanction or 
registration. The threatened NCAA boycott has not changed this policy. But AAU 
do not recognize dual sanctions” (Grayson, 1964, para. 3). 
 
Newly elected AAU President Clifford H. Buck remained optimistic a settlement could 
be reached if his colleagues were willing to stay open-minded (Grayson, 1964, para. 5).  
AAU officials did not share Buck’s optimism. For example, at the 1965 NCAA 
Convention, NCAA members officially approved the boyc tt of AAU-sanctioned track 
meets after March 1, 1965, but with an added resolution to invite the AAU to co-sanction 
events at the domestic level (Liska, 1965).  Col. Hull commented that he was “gratified 
and encouraged by the NCAA resolution” but was suspicious of the compromise offered 
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by the NCAA (Liska, 1965, para. 6).  However, an agreement would not be reached from 
this compromise; thus, both parties continued to feud (Litsky, 1965). 
 Interestingly, the AAU received support from many NCAA members.  
Representatives from the University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, Harvard 
University and the United States Military Academy at West Point all spoke against the 
boycott.  Jerry Ford, the Athletic Director from the University of Pennsylvania, went on 
record to say the boycott was “a device under the cloak of words to sound like a service 
to members” (White, 1965, para. 24).  Prior to the convention, the eight Ivy League 
colleges led by Yale University declared their independence from the control of 
competition by the USTFF and the NCAA (“Ivy Loop, Led by Yale”, 1964).  This move 
was made after the Eastern Collegiate Athletic Conference proposed a coalition to end 
the complex battle for control of U.S. amateur athletics (“Ivy Loop, Led by Yale”, 1964).  
Yale and U.S. Track and Field Coach for the 1964 Olympics Bob Giegengack also vetted 
his frustrations by noting: 
“Yale is a sovereign body not taking any orders from any group. It hasn’t agreed 
to a boycott of anyone.  We are loyal members of the NCAA and are not defying 
anyone.  We just don’t want our boys on the Yale team used as weapons” 
(Grayson, 1964, para. 8). 
 
Despite the complaints from the Ivy League schools, NCAA Executive Director Walter 
Byers felt that no school would consider leaving the NCAA.  He argued, “these people 
are educators and men from such institutions who know how to live with regulations they 
may not be disposed to favor” (White, 1965, para. 29)
 Many schools, however, considered the implications f r competing in an AAU 
competition.  As an example, Southern University of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, competed 
in an AAU event three weeks before the NCAA championships in June 1965.  According 
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to Wiles Hallock, the NCAA Publicity Director, Southern University was “willing to take 
the risk of a penalty” (Litsky, 1965, para. 6).  Inaddition to Southern, several athletes 
from St. John’s University, Grambling University, and Washington State University 
participated in the AAU National Championships in San Diego in June 1965 without fear 
of penalties (“Punishment Not Likely for Collegians”, 1965).  However, the athletes from 
these schools who participated would not be penalized according to NCAA President 
Everett D. Barnes of Colgate University.  Barnes further elaborated that he did not “see 
any action being taken against the colleges since we want more to have the differences 
settled than to have some member colleges penalized for an individual’s actions” 
(“NCAA Plans No Reprisal”, 1965). 
 The NCAA’s actions would cumbersome for the NAIA as the organization 
needed to make a decision for NAIA members sharing affiliation with the NCAA (Land, 
1977).  Of the 455 schools that were members of the NAIA, 138 colleges also maintained 
membership with the NCAA, according to Land (1977).  While the dual member count 
included approximately 30% of NAIA membership, these members with dual affiliation 
were not concentrated in one specific region.  According to Land (1977), 15 of the 32 
geographical districts maintained two dual members or fewer; five districts had zero; and 
eight districts contained only one dual member.  Nevertheless, Duer and the Executive 
Committee had to carefully decide the proper action.  U fortunately, 40% of the district 
chairmen as of 1965 were from institutions holding dual memberships (Duer, 1965a).  
Wilson (2005) illustrated that schools affiliated with the NCAA College Division and the 
NAIA now were put in a position to choose sides.  To address the issue in 1965, the 
Executive Committee reiterated an interpretation of Article I, Section 7 of the NAIA by-
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laws which stated that “Each member institution of NAIA shall, by reason of its 
membership, be assumed to be in full support of the total program of NAIA” (NAIA, 
1965, p. 3).  Furthermore, the policy stated: 
“Any NAIA member institution which permits any member of its athletic 
administration or staff, or any member of the college administration to serve on 
any committee for organizing or administering any part of a program in conflict 
with the NAIA program of policies, activities or evnts shall thereby forfeit the 
right of any member of its faculty or athletic staff from serving on any NAIA 
committee, election or appointment to coaches associati n leadership or sports 
advisory committee. 
 
Those serving the NAIA in a leadership position in co flict with this policy shall 
serve out their regular terms of office but shall not thereafter be eligible for 
reappointment or election so long as this conflict of interest exists. 
 
This policy also implies that care shall be exercised in selection of leadership 
from institutions which may give support of their program to any organization or 
event in direct conflict with or preference to our program of policies, activities 
and events. 
 
Support of an event held on the same date or making a choice between events in 
support of a conflicting or competing program, regardless of actual conflict in 
date, will be interpreted as violation of this policy’ (NAIA, 1965, p. 3). 
 
Land (1977) noted any violations of these polices would carry a two-year suspension but 
exceptions were made for cases related to prejudicial travel expenses or school time loss.  
The member school would be responsible to inform the Executive Committee at least 30 
days in advance of the event and explain their extenuating circumstances (NAIA, 1965).  
The Executive Committee’s rationale for this policy was as follows: 
“Now we feel, and this is our premise, that membership demands responsibility, 
that you have a responsibility in membership, and if you do not want to take 
responsibility for NAIA other than just another opportunity to participate, you can 
still do that, but if you cannot, it is our Executive Committee’s feeling you should 
not be included among the leaders of NAIA” (NAIA, 1965, p. 4). 
 
 Wilson (2005) suggested that with this viewpoint, “the NAIA walked a tightrope 
between allowing member colleges to thumb their noses at the championships it had 
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developed, and pressuring the members so much that they decided to simply opt out and 
join the NCAA” (p. 66).  The Executive Committee attempted to enforce this policy at its 
1965 meeting.  The committee reviewed at least 13 violations involving dual member 
schools that violated the NAIA policy (Land, 1977).  According to meeting minutes, 
several schools were placed on suspension, some were warned, and others were given an 
ultimatum to change (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965).  While it can be argued that 
the Executive Committee was inconsistent with its penalties, the committee was actually 
dealing with each member school on an individual basis.  Thus, each member school 
reviewed was given a chance to explain or justify is position at the Executive Committee 
meeting (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965).   
 The Executive Committee also worked on solving an internal conflict between 
district programs and redistricting.  The NAIA had been dealing with this issue over the 
last 10 years as much of the controversy focused on the all-black schools transitioning 
into their respective geographical district (Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005).  By this time, 50 
member schools were classified among the three at-large districts comprised of black 
colleges (Land, 1977).  To officially address this issue, the Executive Committee 
declared that as of September 1, 1965, the black colleges would begin integrating in their 
respective geographical district (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965).  According to the 
Executive Committee plan, seven districts would be involved.  Specifically, District 6A 
(Southeast at-large district) would become District 6 while District 6B (Southwest at-
large district) would change to District 30 (“Seven Districts Involved in NAIA”, 1964).  
District 30 originally contained all member schools within the State of Pennsylvania.  
Due to the high number of member schools, Pennsylvania would split into two districts:  
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District 18 (Western Pennsylvania) and District 19 (Eastern Pennsylvania).  Member 
schools in Louisiana (former District 18), Alabama and Mississippi (former District 19) 
would be combined to form District 27 (“Seven Districts Involved in NAIA”, 1964).  
Member schools in Tennessee (former District 27) would move into District 24 and 
associate with members in Kentucky.  Some examples of schools affected by this move 
include Le Moyne College, Lane College, Fisk University, Kentucky State College and 
Knoxville College moving into District 24 and Arkansas A&M transitioning into District 
17 (Wilson, 2005).  The Eastern and Western Pennsylvania all-black schools had already 
been integrated before this decision.  Overall, this represented a tremendous gain for the 
black colleges as well as a vast achievement for the NAIA by maintaining their status as a 
forerunner in the civil rights movement (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965). 
 As the 1964-65 fiscal year drew to a close, Duer boasted that 1965 was the best 
year for basketball in the history of the organization (Land, 1977).  The 1965 NIBT 
grossed over $88,000 (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965).  The annual financial report 
reflected the tournament’s success as the NAIA showed $31,500 in gross income (NAIA, 
1965).  The financial success was unexpected slightly as there were major expense 
increases related to staff insurance and retirement programs, travel and general office 
expenses, and salaries (NAIA Executive Committee, 1965). 
 The summer of 1965 sustained the national conflict on amateur sports.  Senator 
Daniel D. Brewster of Maryland referred to the feud between the NCAA and the AAU 
over track and field as “a national disgrace” (“Maryl nd Senator Deplores Feuding”, 
1965, para. 1).  In a 1965 speech, Brewster stated he following to other Senate members 
about the feud: 
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“Here we have a situation in which, because of a feud between the NCAA and the 
AAU, one of our fine, record-setting and patriotic young athletics is about to be 
punished for trying to qualify to represent this country against the Russians. And, 
if Washington State University does not punish him, then that great institution 
will be penalized itself.  All this to satisfy the s lfish claims of our national 
athletic organization…If the two organizations cannot resolve their dispute soon, 
then the American people will demand that Congress take appropriate action” 
(“Maryland Senator Deplores Feuding”, 1965, para. 3-4). 
 
Fellow Senators Robert Kennedy of New York and Henry Jackson of Washington also 
voiced their frustration over the feud between the two organizations.  Kennedy, who had 
previously tried to help resolve the conflict, spoke against the feud believing “the NCAA 
has no business and no right to penalize Gerry Lindgren, or any athlete, for wishing to 
represent his country as an athlete” (“Senators Kennedy, Jackson Take Floor”, 1965, 
para. 4).  Jackson further elaborated with the following: 
“This long time dispute between the AAU and the NCAA must be resolved. I 
would not want to take sides but there must be some areas of compromise that can 
assure the U.S. the strongest representation abroad without subjecting some of the 
participants to discipline on their campuses. President Kennedy called on the late 
Gen. MacArthur to help resolve a dispute between th same groups before the 
1964 Olympics. Must the President of the United States constantly be called upon 
to correct the dispute on each association? This has been a distressing situation for 
a number of decades.  These men who administer our nation’s amateur athletics 
must now demonstrate the same willingness to uphold America’s standards as 
does the young man from my state” (“Senators Kennedy, Jackson Take Floor”, 
1965, para. 11-13). 
 
 Not long after these comments, the Senate Commerce Committee led by Senator 
Warren G. Magnuson of Washington convened a hearing to examine the dispute (Wilson, 
2005).  Magnuson went on record saying that the “dispute has gone on long enough” and 
it had now become “the duty of the Senate to speak out for those who have no voice” 
(“Senate to Investigate National”, 1965, para. 3).  Magnuson further elaborated by noting: 
“We will call the representatives of all athletic organizations concerned in this 
dispute and seek their testimony in public hearings. We will call on those 
educators whose schools have been subjected to outside pressures as a result of 
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this dispute. We will call on the athletes themselves. We will work until we get to 
the heart of the matter, and we will take whatever action is necessary to prevent a 
strangling of athletic freedom in our nation” (“Senate to Investigate National”, 
1965, para. 5-6). 
 
AAU President Clifford Buck welcomed “a thorough and unbiased hearing with a public 
airing of all the facts and principles involved” (“Senate to Investigate National”, 1965, 
para. 11).  Buck also remarked that the proposed hearing “should be very beneficial and 
the proposal deserves the favorable consideration of everyone involved” (“Senate to 
Investigate National”, 1965, para. 12). 
 The hearing was held from August 16 to August 27, 1965, in Washington, D.C. 
(Duer, 1965b).  Magnuson offered an opportunity for Duer to testify at the hearings 
(Wilson, 2005).  According to Land (1977), Magnuson hoped the NAIA would present an 
objective point of view opposed to supporting one organization and arguing issues.  Duer 
took full advantage of this chance to establish the NAIA as “a legitimate and relevant 
voice in matters of amateur athletics” (Wilson, 2005, p. 62).  On August 26, 1965, Duer 
began his testimony by establishing the NAIA’s right to voice valid opinions and propose 
resolutions to the amateur sport controversy (Land, 1977).  He also presented the NAIA’s 
background and position regarding the challenges of the NCAA as well as the NAIA’s 
support of the AAU’s position.  Duer cited his experience with the controversy as he took 
part in more than 20 meetings over the preceding four years in attempts to solve the 
controversy (Wilson, 2005).  Duer also noted that he attended all USOC meetings since 
he became a member in 1946 (Land, 1977). 
 Duer contended four issues, which were evident long before the opening 
challenges by the AAU, were the basis for the entir conflict (Wilson, 2005).  Those 
items were:  
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(1) selection of representation to the International Amateur Federation (IAF) 
(2) selection of athletes for international tours and competitions 
(3) selection of coaches for international tours and competitions 
(4) the right of the NAIA to have representation on inter ational bodies and the 
right of its athletes to have equal opportunities to enter qualifying trails and 
meets for the Olympic and Pan American Games (Land, 1977, p. 166). 
 
Duer discussed the strength of the NAIA track and fiel  program since its inception in 
1952 and referenced Gold Medal winners such as Ralph Boston, Lee Calhoun, Bob 
Hayes, Bobby Morrow, and Dick Stebbins as attempts to establish the merits for Item 4 
(Wilson, 2005).  Duer concluded his testimony by stating that the dual sanctioning rule 
was unsound and unnecessary and doubted it would solve any issues with the conflict 
(Land, 1977).  In return, Duer offered five recommendations to help mollify the situation.  
Those recommendations included: 
1. The administration of amateur athletics in the United States must continue to 
be accomplished by a body composed of all amateur organizations that 
sponsor national programs. 
2. The present power balance between the AAU and the NCAA and power bloc 
voting on issues must be ended by giving representatio  nd more voting 
strength to other worthy national organizations. 
3. There must be only one “sanctioning” body for national and international 
competition. 
4. The USOC, through its board of directors, should exert more dynamic and 
positive leadership in the promotion of amateur athletics and the resolution of 
the differences between organizations contributing to the United States 
Olympic Program 
5. The establishment of a strong arbitration board to res lve differences that 
apparently could not be solved voluntary between th organizations within the 
Olympic program (Land, 1977, p. 167-168). 
 
While it is difficult to assess the complete value of this testimony, NAIA officials 
felt its position as well as Duer’s appearance at the Commerce Committee meeting 
provided great positive publicity and exposure to its philosophies (Wilson, 2005).  After 
his testimony, Duer sent out a newsletter to the Excutive Committee detailing what the 
presentation meant for the NAIA.  According to former Army coach Colonel Earl Blaik, 
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Duer told him that “the official NAIA position in the AAU-NCAA conflict is a sound one 
and I am sure will be discussed in its proper light by he Senate Committee” (1965c, p. 
2).  Another senator stated that he appreciated Duer’s comments and assured Duer that 
“the NAIA is going to be protected and supported” (Duer, 1965c, p. 1).  AAU leaders 
also shared these sentiments and noted “the NAIA was the organization which gained the 
most in the hearings” (Duer, 1965c, p. 1). 
 After the hearings were concluded, Magnuson and the Senate Commerce 
Committee gave the AAU and the NCAA one week to reconcile (“Congress Issues 
Deadline to Feuding”, 1965).  The Committee made no ffort to conceal its irritation and 
explain that if a deal is not reached, then the Senate would move in on the problem 
(“Congress Issues Deadline to Feuding”, 1965).  At the October 1966 USOC meeting, an 
agreement was reached between the feuding organizatio s based on Duer’s 
recommendations (Wilson, 2005).  Further, the USOC Board of Directors voted for 
NAIA representation for all Olympic committees (Duer, 1965-66).  The NAIA was also 
rewarded nominal representation on games committees n sports that were a part of the 
intercollegiate program in a sizable number of NAIA member institutions (Duer, 1965-
66).  This proposal provided the NAIA with 37 representatives to the Olympic Games 
committees (see Table 5.7). 
 Through his latest actions, Duer concluded the NAIA had finally been given equal 
rights for its leadership and athletes.  Ross Merrick of the national AAHPER office 
informed Duer that the stature of the NAIA would change as the Olympic programs 
would bring in new recognition and commensurate respon ibility (Land, 1977).  Merrick 
suggested the NAIA member schools request that the U.S. Olympic Development  
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Table 5-7 - NAIA Representative Distribution for Olympic Games 
Sport Representatives 
Baseball 5 
Basketball (Men’s) 4 
Basketball (Women’s) 1 
Bobsled 1 
Boxing 1 
Gymnastics (Men’s) 2 
Gymnastics (Women’s) 1 
Judo 1 
Shooting 1 
Soccer Football 3 
Swimming (Men’s) 3 
Swimming (Women’s) 1 
Track and Field (Men’s) 4 
Track and Field (Women’s) 1 




Committee establish training centers on their campuses as well as supporting these 
Olympic movements financially (NAIA Executive Committee, 1966).  Because of 
Merrick’s suggestion, the Executive Committee launched a drive to raise $40,000 for the 
Olympic fund and asked all members to come up with $100 per year (Wilson, 2005). 
 As the national amateur conflict started to be resolved, the dual membership 
conflict appeared to be following the same lines.  Due to the Executive Committee’s 
stance on its policies, many schools were starting to pick a side (Wilson, 2005).  The 
1965-66 year did have some institutions still require suspensions or questioning about 
violations but the quantity of such schools was lower than the prior year (Land, 1977).  
The penalty reduction was probably due to the success the NAIA had in total 
membership.  During 1965-66, 26 colleges would jointhe NAIA, bringing the 
membership to a new high of 470 schools (“NAIA Membership Continues to Grow”, 
1966).  According to the Executive Committee, 3,836 athletes representing 491 
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institutions participated in NAIA district, area, and national championships, another new 
high for the organization (“NAIA Membership Continues to Grow”, 1966). 
 Although membership increased, the financial statements for the 1965-66 fiscal 
year showed the NAIA had a deficit of $3,269 (Land, 1977).  This deficit is related to 
several factors.  First, the national office moved from the Aladdin Hotel to the Hotel 
Phillips in Kansas City (“NAIA Gets New Offices”, 1965-66).  Because of the NAIA 
increase in membership to 470 in 1964-65, the NAIA needed more space (Wilson, 2005).  
The Hotel Phillips was only one block from the Aladdin Hotel, provided Duer and NAIA 
staff members with approximately 1,600 square feet.  The new office space included four 
private offices, a reception area, a conference room, and a combination mail and supply 
room (Land, 1977).  With the purchase of new office urniture, the move to the new 
office cost approximately $3,000 (“NAIA Gets New Offices”, 1965-66).   
The football championship was another concern to the NAIA.  After a few years 
in Sacramento, the Camellia Bowl moved to Augusta, Georgia, in 1964 and was 
rebranded as the Championship Bowl (“Potluck Sports”, 1964).  Both the 1964 and 1965 
Championship Bowls were disappointing financially.  According to Land (1977), heavy 
rain affected the attendance to the 1965 affair and the runaway victory by St. John’s of 
Minnesota over Linfield College of Oregon 33 to 0 (“Bluebonnet, Liberty Set”, 1965).  
The poor attendance produced a $10,000 loss for 1965 Championship Bowl (Land, 
1977).  The Executive Committee discussed moving the game once again at its annual 
meeting but tabled the issue pending the receipt of roposals from various cities (NAIA 
Executive Committee, 1966). 
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The Refinement Period (1966 – 1971) 
 Many institutions began to take notice of the NAIA as its stature increased after 
Duer’s testimony to the Senate Commerce Committee regarding the amateur sport 
conflict.  The prior fiscal year (i.e., 1965-66) saw 26 colleges gain membership (“NAIA 
Membership Continues to Grow”, 1966).  However, by the end of the 1966-67 fiscal 
year, another 47 schools would seek entry into the NAIA, the highest increase in 
membership since 1952 (Duer, 1967; Wilson, 2005).  This increase immediately 
prompted the association to raise the number of affiliated conferences (i.e., those with 
more than half NAIA member schools) from 36 to 41 (NAIA, 1967).  Next, the NIBT 
would become more prosperous as a result of the incr ased membership through a growth 
of gate receipts by 10% (Land, 1977).  Further, the NAIA would send a 12-man All-Star 
basketball team to the 1967 Pan-American basketball trials that defeated the Armed 
Forces team in the championship round 77 to 71 (“Monroe Leads NAIA All-Stars”, 
1967).   The NAIA All-Star team would produce four players on the 12-man squad 
representing the United States for the 1967 Pan-American Games in Winnipeg, Manitoba 
(Ferguson, 1967).   Finally, the NAIA also announced it would add hockey as its 
fourteenth national championship (Land, 1977).   
Another milestone was reached at the 1967 Annual Meeting when Dr. Morton 
Cunningham of Fort Hayes State College became the twenty-ninth president of the NAIA 
(Land, 1977).  The interesting note about Cunningham’s appointment revolved around 
his job; Cunningham was a college president instead of n athletic director.  According to 
Wilson (2005), Cunningham had been appointed to the Executive Committee since 1960 
and was the first college or university president to serve as the NAIA’s leader. The 
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NCAA would not elect a college or university president to lead its association until James 
Frank in 1981 (Wilson, 2005). 
 With the organization growing and receiving more att ntion, Land (1977) argued 
it was time for the NAIA to begin refining some of its programs while taking on new 
challenges.  This desire for refinement led to the goal of becoming an international 
organization.  By 1967, several Canadian institutions were seeking admission into the 
organization.  After lengthy discussion at the 1967 Annual Meeting, the delegates in 
attendance concluded that if any Canadian institution could meet the NAIA’s criteria and 
demonstrate program integrity, it would be eligible for membership (Wilson, 2005).  
However, there were some members who had reservations about this concept.  Joe 
Axelson, the Assistant Executive Secretary for the NAIA, wrote to Wilmont Toalson, the 
Chairman of the National Eligibility Committee, to v ice his concern centered on 
differences between U.S. and Canadian educational systems (Land, 1977).  Quoting a 
letter from David F. Anderson, Director of Physical Education at United College in 
Winnipeg, Manitoba, Axelson wrote: 
“The degree-granting institutions for the most in Canada…are three-year, degree-
granting institutions plus an honors [sic] year…At the present time we do not 
have a semester system, therefore, our course structures are for the most part 
based on the full academic year. Eligibility for athle ics, as in most universities in 
Canada, is based on one set of examinations at the end of each year. If a student is 
unable to pass the required number of courses, he i in l gible for the next 
complete year…You ask if there is an accreditation agency within the Province of 
Manitoba or in Canada. No such agency exists for higher education. Accrediting 
is done by the individual universities” (Axelson, personal communication, p. 1). 
 
Despite these limitations, the delegates from U.S. institutions recognized that 
many schools in Canada possessed more similarities than differences and that the 
burgeoning hockey championship would enjoy the boost (Wilson, 2005).  Expectedly, the 
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Executive Committee decided to move forward with the invitational letters and 26 were 
sent out to Canadian schools (Land, 1977).  Lakehead University of Port Arthur, Ontario, 
would become the first Canadian institution admitted in the summer of 1967 (Wilson, 
2005).  Two years later, Simon Fraser University of Burnaby, British Columbia, would 
earn admission into the NAIA and become a dominant force in swimming (“Central 
Swimmers Win Highline Invite”, 1970).  The international image of NAIA basketball 
was also greatly enhanced when the organization supported two all-star team tours (Land, 
1977).  The first, coached by Oklahoma Baptist University coach Bob Bass, traveled to 
the Far East, Malaysia, and Singapore (“NAIA Players Take Summer”, 1966).  The 
second emerged from Georgetown University when it traveled to Israel to participate in 
the eighth Hapoel Games.   
The NAIA Research Committee was also involved in multiple projects during the 
1966-67 school year.  One such project aimed to move f rward with a sound redistricting 
plan. The net effect of schools entering the NAIA was generally positive but integration 
was still a concern. Thus, the Research Committee had an opportunity to recalibrate the 
district boundaries to reflect these issues in a sufficient manner.  Dr. Harry Fritz of 
Western Illinois University, met with the Research Committee three separate times 
during the school year and gave careful consideration to all requests from both individual 
schools and the various districts (Land, 1977).  The recommendations led by Fritz 
proposed each district should support an optimum nuber of schools (e.g., 15), move 
schools into districts that enjoy common schedule/travel agendas, and integrate the 
remaining all-black colleges into their respective geographical districts (Wilson, 2005).  
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According to Land (1977), “this was by far the largest move ever attempted in the 
‘redistricting’ of the NAIA to date” and that this should be a phased in approach (p. 193).   
Several districts were affected by the Research Committee’s recommendations.  
For instance, the Research Committee proposed that District 8 (West Texas) would be the 
first to integrate black colleges within its region (Salwasser, 2011).  In addition, District 
19 (Eastern Pennsylvania) would have new members from Delaware, Maryland, and 
Upstate New York.  This arrangement would leave District 31 with members from the 
District of Columbia, New Jersey, and non-Upstate New York (Salwasser, 2011).  
Collectively, these moves were activated through letters provided to each athletic director 
for all member schools in the districts (Wilson, 2005).  The letters noted the following 
basic policies governing the redistricting activities: 
a. Requests of individual institutions and districts. 
b. An attempt to keep districts from reaching too high or too low a membership 
total as compared to the current national district membership average of 15. 
c. Strengthening of districts. 
d. Integration of predominately Negro schools into previously all-white districts 
wherever and whenever possible (Land, 1977, p. 194). 
 
 Other rule changes involved clarifying the 18-week transfer rule for those 
individuals leaving or returning from the Vietnam War.  Because of the draft and the war 
in Vietnam, many students risked having their schooling interrupted for military service 
(Wilson, 2005).  As a result of this, the delegates pa sed the following: “A student whose 
college career has been interrupted by one year or more of continuous active military 
duty shall be eligible for athletic participation immediately upon registration as a 
regularly enrolled student at the college of his choi e” (NAIA, 1967, p. 5).  This 
exemption was applicable to only the first two terms of attendance following release from 
active duty (Wilson, 2005). 
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 The activity produced by 1966-67 fiscal year emerged through a fiscal recovery 
too. Specifically, the NAIA rebounded from its loss the prior year to earn to earn a 
$5,380 profit (NAIA, 1967).  Still, many financial questions still remained and were 
discussed thoroughly at the annual meeting.  The biggest items centered on insurance 
expenditures; the Olympic and NAIA international development programs; and increased 
operational expenditures (Land, 1977).  As an example, the Development Committee 
recommended the NAIA contribute $50,000 during the next year to its Olympic Fund, 
$20,000 for the Pan-American Trials, $10,000 for the development of sports, $5,000 for 
the Federation of International Sports Union (FISU) games, and $5,000 for 
administration in these areas (Wilson, 2005).  However, the Executive Committee 
considered the collection of investments to be too heavy for the NAIA to sustain but it 
did approve the contribution of $50,000 to the Olympic Fund through a petitioning for 
member institutions to volunteer an extra $100 (Land, 1977).  Some members argued the 
organization should utilize some of the organization’s $45,000 surplus of cash instead, 
but this idea was defeated (NAIA, 1967).    
Unfortunately, football continued to be plagued by financial problems related to 
poor weather for the championship events.  The 1966 Championship Bowl moved to 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, after two years in Augusta, Georgia.  Waynesburg College of 
Pennsylvania defeated Wisconsin State University at Whi ewater 42 to 21 but the contest 
could only attract 6,067 spectators to Skelly Stadium due to the cold weather of Tulsa 
(“Waynesburg NAIA King”, 1966).  The low attendance figure produced a $14,000 loss 
for the Championship Bowl (Land, 1977).  After the event, the Executive Committee 
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commissioned a study to determine better location for the Championship Bowl (NAIA 
Executive Committee, 1967).   
 The 1967-68 school year saw the continued redistricting process continue 
according to geographic alignment.  During this time, 53 NAIA member institutions still 
remained in the three at-large districts (Land, 1977).  On August 25, 1967, Dr. Fritz and 
the Research Committee would meet with Duer, Assistant Executive Secretary Joe 
Axelson, NASC Chairman Dr. Edward Jackson and other representatives from the NAIA 
affiliated black conferences to discuss the redistricting efforts and the problems resolving 
from integration (Wilson, 2005).  After much discussion, all parties agreed to fully 
integrate for the 1968-69 school year.  The Research Committee and the Executive 
Committee would devote much of the 1968 school yearcontacting affected institutions 
and determining the final alignment (Land, 1977). 
 Over 100 NAIA schools would be affected by the redistricting process (Wilson, 
2005).  First, the at-large district schools would be fully integrated into their respective 
geographical regions (Salwasser, 2011).  These regions would include colleges located in 
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia.  After accounting for these institutions, several other districts changed their 
alignments.  District 26 originally held schools in North Carolina, South Carolina and 
Virginia.  After integration, all South Carolina schools would move into the newly vacant 
District 6 while members in Eastern North Carolina and Virginia would claim District 29 
(Salwasser, 2011).  Schools located in the Western part of North Carolina would remain 
in District 26.  Finally, colleges in Louisiana would be in their own district, leaving 
District 27 with Alabama and Mississippi (Salwasser, 2011). 
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 As the fall of 1968 approached, the NAIA scheduled s veral meetings to hear 
from several athletic directors in the affected districts (Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005).  Based 
on these meetings, the athletic directors felt the transition and integration process was 
progressing smoothly.  The NAIA News included the following item to promote 
redistricting success: 
“Eight new districts have been formed in the Southern states by the National 
Association of Intercollegiate Athletics…With this placing of all its 525 member 
institutions into geographic districts, NAIA reaffirms its dedication to democratic 
principles and practices in all areas of its growing a d increasingly complex 
organizational structure… 
 
These changes, effective for the 1968-69 competitiv year, follow many years of 
careful planning and are now a reality in which we all take deep pride. As in the 
past, all leaders in these new districts will have equal opportunity to share in 
planning and administering district qualifying events and other functions of the 
district. Conference affiliations will not be affect d” (“NAIA Announces 
Redistricting Plan”, 1968, p. 2). 
 
Duer continued his support during his address at the 1969 Annual Meeting by stating: 
“…the integration problem in our organization took the greatest step forward in 
the history of the NAIA when we redistricted the completely Negro districts into 
our regular geographic districts, and these district chairmen and the institutions, 
are very pleased about the results.  This took courage and leadership…The 
districts have been established and are fully aware of the benefits to be derived, as 
well as the right and fairness of this district organization” (NAIA, 1969, p. 4-5). 
 
In 1968, conflicting events and dual membership continued to put pressure on all 
member institutions and the association.  For instance, during the 1967-68 year, the 
NAIA hit five institutions with two-year suspensions for violating the organization’s 
policy: Ashland College, Northern Michigan University, Norfolk State College, Bethune-
Cookman College, and McNeese State University (Wilson, 2005).  The dual membership 
problems continued in the next school year as the same number of dual members still 
existed (Land, 1977).  However, the total number of NAIA members increased to 546, 
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thus decreasing the percentage of dual members (Wilon, 2005).  Because of the 
membership decrease, the Executive Committee chose not to implement any drastic 
changes in policy (Land, 1977).  In addition, only two schools were penalized for 
participating in conflicting events in the 1968-69 school year: Texas Southern University 
and Alcorn A&M University (NAIA Executive Committee, 1969a). 
Another membership problem involved non-accredited m mbers (Wilson, 2005).  
There were 46 non-accredited schools, of which 13 were accepted under the condition 
that they would become accredited by their regional agencies (Land, 1977).  The 
Executive Committee recognized this potential issue and ruled that all active members 
would need to be accredited by 1972 or would be demot d to associate member status 
(NAIA Executive Committee, 1969a).  Further, associate members would have to be 
accredited by 1975 or face expulsion from the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).   
Financially, the NAIA reached its best financial condition in the 1967-68 fiscal 
year under its largest membership by earning $53,519 (NAIA, 1968).  This substantial 
profit can be attributed to the success of basketball and the collective 1967 football 
playoffs.  Throughout the school year, basketball ws successful for the NAIA because of 
their success in the Pan-American basketball trials (“NAIA Wins Pan-American”, 1967).  
The NAIA All-Star team won the 1968 Olympic basketball trials in Albuquerque, New 
Mexico (“NAIA All-Stars Win in Trials”, 1968), defeating the AAU team in the finals 
while all four NCAA teams competing (i.e., NCAA Whites, NCAA Reds, NCAA Blues, 
and NCAA College Division) did not perform well (Thompson, 1968).  The 
Championship Bowl was successful as Fairmont State College of Fairmont, West 
Virginia, competed against Eastern Washington State College of Cheney, Washington, 
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for the Twelfth Annual NAIA Championship Bowl (“Fairmont Captures Champion 
Bowl”, 1968).  The championship game was hosted in Morgantown, West Virginia, 
approximately 60 miles from Fairmont (Cross, 1967).  The closeness of the game 
produced a crowd of 12,750 to see Fairmont State defeat Eastern Washington 28 to 21 
(Cross, 1967).  
 While the events on the field were successful during the school year, some NAIA 
members expressed their dissatisfaction with the playoff selection process.  A suggestion 
was made to potentially divide the membership into tw  divisions for football purposes 
only (Land, 1977).  The proposal was given to the Ex cutive Committee that one team 
from each division in each area be selected to participa e in the football playoffs and 
championships for two divisions (NAIA, 1968).  The Executive Committee did not make 
a ruling on this proposal at this time but did establish a policy for the Championship 
Bowl to be held at or near the location of one of the two finalists (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1968).    
The $50,000 goal set in 1967 for the Olympic Fund through the NAIA 
development program was running behind schedule (Land, 1977).  Thus, Duer urged all 
of membership about its full responsibility in fund raising commensurate with the 
opportunities for Olympic representation (NAIA, 1968).  It was also forecasted that the 
NAIA’s internal operations would cost more the next year.  The Executive Committee 
decided to increase the salaries for all employees in the national office by $50 per month 
as well as the Executive Secretary’s salary by $1,000 per year (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1968).  In addition, a new position know as “Assistant to the Executive 
Secretary” in the national office was created in order to coordinate various committees 
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and to share in the administration of national championship events (Wilson, 2005).  
Wallace H. Schwartz was hired as the first to take this position. 
 The 1968-69 school year also produced an unusual appro ch in administration of 
the organization.  Specifically, an interim Executive Committee meeting was called at the 
NAIA headquarters in Kansas City in November (Land, 1977). Only six of the 10 
members of the committee were present at the committee.  Despite this shortfall, many 
issues plaguing the organization was resolved (Wilson, 2005).  Specifically, the NAIA 
Executive Committee discussed solutions to the NAIA’s position on amateur athletics; an 
ethics charge against one specific member filed by two other member schools; a request 
for an exception to district basketball playoff policies; and a problem related to a breach 
of schedule claim against New Mexico Highlands University for cancelling four 
basketball games under contract (NAIA Executive Committee, 1969b). In regards to the 
New Mexico Highlands issue, committee members contacted the university through 
conference telephone calls and ruled that probation was in order for violation of NAIA 
rules (Land, 1977).  According to the meeting minutes, many supporters of the university 
called and wrote to the Executive Committee asking to not penalize the football team and 
bar it from postseason competition (NAIA Executive Committee, 1969b). 
 By the start of the 1969-70 school year, Duer challenged the members and the 
association to differentiate from the NCAA while continuing to refine the NAIA overall 
towards its goals of integrating athletics into the educational programs of its member 
institutions (Wilson, 2005).  One of the programs de igned to accomplish this mission 
was the “Conduct of Athletes” program.  This program was designed to promote 
sportsmanship on the part of players, coaches, and fans (Duer, 1969).  According to Land 
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(1977), the program would be stimulated by utilizing the media at every school and 
producing special articles in The NAIA News and The NAIA Coach (the NAIAC’s 
publication).  Duer (1969) called on all members to in egrate character and sports while 
denouncing the win-at-any-cost approach.  He argued th  win-at-any-cost approach 
diverted attention from good sportsmanship, high ethical standards, and fair play (Wilson, 
2005).  Duer (1969) did not oppose a winning spirit, but believed the pursuit of victory 
should not detract from the character-building aspects of sports. 
 Another program implemented during the 1969-70 school was a new phase of 
development program.  Instead of focusing on internatio al or Olympic development, the 
NAIA focused on national efforts (Land, 1977).  Specifically, the NAIA set a goal to 
raise $330,000 within two years and redistribute this money back to the members for 
travel, housing, and food expenses in participation in on-revenue producing sports 
within the NAIA (Duer, 1970a).   The first actions of this new program, according to the 
annual meeting minutes, were to request contributions from select individuals, 
organizations, and large industrial firms (NAIA, 1970).  These individuals willing to 
contribute would become the “500 Club”.  Duer (1970) believed this development/fund 
raising program, which consisted of carefully selected leaders securing money from 
individuals ($500 or more), was the key to the future success of the NAIA. 
 Eligibility concerns re-emerged during the 1969-70 school year.  Many schools 
were identified as violators of the amateur status rule, transcript falsification, and transfer 
rule (NAIA, 1970; see Table 5.8).  Many of the penalties levied on the member schools 
by the Executive Committee Meeting revolved around probation (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1970).  With the higher number of violatrs than expected, the Executive  
    
206 
 
Table 5-8 - NAIA Membership Violating Rules in 1969-70 
School Issue 
Adelphi University Participation in conflicting event 
Boise State University Conduct of Athletic Program; Eligibility  
College of Charleston Eligibility 
Clark College Eligibility 
Fayetteville State College Eligibility 
Grace College Eligibility 
Hampton Institute Eligibility 
Huston-Tillotson College Eligibility 
Knoxville College Eligibility 
Moorhouse College Eligibility 
Paine College Eligibility 
Purdue University (Calumet campus) Conduct of Athletic Program; Eligibility 
State University of Buffalo Conduct of Athletic Program; Eligibility 
Talladega College Eligibility 
Tampa University Conduct of Athletic Program; Eligibility  
Tennessee A&I State University Conduct of Athletic Program; Eligibility 
Tuskegee Institute Eligibility 
Virginia Union University Eligibility 
University of Southwestern Louisiana Scheduling against major competition 
 
Committee took this opportunity to urge compliance to the eligibility rules (Land, 1977).  
Thus, the committee developed the following chart entitl d “Seven Easy Steps to 
Eligibility Compliance” and published it throughout the year in The NAIA News: 
1. Institutional sponsorship of sports is obtained from information sheets 
received at the National Office. Eligibility compliance is required for each 
sport, so if sports are added or dropped you should notify the National Office 
immediately. 
2. Eligibility forms MUST be filed on ALL sports sponsored by your institution. 
This is required whether a school is active, associate or on probation. 
3. Eligibility forms are to be sent to your DISTRICT ELIGIBILITY 
CHAIRMAN. 
4. Compliance dates MUST be adhered to.  They are as follows: 
October 15 – Cross Country, Soccer, Water Polo, Football. 
January 15 – Indoor Track, Wrestling, Ice Hockey, Basketball, Swimming, 
Gymnastics 
April 15 – Bowling, Volleyball, Outdoor Track, Baseball, Golf, Tennis, 
Decathlon. 
5. The eligibility forms must be filed on or before the due date whether your 
institution is participating in seasonal competition only, or is interested in 
District, Area, and National competition as well. 
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6. Failure to comply with this regulation will result in a loss of NAIA Statistical 
Service and NAIA Ratings to your entire sports program and make your 
institution ineligible for District, Area, or National competition in the sports 
where compliance is not met. 
7. Whenever assistance is needed, or there is a doubt, contact your District 
Eligibility Chairman, or the NAIA National Office (“Seven Easy Steps to 
Eligibility”, 1969, p. 2). 
 
Although eligibility problems existed, several new schools would join the NAIA 
raising the total membership count to 550 (NAIA, 1970).  Furthermore, according to a 
survey conducted by The NAIA News, 1,078 institutions (counting multiple sports 
separately) and 7,189 athletes participated in district, area, and national events during the 
1968-69 school year (“1968-69 Participation in NAIA”, 1970).   Only 87 schools did not 
participate in at least one national event or playoff during that time (Land, 1977).  These 
statistics led the Executive Committee to conclude that 80.3% of the membership 
participated in a national championship or playoff of some kind and that the NAIA 
reached an all-time high of 65,816 athletes participating in NAIA sports programs (Land, 
1977; Wilson, 2005).    
In addition, the organization’s efforts on redistricting were successful as few 
members made requests for changes.   The Research Committee recommended District 
32 (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont) should 
be split into two districts due to the high number of schools (33 members) (Land, 1977).  
The district would be split into a northern half (District 32N) which would consist of 
Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont and include 14 schools, and a southern half 
(District 32S) including Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island consisting of 19 
schools (Wilson, 2005).  While the district was separated, it would still be administered 
by one district committee (NAIA Executive Committee, 1970).   
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 Basketball enjoyed another strong year during the 1970-71 season.  First, the 
Basketball Committee approved a rule modification that allowed dunking (NAIA, 1970).  
In addition, the committee pushed for the adoption of i ternational rule by having the 
semi-final game for third place in the NIBT played under international basketball rules 
(NAIA Executive Committee, 1971).  Duer proclaimed that the 1970 NIBT provided the 
“finest hour” in NAIA basketball history when the top eight seeded teams survived the 
first two rounds of play to meet each other for the first time (“Elmore Smith and Travis 
Grant Pace”, 1970).  Duer believed this to be substantiated when several attendance 
records were broken during the six day tournament.  The 1970 NIBT had a total 
attendance of 69,255 and surpassed any previous marks (Land, 1977).   
A Tuesday night capacity crowd of 10,500 was the first night sell-out in 
tournament history, and a daytime crowd of 4,772 was the largest one-afternoon 
attendance (Land, 1977).  Finally, the NAIA became a full member of the Naismith 
Basketball Hall of Fame (“NAIA Becomes Full Member”, 1969). This membership 
provided the NAIA with rights and privileges of organization membership including the 
nomination of worthy Hall of Fame nominees; a display of NAIA memorabilia in the 
Hall of Fame; and representation on committees setting policies on Hall of Fame 
selection (“NAIA Becomes Full Member”, 1969). 
 In 1970, the NAIA membership further agreed to create two divisions for its 285 
football playing members (“NAIA Will Crown Football Champions”, 1970).  Originally, 
all of these members would be given an opportunity to choose which division (i.e., 
Division I or Division II) they wanted to compete with 97% of these recommendations 
accepted (Land, 1977).  Division I was comprised of 137 members while District II 
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would have 148 members (“NAIA Will Crown Football Champions”, 1970).  The only 
main difference between the two divisions was the lev l of competition played by 
Division I members compared to Division II members (“NAIA Will Crown Two”, 1970).  
Upon the creation of these divisions, Duer stated: 
“This addition of a second division within the NAIA football championship 
program follows more than a year of detailed study by the NAIA Football 
Coaches’ Association under the guidance of Past-President Hanley Painter, 
Football Coach at Lenoir Rhyne (N.C.).  The football programs at our member 
institutions are now such that our schools are actually competing on two different 
levels of competition and this second championship will give all of our schools 
sponsoring intercollegiate football a chance to participate in a national football 
championship on a level in line with the philosophy of their own athletic program.  
The NAIA is the only collegiate organization to spons r a post season program to 
determine a national collegiate football champion and we are proud to be able to 
expand this program to two levels of competition” (“NAIA Will Crown Two”, 
1970, para. 2-3). 
 
The playoff format for both divisions would be similar to past years but the Division II 
Championship would be played one week earlier (“NAIA Will Crown Two”, 1970).  The 
Championship Bowl name would remain with Division I (“NAIA to Add a Second”, 
1970). 
 As 1970 progressed, the conflict between NAIA and the NCAA regarding 
amateurism reached a stage of acceptance rather than esolution.  Land (1977) noted this 
approach essentially set the stage for the “concentration of efforts toward improved 
efficiency of operation and bigger and better national championships within the 
organization” (p. 249).  In fact, the NAIA sent repsentatives to meet with the NCAA to 
discuss common problems shared by both organizations (Land, 1977).  Arnold Kilpatrick, 
Eddie Robinson, and Ted Runner of the NAIA Executive Committee met with Richard 
Koening, Samuel Barnes, and Marcus Plant of the NCAA in Washington, D.C. in May 
1971 (NAIA Executive Committee, 1971).  While no major decisions were made at the 
    
210 
 
meeting, the desire and ability to meet together appe red to be a sign of a working 
relationship between the two conflicted organizations (Wilson, 2005). 
Interestingly, one of the most significant policy changes for the NAIA concerned 
a burgeoning conflict with the NASC.  The NASC held that one of its objectives was to 
get active involvement for its member schools on NCAA planning and administrative 
committees (Land, 1977).  Once this desire was brought to the attention of NAIA 
officials, Duer wrote to NASC Chairman Vanette Johnso  to express his disappointment 
of the NASC’s disloyalty to the NAIA after it had taken a strong approach in pioneering 
integration (Wilson, 2005).  Duer also noted that Article VII, Section II of the NAIA By-
Laws explicitly stated that any member institution serving on part of an NCAA 
committee will be disqualified from participation o any NAIA committee (Land, 1977).   
Johnson responded that the NASC had no intention to u dermine the NAIA and 
suggested a meeting to discuss how the differences might be settled (Wilson, 2005).  At 
the 1971 Annual Meeting, representatives from both the NASC and the NAIA met to 
discuss the issue at length (Land, 1977).  After thse discussions, the Executive 
Committee decided to change its policy and allowed dual members to participate on 
NCAA committees (NAIA, 1971).  However, Wilson (2005) offered “the NASC’s self-
interested policy of trying to play both sides of the street had effectively weakened the 
NAIA’s equally self-interested attempt to force its own members to declare their 
allegiance either to it or the NCAA” (p. 81). 
 At the 1971 Executive Committee meeting, the Executive Committee allowed the 
ice hockey and baseball championships to be played on a Sunday (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1971). Previously, sporting events avoided scheduling on Sunday to adhere 
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to the religious beliefs of many church-based institutions.  Wilson (2005) argued these 
institutions saw this ruling as a potential detriment to these specific schools losing their 
distinctiveness.  At this time, almost no college, high school, or kids’ athletic programs 
included a Sunday component as “the sacredness of the Sabbath was one of the 
traditional values challenged by the cultural revoluti n of the 1960s” (Wilson, 2005, p. 
81).  This precedent would open the door for future requests for exemption from the 
Sunday playing rule (Land, 1977). 
 Finally, three member schools were placed on probati n in 1970.  Austin 
University received probation for the 1970 football season for violating the 18-week 
transfer rule (“Three Placed on Probation”, 1970).  Fisk University earned probation for 
all sports for having an ineligible athlete participate on its 1969 track team (“Three 
Placed on Probation”, 1970). Virginia Commonwealth University received a one-year 
probation in all sports for scheduling more than 25% of its basketball games for the 1970-
71 season against schools designated as major universities (“Three Placed on Probation”, 
1970).  In addition to those three universities, another eight schools were reprimanded for 
their actions including the University of Tampa (NAIA Executive Committee, 1971).  
The sanction assigned to the University of Tampa was the penultimate item to cause its 
move from the NAIA to the NCAA College Division.  However, Tampa President B. D. 
Owens listed economic considerations as the main reson for moving into the College 
Division (“Tampa Picks College Division”, 1971).  Similar financial considerations 
would eventually concern all NAIA member institutions in the near future. 
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The Maturity Period (1971 – 1975) 
 At the end of the 1970-71 school year, the NAIA had 548 members although 
some schools chose to affiliate with the NCAA (Wilson, 2005).  In order to compete 
against the NCAA for membership, Duer and the Executive Committee decided to hire 
Haskell Cohen, a New York publicist, for $12,000 to increase the NAIA’s publicity and 
exposure (Land, 1977).  Cohen was to release news from the NAIA through his office 
under the assumption that news from New York was more n teworthy (Wilson, 2005).  
His approach seemed to focus on what the NAIA should do and was met with predictably 
negative results (Land, 1977).  The members were disappointed with Cohen’s efforts and 
discussed if his services should be retained. After a heated debate over the issue, the 
Executive Committee ruled to retain Cohen’s services with the hope that publicity would 
increase in due time (NAIA Executive Committee, 1972). 
 Publicity was also a main concern for the Special Events Committee as they 
continually worked on publicizing, reviewing, and approving athletic events that were 
socially and educationally significant and sound (Land, 1977).  The Special Events 
Committee had certain requirements that needed to be met in order for an event to be 
featured.  First, at least 50% of the participating eams had to be members in good 
standing with the NAIA (“NAIA Special Event Requirem nts”, 1971).  Other 
requirements involved protection of the amateur statu  of all participating athletes, 
supervision of all financial transactions of events, and restriction of advertisement in 
programs concerning alcoholic beverages, tobacco, or drugs (“NAIA Special Event 
Requirements”, 1971).  Based on these requirements, the Black All-Star Classic in 
Houston, Texas; the Boothill Bowl in Dodge City, Kans s; the Mineral Water Bowl in 
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Excelsior Springs, Missouri; the Baker Invitational Tournament; and the Top of Texas 
Basketball Tournament all earned recognition from the Special Events Committee (Land, 
1977). 
 On the other hand, some athletic events were mirrored with poor conduct that 
“was reflective of the ills of society as well as of the spectators of sporting events” (Land, 
1977, p. 274).  Standards of conduct declined, and NAIA schools found themselves 
trying to control players and fans who no longer felt constrained by traditional standards 
(NAIA Executive Committee, 1972).  As an example, a fight broke out among fans 
during a 1972 baseball game between Jacksonville Stat  University and Birmingham 
Southern University (“Baseball Teams on Probation”, 1972).  Several other incidents also 
occurred at the 1972 NIBT including “people sleeping i  the halls of hotels, immoral acts 
in and around the hotels, too many people in hotel r oms, and beer can littering” (Land, 
1977, p. 275).  The Executive Committee directed member institutions to clarify their 
responsibility for the prevention of such incidents and to reward individual programs for 
their good behavior (NAIA Executive Committee, 1972). 
 The conflicting event issues also remained a problem for the NAIA as seven 
schools would participate in conflicting events throughout the 1971 school year.  
Southern Colorado State College of Pueblo, Colorado, received a two-year probation in 
all sports for participating in multiple conflicting events (“11 Schools Penalized”, 1972).  
The penalty would make Southern Colorado ineligible for district and national 
championship events until the 1974-75 school year (“11 Schools Penalized”, 1972).  Five 
other schools (Alabama State University of Montgomery, Alabama; Bentley College of 
Waltham, Massachusetts; Delta State College of Cleveland, Mississippi; Gannon College 
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of Erie, Pennsylvania; and Mercer University of Macon, Georgia) received a one-year 
probation in basketball, disqualifying them for the1973 NIBT should they qualify 
(“NAIA Puts 8 Schools”, 1972).  Another 11 schools were placed on probation for 
violating eligibility rules (“11 Schools Reprimanded by NAIA”, 1972).  As an example, 
Montana Tech University of Butte, Montana, was placed on probation in football for the 
1972 season because it utilized an ineligible player that transferred from another school 
and participated in a Division II semifinal game (“11 Schools Reprimanded by NAIA”, 
1972).  Finally, four other schools drew suspensions as a result of investigations by 
district eligibility committees (Rockhurst College, New Mexico Highlands University, 
New York State University at New Paltz, and Blackburn College) (“Four Institutions 
Draw Probation”, 1971).   
 Also at this time, intercollegiate athletics would soon be impacted by legislation 
expanding sport offerings to both men and women.  As the 1960s approached, a new 
women’s movement started to emerge which demanded legal equality with men.  This 
push led to the passage of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972 and specifically 
Title IX.   Title IX explicitly states that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis 
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal Financial 
assistance” (20 U.S.C. § 1681, 1972).  While Title IX was not designed specifically for 
college athletics, it impacted all intercollegiate sports where all schools receiving any 
federal government funding must provide equal opportunities for both men and women.   
The act was to take effect in 1978, but Title IX provoked tremendous efforts by 
NAIA and NCAA institutions to bring their schools into compliance with the law 
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(Seifried, 2007; Wilson, 2005).  As an example, Newb rry College, a small private 
institution from Massachusetts affiliated with the NAIA, planned to add $15,000 to 
$20,000 to their athletic budget in 1975 for a fulltime women’s physical education 
instructor and a new intercollegiate women’s program (Waters, 1974).  The University of 
South Carolina Athletic Director Harold Hagen elaborated that “Title Nine looms as a 
crisis on the horizon…if we had to have equal expenses for women, we would have a 
severe problem.  We would have to curtail our men’s program” (“No Drastic Cutbacks 
Yet”, 1974, para. 5).  Clemson University Athletic Director shared these sentiments as he 
announced a reduction of junior varsity football games to three (Waters, 1974).  The 
NCAA took another approach in 1974 when it made a ple to the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) and stated that men’s sports would suffer if equal funding 
were to take place (Rothenberg, 1974; Seifried, 2007).  HEW Public Affairs Director Lou 
Mathis responded to these allegations by saying: 
“We didn’t initiate this law. That was done by women’s pressure groups to 
Congress. But now the NCAA and all the athletic directors are saying we’re 
trying to destroy college athletics.  Well, we’re not. All we’re doing is enforcing 
the law. That’s our job as spelled out by the Constitution. Why don’t they attack 
the Constitution?” (Rothenberg, 1974, para. 3-4). 
 
The major concern to the NCAA and the athletic directors was funding for 
women’s athletics.  The NCAA felt that Title IX regulations were illegally far-reaching 
and claimed that no athletic organization received any federal funding (“NCAA Worried 
over Federal Rules”, 1974).  Brigham Young University Athletic Director Stan Watts 
further argued the HEW requirements would force many schools to cut back on athletics 
(“NCAA Worried over Federal Rules”, 1974).  Further, these new requirements would 
put all universities in a financial bind if they were forced to provide equal opportunities 
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to women.  In response to similar concerns, HEW lawyer Gwen Gregory, who was 
chiefly responsible for the Title IX regulations, argued: 
“It’s true that there are no athletic programs, at le st to my knowledge, that are 
federally financed. However, the athletic program is part of the schools’ overall 
[sic] program. Any discrimination in the athletic program would infect the entire 
undergraduate student program. You can’t separate them. I think it is clear that if 
there is discrimination against a student in athletics…it effects anything else that 
the student is involved in” (Rothenberg, 1974, para. 14-15). 
 
 As the resistance to women’s athletics from the NCAA was apparent, it is not 
surprising a new organization would be born from conflicting viewpoints.  Just as the 
NAIA was created to represent small college men’s basketball teams in 1937, the 
Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW) was created in 1971 to 
sponsor seven national championships and issue guidlines to its member schools 
(Liberman, 1973).  By early 1972, Duer met with AIAW representatives in order to gain 
an understanding of the AIAW’s prerogatives (Wilson, 2005).  After discussing the 
meeting with his fellow Executive Committee members, the NAIA voiced its full support 
for the AIAW to be a governing body for women’s athle ics (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1972).  Duer further complimented the AIAW for its work and suggested the 
NAIA desired for open communications with the AIAW (Land, 1977). 
 By the 1972 Annual Meeting, AIAW President Lucille Magnuson was invited to 
meet with the NAIA Executive Committee to discuss the AIAW program with three 
specific purposes in mind (Wilson, 2005).  First, the Executive Committee wanted to 
learn first-hand the aims, purposes, and future plans of the AIAW.  Second, the 
committee would determine how the NAIA could coordinate its plans with the AIAW’s.  
Finally, both parties wanted to establish the best procedure for advising NAIA member 
schools with their developing women’s programs utilizing the services of the AIAW 
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(Land, 1977).  According to The NAIA News, the meeting was deemed a success, and the 
NAIA went on record fully supporting the AIAW in evry possible way (“AIAW Meets 
with Executive Committee”, 1972). 
 The 1972-73 school year was the thirty-fifth anniversary year for the NAIA 
(Land, 1977).  Thus, the 1972 Annual Meeting was highly attended as approximately 300 
member institutions were represented by delegates (“Convention Keeps Growing”, 
1972).  At this time, the NAIA sponsored 16 national championship events and was 
flourishing based on their game attendance (Land, 1977).  However, the organization, as 
well as the United States overall, would have to deal with some of the ill wills of society.  
While not unique to intercollegiate athletics, the increasing social and political upheaval 
within American society transferred into college athle es who continually grew frustrated 
with the traditional hierarchy of a head coach having absolute control (Wilson, 2005).  In 
addition, concerns over the increase of violence at sporting events and the difficulty 
financing programs became an issue (Duer, 1972).  Facing these issues, Duer had 
continually focused on the basic aim of the NAIA as a way to address these issues – to 
assist in developing sound educational program in intercollegiate athletics (Land, 1977).   
At the 1973 Annual Meeting, Duer stressed that “athletics should be a privilege not a 
right of the athlete” and issued a “challenge to [the] membership to justify [the] claim 
that athletics is part of [the] educational program of the institution” (NAIA, 1973, p. 1).  
 The NAIA would further emphasize these values by looking to the Conduct of 
Athletic Committee managed by Executive Committee member Paul Pierce (Wilson, 
2005).  This committee had been organized for the last few years but was continually 
running into problems related to due process for any disciplinary action they 
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recommended. With the help of its legal team, Pierce and members of the Conduct of 
Athletic Committee designed five guidelines to regulate the conduct of athletics.  The 
guidelines created were the following: 
• An athlete has a personal and property right in so far as competing for an 
institution is concerned, and he cannot be deprived of this right without due 
process. 
• The personal and property right is guaranteed by the 14th Amendment of the 
Constitution of the USA. 
• If it is felt that the athlete is guilty of misconduct, he must be given written 
notice of the hearing date, time and place. 
• The hearing must be in the area of the school or nea  where the athlete lives. 
• The district executive committee could be the group conducting the original 
hearing (Land, 1977, p. 286-287). 
 
One of the first challenges to these guidelines involved the penalties levied against 
Birmingham Southern and Jacksonville State.  NASC President C. D. Henry visited with 
the Executive Committee during its annual meeting in March 1973 to determine if the all-
black schools would receive due process during the penalty process (Wilson, 2004).  
Henry reviewed the procedures and determined that the NAIA procedures would provide 
fair treatment for all schools and individuals involved as well as suppressing future 
violations of the participation policy and conduct of athletics code (Land, 1977).   
 Redistricting was also addressed at the 1973 Annual Meeting.  The previously 
approved plan to combine District 1 (Washington andAlaska) and District 5 (Montana 
and Wyoming) and to divide District 32 did not go into effect as scheduled because the 
members of Districts 1 and 5 resisted the concept (Land, 1977).  In response, the 
Executive Committee compromised to create Districts 32N (Maine, New Hampshire, and 
Vermont) and 32S (Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Massachusetts) to eliminate the large 
original District 32.  Despite this split, both distr cts would have to compete in a bi-
district playoff for the right of one team to go to the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  Interestingly, 
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after a discussion with six district chairmen at the 1973 Annual Meeting, the Executive 
Committee decided that Districts 1 and 5 should be the two affected districts for the 1974 
NIBT instead of Districts 32N and 32S since Districts 1 and 5 had less members than the 
original District 32 (NAIA, 1973).  One year later, District 5 (Montana and Wyoming) 
members would be moved into District 12 which included both North and South Dakota 
(Wilson, 2005).  District 32N would become the new District 5, and District 32S would 
become the lone District 32. 
 As the 1973-74 school year approached, Duer met with the Executive Committee 
at the 1973 interim meeting to discuss the NAIA’s upcoming challenges.  Duer felt there 
were “so many opportunities and challenges to increase the stature of our program” 
(Land, 1977, p. 301).  Duer recognized the opportunities with the following: 
“We have two proposals for sites for the Champion Bwl – we have the beginning 
of an NAIA-TV Network – we have real indication of Kansas City support for the 
Hall of Fame and NAIA film of the Kansas City Story…- we have increasing 
opportunities for national competition….Now we have increasing opportunities 
through national recognition in the Olympics, [and] World Student games.  We 
have a Vice Presidency on the Olympic Committee.  We have had three requests 
to appear before the Senate Hearings for bills design d to bring governmental 
control over amateur athletics.  We were asked to Washington for a hearing on the 
drug study within athletics in the NAIA. We are developing with the Kansas City 
Sports’ Commission a program for the NAIAC selecting an athlete of the year in 
1974” (NAIA Executive Committee, 1973, p. 1). 
 
He concluded it was now time “for [the] NAIA to capitalize on our good fortune and our 
stature and render greater service to our youth in our 565 member institutions” (NAIA 
Executive Committee, 1973, p. 2). 
 The amateur conflict emerged again in 1973 when th NCAA implemented a ban 
on its member school athletes forbidding them to compete on American all-star teams 
against a visiting Russian squad in basketball and track and field (“Athletes to Defy 
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NCAA Ban”, 1973).  According to Lewiston Morning Tribune, NCAA Executive 
Director Walter Byers had written to Marquette University basketball coach Al McGuire 
and Athletic Director Dr. James Scott denying them permission to coach a U.S. team 
against the Russians.  The letter stated that “no student of any NCAA institution may 
participate in the games…No coach of a member NCAA institution may be attached in 
any way to the games” (“NCAA Says College Hoopsters”, 1973, para. 7).  The reasoning 
behind the ban focused on the AAU sponsoring the Russian tour without consulting the 
International Basketball Board as well as countermanding the long-existing NCAA by-
laws (“NCAA Says College Hoopsters”, 1973).  AAU Public Relations Director Richard 
McArthur was disappointed with the NCAA ruling and oted the following: 
“We had hoped to field the best possible team against the Russians and redeem 
our defeat at Munich.  We cannot be held responsible now for the international 
image we present.  We had hoped for some sort of waiver on the part of the 
NCAA but we have found that in dealing with Walter Byers logic and fair play 
rarely enters into his thinking process” (“NCAA Says College Hoopsters”, 1973, 
para. 14-15). 
 
In response, NCAA Public Relations Director Jerry Miles countered McArthur comments 
and acknowledged that “for undergraduates to participate in outside competition has been 
a violation of NCAA rules for years” (“NCAA Says College Hoopster, 1973”, para. 17).  
Miles further noted that this issue was another attempt by the AAU to breach well-
established NCAA regulations. 
 After this latest fight, Congress was ready to take ction again to settle the feud 
between the AAU and the NCAA.  A special committee in the House of Representatives 
began investigations into the NCAA ban (Land, 1977).  Duer was again called to testify 
before the committee to address his concerns (“A.O. Duer Appears before House”, 1973).  
He reiterated the NAIA position of siding with the AAU but was not engaged in the 
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dispute.  In addition, Duer and the NAIA encouraged its athletes to compete in 
international competition; furthermore, they embraced international teams into their 
association (“Athletes to Defy NCAA”, 1973).  Expect dly, Duer also requested the 
House committee provide support for the NAIA so that some of the best athletes or 
coaches would be allowed to participate in international competition U.S (Land, 1977).  
Thus, the involvement of the NAIA in problems larger than those of the internal 
organization lent it considerable stature (“A.O. Duer Appears before House”, 1973).   
In response to the special meeting, Congress introduced a bill that would 
authorize fines up to $10,000 if a college athlete was banned from intercollegiate contests 
because of participation in international amateur competition (“Congress Aims at NCAA 
Ban”, 1973).  The bill was sponsored by Representatives James G. O’Hara of Michigan 
and John Dellenback of Oregon and would provide safguards to college coaches who 
work with U.S. amateurs in international competition (“Congress to Lower Boom”, 
1973).  By the end of Summer 1973, U.S. Senators John Tunney of California and 
Warren Magnuson of Washington would sponsor Senate Bill 2365 which would create a 
federal board to exert  controls on all international and domestic amateur athletics 
(“NCAA Group Frets about Senate”, 1973). 
 According to Land (1977), the conflict between theNAIA and the NCAA was 
starting to take its toll on the various aspects of each organization’s member schools.  
Thus, the Executive Committee sought to ease the tensions with the NCAA by engaging 
in another set of meetings to discuss the divisive issues such as championship choices by 
winning teams; conflicting events; women’s athletics; philosophy discussion of NAIA 
and NCAA; and international competition (NAIA Executive Committee, 1974a).  
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Division discussions surfaced as another important topic during these meetings because 
of the recent decision to reorganize the NCAA.   
In January 1973, delegates of the NCAA met in Chicago for the 1973 NCAA 
Convention to discuss the possibility of a large-scale reorganization (Katz & Seifried, in 
press).  The original plan for reorganization involved dividing NCAA members into two 
divisions, conforming to the university/college distinction, but would provide each 
division with the right to determine its own operating rules (“NCAA Special Convention 
to Consider”, 1973).  Reorganization of the NCAA was important to many schools, 
especially those schools associated with the Southeas ern Conference (SEC).  SEC 
Commissioner Dr. Boyd McWhorter noted:  
“The purpose of the meeting is to draw up a reorganization plan to present at a 
special NCAA meeting later this year. I think the SEC view is almost unanimous 
that restructuring is critical for the NCAA.  If it’s the only thing to be considered 
at the new meeting, I think we can sit there and hone it out” (Shearer, 1973, para. 
4-5). 
 
Legendary Alabama football head coach Paul “Bear” Bryant also shared these sentiments 
noting that the NCAA’s recently approved limitation f 30 football grants-in-aid per year 
and no more than 105 players on scholarship was not enough (Shearer, 1973). 
 On the other hand, NCAA College Committee Member Stanley J. Marshall feared 
the possible results stemming from the proposed NCAA reorganization.  According to 
The Herald-Journal, Marshall commented: 
“The nation’s top 50 or so schools, involved in football bowl and other lucrative 
competition seem to feel that restrictive NCAA rules have been forced upon them 
by college division members.  They cite the 1.6 academic entrance rule, the 
freshman eligibility rules, and other overall legislation as being influenced upon 
them by the small colleges” (“NCAA Starts 67th Annual Meetings”, 1973, para. 6-
7). 
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Marshall further elaborated if the two divisions had the ability to design their own 
operating rules, small college recruiting would suffer to some extent (“NCAA Starts 67th 
Annual Meetings”, 1973).  Marshall continued by offering:   
“Supposing the big school division then voted against the pending proposal to 
issue tenders on the basis of need and the small school division approved such 
scholarships.  Then it would be difficult for small college coaches to recruit.  The 
vote on the reorganization will be a real donnybrook and there may be a flock of 
amendments to modify it” (“NCAA Starts 67th Annual Meetings, 1973, para. 9, 
12). 
 
During the proceedings, Eastern College Athletic Conference (ECAC) President and 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Athletic Administrator Ross Smith acknowledged 
that his block of 120 institutions determined a fate of a proposal that would address this 
possible reorganization (National Collegiate Athletic Association [NCAA], 1973; 
“NCAA Division Not Likely”, 1973).  Smith believed that the NCAA needed to be 
reorganized but “this plan does not in our opinion provide an acceptable process whereby 
the entire membership of the NCAA can achieve its respective goals” (NCAA, 1973, p. 
100).  After Smith’s speech, the proposal to split the NCAA into two divisions could not 
muster the required two-thirds vote of 295 for approval as the bill was defeated 224 to 
218 in a record convention total vote of 442 (“NCAA Reorganization is Rejected”, 1973).  
Following the defeat of this reorganization plan, the NCAA commissioned a special 
convention in the summer of 1973 to determine potential reorganization plans (Falla, 
1981; “NCAA Special Convention to Consider”, 1973).   
 The NCAA Council specifically appointed an 11-man committee to draft a new 
proposal.  According to The NCAA News, the committee addressed five major points with 
their reorganization proposal: 
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1. The institutions at present classified “Major” in the sport of football will 
remain intact, and may vote as a group on restrictive Bylaw legislation 
pertaining only to them in the sport of football. 
2. The membership will be divided into three categories: Division I, Division II 
and Division III.  The NCAA Council will determine which legislation shall 
be subject to divided voting in the Bylaws. 
3. Each institution will be given the prerogative of determining in which division 
it wishes to vote and participate, exclusive to football. 
4. Not later than 1975-76 academic year, approximately 39 National 
Championships will be sponsored with a minimum of 10 National 
Championships to be conducted in each of the three divisions. 
5. The NCAA Council and the NCAA Executive Committee will be restructured 
with each division being guaranteed representation on each group (“NCAA 
Reorganization Proposal Formulated”, 1973, para. 7-11). 
 
According to Falla (1981), Special Committee Chairmn Edgar Sherman suggested the 
labeling of divisions: 
“Started out by suggesting maybe we could call (thedivisions) by colors or names 
to try to avoid the one, two, three implication; but as we progressed, the 
discussion always got back to designating them one, two and three. People who 
wrote in with suggestions and comments also termed th m to be one, two and 
three. I guess rather than fight, we gave in to it, and those are the names given…” 
(p. 232). 
 
An initial draft of this proposal was distributed to NCAA members in March 1973 for 
preliminary reactions and refine for the NCAA Council in April 1973 (“Preliminary 
Reorganization Proposal Issued”, 1973).  After thismeeting, the Special Committee 
revised some provisions such as the ability for each division to establish its own by-laws 
without approval from any other division as well as each division creating its own criteria 
for membership in its own division (“Reorganization Plan Revised by Committee”, 
1973).  After making slight adjustments to the reorganization plan in May 1973, the 
NCAA Council approved the Special Committee’s proposal and subjected it to a member 
vote at the NCAA Special Convention in August 1973 (“Final Reorganization Proposal 
Approved”, 1973). 
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 At the Hyatt Regency-O’Hare Hotel in Chicago, Illino s, the NCAA first Special 
Convention convened on August 6, 1973 (“First Special Convention to Decide”, 1973).  
Many of the members in attendance saw no issues with the proposed plan.  Atlantic Coast 
Conference Commissioner Bob James described the conflict with the following: 
“It got to a point where we felt that we had to have a change so we could solve the 
problems that were common just to us.  It seemed that many of the things we 
wanted were being frustrated by those colleges that had no interest whatsoever in 
the point being debated.  They’d just say, ‘I don’t like that,’ and vote against it.  It 
would cripple us and never affect them” (Attner, 1973, para. 7-8). 
 
Even ECAC Commissioner Scotty Whitelaw had no objections to the plan as the 
conference’s prior reservations had been met (Attner, 1973).  Whitelaw further 
elaborated: 
“We didn’t like the idea of being placed in a divison without having the ability to 
decide if we wanted to be in that division or not.  This new way allows every 
school to examine its own athletic program and decide in just what division it 
would feel most comfortable.  Before, it seemed the proposal was weighed all too 
heavily toward the major schools.  Everything was spelled out for them and little 
was said about the second division for the smaller schools” (Attner, 1973, para. 
17-19). 
 
After discussion of the proposal, a vote was called by the NCAA members.  By a vote of 
366 to 13, the NCAA approved the reorganization pla (Liska, 1973).  This 
reorganization allowed 245 schools to be classified as Division I; 200 colleges in 
Division II; and 225 institutions in Division III (Liska, 1973).  At the time of the 
reorganization, the NAIA maintained 558 member schools while the NCAA had a total 
membership count of 670 (Wilson, 2005).  By the next school year, the NAIA would lose 
45 members.  However, the NAIA membership total would stay relatively stable over the 
next ten years as member schools ranged between 509 and 527 until 1984 (Wilson, 
2005).   
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 Affecting these counts partially were those schools that maintained membership 
with both the NCAA and the NAIA.  Legislation creatd and approved in the past to 
remedy this issue all but appeared to deal with dual membership on a temporary basis for 
the NAIA.  As such, the Executive Committee appointed its own special committee 
chaired by NAIA President Dr. Robert Livingston to study the dual participation policy 
as it appeared in the NAIA Handbook and make recommendations concerning this rule 
(Land, 1977; NAIA Executive Committee, 1974a).  This committee would make two 
proposals to the Executive Committee that would attempt to remedy the NAIA’s problem 
with dual membership.  First, the Special Committee recommended that Article VI, 
Section III, Item 2 of the NAIA By-Laws be replaced with the following: 
“NAIA member institutions may participate in one (1) conflicting amateur non-
NAIA district qualifying, area, or national championship event in one sport of the 
choice EXCEPT in the sports of FOOTBALL or BASKETBALL without penalty 
of probation by NAIA” (Land, 1977, p. 308). 
 
This motion to allow participation in one conflicting event was passed by the members at 
the 1974 Annual Meeting (NAIA, 1974).  A second suggestion involved the special 
events program.  The Special Events Committee proposed the fee for a special event 
should decrease from $100 to $25 and the requirement for financial accounting should be 
eliminated (Wilson, 2005).  This was also approved at the 1974 Annual Meeting. 
As the 1973-1974 fiscal year came to a close, the NAIA was faced with several 
decisions that would alter many past traditions the organization relied upon.  First, the 
NAIA had to decide if the annual NIBT would move into a new home in Kansas City.  
The Crosby Kemper Memorial Arena was constructed in Ka sas City in 1974 for $22 
million (“Looking Back: The History”, 2011).  The new facility would have a seating 
capacity of 16,284 compared to the 9,960 in the Municipal Auditorium (Land, 1977).  
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While more people could attend games, Duer had several reservations about making the 
move to the Kemper Arena.  According to Land (1977), Duer feared the location of the 
Kemper Arena would deter businessmen in downtown from attending the afternoon 
games compared to the Municipal Auditorium’s location n Downtown Kansas City.  In 
addition, many of the hotels for the teams, fans and other participants were approximately 
four miles away from the Kemper Arena (Wilson, 2005).  Nevertheless, at the 1974 
Interim Meeting, the Executive Committee decided to move the tournament to the new 
location (NAIA Executive Committee, 1974b).  The contract negotiated between Kansas 
City and the Executive Committee included the following conditions:  1) the maximum 
rent charged would be $20,000; 2) there would be no other, similar event scheduled at the 
same time in the Municipal Auditorium; and 3) the city would work with the NAIA on a 
5-year contract with a one year clause renewable annually (Land, 1977; NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1974b).  In addition, the city agreed to pr vide shuttle bus service to and 
from the Kemper Arena every 10 minutes (Sharp, 1975).   
Despite the serious reservations, Duer and the Executiv  Committee believed the 
NIBT would grow in Kemper Arena (Sharp, 1975).  However, according to Wilson 
(2005), observers of the negotiations viewed the decision to move as one of blackmail.  
In essence, the NAIA was forced to move the NIBT to the Kemper Arena in order for 
Kansas City to justify its existence.  If the NAIA decided not to move the NIBT to the 
Kemper Arena, Kansas City officials implied that conflicting events would be scheduled 
during the NIBT at the Municipal Auditorium in order to undermine attendance (Wilson, 
2005).  This position can be justified as some marquee events received poor attendance.  
As an example, Boxing Heavyweight Champion Muhammad Ali visited Kansas City to 
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fight in four two-round exhibition fights (“Poor K.C. Turnout for Muhammad Ali”, 
1974).  The attendance for the fights featuring Ali only attracted 3,000 spectators (“Poor 
Crowd at Ali Exhibition”, 1974).  Ali was disturbed by the low turnout and was quoted 
with the following: 
“This is a shame. I’m not a month away from winning the world heavyweight 
championship before a crowd of a hundred million peopl  around the 
world…that’s 10 hundred million…and we couldn’t fill this little chicken coop 
up.  You’re blessed to have a champion like me in this one-horse town” (“Poor 
K.C. Turnout for Muhammad Ali”, 1974, para. 3). 
 
The thirty-eighth annual NIBT was held in the Kemper Arena from March 10 to March 
15, 1975 as scheduled (Land, 1977).  Although a heavy snowstorm disrupted the planned 
transportation by the city, the overall attendance for the 1975 NIBT was 69,555 with a 
crowd of 8,930 viewing the championship game (“Grand Canyon Wins Crown”, 1975). 
 Another major event for the NAIA during the 1974-75 school year involved the 
retirement of Executive Secretary A. O. Duer.  According to Land (1977), the Executive 
Committee had set the date for Duer’s retirement at the end of the fiscal year in which he 
reached 70 years of age.  This placed Duer’s retirement date on July 31, 1975 (Wilson, 
2005).  Before the 1974-75 academic year began, Duer was forced to undergo major 
surgery and was incapacitated for most of the summer of 1974.  The surgery caused him 
to miss the Executive Committee Interim Meeting in August 1974 (Land, 1977).  After 
his recovery, Duer returned to his position and wasable to resume his full-time 
responsibilities until his retirement (NAIA, 1975).  During Duer’s tenure as Executive 
Secretary beginning in 1949, the NAIA began as the NAIB and hosted one national 
championship in basketball for its 309 members and had a goal of establishing some 
committees (Wilson, 2005).  By 1975, the NAIA had established 32 district committees, 
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16 sports committees, 20 general committees, and numerous special committees to help 
regulate the 16 national championship offerings for the 513 members of the NAIA 
(Wilson, 2005).  On March 13, 1975, NAIA President Dr. Arnold Kilpatrick made the 
official announcement of Duer’s retirement at the NAIA Annual Meeting (NAIA, 1975).  
Much praise was given to Duer during the 1975 Annual Meeting from the over 1,200 in 
attendance at the meeting.  In addition, Rich Sambol, sp rts writer for the Kansas City 
Times, praised Duer for his service and proceeded to call him the NAIA’s “Guiding 
Light” during his 23 years as Executive Secretary (Sambol, 1975). 
 The final major event during the 1974-75 school year involved finding Duer’s 
successor as Executive Secretary.  At the Executive Committee Interim Meeting in 
August 1974, Dr. Kilpatrick appointed a search committee to review candidates for the 
Executive Secretary (NAIA Executive Committee, 1974b).  According to Land (1977), 
Dr. Kilpatrick wrote a letter to all past presidents of the NAIA as well as the Executive 
Committee to make as many recommendations as possible to the search committee 
according to the following criteria: “(1) age, not over 56 or 57; (2) national and 
international stature; (3) personality; (4) preparation, by degree, coaching experience, 
executive experience, etc.; (5) speaking ability; (6) credibility, character and integrity; (7) 
enthusiasm; and (8) good health” (p. 320).  The search committee reviewed all 
recommendations submitted by September 1975 and, according to Wilson (2005), 
discussed an agreement with their chosen candidate who insisted that “his name be kept 
quiet because of the sensitivity of his current position” (p. 96). That individual was Joe 
Axelson, the former Assistant Executive Secretary of the NAIA and current General 
Manager of the NBA’s Kansas City Kings.   
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 Several amendments passed during the 1974 Annual Meeting were scheduled to 
go into effect in March 1975 after approval from the NAIA member schools through a 
mail ballot.  These items involved the allowing of:(1) an institution to participate in one 
conflicting event annually; (2) a student participant to carry less than a full load in his last 
term of attendance preceding graduation if his schooling had been done in the four year 
minimal time (3) a freshman who participated in a freshman program and went on to 
participate in a varsity program to have that year count as one of his four years of 
eligibility in that sport; and (4) a student athlete to sign a professional contract but not 
receiving money to appeal for the restoration of his amateur standing (NAIA, 1975).   
While there were three key events that were the focal point of the 1974-75 
academic year, the NAIA was not without its problems.  For instance, Dr. Livingston 
identified three important issues the NAIA would have to contend with in the immediate 
future: (1) the challenge of the NCAA Division III; (2) the matter of dual membership; 
and (3) the pro-amateur rule (NAIA, 1975).  First, NAIA officials viewed the NCAA’s 
Division III as a direct competitor and believed the NCAA was now able to target smaller 
schools to join their association (Wilson, 2005).  After the slight dip in membership count 
following the NCAA’s reorganization in 1973, the Executive Committee appointed 
Committee Member Paul Pierce to research the specific reasons why schools left the 
NAIA for the NCAA and asked Dr. Kilpatrick to look into the perennial problem of 
conflict of events and dual membership (NAIA Executive Committee, 1975a).  Dr. 
Kilpatrick’s research was requested after the Executive Committee took no action 
following three distinct violations related to football games involving Alcorn A&M 
College, Grambling College, and Slippery Rock College (NAIA Executive Committee, 
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1975a; 1975b).  While there may not have been an official penalty, the NAIA did provide 
Slippery Rock College with sanctions for their actions. According to The Gettysburg 
Times, “the NAIA removed all mention of Slippery Rock from its rankings and statistics” 
(“Slippery Rock is Pa. Champ”, 1974, para. 11).  The NAIA also ruled that no player or 
coach from Slippery Rock would be allowed to compete in any postseason contests 
(“Slippery Rock is Pa. Champ”, 1974). 
In regards to the pro-amateur rule, the NCAA announced during its 1974 
Convention that it was changing its amateurism rule.  After discussion at the convention, 
the NCAA members narrowly approved a constitutional change that would allow a 
student athlete to become a professional in one sport but remain an amateur in other 
sports (“Changes in Amateurism Approved”, 1974).  Needing 254 members to approve 
the change to achieve a two-thirds majority, the final vote tally was 258 for the change 
and 123 against (Prewitt, 1974).  This was the NAIA’s original rule before the AAU 
influenced the Executive Committee to change the rule to better match the Olympic 
standards (Hoover, 1958; Land, 1977).  By 1974, the NCAA began to waiver.  University 
of Southern California head football coach John McKay noted he was partial with the 
rule change by explaining the following example: 
“We had a boy at Southern Cal several years ago who was a great football player 
but quit to try professional baseball.  He hurt his arm, and he’s a Los Angeles cop 
now.  He could have returned to school and played football under this policy” 
(Prewitt, 1974, para. 3). 
 
University of California Athletic Director Dave Maggard also favored the rule change 
and believed that the AAU would alter their rules as well.  Maggard’s rationale was based 
on Jim Thorpe’s posthumously re-awarding of several gold medals he won during the 
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1912 Olympic Games which were returned following the discovery that Thorpe played 
baseball on the semi-pro level (Prewitt, 1974). 
 The NAIA Executive Committee remained continually frustrated with its lack of 
publicity and the work of Haskell Cohen.  Yet, at the 1974 Executive Committee Interim 
Meeting, the Executive Committee was presented witha tentative agreement with the 
Hughes Television Network to carry sports programs (NAIA Executive Committee, 
1974b).  According to Land (1977), the deal called for televising events in capsule form 
from each of the 17 sports programs as selected by the network during the course of the 
1974-75 collegiate season.  The Hughes Television Network would pay the NAIA a fee 
of $40,000 for the sports content and provided the NAIA with $2,000 for an exclusive, 
irrevocable 60-day option as a measure of good intentions (Land, 1977).  Cohen 
negotiated the deal with the Hughes Network contract and demanded that he should have 
an increase in his salary of $1,500 per month should the television deal fully materialize 
(Wilson, 2005).  After months of anticipation, the d al did not materialize during the 
1974-75 school year and thus, the Executive Committee decided to terminate Cohen’s 
contract at its 1975 meeting (NAIA Executive Committee, 1975a). 
 Upon Duer’s retirement, the NAIA maintained 513 memb rs; down slightly from 
its peak of 561 at the end of the 1971-72 fiscal yer (Wilson, 2005).  Wilson (2005) 
explained that “anxiety underlay surface optimism as the possibility of more and more 
defections to the NCAA’s new Division III loomed on the horizon” (p. 102).  Still, one of 
the major strengths of the NAIA centered on its democratic form of administration as the 
32 districts, grouped into eight areas enjoyed considerable autonomy in conducting its 
operations (Wilson, 2005).  Many NAIA members and kowledgeable observers believed 
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that the district organization was a key to the NAIA’s future success (Land, 1977).  Thus, 
the organization was decentralized further by providing each member institution the 
responsibility to regulate itself.  As an example, eligibility regulations passed by NAIA 
officials were created in order to move the student athlete steadily toward graduation 
(Land, 1977).  Though designed to be minimal, this management structure created a 
uniform floor upon which any institution may operate nd the ability of the institution to 
manage itself (Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005).  Collectively, the NAIA felt it was in a stable 
position to maintain its current status as a small school association. 
The A.D. (After Duer) Period (1975 – 1986) 
 At the NAIA Executive Committee Interim Meeting in August 1975, Dr. 
Livingston had the unfortunate duty to inform committee members that Joe Axelson, the 
aforementioned anonymous Executive Secretary-elect, could not be released from his 
contract with the Kings and therefore not able to become the NAIA’s third Executive 
Secretary (NAIA Executive Committee, 1975b).  According to Wilson (2005), once those 
in attendance learned that Axelson was the anonymous individual, several committee 
members and observers speculated that Axelson commanded a higher salary than Duer.  
Others blamed Dr. Livingston for issuing a press release that clearly hinted Axelson 
would be appointed Executive Secretary, forcing Axelson to withdraw his name in order 
to mollify the Kansas City Kings owners (Wilson, 2005).  Despite the circumstances, Dr. 
Livingston announced through a newsletter that the search committee would be re-
commissioned and a new search for Duer’s successor would be conducted (Land, 1977).   
 Because he was serving the dual role as NAIA President and Interim Executive 
Secretary until April 1976, Dr. Livingston was able to take a half sabbatical leave from 
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his institution, the Oregon College of Education in Monmouth, Oregon (Land, 1977).  
During his interim tenure, Dr. Livingston foresaw to significant items of legislation that 
would cause the conflicting event issue to permanently subside.  According to Land 
(1977), the Executive Committee temporarily suspended Article VI, Section III, Item 2 of 
the NAIA By-Laws (allowance of member institutions to compete in one conflicting 
event that is not football or basketball).  In addition, the following regulation was 
submitted to NAIA voting delegates at the 1976 Annual Meeting and was adopted for the 
1975-76 school year: 
Each member institution shall be required to submit to the NAIA National Office 
and their [sic] District Chairman its declaration of whether it intends to participate 
in NAIA District, Area or National Events in all sports recognized by NAIA.  
Institutions declaring their intent to participate in the NAIA Championship Event 
program, in each sport, must honor this commitment.  Should an institution 
declare its intent to participate, and then not paricipate, if qualified, it shall be 
liable for any or all of the following penalties: 
(1) The institution shall be suspended for all District, Area, and National 
events to a maximum of two years. 
(2) It shall be ineligible for participation in statistical services, to a 
maximum of two years. 
(3) It shall lose its right to vote on District or National issues during the 
penalty period. 
(4) No member of its staff shall be eligible to serve on District or National 
committees during the period. 
 
Institutions that fail to file their “Declaration of Intent to Participate” form with 
the NAIA National Office and their respective Distrc  Chairman shall: 
(1) Be declared ineligible to participate in any NAIA Championship event 
for those sports in which they are delinquent. 
(2) Cause the institution to be declared ineligible to participate in all other 
NAIA Championship events until the delinquent form is filed. 
(3) Cause statistical service of NAIA to be withheld until the delinquent 
form is filed. 
(4) Cause the institution to be investigated by the NAIA Executive 
Committee for possible institutional censure and/or suspension of the 
institution. 
(5) Cause their athletes and coaches within the delinque t sport(s) to be 
ineligible for NAIA District, Area, or National Awards (Executive 
Committee Makes New Changes”, 1975, p. 16). 




Land (1977) further acknowledged that member schools w uld not have to make 
a declaration of intent for events in cross-country, gymnastics, indoor track, wrestling, 
swimming, golf, outdoor track, and tennis.  Instead, a member institution was only 
required to meet district and/or national entry deadlines and qualifying standards where 
applicable (Land, 1977).  After deliberation, the NAIA voting delegates approved these 
measures by a vote of 87 to 2 (“By-Laws Proposals Receive Approval”, 1976).  In 
addition to this policy, the Executive Committee chose to suspend Article VI, Section C, 
Item 4, which permitted member schools to schedule no more than 25% of its football or 
basketball games against NCAA Division I institutions (“Executive Committee Makes 
New Changes”, 1975).  According to Land (1977), “these two acts of legislation 
essentially wiped out the long struggle between the NAIA and the NCAA in the area of 
institutional participation” (p. 340).  In the past, many institutions were forced to decide 
between two organizations that could offer the greatest benefits.  With these measures, 
now institutions could easily be members of both organizations and receive the best 
benefits from each (Land, 1977).  Thus, instead of the organization forcing the issue, the 
responsibility now rested with each institution to make its intent known at an early 
enough date to avoid embarrassment to the national org nization (Wilson, 2005).   
One other important item conducted during Dr. Livingston tenure as Interim 
Executive Secretary was the official announcement of A. O. Duer’s successor as 
Executive Secretary.  The search committee, which was chaired by Dr. Livingston, 
requested applications and nominations for candidates for the position be submitted to the 
committee by October 1, 1975 (Land, 1977).  By October 27, the search committee met 
to narrow the list of candidates to five recommendations for the Executive Committee’s 
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recommendation (NAIA Search Committee, 1975).  These suggestions were provided to 
all Executive Committee Members on November 16 and 17 in an interim meeting held in 
Dallas, Texas (Land, 1977).  On December 15, 1975, the Executive Committee had made 
its decision, and Dr. Livingston scheduled a press conference at the Raddison-
Muehlebach Hotel in Kansas City to announce Dr. Harry G. Fritz would become the 
NAIA’s third Executive Secretary (“Dr. Harry Fritz Tabbed”, 1975). 
At the time of the announcement, Fritz was serving as the Athletic Director and 
Dean of the School of Health Education at the State University of New York at Buffalo 
(Wilson, 2005).  He possessed a broad athletic background allowing him to relate to 
student athletes, coaches, athletic directors, officials, and leaders in other organizations.  
In addition, Fritz also served as the President of the National Association for Sport and 
Physical Education (NAPSE) and enjoyed two terms on the Board of Governors of the 
AAPHER, representing AAPHER on the United States Collegiate Sports Council 
(Wilson, 2005).  Finally, he was one of the founding members of the National 
Association of Collegiate Directors (NACDA- established in 1965) and a member of the 
NAIA Executive Committee from 1968 to 1972 (Wilson, 2005).  According to Land 
(1977), Fritz demonstrated great leadership skills at each phase of his lengthy career and 
appeared to be an outstanding choice as the new leader of the NAIA. 
 Fritz assumed his full-time duties as Executive Secretary on April 12, 1976 (“Dr. 
Harry Fritz Tabbed”, 1976).  While Fritz would inherit the position, there was still an 
aura of fear in regards to potential defections.  A an example, eight schools of the Iowa 
Intercollegiate Athletic Conference (Buena Vista College of Storm Lake, Iowa; Central 
College of Pella, Iowa; Luther College of Decorah, Iowa; Simpson College of Indianola, 
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Iowa; Upper Iowa University of Fayette, Iowa; The University of Dubuque of Dubuque, 
Iowa; Wartburg College of Waverly, Iowa; and William Penn College of Oksaloosa, 
Iowa) announced that they would “conduct their athletic events under NCAA rules and 
regulations beginning in the fall of 1976” and “had voted to reapply for admission to the 
NCAA as an allied conference” (Iowa Intercollegiate Athletic Conference, 1976).  Upon 
receiving news about the Iowa Conference, Fritz sent letters to the presidents of each 
school involved as well as contacting each athletic director through telephone calls 
(Land, 1977).  He was able to fight off a wholesale defection but foresaw the potential of 
future defections (Wilson, 2005). 
 Part of the reason Fritz feared future departures was due to a recent NCAA 
decision.  In 1975, the NCAA negotiated with its television partner, the American 
Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), to televise the national championship contests in 
football for Division II and Division III as well as some regular season matchups through 
“exception telecasts” (“Football Telecasts and Revenue Spread Wide”, 1976).  According 
to the NCAA, an exception telecast is a game broadcast that is either: 
“Permitted because of special circumstances surrounding a particular game (e.g. a 
sell-out) or those permitted because of the special circumstances surrounding the 
participating institutions (e.g. they are members of Division II or III or they are 
Division I institutions which have never appeared on the ABC-TV series)” 
(“Football Telecasts and Revenue Spread Wide”, 1976, para. 16). 
 
Because these games were televised on ABC, the NCAA was able to receive a rights fee 
of $500,000 for all Division II and Division III fotball championship telecasts (“Football 
Rights Fees Announced”, 1976).  In addition, the NCAA received $150,000 for the rights 
for five other Division II and Division III national championship events and $190,000 for 
four regular season games for the members of Division II and Division III (“Football 
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Rights Fees Announced”, 1976).  The total contract between ABC and the NCAA was 
worth $18 million (“Football Rights Fees Announced”, 1976).  Thus, the NCAA was able 
to provide both Division II and Division III with approximately $840,000 to broadcast 
regular season games on either regional or national television and fully sponsor national 
championship contests.   
According to Land (1977), the amount of money that e NCAA was willing to 
provide to the newly created Division II and Division III showed all schools the long-
term plans the NCAA had for each division for the potential temptation to help NAIA 
members make the transition.  In response to this pos ibility, Dr. Livingston voiced a new 
mantra the NAIA would embrace for the next quarter century; “perhaps the association 
was better off without lukewarm members” (Wilson, 2005, p. 105).  Nevertheless, Fritz 
would meet with the NCAA in December 1976 through a new NAIA-NCAA Joint 
Committee (“NAIA, NCAA Get Together”, 1976).  Both e NCAA and the NAIA were 
represented by their head officials (Fritz for the NAIA; Byers for the NCAA) and two 
other officials associated with each respective organization.  The mission for this initial 
meeting was focused primarily on the common mission of promoting intercollegiate 
athletics (Wilson, 2005).  Specifically, the meeting covered seven main areas: (1) 
common dates for schools declare whether they will compete in NAIA or NCAA 
championships; (2) coordinating dates for postseason fo tball playoffs and bowl games; 
(3) amateurism and limits on financial aid to athletes; (4) international competition; (5) 
government problems; (6) common playing rules; and (7) television coverage (“NCAA, 
NAIA May Be Settling”, 1976).  The meeting proved to be well received and prompted 
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the announcement that future meetings were scheduled for early part of 1977 (“NAIA, 
NCAA Get Together”, 1976). 
 Fritz was highly optimistic about the new working relationship with the NCAA 
and reported that relations were good in his 1978 and 1979 address at the Annual 
Meetings (Wilson, 2005).  His internal optimism and diplomatic skills were also readily 
apparent when the AAU and the NCAA had rekindled their istorical feud over Olympic 
and amateur athletics.  In 1975, the NCAA ruled that any collegiate athlete participating 
in an AAU-sponsored trip to China would face suspenio  and potential loss of 
scholarship (Seppy, 1975).  The reasoning for this new ban, according to NCAA 
Executive Director Walter Byers, was the NCAA constitution states that if a college 
athlete competes for an outside team, with exception to a national team, he/she would be 
declared ineligible for this sport automatically (Seppy, 1975).  These new developments 
in the conflict led President Gerald Ford to appoint a ew commission to review the state 
of Olympic and amateur athletics (Seppy, 1975).  President Ford was an adamant sports 
follower and despised the Olympic and amateur sport conflict (“Ford Names Panel to 
Study”, 1975).  President Ford further elaborated: 
“In the past, rivalries among amateur sports organizations have sometimes 
fragmented our international sports efforts, hindere  opportunity for our athletes 
to develop their skills fully and restrained voluntary financial support for our 
Olympic as well as other amateur sports teams engaged in international 
competition. The federal government has never attemp d to direct amateur 
athletics in this country nor should it….It is through this commission that I am 
establishing today that we hope to find direction in this quagmire” (“Ford Names 
Panel to Study”, 1975, para. 3, 7). 
 
The committee formed under President Ford was tasked to study the state of amateur 
athletics with four basic objectives in mind: 
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1. To provide a “better environment” for amateur athletes, including improved 
athletic facilities for international events, more cooperation between 
organizations and more financial assistance. 
2. To pave the way toward ending the jurisdictional disputes which have beset 
amateur sports in the United States. 
3. To maximize, through a variety of mechanisms, the at letic developmental 
opportunities for young Americans. 
4. To help ensure that the athletes of the highest abili ies represent the United 
States in international competition (Seppy, 1975, para. 11). 
 
Almost immediately after the Commission on Olympic Sports first gathering, the 
commission was ready to recommend sweeping changes i  U.S. policy toward 
international sports competition (“Amateur Policy Criticized”, 1975).  According to 
Commission Chairman Gerald B. Zornow, the commission “barely scratched the surface 
of a surface that needs a considerable amount of scratching” (“Amateur Policy 
Criticized”, 1975, para. 4).  As more meetings were scheduled between officials from the 
NCAA and the AAU, the Commission on Olympic Sports issued a report in February 
1976 stating the U.S. had no effective system for amateur athletics but rather numerous 
organizations that function independently (“Commission Says Amateur Sports”, 1976).  
The report further suggested: 
“Individually, many, if not all, of these organizations are capable of meeting their 
own organizational goals and to some degree meeting the needs of athletes who 
participate in their programs. However, the overall system for amateur sports in 
this country is characterized by its voids as much as by its positive programs.  As 
a consequence, the resources which are devoted to amateur sports are not used as 
effectively or as efficiently as they might be and the benefits derived from 
amateur sports are not as great as they should be” (“Commission Says Amateur 
Sports”, 1976, para. 3-4). 
 
Zornow further argued in the cover letter of the report to President Ford that 
“improvements in the areas of organization, management and finance are required before 
the system as a whole can operate effectively, effici ntly and in the best interests of the 
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public” (“Commission Says Amateur Sports”, 1976, para. 9).  Zornow believed the 
needed reform for amateur athletics cannot come from the existing structure and posited: 
“Rather, there seems to be a need for a single, comprehensive organization to 
provide the leadership, direction, coordination andsupport necessary to effect 
change within the current system.  We see this organization as concerned with 
amateur sports that are played competitively at the international level rather than 
just those sports currently on the Olympic roster since the problems of Olympic 
sports cannot be dealt with effectively in isolation from other amateur sports” 
(“Commission Says Amateur Sports”, 1976, para. 11-12). 
 
 Based on these recommendations, the U.S. Senate began h arings in 1977 and 
1978 with the officials from the amateur sports organizations with the task to develop 
legislation addressing the commission’s concerns (Seppy, 1978).  The NAIA, again, 
played a vital role during these hearings as Fritz was invited to testify before both the 
Commission on Olympic Sports and U.S. Senate (Wilson, 2005).  The commission 
wanted Fritz to provide information regarding the history and background of the NAIA; 
the concept of the NAIA district organization; suggestions for improving international 
competition; and the NAIA’s relationship with and views of the USOC (Land, 1977).  
According to Land (1977), Fritz believed his testimonies were both well received and 
honored the ideas that he and Duer previously expressed.  After the hearings were 
conducted, Congress was ready to write a bill that would drastically reorganize the 
regulation of amateur sports (Seppy, 1978).  Known as the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 
the bill designated the USOC as the cording body for amateur sports, restructured the 
USOC and many of its constituent organizations, and provided the USOC with a mandate 
to resolve any disputes through arbitration (“Carter Signs into Law Amateur”, 1978).  
The Amateur Sports Act also recognized certain rights for amateur athletes while 
providing a resolution of disputes involving all amteur sports organizations (“Carter 
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Signs into Law Amateur”, 1978).  According to Eskey (1978), the Amateur Sports Act 
would appropriate $16 million to the USOC for its reo ganization efforts as well as 
subsidizing sports training centers and distributing information on how to prevent and 
treat injuries. 
 Seppy (1978) noted the amateur sport associations were supportive of the 
Amateur Sports Act when it was discussed in the summer of 1978.  However, by October 
1978, both the NCAA and the AAU chose to withhold any comments about the bill until 
they could read the exact language of the bill (Greene, 1978).  Ultimately, NCAA Public 
Relations Director stated that the bill is “one that’s been supported on a broad base by the 
NCAA and we would…be pleased to have it passed” (Greene, 1978, para. 9).  
Conversely, AAU Spokesman Marty Wise stated: 
“Our stand would be (that) some of the amendments would hamper the 
administration of amateur in the United States and restrict the ability of national 
sports governing bodies to fulfill their obligations with respect to the regulations 
which govern international competition” (Greene, 1978, para. 10). 
 
The NAIA, supportive of the AAU in the past, actively supported the new bill (Wilson, 
2005).  In addition, Fritz noted in his 1979 Annual Meeting address that the NAIA was 
credited as the major reason for the successful passage of the Amateur Sports Act (NAIA, 
1979).  Moreover, Fritz was named to the reorganized USOC Executive Board and 
believed the NAIA was uniquely positioned to play a m jor role in reconciling the issues 
between the different amateur organizations (Wilson, 2005). 
 Many cosmetic changes also occurred in 1976 and 1977.  For example, in the fall 
of 1976, the entire second floor of the Midland Building in Kansas City, which provided 
4,200 square feet of office space, was obtained for NAIA officials as the new spacious 
headquarters (Wilson, 2005).  Other items that changed included altering the Executive 
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Secretary title to Executive Director and the Annual Meeting to the National Meeting.  
Wilson (2005) noted 1976 also saw the welcome addition of an internship program 
through Western Illinois University.  In order to pay for these items, members in 
attendance of the 1977 National Meeting endorsed an increase in member institution fees 
(NAIA, 1977).  By the 1970s, the costs to run many of the events that the NAIA 
sponsored were impacted by the substantial rise of inflation on the U.S. currency (“No 
Easing of Inflation Seen”, 1979).  NAIA officials hoped that the Hughes Television deal 
would supplement income, but when that fell through, they were forced to raise 
membership dues (Wilson, 2005).  The new scale ranged from $300 to $550 per year and 
would be based on the population of the member school (NAIA, 1977).    
Along with budgetary concerns, all colleges and universities began their 
preparations for their adherence to Title IX by 1978.  For NAIA officials, attempting to 
find the place for women’s sports may have occupied th  time and thoughts of leaders 
more than any other issue (Wilson, 2005).  During its interim meeting in 1975, the 
Executive Committee conducted a survey to ascertain what NAIA member institutions 
were doing about implementing women’s athletic programs (NAIA Executive 
Committee, 1975b).  This survey was approved by the NAIA Committee for Women’s 
Athletics (Land, 1977).  Wilson (2005) noted that NAIA officials would meet with 
AIAW representatives at least twice a year and would work through the AIAW as the 
route to promoting national championships for women.  However, NAIA members 
voiced frustration when working with the AIAW as the women’s organization was not 
well managed as its leaders tried to handle complex issues in a short period of time 
(Wilson, 2005). 
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 At the 1976 Annual Meeting, the Executive Committee met with six school 
presidents to design a way for all schools to comply with Title IX (NAIA, 1976).  After 
members returned the surveys, the Executive Committee continued to urge members to 
work with the AIAW toward national competition (Wilson, 2005).  President Dr. 
Livingston offered his personnel opinion that both the NAIA and the NCAA would 
eventually establish their own women’s athletic programs that would be similar to the 
ones offered by the AIAW (NAIA, 1976).  However, these programs would not occur for 
a few more years and, in the meantime, the NAIA would maintain a working relationship 
with the AIAW until the end of the decade.   
By 1978, however, the NAIA Executive Committee established the Task Force on 
Women’s Athletics and to study how the NAIA could develop women’s programs within 
the organization and sponsor its own women’s championships (Wilson, 2005).  The task 
force was chaired by Point Loma College Athletic Director Carroll Land and charged 
with the assessment of current NAIA schools with women’s programs and gathering 
feedback to present at the 1979 National Meeting.  After reviewing the comment, the task 
force developed the following five-point statement of goals for an NAIA women’s 
program: 
• To develop commonality of rules and guidelines for sports competition for 
men and women. 
• To achieve equitable and proportionate representatio  by men and women at 
all levels of governance in the NAIA. 
• To make available institutional membership in the NAIA in the Men’s 
Division, Women’s Division, or both. 
• To expand the NAIA program to include competitive opp rtunities and 
championship events for women and to provide for select d district/national 
sports championships beginning in 1979-80. 
• To explore the sponsorship of co-educations intercollegiate sports and 
establish co-educational programs that will reflect member preferences 
(NAIA, 1979). 




Much discussion during the 1979 National Meeting centered on the task force’s proposal 
for a NAIA sponsored women’s championship program.  While Fritz claimed that 
“consideration of questions concerning women’s competition by the NAIA…should not 
be interpreted as any lessening of…support [for the AIAW]”, many members in 
attendance saw the conversation as a complete opposite (NAIA, 1979, p. 13).  Members 
in attendance ultimately put the issue to a vote and temporarily approved a women’s 
division; however, when the vote was passed to all members through correspondence, the 
measure faced a narrow defeat (Wilson, 2005). 
 While the NAIA was considering adding a separate women’s division, the NCAA 
was committed to overturning Title IX in court.  In the past, the NCAA argued that the 
Title IX regulations were illegal should not be implemented on any athletic organization 
(“NCAA Worried over Federal Rules”, 1974).  By 1975, the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW) developed regulations that athletic departments would 
have to follow (Eskenazi, 1975; Seifried, 2007).  The demands called for the 16,000 
public school systems and 2,700 colleges and graduate schools to grant equal 
opportunities to women or suffer a loss in federal funds; however, the colleges were not 
required to provide equal expenditures for men and women (Eskenazi, 1975).  The HEW 
did not attempt to force colleges to follow these rules but rather have colleges 
acknowledge that they would comply with the law.  As such, some NCAA and NAIA 
members would already implement women’s teams.  As an example, St. John’s 
University of Queens, New York, was sponsoring women’s teams as well as providing 
financial aid to female athletes (Eskenazi, 1975).  St. John’s Athletic Director Jack Kaiser 
further elaborated: 
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“We’ve changed the status of women’s teams from ‘clubs’ to ‘varsity’.  We now 
have women at our varsity dinner and other functions. I think the Government is 
going to be logical about compliance. It won’t ram things down our throat” 
(Eskenazi, 1975, para. 21). 
 
Hall (1975) also acknowledged the University of Southern California was embracing the 
Title IX regulations with a training room that is co-educational twice a day.  However, 
the NCAA’s main argument was that Title IX regulations would disrupt the financial 
basis that most universities operate their intercollegiate athletic programs (“H.E.W. Head 
Says Title IX”, 1975).  HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger disagreed with the NCAA’s 
stance and noted the following: 
“The N.C.A.A. position on this is wrong. Those are things that will be considered.  
The list is just illustrative…It is to help the people who will be administering the 
program.  It is just a guideline to see if they are enforcing the law.  I again repeat 
that the new regulation does not mean equal funding.  But the opportunities need 
to be made available” (“H.E.W. Head Says Title IX”, 1975, para. 5-6). 
 
 Although the NCAA fought the implementation of Title IX, in 1975, NCAA 
President John Fuzak of Michigan State University sent a report from the NCAA Council 
to its members noting that the NCAA had a moral obligation to provide services to 
female student-athletes for its member institutions (Falla, 1981).  Specifically, Fuzak 
noted “the NCAA cannot legally or practically limit its services and programs so as to 
exclude such qualified females” (Falla, 1981, p. 164).  Initially, however, the NCAA did 
not want to interrupt the services already provided by the AIAW, adhering to an earlier 
pledge when the AIAW was created in 1971 (Wilson, 2005).  Yet, the NCAA was 
criticized by the AIAW, for needing to change its ways in order for sports programs to 
achieve true parity (“NCAA Must Change Ways”, 1977).  Grand View College Women’s 
Athletic Director Charles Jacobson further elaborated on this viewpoint with the 
following: 
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“There’s no way in the world most colleges can afford an equal program for men 
and women if men stay where they are.  There’s no way they can spend the same 
amount of money on women’s athletics, so something is going to have to happen” 
(“NCAA Must Change Ways”, 1977, para. 3-4). 
 
Jacobson further commented that discrimination against women was widely apparent on 
most NCAA member school campuses and predicted that some of the financial realities 
of meeting federal requirements would cause some major changes to male competition 
(“NCAA Must Change Ways”, 1977).   
 By 1978, the NCAA’s court case was dismissed by the U.S. District Court of 
Kansas (White, 1978).  The NCAA believed the regulations of Title IX to require 
colleges to provide equal accommodations to female athl tes to avoid discrimination 
would be too costly (NCAA v. Califano, 1978).  However, the courts ruled the NCAA’s 
claim was premature since no college had yet to face any challenges to provide equal 
facilities (White, 1978).  Furthermore, the court ruled the NCAA lacked any legal 
standing to sue since they could not show how it would be injured by the regulations 
(NCAA v. Califano, 1978).    Regardless of the court case results, another proposal was 
presented at the 1978 NCAA Convention to sponsor three championships for women in 
Division II: basketball, gymnastics, and swimming (“161 Proposals in Legislative 
Package”, 1978; White, 1978).  Many arguments were presented from delegates of 
member schools that showed tremendous support for the proposal including Springfield 
College delegate Edward Steitz.  Steitz belief behind the proposal was as follows: 
“As we all realize, no institution is compelled, nor is it mandatory, to participate 
in an NCAA championship. We have NCAA members, especially in Divisions II 
and III, that are not members of AIAW or any other predominately female-
dominated organization. The NCAA has both a moral and legal responsibility to 
provide women’s championship competition for our colleagues who are in those 
positions.  The NCAA legal counsel has told us so without any equivocation.  We 
strongly believe the NCAA, or any other national organization to which we 
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belong, has the responsibility to present as many opportunities and services to the 
membership as it can possibly provide, regardless of whether another organization 
to which we belong offers somewhat similar service” (Falla, 1981, p. 166). 
 
While support for the proposal was available, some members still had fears that the 
current organization of the NCAA structures (i.e., Division I, II, and III) would not be 
appropriate for women at this time (Falla, 1981).  This proposal would be defeated by 
Division II voters 31 to 44 (Falla, 1981). 
  The NCAA would appeal the court ruling and bring the case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in 1980 where it was again dismissed by the courts.  However, the NCAA was 
beginning to recognize its legal vulnerability under Title IX (Wilson, 2005).  Thus, a 
third proposal was brought to the 1980 Convention fl or to sponsor women’s 
championships in basketball, field hockey, swimming, tennis, and volleyball for Division 
II and Division III (“More Than 1,000 Expected”, 1980).  According to White (1980), 
Division I had no immediate plans to implement championships for women.  However, 
the move to have championships in Division II and III was based on the number of 
members in both divisions that were not members of the AIAW.  Assistant Executive 
Director Tom Hansen noted the following: 
“Only 74 percent of our Division III institutions [283 schools total] are also 
members of the AIAW and only 83 percent of Division II members [179 schools 
total] belong to the AIAW.  This leaves a lot of schools with no national 
tournaments for women’s athletics” (White, 1980a, pra. 6). 
 
After lengthy discussion, both Division II and III approved the sponsorship of five 
national championships each for women and would go into effect in the 1981-82 
academic year (“A Calm Convention”, 1980). 
 The NCAA’s approval for national championships for women suggested both the 
NAIA and the AIAW to analyze their current offerings of women’s sports.  Upon hearing 
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the news, AIAW President Carole Mushier criticized both the NAIA and the NCAA for 
their past attempts to created women’s championships (“AIAW Criticizes NCAA, 
NAIA”, 1980).  While the NAIA was more than willing to meet with the AIAW about its 
goals, Mushier’s frustrations were mainly directed at the NCAA for its refusal to discuss 
the problem with the AIAW.  At its annual conferenc in 1980, the AIAW Executive 
Board had “strenuously opposed” any proposal under consideration at the NCAA 
Convention that would establish women’s championships in Division II and III (“AIAW 
Criticizes NCAA, NAIA”, 1980, para. 5).  Mushier would further comment on the 
situation by arguing: 
“The NCAA proposals represent another attempt to depriv  women of athletic 
opportunities and undermine the growing strength of AIAW, the organization 
created to govern and stimulate women’s athletic programs. This latest effort is a 
continuation of the NCAA’s unceasing desire to dominate college athletics. They 
have traditionally opposed increased opportunities for women athletes.  The 
NCAA traditionally had defined ‘athletics’ as ‘men’s athletics’. They have 
demonstrated no genuine interest in expanding opportunities for women that 
AIAW now offers, and undoubtedly at more than twice th  price” (“AIAW 
Criticizes NCAA, NAIA”, 1980, para. 6-7, 9). 
 
 After a history as a forerunner to items that were once taboo, the NAIA was now 
trailing the NCAA in terms of female participation.  In addition, it was condemned by the 
AIAW for the NCAA’s actions at its conference.  Thus, at the 1980 National Meeting, 
Carroll Land was prepared to submit a new women’s sport  proposal addressing some of 
the limitations from his prior report (Wilson, 2005).  During his deliberation, Land 
referenced both the Title IX imperatives and the NCAA’s vote in order to encourage the 
members in attendance that the establishment of a wmen’s program for the NAIA was 
now a necessity instead of an option (NAIA, 1980).  Land’s recommendation was also 
vital to the organization as the AIAW began to emerge as a stronger competitor.   
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During its convention, the AIAW called for a five-year moratorium on both the 
NCAA and NAIA women’s championships in order to avoid any of the corruption that 
had marred men’s programs (“Women’s Organization Promises”, 1980).  The AIAW also 
agreed to allow all transferring student athletes to compete immediately and receive 
financial aid after one year in their new institution (Gross, 1980).  These decisions made 
any type of cooperation impossible.  Should NAIA memb r schools wish to compete in 
the AIAW, they would be in violation of NAIA rules just by following the AIAW’s rules 
(Wilson, 2005).  Finally, the AIAW announced it had reached an agreement with the 
Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) to televise some of their 
championship contests for their Division II and III (Gross, 1980).  The AIAW already 
maintained an agreement with the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) to broadcast 
AIAW Division I contests for $1 million over three years (Gross, 1980).   
 The proposal offered by Carroll Land was to provide women national 
championships in nine different sports: basketball, volleyball, track and field, cross 
country, tennis, golf, gymnastics, softball, and swimming and diving (“NAIA Approves 
Program for Women’s”, 1980).  While more than the NCAA’s offerings, the number of 
women’s sports offered lagged behind the AIAW’s sponsorship of 17 different 
championships (White, 1980b).  However, Park College Indoor Track Coach Bob 
Moorman contended that the NAIA should move ahead with the proposal since the 
AIAW lacked in areas that both the NAIA and the NCAA had already accomplished (i.e., 
integration and infrastructure) (Wilson, 2005).  The AIAW implemented grouping similar 
to the NAIA’s old District 29 member-at-large grouping for black colleges (Wilson, 
2005).  If the NAIA would sponsor women’s athletics, then those female participants 
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from the all-black schools could participate in an integrated structure.  Moorman also 
noted that the NAIA’s focus on smaller schools would provide a more balanced 
alternative for members instead of the AIAW’s mixing of larger and smaller schools 
(Wilson, 2005). 
 Wanting to hear from all angles, NAIA officials invited the newly elected AIAW 
President Christine Grant to argue her case against the policy (Wilson, 2005).  She 
reiterated the argument that the AIAW offers more championship opportunities for 
women (“Championship Play Approved”, 1980).  Grant lso noted the future plans of the 
AIAW and its 971 members would be to sponsor 39 natio l championships in 17 sports 
on three division levels while providing each school the opportunity to choose its division 
level by sport (Fields, 1980).  She mentioned the AIAW’s recent deal with NBC and 
ESPN and described how the money would be distributed to all three divisions (White, 
1980b; Wilson, 2005).  Finally, she concluded her arguments mentioning the five-year 
moratorium voted on by the AIAW delegates as they opposed both the NAIA and the 
NCAA staging women’s tournaments (“Women’s Organization Promises”, 1980).  
Despite her pleas, the members in attendance voted decisively (113 to 12) in favor of 
commencing women’s championships (“NAIA Approves Program”, 1980).  The measure 
was then sent out to all members through the mail to ge  final approval.  With 79% of the 
eligible colleges voting, the women’s proposal was approved 267 to 119 (Fields, 1980).  
The plan was set to go into effect in the fall of 1980, an entire year earlier than the NCAA 
had planned (“NAIA Approves Program”, 1980).  The first women’s champion crowned 
was the University of Wisconsin-Parkside of Kenosha, Wisconsin, in cross-country 
(Wilson, 2005).  Later in the fall, Azusa Pacific College of Azusa, California, would 
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capture the first women’s national title in volleyball, a sport that was dropped for the men 
in 1979 (Wilson, 2005). 
 With the NCAA now trailing in female sport offerings, the 1981 Convention saw 
many NCAA constituents tackle this issue with new authority.  Specifically, a proposal 
(Proposal No. 51) was brought to the convention floor that would increase the NCAA 
Council from 18 individuals to 22 while providing a minimum of four positions for 
women (“Delegates Focus on Four Key”, 1981).  In a second proposal (Proposal No. 53), 
the NCAA Executive Committee would also increase from 10 members to 12 and would 
allocate at least two positions on the committee for w men (“Delegates Focus on Four 
Key”, 1981).  Proposal No. 51 would gain the necessary two-thirds for passage and 
triumph with 68.6% of the total vote (369 to 169) despite a requested recount (the recount 
tally showed 383 for the policy and 168 against) (“Governance Approval Highlights 
Convention”, 1981).  Proposal No. 53 passed easily since it only needed a simple 
majority in comparison to Proposal No. 51, which was a constitutional amendment 
(“Governance Approval Highlights Convention”, 1981).  
 While there were opponents to Proposal No. 51 and No. 53, there was more 
heated debate at the NCAA Convention over Proposal No. 72 (“NCAA Yields to 
Women”, 1981).  This proposal called for the addition of women’s championships to 
Division I athletics (“Governance Approval Highlights Convention”, 1981).  According 
to Falla (1981), the proposal was an amendment to an NCAA bylaw and would only 
require a simple majority from Division I schools to approve the measure.  University of 
Arkansas Athletic Director Frank Broyles spoke out against the policy, stating the 
following in regards to the AIAW’s rules that prohibit off-campus recruiting: 
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“Let me make one thing clear once and for all, we will have no choice in the 
national championships.  Any coach knows he’s going to have to meet the 
competition. If I choose to stay in AIAW, I can’t recruit off-campus and I won’t 
have the best players.  There is no option for any athletic director in this room, 
believe me, there is no option.  You’re asking women to join a method of 
recruiting that has driven men out of coaching.  And maybe double the 
enforcement staff” (Tucker, 1981, para. 9-10). 
 
A vote occurred after the discussion and would end in a tie (“Governance Approval 
Highlights Convention”, 1981).  Immediately after the count, a second vote was called 
and the proposal would be defeated by the slimmest of margins (Tucker, 1981).  
According to The NCAA News, 128 were against the proposal while 127 were for it 
(“Governance Approval Highlights Convention”, 1981).  After the second count, Broyles 
cheered loudly and would be joined by many others (Tucker, 1981). 
 This vote would then be followed by another motion t  rescind the prior year’s 
vote at the 1980 Convention and abolish the women’s championships in Division II and 
III (Falla, 1981).  This motion would be overwhelmingly defeated (“NCAA Yields to 
Women”, 1981).  Instead, the entire body would approve the addition of women’s 
championships in fencing, golf, and lacrosse for Division II and III schools (Tucker, 
1981).  This adoption put the NCAA members in an odd position.  First, any Division I 
school with women’s teams would have to send them to either Division II or III to 
compete for a national championship (“NCAA Yields to Women”, 1981).  Second, the 
approval of Division II and III championships creatd major inconsistencies since the 
championships in the lower divisions were widely accepted but fought against 
unmercifully by Division I (Falla, 1981).  Because of this argument, a motion to 
reconsider the stance on Division I was brought to the convention floor and would easily 
pass with a vote tally of 141 to 105 (“Governance Approval Highlights Convention”, 
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1981).   In the final vote of the day, the Division I delegates finally approved women’s 
championships in Division I with by a tally of 137 to 111 (“Governance Approval 
Highlights Convention”, 1981). 
 As the NAIA and the NCAA were now beginning to offer national championship 
opportunities for women, the AIAW was starting to see its decline.  AIAW President H. 
B. Grant was outside the NCAA Convention doors hoping that her message would 
translate to the NCAA membership (Tucker, 1981).  She would continually reiterate the 
values of the AIAW in the press. 
“Since 1970, we have fought to create a strong, viable, alternative approach to 
athletics and each year the battle to survive has taken a greater toll.  I emphasize 
the fact that AIAW has taken the leadership role in attempting to bring the 
officers of the three organizations (AIAW, NCAA and NAIA) together.  Since the 
NCAA in November 1978 had declined our invitation t discuss the topic, the 
executive committee contacted the American Council on Education to urge that 
their newly created Presidents’ Committee on Collegiat  Athletics convene a 
meeting so that the elected leadership of NCAA, NAIA, and AIAW could discuss 
possible solutions to the many problems facing intercollegiate athletics” (“A Key 
Time for Women”, 1981, para. 8, 10-11). 
 
Despite these comments from Grant, other AIAW officials argued their greatest fear was 
the organization’s loss of control over women’s athletics (“Women Fear Power Loss”, 
1981).  After the NCAA Convention, former AIAW President Christine Grant felt that 
the NCAA would “come to regret” its decision to add women’s championships (“NCAA 
May Regret Latest Move”, 1981).   
“What I see is women losing control of their own athle ics. I can only hope you 
will be as kind to us as you have been over the years to major college football.  
You have spoken during this convention of providing us options. But in motion 
after motion, you have assured women will have no options.  You bought your 
way into women’s athletics with promises of money, but I believe you will come 
to regret your action” (“NCAA May Regret Latest Move”, 1981, para. 2-3). 
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Once women’s sports were added to Division I, all schools within Division I 
would have until May 1981 to decide between the NCAA and the AIAW for national 
championship play (Henkel, 1981). In order to entice s hools, the NCAA promised to 
provide $2 million to help fund women’s championships as well as funding traveling 
expenses, something the AIAW did not provide (Henkel, 1981).  Thus, many AIAW 
members left the organization to affiliate with theNCAA.  The departures included many 
schools were already affiliated with the NCAA on the men’s side such as the University 
of Kansas, the University of Missouri, Kansas State University, and the University of 
Nebraska (“Some Big Eight Women”, 1981).  However, some colleges decided to stay 
with both organizations.  As an example, Ohio University allowed its basketball, cross-
country, swimming and diving, indoor and outdoor track and field, and volleyball teams 
to compete for NCAA championships while their field hockey, lacrosse, softball, and 
tennis teams fought for AIAW titles (“OU Makes One-Y ar”, 1981).   
 The biggest threat to the AIAW centered on the 1981-82 women’s basketball 
championships.  In March 1982, the NCAA officially announced its 32-team women’s 
basketball tournament, labeling the tournament as “an historic occasion” for the NCAA 
(“NCAA Releases First Women’s”, 1982, para. 1).  The bigger story, unfortunately for 
the AIAW, was centered on the level of competition in the NCAA tournament.  Of the 
Top 20 women’s basketball teams, only three had chosen to compete in the AIAW:  the 
University of Texas; Rutgers University; and Villanova University (“History of the 
Women’s”, 2001; “Women Cage Powers Vie”, 1982).  Next, the AIAW would also lose 
its NBC contract once the NCAA hosted its first women’s championships in the 1981-82 
academic year (“His Wish Granted”, 1982).  The AIAW tried to sue the NCAA under the 
    
256 
 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law in 1982 (“N.C.A.A. Upheld in Trust Case”, 1983).  However, 
this effort would prove to be futile and would lead to the AIAW delegates to vote on 
suspending all operations in the summer of 1982 (Fields, 1982).  The courts also held that 
legal competition rather than illegal monopolistic practices caused the demise of the 
AIAW (“N.C.A.A. Upheld in Trust Case”, 1983).  Specifi ally, the AIAW failed to prove 
to the court any “specific intent necessary to sustain i s claim of attempted monopoly” by 
the NCAA under the Sherman Act (“N.C.A.A. Upheld in Trust Case”, 1983, para. 3). 
 The NAIA attempted to continue a working relationship with some of the AIAW 
representatives through March 1981 in order to develop an Athletes’ Bill of Rights 
(Wilson, 2005).  Fritz further explored the possibility of having both the NAIA and the 
AIAW jointly sponsor women’s championships (Middleton, 1981).  While these items 
did not come to fruition, the NAIA and the AIAW agreed to use the same set of playing 
rules for their women’s championships which were published by the National 
Association for Girl and Women in Sport (Fields, 198 ).  Although the NAIA agreed to 
this policy, Fritz reiterated that it was in the NAIA’s best interest to allow its members to 
compete in NAIA championships by the fall of 1982 as long as they abide by NAIA, 
AIAW, or their own institutional rules, which were typically stricter than the 
organizational rules (Fields, 1981).  Fritz concluded his argument by suggesting: 
“We were interested in meeting with A.I.A.W. to find ways to permit dual 
membership in our organization and the women’s group, without penalizing our 
schools…But A.I.A.W. insists that their rules must be used…They maintain that 
only their rules protect students’ rights” (Fields, 1981, para. 8). 
 
According to Crowl (1983), Fritz acknowledged in his annual report that the 
NAIA women’s division drastically increased from 285 members in 1981-82 academic 
year to 460 institutions in 1982-83 and forecasted that the women’s membership would 
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likely surpass the men’s membership by 1985.  One of the reasons the NAIA saw a 
tremendous growth in women membership was due to the decline of the AIAW.  Many 
schools within Division I did not have the experienc  to operate women’s athletics and 
looked to begin their smaller and more low-key programs with the NAIA (Crowl, 1983).  
Some of the women’s teams that initially joined the NAIA were Gonzaga University, 
Hardin-Simmons University, Marquette University, Pan American University, and the 
College of William and Mary (Crowl, 1983).  Before these schools could officially join, 
the NAIA had to change its rule that barred Division I schools from participating in 
NAIA competition (Wilson, 2005).  Appropriately, NAI  delegates decided to set up 
mechanisms that allowed for exemptions to the rule, thus approving the Division I 
schools to have women’s programs within the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  At the 1984 
National Meeting, delegates furthered the movement for women by guaranteeing them 
half of all future vacancies on the Executive Committee, or National Executive 
Committee (NEC) as it was now being called (Crowl, 1984).  Furthermore, NAIA 
President David Olson established a new Women’s Sports Development Committee in 
the summer of 1985 that would assure a formalized process to focus attention on 
women’s issues (Wilson, 2005). 
 By 1983, the NAIA provided intercollegiate sport services for approximately 530 
schools (“Small-College Group Eyes”, 1983).  As such, a proposal was made at the 1983 
National Meeting to establish two divisions of competition for four sports:  (1) men’s 
baseball; (2) men’s basketball; (3) women’s basketball; and (4) women’s volleyball 
(“Small-College Group Eyes”, 1983).  While the NAIA had divisions for football, many 
delegates were against this proposal.  Many of the critics noted that the two separate 
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divisions would result in unnecessary expenses as well as destroying many regional and 
intrastate rivalries (Crowl, 1983).  They also expressed that two divisions would also 
threaten the popularity the 32-team NIBT (Crowl, 1983).  In comparison, those who were 
in support of the proposal noted the wide disparities in levels of play among institutions 
such as schools that offered athletic scholarships ver us those that did not (Crowl, 1983).  
After lengthy discussion, the proposal for the two divisions was rejected by the NAIA 
delegates in attendance at the 1983 National Meeting (Wilson, 2005).  Other issues with 
the Districts also emerged in 1983 when the newly established District 29 in Maryland 
and Virginia was dissolved immediately after issues with dual membership and small 
membership (Wilson, 2005).  This left the organization with 31 districts until 1985 when 
District 29 was established as the district for Hawaii schools.   
 While the NAIA achieved tremendous growth, some governance issues began to 
surface.  In 1980, NAIA President LeRoy Walker first noted that the structure of the 
NAIA needed “to be consistent with the times and the NAIA constitution and by-laws” 
(Wilson, 2005, p. 123).  By 1983, both Walker and Fritz were also growing more 
frustrated with the outdated governing structure.  The 1984 Annual Meeting prompted 
many delegates to argue that the 10-member Executiv Committee was also not adequate 
in handling the wide variety of interests of the NAIA (Crowl, 1984).  Fritz called for the 
creation of a task force that would review four possible changes to the NAIA governance 
structure (Wilson, 2005).  First, the National Meeting could become more of a convention 
that maintained final decision-making authority, similar to the NCAA’s Convention.  
Second, Fritz suggested a more broad-based executiv board that would be modeled 
comparatively to the NCAA and could bring legislation to the convention and function as 
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the key-decision maker for the association.  Third, Fritz suggested that the Executive 
Committee would reduce in size and stature, taking more of a committee oversight role 
over the daily operations and implement decisions of the board and convention.  Finally, 
Fritz recommended that the NAIA overhaul its district alignment as he labeled it as both 
a strength and weakness (Wilson, 2005).   
 After the 1984 National Meeting, The NAIA News began circulating Fritz’s ideas 
while challenging its readers who believed in the NAIA’s mission to maintain the goal of 
integrating intercollegiate athletics with an institution’s educational purpose (Wilson, 
2005).  The organization continued to reaffirm its commitment to high academic 
standards at the 1984 National Meeting.  However, this affirmation, according to Fritz, 
was a major reason that many schools were leaving the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  
Specifically, Fritz argued the members should support the academic standards openly and 
encourage those dissatisfied with the rules to maintain their membership and not defect to 
the less restrictive NCAA (Wilson, 2005).   
The Presidential Advisory Committee (PAC) was also in favor of these high 
academic standards.  In 1983, the PAC organized its own separate sub-committee called 
the Presidents’ Committee on Academic Qualifications a d Admission Standards 
(Wilson, 2005).  At the 1984 National Meeting, the sub-committee, headed by 
Southwestern Oklahoma State University President Leonard G. Campbell, would make 
its first proposed legislation by proposing five separate items involving the governance of 
the organization (Crowl, 1984).  The most notable of the proposals involved each 
member institution’s president to appoint a faculty athletic representative that was a 
member of the school’s faculty but not affiliated with the athletic department (Wilson, 
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2005).  All of the sub-committee’s proposals were supported by the delegates, with some 
receiving unanimous approval (Crowl, 1984).  The PAC also suggested ways to provide 
more power to university presidents within the NAIA (Crowl, 1984).  According to 
Wilson (2005), “this desire suggested a different direction for governmental reforms than 
Fritz had envisions and precipitated two years of contentious debate on the NAIA’s 
future” (p. 145). 
 In the fall of 1984, Fritz’s task force would meet to draw up a proposed new 
governing structure for the NAIA.  Associate Executive Director Wally Schwartz was 
quoted by The Chronicle of Higher Education saying that “the governance model we 
currently operate under is 40 years old, and it is healthy at times to re-evaluate” (“Sports 
Study Set by Association”, 1984, para. 2).  Schwartz continued to note that the NAIA 
was looking for ways to “bring more people into lead rship roles and to have more 
involvement from college presidents and faculty representatives” (“Sports Study Set by 
Association”, 1984, para. 4).  The proposal created by this task force published in The 
NAIA News covered six pages in length.  Within the proposal, three new governing 
bodies would be established:  a 50-member council i harge of the regulation of 
championships and the oversight of all NAIA programs and policies; an eight-member 
executive board that would oversee the day-to-day operation of the NAIA; and a Council 
of Presidents (COP) that would provide formal authori y to the PAC (“Limits on Playing 
Season”, 1985).  In addition, each institution would be allotted one vote for any proposed 
changes to the NAIA Constitution and the By-Laws (Monaghan, 1985).  Interestingly, the 
Executive Director was not included in this organiztional plan (Wilson, 2005).   
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Eligibility Committee member Arleigh Dotson expressd his desire to remain 
with the current arrangement since the power would remain with the Executive 
Committee, and he felt comfortable approaching that body with ideas (Wilson, 2005).  
Furthermore, Dotson argued if the presidents, district chairs, faculty athletic 
representatives, athletic directors and other groups feeling left out would recognize how 
readily they could share in the power, they would be content as well (Wilson, 2005).  
Another concern from delegates was the proposed structure would increase costs since its 
implementation would involve more people (Monaghan, 1985).  According to Saginaw 
Valley State College Jack Ryder, “some elements in he proposal could be deleterious to 
incorporating the numbers of women that should, in the eyes of the executive committee, 
be involved in the governance process” (Monaghan, 1985, para. 7).  In addition, the 
proposal also provided confusion as there was no coherent line of authority (Wilson, 
2005).  As such, the delegates in attendance at the 1985 National Meeting voted to 
withdraw the proposal from consideration for the moment (Monaghan, 1985).  However, 
the NAIA delegates agreed to allow each institution o have one vote instead of the 
representation design of the past (Monaghan, 1985). 
A bigger issue discovered in the meeting minutes of the 1984 Executive 
Committee meeting highlights the National Executive Committee’s (NEC) negative view 
of the university presidents (Wilson, 2005).  According to the minutes, the NEC believed 
the presidents developed inefficient proposals that were more focused on the philosophy 
of ideals instead of their practical implications (NAIA National Executive Committee 
[NEC], 1984).  In addition, the NEC felt that university presidents did not use advisors 
effectively nor did they appreciate the ability and hard work of the athletic directors 
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(NAIA NEC, 1984). Point Loma College Athletic Director Carroll Land argued that an 
increased presidential role would be a detriment to the NAIA since it would undermine 
the efforts of the athletic directors (Wilson, 2005).  Land would concede, however, that 
some of the issues faced by the NEC in 1985 stemmed from ineffective operating policies 
established years earlier that he established during his tenure on the Executive Committee 
(Wilson, 2005).   
 The NEC also expressed its frustrations with Fritz as the Executive Director of the 
NAIA.  At the 1985 National Meeting, the NEC voted 9 to 0 to review the status of his 
contract before the end of the summer meeting (Wilson, 2005).  The NEC’s reasoning for 
the vote related to Fritz’s inability to provide the NEC a coherent and audited budget for 
the next fiscal year (Wilson, 2005).  However, the NEC’s view of Fritz was already in 
decline because of his decline in performance as Executive Director.  Fritz also expressed 
his own frustrations regarding the NEC and seized th  opportunity to blister them for 
their own shortcomings.  Fritz felt that each member of the NEC had a narrow focus on 
their local and/or denominational interests, which worked again the NAIA as a whole 
(Wilson, 2005).  Specifically, the multiple functions that the NEC handled created a 
gridlock for future NAIA actions. Fritz supported a change in governance in order to 
eliminate this bottleneck effect.  According to Wilson (2005), Fritz’s critique was a 
reflection of “a common frustration of administrators trying to manage departments that 
had little knowledge of or interest in the organization’s overall operation (p. 148). 
 Interestingly, PAC member, Jeff Farris, expressed his own frustration in regards 
to the presidents’ lack of involvement.  By 1985, the PAC was simply an advisory board 
that did not receive much consideration (Wilson, 2005).  As such, Farris and the PAC 
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members came up with an idea that was indirectly suggested by the NEC.  Since the 
delegates at the 1985 National Meeting approved the one vote per institution rule 
(Monaghan, 1985), the presidents could theoretically have that vote since they appointed 
delegates.  Thus, the presidents could choose to app int themselves instead of the 
customary practice of appointing the athletic directors (Wilson, 2005).  The presidents 
could also forward nominations for the NEC itself and could nominate only presidents to 
the committee (Wilson, 2005).  Farris, however, did not speak for all member institution 
presidents but rather a small consortium of 25 to 30 that shared similar frustrations 
(Wilson, 2005).   
According to the minutes of the newly established NAIA Summer Meeting, the 
presidents also wanted the NAIA to enhance its role in order to improve the association 
(NAIA, 1985).  Furthermore, the presidents noted that if the NEC did come forth with a 
restructuring proposal to include university presidnts, then it would be able to solve this 
problem without any conflict.  Farris argued that the presidents must not try to re-design 
the NAIA (NAIA, 1985).  The NEC recognized Farris’s viewpoints and believed it was 
necessary to develop a committee to help craft a new proposal with a target date of action 
at the 1987 National Meeting (Wilson, 2005).  However, the NEC underestimated the 
urgency of their task.  NAIA President David Olson hoped to have a preliminary proposal 
drafted to give to all the NAIA members by December 15, 1985, but the possibility of 
taking 18 months to analyze and refine the plan would turn out to be an illusion (Wilson, 
2005). 
 Recognizing Fritz’s claim of bottlenecking, the NEC decided to schedule a third 
annual meeting in the late fall (Wilson, 2005).  The first fall meeting, however, was met 
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in executive session to discuss Fritz’s contract as Executive Director.  At the meeting, 
Olson explained that all legal ramifications to theremoval of Fritz were still under study 
and if action was taken now, the NAIA and the NEC may be on shaky ground (NAIA 
NEC, 1985).  Officially, the NEC approved a motion t  conduct a thorough annual 
evaluation of Fritz to be completed by March 1, 1986 in advance of the 1986 National 
Meeting (NAIA NEC, 1985).  However, the NEC also agreed to extend Fritz’s contract 
as Executive Director until July 31, 1987, as an effort to ease tension between the two 
(Wilson, 2005). 
 Members of the PAC were also invited to the fall NEC meeting.  Northeastern 
Oklahoma A&M College President Roger Webb brought some issues that the presidents 
previously identified as concerns for the NAIA: (1)criteria for NAIA membership; (2) 
season length; (3) number of contests; (4) district inconsistencies toward infractions; (5) 
failure to communicate with the presidents; and (6) the need for change in the NAIA’s 
structure (NAIA NEC, 1985).  After sharing these con erns, the NEC quickly responded 
by changing the PAC into the Council of Presidents (COP) (Wilson, 2005).  The COP 
was charged with the following functions: proposing changes to the NAIA constitution 
and by-laws; advising the NEC; reviewing NAIA academic and admission standards; and 
reviewing NAIA sports programs (NAIA NEC, 1985).  It was the NEC’s hope that 
tensions created between the two bodies would ease by providing the presidents with this 
measure. 
 These efforts would be in vain, however, as the COP had its own vision for the 
NAIA.  During a joint meeting with other presidents, Mount Mercy College President 
Tom Feld designed a proposal for a COP takeover of the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  After 
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minor revisions to the plan, the COP scheduled a meeting in Kansas City on November 
12, 1985, with NEC representatives David Olson and Roger Jenkinson in attendance.  At 
the COP meeting, former PAC member Jeff Farris was elected as chairman of the COP, 
and the COP moved quickly to approve Feld’s plan to affect a peaceful revolution in the 
NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  Feld’s plan saw the National Meeting become the legislative 
branch of the organization; the NEC would serve in an administration role; and the COP 
would become the governing body of the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  This plan would also 
reduce the NEC’s current power.  According to Wilson (2005), Olson wondered if the 
COP’s actions would “demoralize athletic directors, di trict chairs and others in the 
trenches and if the COP had the time or the knowledge to run the organization (p. 149).  
While the COP efforts were concerning, Olson and the NEC were also engaged in 
conflict with Fritz, trying to exercise more effective control over the Executive Director 
(Wilson, 2005).  The committee members were required to have their evaluations of the 
Executive Director by December 1, 1985, while Fritz was charged with crafting a 
coherent budget by November 18.   As 1986 approached, t  COP’s proposal was 
published in various news outlets.  University of Central Arkansas (UCA) President Jeff 
Farris led the charge by spreading the COP’s messag of attempting to band together to 
regain control of their athletic programs (“NAIA Regains Control of Athletics”, 1986).  
Farris would further state the following: 
“Everybody around the country is concerned about some f the things that are 
happening in college athletics.  Presidents naturally get more concerned when 
they hear some of these things.  I think presidents verywhere have banded 
together and have begun talking about their role.  We have a chance to do some 
things that can make the NAIA unique and get more attention and respect” 
(“NAIA Regains Control of Athletics”, 1986, para. 2). 
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Farris further elaborated that he was tired of the NAIA member schools being considered 
havens for athletes who do not have the grades to get into larger colleges (“NAIA 
Presidents Joining Forces”, 1986).  To elaborate on this remark, Farris stated: 
“It really disturbs me to read all the time about this blue-chip athlete who is not 
eligible to play for any NCAA school, so he’ll proba ly have to go to an NAIA 
institution. That’s embarrassing. It’s also terribly embarrassing for an athlete to 
play four years and still be three and a half years short of any degree” (“NAIA 
Presidents Joining Forces”, 1986, para. 5). 
 
Farris also commented that the NAIA member schools d  not have an effective way to 
enforce association rules (“NAIA Regains Control of Athletics”, 1986).  Farris called the 
current system “an honor system” and “if you’re accused, you are asked if you are guilty 
and if you say no, that’s it” (“NAIA Regains Control f Athletics”, 1986, para. 8).  He 
finally mentioned that the NAIA has “an organization entirely run by athletic 
people…you don’t expect them to legislate things that will make their jobs tougher” 
(“NAIA Regains Control of Athletics”, 1986, para. 9). 
 The COP’s proposal was also disclosed to the media.  According to The Daily 
Leader, the new structure would give the COP three responsibilities held by the NEC:  
the continuing review and evaluation of academic standards; the budget and all fiscal 
matters of the NAIA; and the employment and supervision of the Executive Director 
(“NAIA Council Proposes New”, 1986).  The COP members would be comprised of 
either school presidents or chief executive officers (CEO) that are elected from each of 
the 32 districts (“NAIA Shifts More Responsibility”, 1986).  The NEC would retain 
administrative duties but would report to the COP under this proposal (“NAIA Shifts 
More Responsibility”, 1986).  According to Farris, the primary goal of this plan is “to get 
the president more meaningfully and actively involved in the affairs of the NAIA” 
    
267 
 
(“NAIA Shifts More Responsibility”, 1986, para. 5).  Furthermore, Farris noted that “the 
presidents can work productively with the athletic people…not that we don’t have good 
academics, but we have to continue to improve and define what they are” (“NAIA Shifts 
More Responsibility”, 1986, para. 6). 
 Mount Mercy College President Tom Feld informed some reporters that 
restructuring the NAIA was in discussion for many years but recent turmoil in college 
athletics prompted the presidents to act (Wilson, 2005).  Feld clarified this statement with 
the following: 
“Intercollegiate athletics in this country has been a disgrace, and the public is fed 
up with it. We don’t have the same problems that the big National Collegiate 
Athletic Association institutions have, but we don’t want to wait until there are 
problems.  We want to address the issues now” (Farrell, 1986, para. 7). 
 
Misericordia College President Joseph Fink noted th presidential authority over the 
NAIA affairs would distinguish the NAIA member schools from the NCAA institutions 
(Farrell, 1986).  While the NAIA members felt pressures to win, Fink believed constant 
presidential review of athletics policies will keep s orts in the proper student-athlete 
perspective (Farrell, 1986).  In contrast, NAIA Presid nt David Olson questioned whether 
each university president would have the time to control the NAIA’s affairs.  Olson 
described his feelings with the following: 
“I don’t consider the proposal a personal affront, but I have some questions 
whether presidents have the time and commitment to do some of the things they 
say they want to do. I spend considerable time, significant periods of time at a 
stretch, with NAIA business. Whether the presidents can do likewise remains to 
be seen.  I think we have made significant headway in redesigning the NAIA.  
Any time you can involve chief executive offices in the athletics program of an 
institution, it has been my experience that it is avery positive thing” (Farrell, 
1986, para. 17-18). 
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However, the new policy would still need to acquire two-thirds of the 
membership vote to change the power structure of the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  In order to 
acquire the necessary votes, the COP began encouraging its fellow university presidents 
to contact the athletic department and assuring them t at the change would not be a 
hostile takeover.  Instead, the COP’s change was a way for the presidents to work 
cooperatively with the athletic staffs (Wilson, 2005).  In addition to talking with the 
athletic staffs, many presidents decided to appoint themselves as their institutional 
delegate for the National Meeting (Wilson, 2005).  Others had gathered proxies from 
presidents who would be unable to attend the 1986 meeting (Farrell, 1986).  As such, 
Wilson (2005) described this power play by the COP as the “great proxy battle of 1986” 
(p. 151).  NEC member Carroll Land further denounced this ploy by the COP as 
undermining the democratic nature of the NAIA.  In response to the proxy vote, Tom 
Feld said: 
“The apprehension will fade as long as the presidents, i  essence, don’t do that 
anymore.  The proxy was needed this year for us to have a meaningful role.  The 
presidents don’t intend to collect proxy votes in the future, but the proxy vote is 
important to those institutions that can’t make the convention. I think the district 
chairmen should get those votes” (Farrell, 1986, para. 11). 
 
The COP’s tactic would prove to be successful as the plan to restructure the 
NAIA was overwhelmingly approved 319 to 55 (Farrell, 1986).  Effective August 1, 
1986, the COP would enjoy rule over the decision-making process of the NAIA (Wilson, 
2005).  Several members were encouraged by the change but still had reservations about 
the COP’s position.  North Carolina Central University President Leroy Walker noted: 
“It’s the right move, with certain concerns addressed.  The bottom line, in the 
NCAA and the NAIA, is that presidents are responsible.  And if they’re 
responsible, they have to get directly involved.  If they’re not going to attend 
meetings and don’t get involved in athletics, it is not going to work.  Until they 
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become more involved with the concerns with athletics, then the things that 
happened at Tulane and Georgia are going to continue o happen” (Farrell, 1986, 
para. 16-17) 
 
Walker acknowledged a point-shaving scandal at Tulane University in 1985 as well as a 
lawsuit filed against the University of Georgia where a former instructor spoke about the 
favoritism to athletes at Georgia (Farrell, 1986).  Dakota Wesleyan University President 
James Beddow also acknowledged: 
“You’d be surprised by the level of interest by thepr sidents. The NAIA is 
mostly small institutions know a lot more about what goes on their campuses than 
presidents of large institutions.  These presidents k ow athletic programs and they 
know them well.  All the presidents understand thatit is ‘put up or shut up’ time.  
There is a commitment there to see it through the long haul.  I can guarantee 
presidential involvement from here on in.  I don’t think this is Halley’s Comet” 
(Farrell, 1986, para. 22-23). 
 
 As the COP vote was occurring, the NEC also considered what to do in regards to 
its Executive Director.  According to Wilson (2005), Fritz felt he was punished for 
shoddy work conducted by the NEC, causing the COP to conduct their hostile takeover.  
While Fritz was a well-liked individual, he appeared to be incapable of change and would 
not adapt to the new regime of the NAIA.  Thus, the NEC made the decision to remove 
Fritz as the NAIA’s Executive Director and delegated him to be a consultant to the COP 
effective April 1, 1986 (Lederman, 1986).  His removal, however, was complicated as 
Fritz refused to vacate his office and had to be forcibly ousted by security (Wilson, 
2005).  Once Fritz was removed as Executive Directo, the NEC named Wally Schwartz, 
the Assistant Executive Director, to the position on an interim basis while also serving as 
Chief Operating Officer (COO) (Wilson, 2005). 
 As Schwartz became acclimated to the new NAIA regim , he was also able to 
analyze the organization’s budget (Wilson, 2005). The fiscal budget was an item that 
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generated much conflict between Fritz and the NAIA.  Since he was named to the 
position, there were rumors that the NAIA was in financial trouble.  In 1979, an article in 
The Kansas City Times quoted anonymous sources that identified the NAIA’s money 
issues (“NAIA is Ailing Financially”, 1979).  Some of the items mentioned from these 
disgruntled employees include the following:  
Financially, we’re as low as we’ve ever been. When Al Duer (former executive 
director) left, there was a big reserve, but now there is none, we have nothing to 
fall back on. And we’re in trouble (“NAIA Suffering Financial Woes”, 1979, 
para. 2). 
 
Everybody’s near panic. There’s a real worry about expenditures, needless 
expenditures. There is concern, and it is quite justified. 
 
There is an overall mood of depression. We’re carrying on a façade. Things are 
shaky. 
 
We shouldn’t be trying to go big time – putting our football games in the 
Kingdome or trying to develop international competition. We started out as an 
austere organization and that’s the way it should stay (“NAIA is Ailing 
Financially”, 1979, para. 6, 9, 11). 
 
In reference to the final quote, the NAIA held its 1977 Division I championship game in 
the Kingdome in Seattle, known as the Apple Bowl, and the International Cup basketball 
tournament in Kansas City (“NAIA is Ailing Financially”, 1979).  Both of these contests 
were believed to be overall failures (Wilson, 2005).  In response to these accusations, 
Fritz denied that the NAIA had financial difficulties.   
“I don’t know where you got your information but there is no crisis problem. 
There is a continual financial problem, but most organizations have concern about 
meeting expenses. We have to watch our P’s and Q’s…We don’t need money to 
exist, just to exist as an organization. But we do in rder to exist and do all the 
things we’d like to do. We’ve been very jealously guarding our reserves at the 
approximate level” (“NAIA is Ailing Financially”, 1979, para. 4, 8). 
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This issue continually kept the NEC and Fritz in costant conflict as the NEC called for 
better accounting practices.  When Fritz was removed as Executive Director, Schwartz 
discovered why.   
On May 6, 1986, Schwartz analyzed the NAIA budget and noted that the 
organization had approximately $160,000 in its checking account and $315,000 in 
accounts payable (Wilson, 2005).  Fritz had also compiled bills in his desk drawer, 
paying them only as money became available.  In addition, any budget statements 
provided by the NAIA were only snapshots at a given moment because Fritz continually 
moved funds from the NAIA and the NAIAC in order to establish solvency (Wilson, 
2005).  The financial issues were a major concern to the presidents and the requests for 
better accounting standards can be labeled as a cause for the COP takeover.  Regardless, 
the financial health and stability of the NAIA was in serious doubt and would have 
significant ramifications that would be felt the organization for many years. 
The Decline Period (1986 – 1995) 
 The COP was scheduled to be in charge of the NAIA’s budget, academic 
standards, and hiring practices on August 1, 1986 (Farris, 1986b).  While Schwartz was 
running the office on an interim basis, it was UCA President and COP Chairman Jeff 
Farris who became the de facto head of the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  According to Wilson 
(2005), Farris issued a press release noting the NAIA’s immediate tasks were to develop 
an operating budget reflecting the sports programs offered by the organization and to 
select the successor for the Executive Director.  While these were the main concerns, 
Schwartz did oversee some new policies.   
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One of the most discussed items for all organizations during the 1980s involved 
the abuse of illegal drugs.  While illegal drug use had always been a concern, it was not 
until the 1985 that a formal effort was made on the collegiate level to provide drug 
testing.  At the 1985 NCAA Convention, the Special NCAA Committee on Drug Testing 
presented Proposal No. 75 as an effort to have drug testing in the NCAA (“Questions and 
Answers Concerning”, 1986).  An official NCAA program would be reviewed and 
formally discussed in 1986 as many member schools were already conducting their own 
drug testing programs.  As an example, according to a December 1984 survey, 
approximately 90 of 518 member schools sampled conducte  some form of testing 
(“Questions and Answers Concerning”, 1986).  Many prominent NCAA coaches also 
spoke in favor of drug testing.  As an example, North Carolina State University Athletic 
Director and Basketball Coach Jim Valvano was a major proponent for drug testing and 
prevention in intercollegiate athletics (Droschak, 1986). 
“I don’t have the answer to drugs, but I am mad as hell about it. Without question, 
our goal is to have a drug-free athletic program.  It is an important issue that must 
be discussed this year. We have the opportunity as athletes to make a strong 
statement and hopefully help solve problems as opposed to saying it’s everywhere 
and we just reflect that. My own personal opinion – and this is Jim Valvano 
talking and not the university – is a very strong ad hard line on drug testing. If a 
youngster is shown positive, I want him off the squad” (Droschak, 1986, para. 2, 
4, 7). 
 
 While having the support of many high-ranking NCAA members it took tragedies 
to prompt action on the drug issue. Perhaps the most widely known happened in June 
1986 when University of Maryland All-American Len Bias was found collapsed in his 
dormitory room and pronounced dead after two hours f unsuccessful attempts to revive 
him from an apparent heart attack (“Bias May Have Us d Cocaine”, 1986). Bias was 
selected as the second overall pick in the NBA Draft by the Boston Celtics and medical 
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reports relayed that Bias had cocaine in his system when he died (“Bias May Have Used 
Cocaine”, 1986; Keteyian & Selcraig, 1986).  Although what happened to Bias was 
unfortunate, the incident provided rationale for intercollegiate athletic associations to 
institute drug testing policies.  In the end, the NCAA nearly unanimously approved the 
testing for “street drugs” as well as performance-enhancing drugs (“NCAA Schools Vote 
to Test”, 1986).   
 The NAIA also recognized the severity of this problem and implemented its own 
policy in July 1986 (Wilson, 2005).  The NAIA required its 480 members to stress 
education over punishment by adopting a drug education nd screening program by the 
end of 1986 (“NAIA Members Adopt Drug”, 1986).  The Policy on Substance Abuse 
stated: 
“Drug abuse is a major social problem which demands the attention of all 
segments of society, in particular the education community.  The magnitude of the 
problem compels this association to accept the responsibility to provide leadership 
in educating student-athletes who may be using or may be under pressure to use 
drugs” (“NAIA Members Adopt Drug”, 1986, para. 3). 
 
The COP and the NEC required all member schools to submit a policy statement by 
January 1, 1987, which would outline their position on drug abuse and describe their 
method of educating student athletes on the problem and screening for their use (“NAIA 
Members Must Adopt”, 1986).  Furthermore, by January 1, 1988, all institutions must 
have screened their student athletes (Wilson, 2005).  Before this official NAIA policy 
came into effect, many member schools instituted thir own individual drug education 
and drug screening plans.  As an example, the University of South Carolina at 
Spartanburg (USCS) USCS Athletic Director Gene DeFilippo commented: 
“We have an education program and drug testing program, so yes, I guess you can 
say we’re ahead.  We have a drug education program where we bring in Dr. 
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Harold Moody to talk to the kids about health hazards and talk about damage 
drugs cause to the heart, liver, brain, etc.  We also will do some things differently 
this year like brining in former addicts of alcohol and drugs to talk about the 
problems they went through” (“NAIA Members Must Adopt”, 1986, para. 8-9, 
11). 
 
Schwartz was proud of the stance that the NAIA was taking since it favored education 
over punishment.  He further elaborated on this point by suggesting: 
“It creates a statement that these abuse substances re more than just a passing 
thing when you make a big fanfare saying you are going to check at national 
events.  We felt that this was enough of a concern that it needed to be addressed 
by each and every institution, not just once a yearbut throughout the whole year” 
(“NAIA Members Must Adopt”, 1986, para. 16). 
 
Schwartz’s comments outlined the major difference between the NAIA and the 
NCAA drug-testing policies.  When the new program went into effect on January 1, 
1988, all NAIA schools were required to screen their student athletes for drugs at any 
time during the year – before, during, or after an athlete’s season (“NAIA Considering 
Tougher Drug”, 1986).  The NCAA’s plan only required drug screening at championship 
events and bowl games (“NCAA Schools Vote to Test”, 1986).  Many of the NAIA 
officials encouraged the stance the NAIA took to combat drug abuse.  College of 
Charleston Athletic Director John Krese felt that the NAIA has “the better system” and 
can “possibly curtail possible use of drugs more than the NCAA” (“NAIA Considering 
Tougher Drug”, 1986, para. 4).  Presbyterian College President Kenneth Orr also noted: 
“My sense of it (the plan) was that the NAIA developed a policy that needed to be 
more of a pervasive and not one that focuses only on th se teams or individuals 
participating in championship events. By pervasive, I mean the institutions need 
to look at the problem as a whole and respond to it” (“NAIA Considering Tougher 
Drug”, 1986, para. 6). 
 
 Although the NAIA still competed with the NCAA on many aspects of 
intercollegiate sport, the NAIA did not enjoy the same financial standing.  Thus, when 
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the COP had its first official meeting as the administrative board in July 1986, budgetary 
issues were the first item discussed (Wilson, 2005).  COP and Administrative Committee 
members Leonard Campbell and Tom Feld presented a preliminary budget proposal 
based on analysis of the association’s finances as of the 1985-1986 fiscal year (NAIA 
Council of Presidents [COP], 1986).  Campbell and Feld proposed that the organization 
work on a budget of $125,000 for the next fiscal year starting on August 1, 1986 (NAIA 
COP, 1986).  According to Wilson (2005), the COP discussed ways to increase its 
revenue including charging its members a registration for the NAIA’s National Meeting 
which would bring in an additional $30,000 in revenu .  In terms of costs, the COP 
agreed to eliminate the practice of paying for meals at NAIA events and meetings (NAIA 
COP, 1986).  In addition, the COP agreed that the budget 1987-1988 fiscal year needed to 
be balanced (Wilson, 2005).  In order to achieve a bal nced budget, the COP agreed that 
many of the sporting events should be self-supporting and specifically focused on the 
women’s NIBT.  The women’s postseason basketball tournament was a big money loser 
for the NAIA, and the COP decided to subsidize the women’s NIBT up to of $30,000 
(NAIA COP, 1986). 
 The COP was also considering the official successor to Harry Fritz as Executive 
Director.  While originally a task that was conducted by the NEC, the hiring of the 
Executive Director was now under the sole jurisdiction of the COP (Farris, 1986b).  As 
such, most of the search committee for the new position appears to have come from the 
COP Administrative Committee: Chairman Leonard Campbell of Southwest Oklahoma 
State University; Tom Feld of Mount Mercy College; Joe Struckle of Northwest 
Oklahoma State University; Fred Young of Elon University; and John Tomlinson of 
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Mesa State University (Wilson, 2005).  While there was an extensive search, the group 
focused on one major candidate: COP Chair and UCA President Jeff Farris.  However, 
Farris was not interested in the position initially.  In an interview with The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, Farris noted that he was happy at UCA since he was at the school for 
26 years (Lederman, 1986).  Yet, through the search committee’s persistence, Farris 
became excited about the prospect of running the NAIA (Lederman, 1986).  Feld had 
specifically noted that “one of Jeff’s strengths, which was important to the search 
committee, is that he has played many roles in the NAIA…he will bring all those 
perspectives to his job as executive director” (Lederman, 1986, para. 14).  Farris became 
the choice for the Executive Director, and he agreed to assume the role officially on 
December 1, 1986 (Wilson, 2005).  Farris established many goals upon his arrival to the 
position.  His main focus was on the student half of the student-athlete, specifically 
examining examine and clarifying the academic standards of the association (Lederman, 
1986).  In addition, Farris identified that he wanted o precisely define the role and 
mission of the NAIA; develop external sources of funds through corporate and business 
support; and increase the association’s membership (Lederman, 1986) 
 Before Farris formally took office, the COP was alre dy working on ways to 
expand publicity of the NAIA. In March 1986, the COP negotiated with ESPN to televise 
the 50th NIBT semi-finals and championship rounds to a national audience in 1987 
(Atkin, 1986).  According to Wilson (2005), in order for ESPN to televise the event, the 
NAIA would have to solicit $250,000 in advertising.  The COP and the NAIA worked 
hand in hand with the Kansas City Area Chamber of Commerce in order to raise the 
funds since everyone involved saw the broadcast deal as n opportunity to boost the 
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organization’s visibility (Wilson, 2005).  Their efforts would prove to be fruitful and 
ESPN televised the 1987 NIBT (Jablonski, 1986; Wilson, 2005).  The American public 
was treated to two semi-final match-ups between Central Washington University of 
Ellensburg, Washington, and Washburn University of T peka, Kansas, as well as West 
Virginia State University of Institute, West Virginia, and Georgetown College of 
Georgetown, Kentucky (“Jackets Nip Tigers”, 1987).  Washburn would narrowly edge 
Central Washington 65 to 63 and meet West Virginia State, who dominated Georgetown 
74 to 67 (“Jackets Nip Tigers”, 1987).  In the 50th NIBT Finals, Washburn defeated West 
Virginia State 79 to 77 to capture its first national championship (“Washburn Ichabods 
Edge West”, 1987).   
The golden anniversary of the NIBT was successful and ESPN was impressed 
with the event.  An estimated 1.5 million homes nationwide tuned in to see the ESPN 
telecast of the NIBT (“NAIA Men’s Basketball Tournament”, 2012).  As such, an 
agreement was reached to televise the men’s NIBT finals for the next five years (Wilson, 
2005).  According to the agreement, ESPN would carry live broadcasts of the semi-finals 
and championship games in the first year, but only the championship game in subsequent 
years (“NAIA-ESPN Sign Contract”, 1987).  ESPN Presid nt and CEO J. William 
Grimes noted that “the dream of all NAIA players is to go to Kansas City and play in the 
tournament…ESPN will enable [sic] millions of basketball fans to be able to share in the 
players’ unforgettable experiences (“NAIA-ESPN Sign Contract”, 1987, para. 3). Farris 
also shared his excitement for the ESPN contract by stating:  
“ESPN is giving us an opportunity to showcase the campionship game of the 
tournament on which our association was built. At the same time, we can show 
the viewers that the NAIA is more than a basketball tournament. We are an 
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athletics association to the education of our student-athletes” (“NAIA-ESPN Sign 
Contract”, 1987). 
 
 With one of Farris goals achieved, the COP would also focus time on getting the 
organization financial affairs in order.  In November 1986, Schwartz announced the 
various associations within the overall NAIA body (i.e., coach association; athletic 
director association; sports information association; etc.) would have separate accounts 
for funds generated by their own dues structure in an effort to end the accounting system 
that Fritz employed during his tenure as Executive Dir ctor (Wilson, 2005).  Each 
association was now in charge of the development of formal budgets in order to distribute 
money properly and take responsibility for all spending decisions (Wilson, 2005).  
Fortunately, this reform policy would be short lived as the COP would develop a new 
dues schedule that would include the membership fees for these particular associations.  
Since the NAIA’s budget was primarily derived from membership dues, Farris and the 
COP were forced to analyze their financial health while encouraging members to escape 
the customary barebones budget (Wilson, 2005).  As such, the COP would propose a 
drastic increase in membership dues in January 1987and would not be officially 
approved until April 1989 (NAIA COP, 1989).  The pro osed plan was a phased in fee 
increase over three years to a range of $2,250 and $3,300 per year based on the 
population of the school (NAIA COP, 1989).  According to Wilson (2005), “the new 
assessments provided a much more solid base for NAIA operations than had ever been 
the case before” (p. 165). 
 The most important element that Farris wanted to focus his efforts on was to 
upgrade the academic standards for NAIA student athletes (Lederman, 1986).  Farris 
wanted the NAIA to be placed head and shoulders above the NCAA when it came to 
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academic standards (Wilson, 2005).  Therefore, the NAIA began implementing policies 
that differed significantly from the NCAA standards.  As an example, NAIA members 
voted to disallow remedial courses in determining a athlete’s academic load in 1987 
(Wilson, 2005).  The NAIA agreed that classes that contributed to an athlete’s graduation 
would be the considered in the student’s academic load.  As such, the COP established a 
task force on academic standards that met before the September 1987 COP meeting.  The 
task force included athletic directors, coaches, members from the Eligibility Committee, 
and district chairs, and they agreed on a consensus plan of attack on higher education 
standards (Wilson, 2005). 
 The members of the task force recognized that the NCAA also looked to increase 
its academic standards.  The NCAA’s campaign focused primarily on a proposition on 
freshmen eligibility, Proposal No. 48 (Wilson, 2005).  At the 1983 Convention, NCAA 
delegates voted to require freshmen student athletes entering college in the fall of 1986 to 
have achieved at least a 2.00 grade point average (GPA) in a core curriculum of 11 
academic subjects as well as achieving a minimum score of 700 on the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT) or a 16 on the American College Testing (ACT) test to be eligible 
for practice and participation in Division I athletics in their freshman year (White, 1986).  
After discussion at the Convention, however, the proposal would be not be phased in 
until the start of the 1986-1987 school year and that incoming freshman athletes would be 
required to secure a 2.20 GPA and a 660 on the SAT or a 13 on the ACT to qualify for 
full eligibility (“Changes in ‘Proposal 48’ Will”, 1986).  If the student had a GPA of 1.80, 
the student could still qualify for eligibility with an SAT of 740 or an ACT of 17 
(“Changes in ‘Proposal 48’ Will”, 1986).  These figures would continue to be adjusted 
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until the proposal would be fully implemented in the 1988-1989 school year with the only 
exception that a 15 on the ACT was the floor instead of the proposed 18 (“Changes in 
‘Proposal 48’ Will”, 1986). 
 When Proposal No. 48 was passed by the NCAA, there was a mixed reaction to 
the policy.  Randy Beard of The Herald-Journal praised the NCAA for its approach “to 
strike fear into the hearts” of major college athletic directors as well as football and 
basketball coaches everywhere (Beard, 1987, para. 1).  However, the proposal had major 
repercussions to intercollegiate athletics.  According to a survey of major-college football 
and basketball recruits in 1986, almost 500 incoming freshman would be ruled ineligible 
for practice or regular season participation during their first year in college (Bock, 1986).  
Many of these students were found to attend predominantly black schools (Bock, 1986).  
While the number of athletes ruled ineligible is high, few in intercollegiate athletics were 
surprised by the account.  According to Gavie Hopkins, Assistant Athletic Director at the 
University of Arizona, “young people recruited to be impact players in revenue sports 
generally come from poor educational backgrounds” (Bock, 1986, para. 16).  
Furthermore, Hopkins added, regarding Proposal 48: 
“I oppose using test scores to adversely affect a class of people from going to 
college and getting a degree. The tests are biased. When has any inner-city 
disadvantaged community ever tested well.  I am an example of that. Don’t test 
from a background of knowledge. Test what these kids have lived, smelled, and 
tasted for two to three generations” (Bock, 1986, para. 18). 
 
In contrast to Hopkins, Arliss Roaden, executive dir ctor of the Higher Education 
Commission in Tennessee argued: 
“I like the legislation, but I think in the future the NCAA ought to look at 
increasing the standards. They are awfully low right now….I am disappointed, 
though. After it was passed, with the time frame for implementation, nobody 
really believed it would happen.  
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There seemed to be an undercurrent of feeling that they’d back off.  When they 
didn’t, athletes were caught unprepared when they souldn’t have been. They 
were warned” (Bock, 1986, para. 22, 24). 
 
 While the NCAA Council saw the struggles with the implementation of Proposal 
No. 48, the NAIA was figuring how to implement a similar plan and extend it further.  
According to Wilson (2005), the COP wanted student athletes to demonstrate their 
academic seriousness and progress toward their degree.  First, the NAIA required its 
student athletes to maintain a 2.0 GPA for the duration of their careers (“NAIA Clarifies 
Academic Rule”, 1987).  In addition, the COP mandate  that student athletes must 
complete 12 credit hours to participate in sports in their first semester of play; 24 credit 
hours to play in their second season; 48 credit hours for their third season; and 72 hours 
for their fourth season starting in the fall semester of 1989 (“NAIA Approves 
Legislation”, 1988). Furthermore, the NAIA’s plan required member schools to be 
accredited by one of six accrediting bodies.  Those schools that do not have accreditation 
would have four years to meet this standard (“NAIA pproves Legislation”, 1988).  
Farris and the COP were proud of this policy as it separated them from the NCAA in 
terms of academic eligibility.  Farris also shared: 
“This represents a giant stride and one that will allow us to say to all of our 
constituencies that we are placing athletes in a proper perspective as an important 
part of our institutions. This clearly places the NAIA as the athletic association 
which demonstrates…that only bona fide college students will represent our 
institutions in our athletic programs” (“NAIA Approves Legislation”, 1988, para. 
3-4). 
 
Dr. Richard Rosser, president of the National Association of Independent Colleges and 
Universities also praised the NAIA for their policy. 
“This is really a pioneering effort by the NAIA to put emphasis on academic 
progress. Anything which improves the emphasis of academic enterprise is sorely 
needed. We must restore the idea that ‘athletes’ is the econdary consideration or 
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emphasis among the student-athlete” (“NAIA Approves L gislation”, 1988, para. 
5-6). 
 
 Despite the success of the proposal’s passing, the COP was continually frustrated 
by the NAIA’s lack of visibility in comparison to the NCAA.  According to The Herald-
Journal, some NAIA member schools felt that the organization had fallen behind the 
NCAA in terms of academic standards (“NAIA Approves Legislation”, 1988).  Farris 
acknowledged this belief was “the strangest thing I’ve found in the year I have been in 
this job with NAIA is the perception that the academic standards of the NAIA somehow 
are lower than the academic standards of the NCAA” (“NAIA Approves Legislation”, 
1988, para. 15). This claim was substantiated by the COP’s Marketing and Membership 
Committee public opinion survey on college athletics (Wilson, 2005).  The results of the 
survey data showed that the American public had a neg tive view on college athletics, 
believing it to be overemphasized in schools or plagued by various problems (e.g. 
gambling; drug use; etc.) (Wilson, 2005).  The most surprising result from this study, 
however, was that the NAIA did not even register with the American people.  
Furthermore, a survey of ten major media sources showed that none of the organizations 
could name Farris as Executive Director and only two (Sports Illustrated and The Los 
Angeles Times) knew of the NAIA’s greater commitment to academics (Wilson, 2005).  
In order to increase the NAIA’s appeal, the Marketing and Membership Committee 
created a public relations department as well as a dep rtment of membership services to 
handle publications, ratings, statistics, and awards (Wilson, 2005). 
The NAIA delegates also had many considerations for alte ing the on-field 
product.  First, the NAIA agreed to limit member schools to schedule up to 65 baseball 
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games, 11 football games, and 32 basketball games per year (Rhoden, 1989).  According 
to Farris, the NAIA never had this restriction befor . 
“That’s been an issue, sort of, on why we didn’t and nobody ever knew except 
with a small association we kind of know what each other is doing…We put a 
great deal of emphasis on academics. And also if we’re going to compete for 
national championships, let’s all compete on as level of a table as we can” 
(“NAIA Sets Limits on Sporting”, 1989). 
 
There were also arguments for the expansion of championship offerings as well as 
division splits for some of the NAIA sponsored national championships.  In 1986, the 
NAIAC had recommended that the football, softball, nd women’s basketball postseason 
should be expanded for the 1987 season and divisions for men’s and women’s basketball 
(“NAIA against Expansion Format”, 1986).  During his interim tenure as chief 
administrator, Schwartz noted that the NEC had “concer  for athletes missing more class 
time, whether the number of participating schools justified expanded playoffs, and the 
financial impact of the institutions and the association” (“NAIA against Expansion 
Format”, 1986, para. 3).  One year later, the football playoffs would expand to 16 teams 
in Division I and 16 in Division II (“Blue Hose ‘Meet’ Lions”, 1987; Wilson, 2005).  
Unfortunately, this increase would only last for two years as the number of schools 
competing in Division I reduced to the point where th playoffs were reduced to eight 
teams (Moore, 1989).  The football division splits were also going through problems in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  By 1989, 52 schools fr m seven conferences were 
playing Division I football while 105 schools in 12 conferences competed at the Division 
II level (Wilson, 2005).  Ultimately, the NAIA would return to undivided competition in 
football by 1997. 
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NAIA President Roger Jenkinson reengaged the NEC on the division split  issue 
in February 1987 by appointing a task force to research the possibility of splitting men’s 
and women’s basketball into two divisions (Wilson, 2005).  After discussing several task 
force recommendations, the delegates in attendance of th  1988 National Meeting 
approved the division split by a two to one margin and instructed the NEC to develop a 
formal plan for the 1989 National Meeting (Wilson, 2005).  The NEC proposed creating 
two divisions in men’s and women’s basketball as well as baseball and volleyball 
(“NAIA to Split in 4 Sports”, 1989).  After hearing the proposal, the delegates in 
attendance at the 1989 meeting overwhelmingly supported the NEC’s proposal with a 
257 to 143 vote (“NAIA Split Decision Affects”, 1990).  Farris explained: 
“The split will mean schools which commit roughly the same resources to 
athletics will play each other, avoiding situations where smaller schools must try 
to compete against larger ones. Our championship opportunities have been 
dominated more and more by our members who place greater emphasis on the 
financing of their programs.  This has caused discus ion in recent years about the 
desirability of a second division in our competition, a division for the lower 
emphasis programs” (“NAIA to Split in 4 Sports”, 1989, para. 2-3). 
 
 Although the proposal was accepted, the NEC postponed its implementation until 
1991 (“Changes Mark NAIA Convention”, 1990).  Specifically, the NAIA chose to have 
separate divisions of competition for men’s and women’s basketball beginning in the 
1991-1992 academic year while volleyball would be implemented in 1993-1994; baseball 
was postponed indefinitely (“Changes Mark NAIA Conve tion”, 1990).  By the spring of 
1990, Farris notified the NEC Divisions of Competition Committee that a consensus on 
the issue seemed elusive (Wilson, 2005).  While there was an acceptance of the proposal, 
some schools were opposed of the separation plan developed by the NEC.  According to 
Wilson (2005), “some schools flatly said they would bolt from the NAIA if divisions 
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were not adopted to give them a better chance to compete” (p. 169).  Kansas Wesleyan 
coach Dennis Wahlgren shared this resentment and note  that “year in, year out, we can’t 
compete with Division I NAIA schools because of their budgets and what they can give 
in athletic scholarships” (“State Schools Applaud NAIA”, 1990, para. 6).  
 The basic guidelines for the division split required at least half the member 
institutions participating in a sport for them to be eligible for divisions with the 
expectation that at least 100 institutions would fit into each division (Wilson, 2005).  In 
addition, the divisions had to promote competitiveness and be financially stable.  By 
1991, the division split would only occur in men’s and women’s basketball (MacKay, 
1991).  Despite plans for a division split, the 1993-1994 volleyball split never occurred 
(Wilson, 2005).  The initial distribution of schools saw 235 schools go to Division I 
men’s basketball and 184 in Division II.  Women’s basketball schools were divided 199 
and 194 respectively (Wilson, 2005).  Furthermore, th  championship tournaments in 
Division I would have 32 teams competing for a national championship while Division II 
only included 20.  Finally, the COP agreed to have the Division I NIBT would be held in 
the Kemper Arena while the Division II NIBT would be held on the campus of Tarleton 
State University in Stephenville, Texas (MacKay, 199 ). 
 The 1989 National Meeting in Memphis would have its fair share of surprises.  
Feeling that he had achieved many of the goals that he set for himself when he was 
named Executive Director, Farris made the startling a nouncement that he was retiring 
from his position (NAIA COP, 1989).  Farris’s health started to decline, and he was 
concerned that he would not be able to effectively p rform his duties and that his choices 
were “either not to work the way I wanted to work o get out” (Lederman, 1989, para. 3).  
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However, Farris believed the NAIA was a healthy organization and now was the right 
time to step down (Corbitt, 1990a).  In addition, ulike the past Executive Directors, the 
NAIA already had Farris’s successor on staff:  Athens State College and Calhoun 
Community College President James Chasteen (Corbitt, 1990a; 1990b; Lederman, 
1990a).  Chasteen’s appointment as Executive Directo  would start on January 1, 1991, 
but Farris would retire at the end of July 1990 (Corbitt, 1990b; Lederman 1989). When 
Farris had retired in July 1990, the NAIA’s membership count was 465 (Wilson, 2005). 
 On his way out, Farris realized that the new governance structure was plagued 
with defects that hindered the effectiveness and effici ncy of the association (Wilson, 
2005).  By 1986, the COP was intended to function like a college board of trustees but 
tended to stray into the day-to-day functioning of the association.  This action interfered 
with the NEC’s assigned role which focused on the administration of the organization 
(Wilson, 2005).  Furthermore, the national office staff found working with the COP to be 
a more difficult connection than with the athletic d rectors of the NEC.  According to 
Wilson (2005), “many athletic directors grew disenchanted with the NAIA, but once they 
had taken power, the presidents were not about to give it up” (p. 171).  Further, other 
NAIA members questioned why the NEC had not been eliminated when the COP’s plan 
had implemented their takeover in 1986.  The original plan by recognized that divided 
leadership would threaten the day-to-day operations and chose to eliminate the NEC 
(Wilson, 2005).  On the other hand, Farris sought to make the transition as smooth as 
possible and decided to retain the NEC.  This decision proved to be problematic as the 
power division grew stronger as each year passed (Wilson, 2005). 
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By the fall of 1988, the COP revisited the governance structure through 
establishing a research committee with Tom Feld in charge (Wilson, 2005).  This 
frustrated members of the NEC, including newly elected NAIA President Phyllis Holmes, 
the first female president of the organization (“NAIA Has First Female”, 1988).  Holmes 
expressed her frustration with what she perceived as the COP’s attempt to pursue a flow-
through method policy similar to what the NCAA has and stray from the original 
grassroots governance that the NAIA had historically used (Wilson, 2005).  At the 1989 
COP Meeting, the COP developed and approved a new governance plan that featured the 
COP, athletic directors, and faculty athletic representatives as equals with a coordinating 
council drawing from the three to blend their perspctives (NAIA COP, 1989).  
Specifically, the COP would focus on the finance and development of the association; the 
athletic directors would handle competition; and faculty athletic representatives would 
oversee eligibility and academic standards (Wilson, 2005).  The NEC asked to review 
this plan and won a delay in voting until the 1990 meeting (NAIA COP, 1989). 
However, the COP began to have reservations about sharing power on an equal 
basis and decided to create a new proposal for NAIA governance (Wilson, 2005).  Farris 
created a new proposal that had membership at the top, the COP next, and followed by 
the Executive Director, with a National Coordinating Committee to advise him.  Beneath 
the Executive Director were three equal bodies: the a letic directors, the faculty athletic 
representatives, and the district chairs.  The delay in voting allowed the COP to change 
its vision from sharing power to ruling without the NEC’s constraints.  The NEC 
countered this proposal with one of their own.  It was similar to the COP but included a 
renamed NEC (the National Administrative Council) that would keep its college-board 
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oversight mission.  Feld noted that the NEC’s proposal undermined the Executive 
Director’s administrative role in favor of creating an Administrative Committee, whose 
only purpose would be to extend the NEC’s power.  As the 1990 National Meeting 
approached, COP member Joe Struckle notified the NEC that the original proposal would 
win handily.  Realizing potential defeat, the NEC withdrew its proposal and accepted a 
compromise proposal with the COP to give them ultima e control (“NAIA Officials 
Compromise”, 1990).   
Thus, delegates in attendance of the 1990 National Meeting showed unanimous 
approval for the COP plan (Lederman, 1990b). The COP would now have full 
governance of the NAIA while the NEC would be disbanded by the end of 1990 (“NAIA 
Votes to Go”, 1990).  The COP would be comprised of college presidents from each of 
the 32 geographic regions while the Executive Director would report directly to them 
(“NAIA Split Division Affects”, 1990).  The Executive Director title, however, would 
now change to the NAIA’s Chief Executive Officer (“NAIA Split Division Affects”, 
1990).  Additionally, a nine-member National Coordinat ng Committee (NCC) was 
established and would oversee the athletic directors, faculty athletic representatives, and 
district chairs (“Changes Mark NAIA Convention”, 1990).  The NCC would report 
directly to the CEO.  Since the NEC was to disband, this meant that the office of the 
NAIA President would be abolished, leaving the CEO as the de facto figure head of the 
NAIA (Wilson, 2005).   
Chasteen faced challenges when he was instituted as the CEO.  First, he had to 
overcome his own limitations.  For example, Farris participated at nearly every level of 
NAIA athletics and was very familiar with the organization.  Yet, Chasteen had no 
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athletic experience and focused primarily on the educational side when reaching the 
position of President at two Alabama colleges.  Further, Chasteen was a charter member 
of the COP and served as chairman of the National Committee on Academic Standards 
(Wilson, 2005).  He provided many in the national office with positive reinforcement and 
created a pleasant working environment, but he did not connect well with the 
membership because of his lack of sports experience (Wilson, 2005).   
Chasteen was committed to his job and decried that his focus would be on 
membership and resource development in the immediate future (Wilson, 2005).  
However, results on this front never seemed to materialize as membership within the 
NAIA continued its decline.  From 465 members in the fall of 1990, membership dropped 
to 436 in the fall of 1991, 409 in 1992, and 389 by the fall of 1993 (Wilson, 2005).  This 
drop was the biggest departure in membership since the 1973 NCAA Reorganization.  
There were several theories as to why membership decreased such as the tightened 
academic standards.  Other reasons focused on financial id limitations.  The COP 
declared limits in scholarships in all sports including football (33 full scholarships in 
Division I and 12 in Division II) and basketball (12 scholarships in Division I and 3 in 
Division II) (Luder, 1992a). Some schools were also deterred by a new NAIA policy that 
mandated that any booster club funds were controlled by the institution instead of the 
athletic department (Wilson, 2005).  Through oversight from the university, the NAIA 
attempted to avoid the abuses that many NCAA programs experienced with out-of-
control boosters (Lowitt, 1986).  Many, of course, w re enticed by the NCAA’s ability to 
offer more financial incentives compared to the NAIA.  In 1989, the NCAA reached an 
agreement with CBS to televise the NCAA Division Men’s Final Four for $1 billion for 
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the next seven years starting in 1991 (Gerard, 1989).  The funds received from CBS 
would go toward the sponsorship of both men’s and women’s sports, specifically 
Division II and III, as well as broadcasting the national championships for 16 different 
contests (“Schultz Seeks Members’ Ideas”, 1989).  According to Wilson (2005), the 
highly publicized deal “surely caught the attention of financially-strapped NAIA athletic 
directors and presidents” (p. 187). 
 Two other items have been argued to be reasons for the declining membership.  
The first reason stems from discussion that began in 1986 when an editorial in The 
Kansas City Star mentioned the possibility of the NAIA offices searching for a new home 
(Wilson, 2005).  Many cities began enticing the organization to move by offering 
buildings, tax breaks, and several other perks.  The COP “frequently decried [its] low 
place on the Kansas City sports pecking order, withthe NCAA, the Royals, the Chiefs, 
the Kings, and the Big Eight basketball tournament all seeming to attract more local 
attention” (Wilson, 2005, p. 169).  By 1990, the City of Canton, Ohio made a formal 
offer for the association to move from its original Kansas City home (NAIA COP, 1990).  
The COP considered the offer but formally rejected i  by an 18 to 9 vote (Kerr, 1990; 
NAIA COP, 1990).  The COP felt that the smaller size and difficult air access offset the 
advantages that Canton offered over Kansas City (Wilson, 2005).  The COP then voted to 
stay in Kansas City as long as the city kept its promises (NAIA COP, 1990).  However, 
the NAIA’s lease with the Midland Building was still set to expire in the summer of 1991 
(Wilson, 2005).   
The relationship between the NAIA and Kansas City was further altered when the 
NAIA was required to reschedule the 1990 NIBT due to a Big Eight basketball game 
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(“NAIA Tournament Gets Snub”, 1990).  Thus, on September 30, 1992, the NAIA 
announced that it would move its headquarters as well as the NIBT to Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
by the summer of 1993 (“Basketball; N.A.I.A. Approves”, 1992).  Kansas City officials 
and even NAIA staff members were surprised by this announcement as well as the COP’s 
unanimous decision to move (Luder & Fitzpatrick, 1992).  Chasteen commented that 
Tulsa Mayor Rodger Randle made the initial contact with the NAIA and offered an 
outstanding deal (Luder, 1992d).  According to Wilson, (2005), Randle initiated the 
negotiations and offered discounted floor space and parking; country club memberships; 
and a supportive community as incentives for the NAIA to consider relocation.  Chasteen 
further elaborated: 
“There’s a lot of financial support and a commitment to amateur sports (in Tulsa). 
Here (in Kansas City), I think the commitment is to pr fessional sports, and I 
understand that. If you list all the sports priorities in Kansas City, the NAIA 
would not be at the top. Tulsa will take us as their top priority” (Luder, 1992d, 
para. 2-3). 
 
The COP was able to conduct these negotiations in absolute secrecy and kept the move a 
surprise to everyone in attendance of the 1992 Nation l Meeting.  Members of the NAIA 
national office staff were not told until minutes before it was announced to everyone in 
attendance, including senior NAIA staff member Wally Schwartz (Luder, 1992d).  
According to Wilson (2005), Schwartz discussed the rumors of a possible move with 
Chasteen, and Chasteen brushed off the rumors.  A few hours later, the move was 
announced and Schwartz felt betrayed.  John Laney, Vice President of the Greater Kansas 
City Sports Commission shared Schwartz sentiments, stating “we are disappointed, to put 
it mildly, and perplexed. I would certainly hope tha  we have the opportunity to discuss 
with them what the problems were that led to this” (Luder & Fitzpatrick, 1992).  Many of 
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the athletic directors in attendance of the 1992 Nation l Meeting were also caught off-
guard.  William Jewell College Athletic Director noted the move hit him on a personal 
level (Luder, 1992e).  
“I think all of us are in an emotional state of shock. Whenever you’re in a 
situation like this, you need some healing time to step back and see how to react.  
Right now, it affects my emotions from a standpoint f close personal 
relationships.  In my case, the NAIA means a basketball ournament in Kansas 
City since I was in high school in 1957.  The NAIA means making a local call to 
Wally Schwartz about eligibility. The NAIA means that, if I needed something 
from the national office, Steve Veal (Vice President of Championships) lives 
close enough to come by and drop it off” (Luder, 1992e, para. 2-3). 
 
Frank Diskin, Athletic Director at Rockhurst College, felt bothered “that the leadership of 
this association doesn’t trust the membership enough to let them in on what’s going on 
until after it happens” (Luder, 1992e, para. 6).   
A second reason as to why schools may have considered l aving the NAIA 
centered on another one of its cornerstones: the district system.  The NAIA always prided 
itself on the district organization and the grass-roots approach to governance (Wilson, 
2005).  When Farris was Executive Director, he received a recommendation from the 
NEC to institute a guideline for all districts to have at least 10 member institutions.  The 
NEC appointed an alignment committee to rearrange some of the southeastern districts 
and made a recommendation to Farris and the NEC (Wilson, 2005).  To Farris and 
national office’s surprise, there was no feedback from member institutions in Alabama, 
Mississippi, and Louisiana.  According to Wilson (2005), Farris was “embarrassed 
because he had written to them on the assumption that they were aware of the plans” (p. 
182).  This plan was scheduled to go into effect in August 1991, but Farris postponed the 
order out of respect to the affect areas.  Hawaii also faced issues due to revenue sharing.  
The NAIA by-laws noted that districts were to send a portion of their playoff revenues to 
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the national office to help fund championships (Wilson, 2005).  Since Hawaii schools 
always had to come to the mainland for district playoffs and championships, Hawaiian 
schools had trouble funding their travel costs.  As such, the COP agreed to let members in 
Hawaii keep their district playoff revenues to cover their travel costs (Wilson, 2005). 
By the 1991 National Meeting, several affiliated conference commissioners 
requested the COP to assess the role that affiliated conferences would play in the NAIA 
future (“NAIA Votes to Ditch”, 1993; Wilson, 2005).  In February 1992, the Futures 
Committee advocated integrating the conferences into the governing and championship 
structures in some way.  The COP called for an ad hoc committee to develop a proposal 
for a governance structure through conference affiliation at the 1992 National Meeting 
(Wilson, 2005).  Chasteen also shared his thoughts on he affiliated conference proposal 
noting that “the NAIA has always been built around the district structure, but we’ve 
really notice the growing importance and significane of affiliated conferences” (Luder, 
1992b, para. 3).  During the first day of meetings, many delegates appeared to be in favor 
of the proposal.  NAIA Futures Committee member Joel Thomson shared: 
“I think it’s in the best interests of the association. It does a couple of important 
things for the association.  It allows colleges to form associations with a common 
ground. And it allows teams to compete for conference championships, win that 
conference and not have to compete again to qualify for national competition” 
(Luder, 1992c, para. 7). 
 
Thomson noted that 67% of the NAIA member institutions at this time were members of 
an affiliated conference (Luder, 1992c).  Under the proposal, a winner of an affiliated 
conference would advance automatically to region or area competition and to national 
competition (Luder, 1992c).  Schools that are not affiliated with conferences could still 
qualify for regional and national competition through district play (Luder, 1993). 
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 In October 1992, the COP would assemble another committee that was dedicated 
to the role of affiliated conferences and would be chaired by Hastings College President 
Bob Boerigter (Wilson, 2005).  The goal of this committee was to flesh out the 
conference recommendations and develop a plan to make conferences a central part of 
NAIA operations.  When the COP gathered in April 1993, the committee presented a 
detailed map to achieve its goals, including the placement of conferences and 
independents in regions based on the specific sport(Wilson, 2005).  The proposal noted 
that basketball would be the first sport that would see the implementation of regions in 
the 1993-1994 academic year with other sports adopting it the next year (“NAIA Votes to  
Table 5-9 - 1993 NAIA Division I Men's Basketball Region Alignment 
Conference Membership 
Arkansas Intercollegiate 9 
Carolinas Intercollegiate 8 
Chicagoland 7 
Eastern Intercollegiate 6 
Georgia Atlantic 9 
Golden State Athletic 7 
Gulf Coast Athletic 9 
Heart of Texas 6 
Kentucky Intercollegiate 7 
Oklahoma Intercollegiate 6 
Sooner Athletic 6 
Show-Me Collegiate 6 
Southern States 8 
Tennessee Collegiate 9 
West Virginia Intercollegiate 14 
Wolverine-Hoosier 7 
Pacific Northwest (Independent) 7 
Pacific Northwest- Montana (Independent) 5 
Great Lakes (Independent) 12 
Far West (Independent) 6 
Far West- Hawaii (Independent) 3 
Southeast (Independent) 7 
Southwest (Independent) 11 
Midwest (Independent) 10 
Northeast (Independent) 8 
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Ditch”, 1993- see Tables 5.9 and 5.10).  In order to qualify for the 32-team Division I 
men’s basketball tournament, a team would have to win one of the 16 affiliated 
conferences; one of the nine regional berths for independents; or one of the seven at-large 
slots (Wilson, 2005).  The Division II men’s tournament had a 24-team field made up of 
14 conference champions, seven regional independents, a d three at-large teams (Wilson, 
2005). 
Table 5-10 - 1993 NAIA Division II Men's Basketball Region Alignment 
Conference Membership 
Central Atlantic 9 
Florida Sun 8 
Heart of America 9 
Kansas Collegiate 9 
Lake Michigan 7 
Mayflower 7 
Mid-Central 6 
Midwest Classic 7 
Nebraska-Iowa 7 
North Dakota Athletic 6 
Northwest 7 
South Dakota Intercollegiate 6 
Tennessee-Virginia 11 
Texas Intercollegiate 6 
Pacific Northwest (Independent) 9 
Southwest (Independent) 8 
Midwest (Independent) 10 
Great Lakes (Independent) 10 
Great Lakes (Independent) 7 
Northeast (Independent) 8 
Northeast (Independent) 10 
  
 The COP approved these recommendations and put it on the agenda for the 1993 
National Meeting.  The COP also explained how conferences would qualify as an 
affiliated conference:  must have at least six membr institutions; a charter or constitution 
with appropriate officials, eligibility rules, and standards that matched NAIA rules; and 
sponsor at least one men’s and women’s sport in fall, winter, and spring (Wilson, 2005).  
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The committee still wanted to retain districts; however, no sufficient role could be 
sustained for them.  Thus, the district system was eliminated.  After the proposal was 
refined, the Council of Affiliated Conferences and I ependents (CACI) was created to 
replace the district chairs on the NCC.  Members in attendance of the 1993 National 
Meeting overwhelmingly approved the policy by a vote f 262 to 58 (“Reorganization for 
the N.A.I.A.”, 1993).   
The difference in votes can be explained by those member schools in a conference 
and those that are classified as an independent (Luder, 1993).  William Jewell women’s 
coach Debbie Baker was in favor of the change and believed “it makes our conference 
more competitive knowing the stakes are higher” (Luder, 1993, para. 3).  In contrast, 
Rockhurst College Athletic Director and men’s basketball coach Frank Diskin voiced: 
“I thought the district concept was a grass-roots cncept. With the district system, 
you developed some great in-state rivalries. I can’t see us developing a great 
rivalry with Minnesota-Duluth…It makes it difficult for us, especially in 
increased travel. It makes you look real hard at getting into a conference. We 
continue to look” (Luder, 1993, para. 4, 9). 
 
Avila University men’s basketball coach Fred Turner shared Diskin’s concerns and 
believed that the NAIA was hurting themselves (Luder, 1993).  He further stated that “the 
districts were working smoothly, and the rich tradition is with the district system” (Luder, 
1993, para. 12). 
 After making the move to Tulsa and abolishing the district system, Chasteen was 
proud to announce that the NAIA had a budget surplus of $437,000 in 1993 (Wilson, 
2005).  This surplus was a substantial increase from the 1992 surplus of $122,000 and the 
1991 deficit of $47,000.  The financial success of the organization led the COP to begin 
sponsoring women’s golf tournaments in the 1993-1994 fiscal year and then as a 
    
297 
 
championship sport in 1994-1995 (Luder, 1992f; Wilson, 2005).  In addition, the 
Division II men’s basketball tournament would expand from a 20-team tournament to a 
24-team and then a 32-team tournament by 1995 (“College Basketball”, 1994).  The 
organization also envisioned a plan for a championship festival, similar to an Olympic 
festival, in the spring involving at least eight sports starting in 1998 (“Sports Digest”, 
1994). However, this expansion phase would not last long nor would the profits.   
At the 1995 COP Meeting, the presidents discussed reducing the number of 
basketball teams for the postseason to 16 each as well as hosting both division 
tournaments in the same city (NAIA COP, 1995).  In addition, the COP agreed to end the 
two-division structure in football after the 1995 playoffs (Wilson, 2005).  These moves 
were a result of a shrinking budget that supported an $182,000 deficit and more 
uncertainty (NAIA COP, 1995).  According to Blum (1995), membership shrunk from 
474 institutions in 1988 to 392 in 1995.  Furthermoe, from 1990 to 1993, 92 schools left 
the NAIA while only 15 joined during the same timespan (Blum, 1995).  Nearly 50 
members also held memberships with the NCAA and could easily leave around this time 
(Blum, 1995).  Membership would continue to fall to a membership count less than 300 
institutions today (“About the NAIA”, 2013).  Westminster College Athletic Director 
Joseph Fusco summarized the defection by noting: 
“We’ve been a loyal member of the NAIA, and they have been good to us. But we 
see erosion of membership nationally.  We needed to take care of ourselves, to be 
in a good position in case the worst happens” (Blum, 1995, para. 4). 
 
Many feared that the mass exodus of members would ca se the NAIA to fall including 
Bard College Athletic Director Joel Thomson. Specifically, Thomson stated: 
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“I’d hate to be the one to put the nail in the coffin.  My gut feeling is that unless a 
significant number of NCAA members look in a different decision and join, I 
don’t think the NAIA will hold up for the next three years” (Blum, 1995, para. 6). 
 
Chasteen, however, denied these suggestions and felt the changes that were made in the 
past two years would “position itself solidly for the future” (Blum, 1995, para. 7).  
Chasteen believed the drop in membership was related to the change in governance as 
well as its toughened standards on academic eligibility, f nancial aid, and its move from 
Kansas City to Tulsa.  Chasteen further explained his expectations believing that 
membership would range between 375 and 400 once the membership fluctuation settles 
(Blum, 1995). 
The Stabilization Period (1995 – 2002) 
 Chasteen had good reason to be upbeat and expect the ins itution movement to 
subside.  The NAIA now had an unlikely ally in its favor:  the NCAA.  Many schools 
were leaving the NAIA to join the NCAA, specifically Division III.  This movement 
caused the membership count in Division III to increase exponentially.  According to 
Wilson (2005), if each division was counted separately, Division III would be the largest 
athletic association, followed by the NAIA, Division II, and finally Division I.  Because 
of their rapid growth, the NCAA Council implemented a two-year freeze on membership 
growth on Division II and III until changes in the governance structure were in place 
(“Restructuring Prompts Moratorium”, 1995).  NCAA President Eugene Corrigan 
explained the moratorium with the following: 
“The NCAA is not refusing new members, but time is needed to work through the 
long-range impact of restructuring and membership growth.  There is no desire to 
exclude institutions with athletics programs comparable to those of current 
members…During this period, the Association will study and evaluate appropriate 
procedures and criteria for NCAA membership in light of the potential for a large 
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increase in the number of schools that might want to join” (“Restructuring 
Prompts Moratorium”, 1995, para. 6, 8). 
 
This alliance was more apparent when Huggins (1996) wrote an article entitled “Stronger 
NAIA Eases Threat of Excessive Growth in Division III”.  In the article, University 
Athletic Association Executive Director and Division III Task Force member Richard 
Rasmussen noted that “a strong NAIA is a very healty thing for the NCAA…it relieves 
the pressure on Division III of having to deal with excessive growth” (Huggins, 1996, 
para. 6).  Similarly, NAIA President Bill Patterson remained upbeat about the NAIA’s 
future.  He explained: 
“The problems we are facing are the rumors, not the reality. We feel that the one 
problem we have is rumor control.  Both the NAIA mebers and the NCAA 
members, as we express our concerns, are making a problem out of a non-
problem. The (NCAA) moratorium gives us some time to allay some fears” 
(Huggins, 1996, para. 10). 
 
The NCAA moratorium would be extended to four years on August 1, 1997 and is still 
continued to this day as an orientation program for schools joining the NCAA 
(“Membership Total Hits 1,261”, 2000). 
 However, teams moving from the NAIA to the NCAA never seemed to stop.  The 
reason many schools were considering Division III over the NAIA was due to its non-
scholarship nature.  Many schools in the NAIA were more comfortable with the Division 
III philosophy of no athlete financial opposed to the limited financial aid provided by the 
NAIA (Huggins, 1996).  However, other schools mainted other reasons.  The 
University of Wisconsin of Platteville (UW-P) made the move to the NCAA because of 
the high membership dues (Leitner, 1990).  UW-P Sports Information Director Terry 
Owens further accounted: 
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“The dues for the NAIA memberships were up and the on s for NCAA Division 
III aren’t as expensive. In the postseason, the NCAA will help defray some of the 
costs, whereas the NAIA doesn’t. It was an economic decision…The NAIA has 
lost a ton of teams. It is in a lot of trouble. It was an obvious decision to go to the 
NAIA” (Leitner, 1990, para. 3, 6). 
 
Western Washington University basketball coach Brad Jackson noted that when his 
school was considering transferring to the NCAA, memb rship in the NCAA was more 
prestigious (“Washington Colleges Could Leave”, 199).  Jackson noted that “the NAIA 
is looked upon as a little brother or sister, or almost a nonentity by some people” 
(“Washington Colleges Could Leave”, 1991, para. 11) Northeastern Oklahoma State 
University (NOSU) Athletic Director Gill Cloud also considered several factors but “the 
primary one has been scheduling differences, particularly in football…The number of 
NAIA Division I schools had dwindled so drastically we can hardly fill our schedules” 
(“SOSU Leaves NAIA For”, 1994, para. 3).  Southeastrn Oklahoma State University 
Athletic Director Don Parham made efforts to stay with the NAIA due to their charter 
member status but saw other Oklahoma schools depart for the NCAA (“SOSU Leaves 
NAIA For”, 1994).  Furthermore, Parham offered: 
“NCAA membership dues are $900 compared to approximately $3,500 to $4,000 
NAIA dues.  The NCAA also pays our catastrophic insurance ($6,000 to $7,000), 
provides strong financial support for playoff teams and allows members at all 
levels to share in the NCAA’s lucrative football and basketball TV income” 
(“SOSU Leaves NAIA For”, 1994, para. 5). 
 
 In order to combat these losses, the COP approved a program to permit dual 
members eligibility exemptions for one sport (NAIA COP, 1996).  The COP also 
discussed potential ways to attract those members who regretted leaving the NAIA for 
the NCAA (Wilson, 2005).  The COP developed a time table for recruiting new members 
while laying out its expectations for members of the COP including being strong 
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advocates for the organization (NAIA COP, 1996).  The NAIA also attempted to correct 
its financial issues by providing a stable national body.  Sister Grace Mary Flickinger, 
chairwoman of the Council of Faculty Athletic Representatives reported that the NAIA’s 
budget was balanced (Monaghan, 1995).  While explaining the budget, Flickinger further 
noted: 
“Some schools have left because they thought it was to their financial benefit to 
join the more wealthy organization. Some left when we established more-
stringent academic policies. I think that if we can establish more-stringent 
reporting policies on financial aid, more will leave” (Monaghan, 1995, para. 6). 
 
Despite the losses, however, both Flickinger and Chasteen remained positive about the 
current membership.  Flickinger argued that those schools that remain are here “because 
they are committed to the NAIA’s philosophies” (Monaghan, 1995, para. 8).  Chasteen 
continued to feel that the organization had turned th  corner and felt that membership 
would range around 350 over the next five years (Monaghan, 1995).   
However, these promises appeared to be nothing morethan just hopes and 
prayers.  Westminster College Athletic Director Joseph Fusco provided the following 
when discussing his institution’s move to Division II: 
“We had to ask ourselves the question, as a national org nization with a declining 
membership, ‘What is the appeal for industry and business and others who 
support athletics to continue to support the NAIA?’. I have seen no real strong 
effort on the part of the present administration to stem that tide. I see a continual 
decline. I don’t see a viable organization with 300 or fewer schools” (Morgan, 
1995, para. 1-2). 
 
Fusco’s comments reflect the lack of management from the COP due to the group’s high 
turnover rate.  According to a study of the 225 institutions between 1986 and 1994, the 
turnover of presidents was an often cited reason for their departure from the NAIA 
(Wilson, 2005).  From 1992 to 1995, the president turnover from the COP was 90 percent 
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(Wilson, 2005).  Many of the members that voted for the move to Tulsa or elected 
Chasteen as the CEO were now gone from the organization.  An average of 50 new 
presidents per year had taken over NAIA institutions a d many of them had experience 
with the NCAA instead of the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  In addition, the presidents had 
many other issues to consider at their university level.  With the low morale in the mid-
1990s, the COP was led to make tough decisions.   
In June 1996, the COP decided to buy out the remaining time on Chasteen’s 
contract and remove him as CEO (“NAIA’s Chasteen Haging”, 1996).  Many members 
faulted him for the NAIA issues, noting that” he failed to understand or be responsive to 
the needs of the membership” (Wilson, 2005, p. 206).  The COP felt that Chasteen 
needed to have a better grasp as to which schools were at risk for moving but instead 
chose to watch them leave (Wilson, 2005).  The COP allowed Chasteen to resign from 
his position and named NAIA President Bill Patterson as the interim CEO until a 
replacement could be found (Ferguson, 1996).  When Patterson was appointed, he gave 
an impassioned speech to the members at the 1996 National Meeting that set the goals for 
the organization (Wilson, 2005).   
“The NAIA is not dying. Our survival isn’t threatend. Today more than ever 
athletics is governed far too much by money and greed than education. It is driven 
by won-loss records rather than academics. We must not let this organization 
deviate from its goal…We have 362 NAIA schools in 45 states and British 
Columbia, and over the last 10 years we’ve had a net loss of 109 institutions, 14 
of those schools didn’t meet NAIA accreditations and 37 more are either merged 
or gone” (Ferguson, 1996, para. 5, 7). 
 
While Patterson was in charge on an interim basis, Western Montana College Chancellor 
Shelia Stearns and Georgetown College President William Crouch were in charge of 
finding Chasteen’s permanent replacement (“NAIA’ Chasteen Hanging”, 1996).  Both of 
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them agreed that the next CEO of the NAIA should not be a college president.  Instead, 
they felt that the new CEO should be able to bridge the gap between presidents and 
athletic directors as well as market the NAIA effectively.  After considering several 
individuals, Stearns and Crouch settled on Steve Baker s the new CEO of the NAIA 
(Ferguson, 1997). 
 Baker was a former Major League Baseball (MLB) pitcher for four seasons 
(Wilson, 2005).  While his playing career was rather m diocre, Baker joined the MLB 
Commissioner’s office in New York working for MLB International (Ferguson, 1997).  
Baker served as the Vice President in the marketing department, overseeing operations in 
Europe.  Over a period of seven months, both Stearns and Crouch got to know Baker as 
he researched the NAIA (Wilson, 2005).  Vice Presidnt of NAIA Championships Lynn 
Adams was excited about the hiring of Baker (Ferguson, 1997).  She explained that 
“Steve came to the front of the candidates very early…In fact, he had on-the-job training 
by visiting NAIA schools and educators to be sure this was going to be a right fit for 
him” (Ferguson, 1997, para. 6).  When Baker was hired, he appeared at the April 1997 
COP meeting in Tulsa showcasing his commitment and f miliarity with the NAIA.  
Although there would need to be some time to develop a comfort level between the COP 
and Baker, the membership received a boost of morale due to Baker’s outside nature.  
After speaking with many NAIA presidents, Baker set for h a plan of action 
centered on his perceptions of the NAIA’s problems.  Some of the items that Baker 
identified include the continued lack of visibility for the NAIA and its championship 
events and poor communication between the national office and both member institutions 
and the public (Wilson, 2005).  Part of the reason for the poor communication dealt 
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primarily with the structure of the NAIA governance.  After discussing issues with many 
member institutions, Baker got the message a restructuring of regions was needed again 
in order to create the needed interaction between mmber schools and the national office.  
As such, Baker made suggestions to enhance the regional plan that would be centered on 
cutting expenses and creating media and corporate excitement at the regional level 
(Ferguson, 1998a).  Based on Baker’s suggestions, the Regional Enhancement Task 
Force proposed three options at the 1998 National Convention:  
“The status quo; the national basketball tournament with an eight-team field 
beginning at the regional level (seven geographic areas; or the reduction of the 
national field to 24 teams with eight geographic regions and a decrease in 
qualifiers in the individual sports” (Ferguson, 1998a, para. 4). 
 
Those in attendance were in favor of the regional ehancement policy.  COP Chairman 
Bill Crouch felt that a decision could be reached by the end of the meeting (Ferguson, 
1998b).  He also argued: 
“It would be my desire to approve most of the regional enhancement program, 
and leave further studies of the Far West and Northeast regions to the task force. 
Except for those areas, most of the NAIA membership is n the Heartland of our 
country” (Ferguson, 1998b, para. 2). 
 
However, Baker was not satisfied with the proposed regional enhancements.  As such, the 
CEO proposed an expansion of regions to 14 to the COP where each region would be 
comprised of at least two conferences and no more than three (Bunch, 1999).  After an 
extended discussion, the COP approved the proposal due to its attendant marketing plan.  
By the year 2000, the regional emphasis meant COP members represented both their 
college and region while much of the NAIA governance was handled by Regional 
Management Committees, similar to the past district chairs (Wilson, 2005). 
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 In addition to the region expansion, Baker proposed at the Spring 1999 COP 
meeting to transition the NAIA from its dues assessment based on enrollment to a flat fee 
for all members (Wilson, 2005).  Baker argued that by basing dues on full time 
equivalent (FTE) enrollment was an imperfect science since enrollment would always 
fluctuate.  More importantly, the historical dues as essment was based on an assumption 
that smaller enrollments meant fewer sports could be sponsored.  After another lengthy 
discussion, the COP implemented a three-year adjustment period, beginning in the 2000-
01 academic year, where dues would move to a flat $4,400 (Wilson, 2005).  Although 
this amount was substantially higher than the $900 in fees for Division III, Baker hoped 
that the NAIA assessment would decreased as alternative revenues would become 
available. 
 As Baker became acclimated to his position, the membership numbers for the 
NAIA remained fairly constant between 1997 and 2002.  According to Wilson (2005), 
“from 344 members in 1997-98, of which 70 were dual members and thus mostly 
expected to move to the NCAA when their probation tme was up, membership declined 
only to 332 by 2001-02” (p. 220).  This stabilization in membership started to give the 
NAIA its confidence back.  As such, the COP implemented a policy that halted any 
school waiting for NCAA admission to be unable to compete in NAIA title competitions.  
This new policy helped the NAIA distance itself from the perception that “if you can’t be 
in the NCAA, you can always play NAIA ball” (Wilson, 2005, p. 220).  The COP would 
also establish a $1,500 application fee for schools seeking to join the NAIA as well as 
instituting more rigorous screening of applicants to determine their viability. 
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 As the end of the 20th century approached, the organization began to question the 
main office and the NIBT were in the best location.  According to a study conducted by 
Creative Resources in 1996 showed the move from Kansas City to Tulsa severely 
damaged the organization (Wilson, 2005).  The membership never felt included in the 
decision-making process to consider the move to Tulsa, nor did the leadership clearly 
communicate the true purpose of the move (Wilson, 2005).  The NAIA’s lease with Tulsa 
would expire in 1998, and Baker did work with Tulsa and Mayor Susan Savage on a 
renewal (Klein, 2000).  Baker was committed to staying in Tulsa and attempted to come 
up with a future plan for the NAIA (Klein, 2000).  However, the organization had its 
issues within Oklahoma.  First, attendance in the Mabee Center paled in comparison to 
the crowds in Municipal Auditorium or Kemper Arena i  the 1960s and 1970s (Wilson, 
2005).  The 1999 Division I NIBT would only draw about 31,000 attendees, 
approximately 4,000 less than the NIBT’s draw in its final year in Kansas City (Klein, 
2000).  Nevertheless, the NIBT was a successful event for the Tulsa community.  In 
1994, the NIBT was estimated to bring more than $11 million into the city’s economy 
while the NAIA Convention, Men’s and Women’s Tennis Championships, and the Men’s 
Golf Championship would generate an additional $9 million (Hartnett, 1994).  The NAIA 
was also viewed as a boost to the Tulsa economy for approximately $65 million by 1999 
(“Solon: Oklahoma Schools Should”, 1999).  Baker acknowledged the economic success 
by suggesting: 
“This organization can thrive here in Oklahoma, andwe think we’re doing a 
pretty good job of making it here.  It would just help us a lot if we had more 
participation by as many schools as possible in Oklahoma” (“Solon: Oklahoma 
Schools Should”, 1999). 
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Baker was fully aware that the organization lacked the historic connection that it 
originally had in Kansas City (Wilson, 2005).  Many schools within the Oklahoma region 
moved to the NCAA, robbing the NAIA and the NIBT of potential local appeal (“SOSU 
Leaves NAIA For”, 1994).  Moreover, it appeared that none of them were willing to 
move back.  Oklahoma City University Sports Information Director Tony Sellars felt his 
school was happy with its decision to move to Division II (“Solon: Oklahoma Schools 
Should”, 1999).  NOSU Athletic Director Gil Cloud also noted that after investing four 
years becoming active in Division II, his school had no plans to return.   
“We were completely surrounded by states that had me the decision to go to 
NCAA. Finding comparable opponents in all sports, not just football, became a 
problem. We felt for the longevity of our program tha ’s where we wanted to be” 
(“Solon: Oklahoma Schools Should”, 1999, para. 16).
 
 By 1999, the NAIA and the City of Tulsa were negotiating to move the 
organization into the downtown area (Bunch, 1999).  The deal negotiated would have the 
NAIA move the NIBT to the Maxwell Convention Center fo  2000 and 2001 while also 
carrying a three-year renewal option (Bunch, 1999).  Baker showcased his enthusiasm 
stating that the NAIA was “excited to establish this partnership with the Tulsa 
Convention Center and we appreciate the efforts of he Tulsa Sports Commission to help 
make this move a reality (Bunch, 1999, para. 4).  However, this support was more of a 
façade as Baker had issues scheduling meetings with Mayor Savage to discuss the 
NAIA’s importance to the downtown developments (Wilson, 2005).  Baker’s continued 
frustrations led to his recommendation to the COP to seek requests for proposal from 
cities that had expressed interest in the NAIA in April 2000 (Bunch, 2000a).  As news of 
this broke, Oklahoma City requested an exploratory meeting with Baker in an attempt to 
lure both the NIBT and national office (Bunch, 2000b). As time progressed, the COP 
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would receive bids from 18 cities interested in housing the organization: Branson, 
Missouri; Chula Vista, California; Cleveland, Ohio; Denton, Texas; Fort Wayne, Indiana; 
Grand Rapids, Michigan; Hardin County (Jackson), Tennessee; Kingsport, Tennessee; 
Lexington, Kentucky; Lincoln, Nebraska; Louisville, Kentucky; Memphis, Tennessee; 
Mobile, Alabama; Muncie, Indiana; Olathe, Kansas; St. Charles, Missouri; and Tulsa, 
Oklahoma (Bunch, 2000a).   
The NAIA had several requirements for their new home but they wanted to 
engage in a specific strategy to pick the right home.  First, the chosen city should be 
within 45 miles of an international airport (Bunch, 2000c).  In addition, the city should 
have five NAIA schools within a 100-mile radius as well as access to a basketball facility 
with seating of 7,000 (Wilson, 2005).  Furthermore, th  city should provide adequate 
ground transportation and hotel rooms to house natio l tournament participants (Bunch, 
2000c).  By September 2000, the Relocation Committee reviewed the proposals and 
narrowed the group down to five: Cleveland; Fort Wayne; Lexington; Olathe; and St. 
Charles because the NAIA decided to leave Tulsa for go d (Bunch, 2000c, 2000d).  The 
front runner of these cities was believed to be Olathe, Kansas, a suburb 20 miles 
southwest from Kansas City (Wilson, 2005).  Its proposal included 27 acres to construct a 
convention center, hotel, and 8,000 to 10,000 seat arena (Bunch, 2000c).  In comparison, 
Fort Wayne established a committee to raise $1.5 million n private money to lure the 
NAIA and designated three sites in to house the headqu rters (Bunch, 2000c). 
By the end to 2000, both Lexington and Cleveland ha withdrawn their bids 
leaving only three finalists.  After leaving Kansas City, Missouri, rather abruptly in 1994, 
the COP decided on Olathe over Fort Wayne and St. Charles (Fields, 2001).  Olathe 
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maintained the built-in advantage over the other two cities of representing a return to the 
association’s roots (Wilson, 2005).  The NAIA would join in a partnership with the 
Olathe School District and the City of Olathe in the construction of the new headquarters.  
The school district was committed to provide $100,0 per year for ten years starting in 
2001 and be used for capital costs of a convention center (Bunch, 2001).  The Olathe 
Chamber of Commerce anticipated that the NAIA would generate an economic impact of 
$20.7 million in industrial output, 300 jobs, and $6.4 million in increased total earnings 
by Kansas City households (Bunch, 2001).  However, th  calling card for the COP was 
Olathe’s efforts to promote character similar to the NAIA’s plans to offer character-based 
sportsmanship programs (Fields, 2001).   
During the negotiation process, Baker announced a program focused on character 
building and sportsmanship (“NAIA Unveils Program on Sportsmanship”, 2000).  
Known as the Champions of Character, the program encouraged the 328 member schools 
to set character standards and accountability in NAIA sports (“NAIA Unveils Program on 
Sportsmanship”, 2000).  The program called for the emphasis of five core values that 
would govern both officials and student athletes in the classroom, on the athletic field, 
and in the community: Respect, Integrity, Responsibility, Community Leadership, and 
Sportsmanship (Covitz, 2002).  According to Baker, this program was established for the 
NAIA to devise its own brand while setting it apart from the NCAA (Covitz, 2002).  
Baker further noted: 
“Before you figure out what your brand is, you ask the question, ‘What do we do 
well?’. The answer from our membership was we utilize participation in sport to 
create solid citizens. It’s the academic experience, a good education, that 
character-building as you play sports. We were turning out citizens who 
participate in the community.  They’re teachers, lawyers, doctors, civil servants, 
moms and dads” (Covitz, 2002, para. 47). 




The NAIA sought to change the culture of sports by ending trash talking and 
unsportsmanlike behavior while seeing the importance of being a team player and 
following the instructions of coaches (Boyce, 2001).  The program also attempted to end 
the use of profanity by both athletes and coaches (Boyce, 2001).  Olathe recognized the 
Champions of Character program as a positive and chose to promote its bid by 
emphasizing the focus on character.  Once the NAIA returned, Olathe became the first 
community to take part in the program (Boyce, 2001). 
  The combination of the Champions of Character program and the NCAA 
moratorium helped the NAIA maintain its membership, even charting an increase in 
members in 2001 (Boyce, 2001).  However, several schools were awaiting the end of 
their application period.  As such, the membership count in 2002 decreased to 307, a loss 
of 28 schools (Wilson, 2005).  While most of these schools left to join the NCAA, some 
went to other organizations or even worse ended their athletic programs (Wilson, 2005).  
However, the decline stabilized rather quickly in 2003 despite falling under 300 
members. In response, Baker chose to pursue some potential prospects to join the 
association.  In March 2003, Baker listed six different categories of schools to target 
including the newly labeled historically black universities and colleges (HBCUs); 
Division II schools facing budget cuts; Division III schools that recognized possibilities 
for generating enrollment increases through athletic scholarships; and schools in Canada 
and Mexico (Wilson, 2005).  The Canadian pursuit proved to be a fruitful attempt as the 
University of British Columbia, the University of Alberta, and the University of Victoria 
joined the Simon Frasier University in the NAIA betw en 1999 and 2001 (Wilson, 2005). 
    
311 
 
 The NAIA received another boost when it reached an agreement with College 
Sports Television (CSTV) to broadcast national championship games (“NAIA and Cable 
Station Reach”, 2003).  The agreement was a five-year d al that gave CSTV the 
exclusive rights to broadcast five NAIA national championship games, including football 
and four basketball tournaments (“NAIA and Cable Station Reach”, 2003).  Upon the 
announcement of the agreement, Baker noted: 
“Partnering with CSTV is a tremendous opportunity for the NAIA as we seek to 
expand the awareness of our association, member institutions, and student 
athletes…Broadcasts of NAIA championships will further expose to the sports 
public our brand of sports where student-athletes play simply for the love of the 
game” (“NAIA and Cable Station Reach”, 2003, para. 3). 
 
The agreement also called for the organization to share production costs with CSTV, but 
as viewership would increase and advertisers pay for sp nsorships, CSTV would become 
a major resource (Wilson, 2005).  The network was originally available on the DirecTV 
satellite service as part of a premium sports package.  However, CSTV would begin to be 
picked up by several cable services, eventually leading to CBS acquiring CSTV in 2006 
for $325 million (Whitford, 2010).  CSTV would eventually become the CBS College 
Sports Network and continues to broadcast NAIA events as of 2013 (“CSTV to Become 
CBS”, 2008). 
Aftermath and Summary 
 Throughout its over 75 year history, the NAIA has been a legitimate organization 
that was dedicated to the promotion of intercollegiate athletics as an extension of 
institution.  Originally designed as a basketball-centric organization, the association 
created the first national collegiate basketball and football championships which 
prompted other collegiate organizations to follow its lead.  The NAIA continued to 
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innovate throughout its history as it was the first organization to integrate African-
American athletes and HBCUs as well as one of the first to sponsor national 
championships for women.  At the height of its popularity, the NAIA’s success caused 
the NCAA to implement procedures to attract members to join their organization such as 
the Sanity Code and the Division Reorganization.  While the organization fell upon bad 
times during the late 1980s and 1990s, the NAIA survived the departure of many schools 
and crafted a new identity that is focused on sportmanship and character building.  With 
the creation of the Champions of Character program, the NAIA has re-emphasized 
policies and procedures that Emil Liston and Al Duer publicly promoted during their 
lifetimes.  
 While the NAIA has done better in recent years, it till has its setbacks.  NAIA 
CEO Steve Baker resigned from his position in 2006.  After nine years at the helm of the 
organization, Baker wanted to pursue new interests (Boyce, 2006a).  Baker noted it was 
an honor to associate with the NAIA and was proud of the organization’s success (Boyce, 
2006a).  Taking over for Baker was NAIA COO and General Counsel Jim Carr (Boyce, 
2006b).  Carr spent much time learning from Baker and desired to continue the work that 
Baker started.  For example, upon his hiring, Carr noted that the NAIA “will never 
challenge the NCAA in the marketplace, but there is room for growth” (Boyce, 2006b, 
para. 11).  Carr elaborated that the key is to determine what the NAIA stands for and 
what their niche is, a strategy the organization always seemed to pursue (Boyce, 2006b).  
The NAIA also announced in 2007 that it was abolishing the region system and would 
primarily have direct qualification for postseason competition through affiliated 
conferences (“NAIA: Presidents Approve”, 2007).  In addition, the direct qualification 
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policy reduces postseason redundancy and provides a sound financial structure for 
postseason competition (“NAIA: Presidents Approve”, 2007). 
One major niche that the NAIA will always maintain is their focus on basketball.  
When the NAIA moved its national office to Olathe, the organization decided to have the 
NIBT where the first tournament was held: the Kansas City Municipal Auditorium 
(Boyce, 2002).  After eight years in Tulsa, the NIBT was welcomed back with open arms 
as the 2002 NIBT drew more than 40,000 fans over the six day tournament (Boyce, 
2002).  The tournament has been held at the Municipal Auditorium since 2002 and has 
recently celebrated its 75th anniversary in 2012 (Covitz, 2012a).  Since its return to the 
Municipal Auditorium, the NIBT has averaged 40,000 fans each year while generating 
more than $2.5 million for the Kansas City economy (Covitz, 2009).  Although the 
average attendance is only 4,000 per game, Carr did not consider moving from the 
Municipal Auditorium since it has easy access to the hotels and restaurants in Downtown 
Kansas City, items that Al Duer considered when the NAIA moved the NIBT to the 
Kemper Arena (Covitz, 2009).  Due to its high visibility, Carr and the NAIA agreed to an 
extension to keep the NIBT in the Municipal Auditorum until 2013 (Covitz, 2009).  
After 2012, however, the tournament attendance dropped to 34,080, a decrease from 
38,207 in 2011 and 41,131 in 2010 (Covitz, 2012b).  In response to the decline, Carr 
offered the following: 
“My goal is always above 40,000. We have to keep at it, dd some new twists 
next year, and get back over 40,000. I still think there’s huge potential (to tap) 
with young people, whether it be through schools, or youth basketball teams, 
churches. Places where young people gather” (Covitz, 2012b, para. 8). 
 
 Carr and the NAIA have the ability to access the youth in the Kansas City area 
more than ever.  After six years in Olathe, the NAIA moved back into Downtown Kansas 
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City in 2007 after it struggled to find fundraising opportunities and the organization 
lacked strong community relations (Cooper & Horsley, 2006).  Olathe Mayor Mike 
Copland was disappointed that the NAIA was leaving the area but felt good that the 
organization was staying within the area (Cooper & Horsley, 2006).  After announcing 
the move, Carr shared: 
“We’re extremely excited to be downtown and part of he revitalization of 
downtown.  First of all, with the history of the organization being 
downtown…and you look out to the south and see the Sprint Center almost 
finished…we have a great relationship and we’re goin  to partner with some 
things at the College Basketball Experience” (Covitz, 2007, para. 4). 
 
Today, the NAIA’s headquarters stands on the corner of Twelfth and Grand and is within 
close proximity to the Sprint Center and the College Basketball Experience.  The building 
was refurbished for $600,000 and includes exhibits from the organization’s history dating 
to 1937 on display (Covitz, 2007).  Carr believed that the downtown building would give 
the NAIA a higher profile and better image within the community (Covitz, 2007). 
 Image and visibility are vital to the success of the organization and always 
seemed to be the missing element for prolonged succe s.  Although the move back to 
Kansas City brought a sense of nostalgia to the organization, several schools still decided 
to move away from the NAIA.  Some recent examples of institutions include William 
Jewell College in 2011, which has competed in the NAIA since its inception (Palmer, 
2011).  According to William Jewell President David Sallee, it was a difficult decision to 
make because of the strong ties that the school has with the association.  However, Sallee 
explained: 
“This was about institutional positioning. It’s about taking advantage of the 
NCAA brand power. In the minds of the general public, there is obviously a 
strong athletic brand attachment, but there is also  general perception that NCAA 
schools are really good schools” (Palmer, 2011, para. 5). 




Azusa Pacific University also moved from the NAIA to the NCAA in 2011 reiterating 
William Jewell’s concerns. Athletic Director Bill Odell offered that it was much easier to 
recruit when a school is associated with the NCAA and explained that “when we go into 
a house in Southern California and say we’re an NAIA school, a lot of kids don’t know 
what that is…they know the NCAA, so there’s something there that you don’t have to 
explain” (Palmer, 2011, para. 7-8).   
From another perspective, the departure of NAIA continued due the quality of 
competition. For instance, upon announcing his schools move to Division II in 2010, 
Walsh University Athletic Director Dale Howard felt that after winning national 
championships in NAIA that they “were poised to move our athletic program to the next 
level” (“Stark Schools Are Approved”, 2010, para. 6).  The South Dakota School of 
Mines and Technology and Black Hills State University both moved to Division II in 
2010 feeling that the move was “the beginning of a new era that will open up all sorts of 
positive possibilities for our student athletes andlumni”, according to South Dakota 
Tech Athletic Director Dick Kaiser (“SD Mines, BHSU to Move”, 2010, para. 3).  
Finally, Dominican University of California Athletic Director Ian Tonks felt that his 
schools move to Division II in 2008 “would bring greater exposure to Dominican athletes 
outside of the San Francisco Bay Area” because of the higher level of competition 
present in the NCAA (“Dominican U. (CA) Moving”, 2008, para. 3).   
Despite these defections, some schools decided to return to the NAIA.  Menlo 
College of California left the NCAA Division III to join the NAIA level after a successful 
football season in 2009 (Cosgriff, 2009).  Head football coach Fred Guidici noted that 
despite their high ranking in Division III football, the school wanted to have all its 
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athletic programs in the same association (Cosgriff, 2009).  Finally, after twelve years as 
a NCAA Division II member, West Virginia University Tech decided to return to the 
NAIA (Keenan, 2006).  WVU Tech Athletic Director Gary Prince felt that the NAIA was 
“a good fit for Tech…the history of Tech shows that it was always a very strong school 
financially and athletically as a part of the NAIA” (Keenan, 2006, para. 7).  Prince also 
acknowledged that he did not feel the move back to the NAIA was a move downwards, 
noting that the competitive level is very similar to Division II (Keenan, 2006). 
Finally, as of 2011, the NAIA maintained a membership count of 290 members 
(Palmer, 2011).  While its membership significantly decreased from its peak of 558 
schools in 1973 (Wilson, 2005), the NAIA still has  healthy roster of schools that 
compete for 23 national championships in 13 different sports (“About the NAIA”, n.d.).  
Again, despite suffering for image and visibility, he organization crafted a niche centered 
on character-building and sportsmanship that has re-ignited the organization as a viable 
contender in intercollegiate sports.  Still, the NAIA has work ahead of it as the NCAA is 
still viewed as the premiere college sports organization.  However, through its deal with 
CBS College Sports and emphasis on the student athlete experience over the 
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Chapter 6 – Statistical Analysis 
This chapter provides the statistical findings from the quantitative models 
discussed in Chapter 4.  The chapter first shows the summary results and significant 
findings from Model One, which predicts the likelihood of college movement from the 
NAIA to the NCAA Division II or Division III based on social identities.  Next, the 
chapter analyzes the results provided by Model Two, which estimates if a reclassification 
of athletic associations creates an increase in total university applications. 
Model One 
To investigate the effect that a university’s social identities have on the likelihood 
of university movement, this dissertation examines th  initial movement of schools from 
the NAIA to either Division II or III between 1973 and 2012.  Recall, the unit of 
observation was a university-year.  The sample did not include any international 
universities nor any U.S. institutions not included in the IPEDS database.  Colleges and 
universities that were members of the NAIA during the sample time period were included 
in the data set one year after departing the NAIA for Division II or Division III.  After 
one year in the NCAA, the observed university was removed from the sample. A 
university’s movement to either Division II or Division III was observed through the use 
of a 1/0 dichotomous variable. The value of one indicated an observed university left the 
NAIA in the current year, while zero signifies that the university stayed in the NAIA. 
This variable served as the dependent variable.  The final data set included 22,367 
university-year observations from 1973 to 2012. 




During the time period analyzed, 264 universities transitioned from the NAIA to 
Division II and 233 schools moved to Division III.  Table 6.1 displays the summary 
statistics for the various university identities utilized in the analysis.  In the sample, 1.9% 
of university-year observations occur when the university joins Division II, while 1.0% 
joined Division III.  In terms of school designation, 76.2% of the university-year 
observations were identified as private, 2.9% were women’s colleges, and 6.5% were 
classified as historically black universities.  Approximately 23% of the observations were 
affiliated with a mainline protestant religion, 17.4% affiliated with an evangelist 
protestant religion, and 13.8% were associated with Catholicism.  Finally, 10.9% of the 
university-year observations occurred during Duer’s tenure (1949 – 1975) as Executive 
Secretary of the NAIA, 32.2% during Fritz’s tenure (1975 – 1986), 14% while under  
Table 6-1 - Summary Statistics for Model One 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min  Max Median 
Joined Division II  0.019 0.108 0 1 0 
Joined Division III 0.010 0.102 0 1 0 
Private 0.762 0.426 0 1 1 
Women’s 0.029 0.168 0 1 0 
BCU 0.065 0.246 0 1 0 
Catholic 0.138 0.345 0 1 0 
Mainline Protestant 0.229 0.420 0 1 0 
Evangelist Protestant 0.174 0.380 0 1 0 
Black Protestant 0.008 0.088 0 1 0 
Other Christian 0.002 0.040 0 1 0 
Other Religious  Affiliations 0.004 0.064 0 1 0 
Duer as Leader 0.109 0.312 0 1 0 
Fritz as Leader 0.322  0.468 0 1 0 
Farris as Leader 0.140  0.347 0 1 0 
Chasteen as Leader 0.146 0.352 0 1 0 
Baker as Leader 0.172 0.377 0 1 0 
Carr as Leader 0.110 0.313 0 1 0 
n = 22,367 
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Farris (1986 – 1990), 14.6% under Chasteen (1991 – 1996), 17.2% during Baker’s tenure 
(1997 – 2006), and 11% of the observations under Carr’s leadership (2007 – Present). 
Table 6.2 provides the number of observations located in the geographic regions 
identified by IPEDS.  Of the eight regions identified, the Rocky Mountain region has the 
lowest amount of observations (3.09% of the total sample).  The New England region is 
the second smallest region (4.51% of observations) followed by the Mid-East region 
(8.49% of sample).  The largest number of observations were located within the 
Southeast region (29.03%) followed by the Great Lakes region (17.11%), the Plains 
region (16.41%), the Far West region (10.81%), and the Southwest region (10.56%).  In  










New England (NE) 1,008 4.51 
Mid-East (ME) 1,898 8.49 
Great Lakes (GL) 3,826 17.11 
Plains (PL) 3,670 16.41 
Southeast (SE) 6,493 29.03 
Southwest (SW) 2,363 10.56 
Rocky Mountain (RM) 691 3.09 
Far West (FW) 2,418 10.81 
Religious  
Affiliations 
Catholic (CATH) 3,095 13.84 
Mainline Protestant (M_PROT) 5,116 22.87 
Evangelist Protestant (E_PROT) 3,902 17.45 
Black Protestant (BL_PROT) 175 0.78 
Other Christian (OTH_CHR) 36 0.16 
Other Religious Affiliations (OTH_REL) 92 0.41 
Size 
Not Classified by Carnegie (SIZEC1) 1,772 7.92 
Small or Very Small (SIZEC2) 15,451 69.08 
Medium (SIZEC3) 4,450 19.90 
Large or Very Large (SIZEC4) 694 3.10 
Sponsored  
Sports 
Football (FB) 6,119 27.36 
Men’s Basketball (MBB) 15,795 70.62 
Women’s Basketball (WBB) 14,328 64.06 
Baseball (BSB) 12,117 54.17 
Men’s Hockey (MHKY) 582 2.60 
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terms of religious affiliation based on the categories developed by Steensland et al. 
(2000), 55.5% of the sample was affiliated with anyreligion and 41.1% associated with a 
Protestant affiliation.  Specifically, 22.87% of the observations aligned with a Mainline 
Protestant religion while 17.45% chose an Evangelist Protestant denomination and 
13.84% were affiliated with the Roman Catholic faith.  Many of the schools found in the 
sample defined themselves as small or very small (SIZEC2) (69.08%) according to the 
Carnegie Foundation.  Approximately 20% of the university-year observations were 
described as medium (SIZEC3), 3.10% were identified as a large or very large university 
(SIZEC4), and 7.92% were not classified as a size by the Carnegie Foundation (SIZEC1).  
Finally, 70.62% university-year observations sponsored men’s basketball, 64.06% 
sponsored women’s basketball, and 54.17% sponsored baseball.  Only 25% of the 
observations sponsored a football team and even fewer (2.6%) sponsored a men’s hockey 
team. 
Table 6.3 further displays university tabulations ba ed upon a school’s movement 
to either Division II or III.  Many of the schools that chose to transition into the NCAA 
were located within the Southeast region (0.49% of total sample to Division II and 0.16% 
to Division III) while very few colleges found in the Rocky Mountain region changed 
their athletic affiliation (0.05% of total sample).  Schools located in the New England, 
Mid-East, and Great Lakes regions moved to Division III more frequently than Division 
II.  In comparison, universities found in the Southeast, Southwest, and Rocky Mountain 
regions preferred Division II over Division III while colleges located within the Plains 
and Far West regions moved at a nearly similar rate.  Schools affiliated with a Mainline 
Protestant denomination tend to transfer to Division III opposed to Division II.  Medium 
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and large or very large schools moved more to Division II (0.50% medium; 0.12% large) 
compared to Division III (27% medium; 4% large) while small or very small schools 
prefer Division III (0.72%) over Division II (0.55%).  Finally, schools sponsoring teams 
in football (0.63% versus 0.46%), men’s basketball (1.15% versus 0.97%), women’s 
basketball (0.98% versus 0.73%), and baseball (0.92% versus 0.82%) aligned more 
frequently with Division II while men’s hockey sponsored schools (0.13% versus 0.04%) 















Table 6-3 - University Tabulations by Division Movem nt 
Identity Variable  
Names 
Number to  
Division II  
% of  
Sample 
Number to 
Division III  





NE 5 0.02 27 0.12 
ME 32 0.14 54 0.24 
GL 26 0.12 54 0.24 
PL 31 0.14 26 0.12 
SE 110 0.49 36 0.16 
SW 29 0.13 14 0.06 
RM 12 0.05 0 0 
FW 19 0.08 22 0.10 
Religious  
Affiliations 
CATH 25 0.11 35 0.16 
M_PROT 37 0.17 76 0.34 
E_PROT 24 0.11 20 0.09 
BL_PROT 1 <0.01 0 0 
OTH_CHR 1 <0.01 0 0 
OTH_REL 0 0 1 <0.01 
Size 
SIZEC1 4 0.02 4 0.02 
SIZEC2 123 0.55 160 0.72 
SIZEC3 111 0.50 60 0.27 
SIZEC4 26 0.12 9 0.04 
Sponsored  
Sports 
FB 141 0.63 103 0.46 
MBB 258 1.15 217 0.97 
WBB 220 0.98 163 0.73 
BSB 205 0.92 184 0.82 
MHKY 8 0.04 29 0.13 




Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present the results from the logistic regression model, Model 
One, predicting the likelihood the focal university will move from the NAIA to Division 
II and Division III respectively.  Five variations of Model One were estimated.  The first 
model, Model 1A, predicted the likelihood of a school moving to Division II in the 
current year (Y1) based upon the social identities of other schools moving in the current 
year.  Model 1B estimated a school’s potential for m vement in Y1 based upon the 
transition of schools from the prior year (Y2), while Model 1C analyzed school 
movement in relation to colleges relocating two years (Y3) prior to the current year.  
Model 1D projected the likelihood of movement in Y1by combining past efforts in Y2 
and Y3.  Finally, Model 1E estimated the potential for schools to transition to Division II 
based upon the movement of other schools in Y1, Y2, and Y3.  One variable from each 
social identity grouping was removed due to collinearity issues with its respective 
grouping.  These variables include the New England region (NE), schools not classified 
by the Carnegie Foundation (SIZEC1), and schools affiliated with a religion outside of 
Christianity (OTH_REL). These variables are the refnce category for each identity. 
Several variables were also removed from each model due to their respective observation 
frequency.  For example, the sample does not include any schools that moved from the 
NAIA to Division III that are from the Rocky Mountain region (RM).  The sample also 
does not include any schools that have a denomination that is classified as a Black 
Protestant (BL_PROT) or Other Christian (OTH_CHR) denomination for either division. 
According to the results on Table 6.4, many of the indicator variables only 
showed significance in certain models.  For example, schools classified as private are 
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significant at the 99% confidence level and negatively related in Model 1B.  Women’s 
only colleges are positively related in Model 1D while HBCUs are negatively related in 
Models 1A and 1E.  The Mid-East (Model 1C, positive) and Plains regions (Model 1A 
and Model 1E, negative) are the only geographic regions to show significance.  Colleges 
classified as large (SIZEC4) are significant and positively related at the 99% confidence 
interval in Model 1B and Model 1C and positively significant at the 95% confidence 
level in Model 1D.  Schools affiliated with Catholicism (CATH), a Mainline Protestant 
denomination (M_PROT), and an Evangelist Protestant de omination (E_PROT) show 
significance at the 99% confidence level and negative relations in Model 1A.  However, 
in Model 1E, both Catholicism and Mainline Protestant denominations are negatively 
related at the 95% confidence level while Evangelist Protestant denominations are 
negatively related at the 99% significance level.  Both men’s basketball (MBB) and 
women’s basketball (WBB) are significant at the 99% level throughout all models 
although MBB is positively related and WBB is negative.  Football (FB) is significant 
and positively related in Models 1B, 1C, and 1D while men’s hockey (MHKY) shows 
significance and a negative relationship in Model 1A.  Schools affiliated with the NAIA 
during Duer’s tenure as leader (DUER) show a negative and significant relationship in 
Model 1E.  However, in Model 1C, a positive and signif cant relationship for DUER at 
the 95% confidence level is estimated.  Only Chasteen (CHASTEEN) (Model 1B) and 
Baker (BAKER) (Model 1B and Model 1C) display a positive and significant 
relationship. 
Table 6.4 also displays the interactions of the indicator variables with the number 
of schools moving to Division II possessing the respective identity. Private schools do not 
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Table 6-4 - Division II Movement 






Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  
N/A INTERCEPT -3.31 2.62 -5.97** 2.09 -10.71*** 2.15 -4.84 2.94 -3.92 2.81 
N/A TREND -0.07 0.07 -0.04 0.06 0.14** 0.05 -0.05 0.08 -0.06 0.08 
Indicator 
PRIVATE -0.30 0.27 -0.75** 0.27 -0.46 0.27 -0.53 0.31 -0.11 0.31 
WOMENS --- --- 1.35 0.91   1.62* 0.84 0.63 0.88 
BCU -1.12** 0.39 -0.23 0.30 0.19 0.32 -0.19 0.31 -1.24** 0.39 
ME 0.18 0.55 0.91 0.54 1.36** 0.54 0.88 0.58 0.05 0.63 
GL -1.06 0.56 -0.30 0.54 -0.17 0.55 -0.21 0.56 -0.70 0.56 
PL -1.48** 0.61 -0.42 0.54 -0.39 0.55 -0.44 0.57 -1.47* 0.64 
SE 0.13 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.38 0.53 0.06 0.55 -0.08 0.55 
SW -0.56 0.57 -0.27 0.54 0.18 0.54 -0.13 0.55 -0.76 0.60 
RM -0.43 0.63 0.21 0.59 0.26 0.58 0.01 0.61 -0.41 0.66 
FW -1.07 0.62 0.14 0.57 0.09 0.57 0.44 0.58 -1.18 0.71 
SIZEC2 -0.52 0.48 -0.14 0.45 -0.07 0.49 -0.28 0.47 -0.62 0.48 
SIZEC3 -0.28 0.54 0.91 0.48 0.73 0.51 0.68 0.51 0.00 0.54 
SIZEC4 0.62 0.60 1.40** 0.55 1.51** 0.61 1.33* 0.61 0.75 0.62 
CATH -1.22** 0.43 0.16 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.32 -1.13* 0.48 
M_PROT -0.75** 0.29 -0.19 0.27 -0.32 0.28 -0.09 0.31 -0.71* 0.34 
E_PROT -1.44*** 0.35 -0.66* 0.30 -0.37 0.30 -0.55 0.35 -1.93***  0.45 
FB 0.12 0.28 1.29***  0.23 0.88***  0.23 1.27***  0.31 0.52 0.37 
MBB 3.26***  0.73 3.61***  0.72 2.36***  0.71 3.32***  0.71 3.91***  0.91 
WBB -0.98** 0.33 -1.16***  0.33 -1.20***  0.36 -1.76***  0.42 -1.70***  0.40 
BSB 0.07 0.32 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.26 0.24 0.34 0.04 0.37 
MHKY -1.72**  0.58 --- --- -0.04 0.48 0.45 0.50 -0.06 0.41 
DUER -3.47 2.35 -1.95 1.95 4.12* 2.11 -3.97 3.17 -5.73* 2.84 
FRITZ -2.48 2.07 -2.68 1.68 2.42 1.64 -2.72 2.25 -3.67 2.25 
FARRIS -1.62 1.36 -1.43 1.13 2.14 1.25 -1.55 1.54 -2.11 1.64 
CHASTEEN -0.77 1.08 1.82* 0.85 0.88 0.93 -0.13 1.35 -1.73 1.70 
BAKER -0.30 0.64 0.23 0.45 1.94** 0.72 1.88* 0.89 0.06 0.91 
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(Table 6.4 continued) 






Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  




Sum Y1 0.52 0.82 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Sum Y2 --- --- -0.64 0.93 --- --- --- --- -0.08** 0.03 
Sum Y3 --- --- --- --- -5.19***  1.06 --- --- -0.13***  0.04 
SumY2Y3 --- --- --- --- --- --- -2.32* 1.13 --- --- 
SumD2_PRIV -0.12 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.70***  0.16 0.72***  0.16 -0.01 0.19 
SumD2_WOMEN --- --- -0.53 0.99 --- --- -1.72 1.11 -0.70 1.16 
SumD2_BCU 0.19 0.19 -0.10 0.18 -0.32* 0.15 0.05 0.18 -0.02 0.16 
SumD2_ME -0.24 0.45 -0.24 0.40 1.86***  0.45 0.27 0.38 -0.07 0.40 
SumD2_GL -0.22 0.53 0.17 0.39 2.18***  0.49 0.40 0.51 -0.22 0.32 
SumD2_PL -0.24 0.46 -0.57 0.39 1.81***  0.39 0.01 0.37 -0.25 0.43 
SumD2_SE -0.20 0.43 -0.60 0.40 1.82***  0.39 -0.10 0.41 -0.27 0.37 
SumD2_SW -0.36 0.44 -0.26 0.38 1.67***  0.39 -0.03 0.45 -0.26 0.34 
SumD2_RM -0.14 0.43 -1.05* 0.51 2.49***  0.50 0.10 0.49 -0.18 0.34 
SumD2_FW -0.15 0.37 0.20 0.35 2.00***  0.41 0.58 0.33 0.10 0.45 
SumD2_SIZEC2 -0.68 0.65 1.97***  0.56 1.53** 0.52 2.25***  0.60 0.61 0.65 
SumD2_SIZEC3 -0.79 0.69 2.01***  0.57 2.06***  0.57 2.36***  0.58 0.58 0.64 
SumD2_SIZEC4 -0.77 0.71 1.54** 0.55 1.89***  0.56 2.25***  0.65 0.60 0.65 
SumD2_CATH 0.02 0.22 -0.28 0.16 -0.67***  0.18 -1.07** 0.33 -0.15 0.19 
SumD2_MPROT -0.18 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.49* 0.24 -0.28 0.21 0.14 0.23 
SumD2_EPROT 0.10 0.17 -0.28 0.19 -0.07 0.22 -0.66* 0.27 -0.21 0.21 
SumD2_FB -0.17 0.09 0.21** 0.08 0.21* 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.08 
SumD2_MBB 0.09 0.41 -0.87 0.68 1.20* 0.52 -0.58 0.78 -0.40 0.69 
SumD2_WBB 0.18 0.17 -0.02 0.14 -0.15 0.13 -0.04 0.18 -0.09 0.12 
SumD2_BSB 0.19 0.24 -0.17 0.18 -0.14 0.18 0.34 0.23 0.12 0.15 




-0.02 0.05 0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.02 
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(Table 6.4 continued) 
  Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 1E 
Identity Variables β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  






--- --- 2.12 1.52 --- --- 1.29 0.85 1.82***  0.33 
BCU*SumD2_BCU 0.62*** 0.12 0.40***  0.11 0.03 0.24 0.23** 0.08 0.35***  0.06 
ME*SumD2_ME 0.74*** 0.14 0.54** 0.17 0.05 0.17 0.26* 0.13 0.36***  0.09 
GL*SumD2_GL 0.99*** 0.24 0.00** 0.15 -0.16 0.34 -0.07 0.12 0.19** 0.08 
PL*SumD2_PL 0.83*** 0.19 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.32***  0.07 
SE*SumD2_SE 0.20*** 0.04 0.13** 0.05 0.16***  0.05 0.13***  0.03 0.10***  0.02 
SW*SumD2_SW 0.76*** 0.15 0.58***  0.17 0.02 0.22 0.24* 0.12 0.38***  0.09 
RM*SumD2_RM 0.98*** 0.15 0.53***  0.15 0.68***  0.16 0.46***  0.11 0.47***  0.09 
FW*SumD2_FW 0.82*** 0.15 -0.75* 0.35 -1.50 0.88 -1.08** 0.34 0.59***  0.17 
SIZEC2* 
SumD2_SIZEC2 
0.09** 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04** 0.02 
SIZEC3* 
SumD2_SIZEC3 
0.37***  0.08 -0.00 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.09** 0.04 
SIZEC4* 
SumD2_SIZEC4 
0.84***  0.18 0.28 0.20 0.31 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.28** 0.09 
CATH* 
SumD2_CATH 
0.80***  0.18 -0.07 0.21 -0.20 0.36 -0.11 0.18 0.43** 0.14 
M_PROT* 
SumD2_MPROT 
0.13 0.07 -0.29* 0.14 -0.10 0.12 -0.21* 0.10 0.04 0.05 
E_PROT* 
SumD2_EPROT 
0.38***  0.10 0.18 0.24 -0.44 0.31 -0.06 0.21 0.41***  0.09 
FB*SumD2_FB 0.13** 0.04 -0.10* 0.04 0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 
MBB*SumD2_MBB -0.10 0.06 -0.14 0.08 0.02 0.10 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.04 
WBB*SumD2_WBB 0.11* 0.05 0.15** 0.06 0.16* 0.07 0.14** 0.04 0.08***  0.02 
BSB*SumD2_BSB 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 
MHKY* 
SumD2_MHKY 
2.41***  0.60 --- --- 0.08 1.17 -1.11 1.18 0.06 0.04 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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have significance in any model when related to other private schools moving to Division 
II (PRIVATE*SumD2_PRIV).  Women’s colleges (WOMENS*umD2_WOMEN), 
however, have a significant and a positive relationship at the 99% confidence level in 
Model 1E.  However, WOMENS*SumD2_WOMEN is not significant in the other 
models.  HBCUs (BCU*SumD2_BCU) are also significant d positively related in 
Models 1A, 1B, 1D, and 1E.  All interactions involving the geographic regions were 
significant and positively related in Models 1A and 1E.  However, the Southeast region 
(SE*SumD2_SE) is the only interaction to maintain a significant and positive 
relationship throughout all models.  Similarly, all Carnegie size interactions 
(SIZEC2*SumD2_SIZEC2, SIZEC3*SumD2_SIZEC3, SIZEC4*SumD2_SIZEC4) as 
well as interactions involving Catholicism (CATH*SumD2_CATH) and Evangelist 
Protestant denominations (E_PROT*SumD2_EPROT) are significant and positively 
related in Models 1A and 1E.  Finally, the football (FB*SumD2_FB) and men’s hockey 
(MHKY*SumD2_MHKY) interactions show a significant positive relationship in Model 
1A while women’s basketball (WBB*SumD2_WBB) is signficant and positively related 
for all models. 
For schools moving to Division III, Table 6.5 shows the private school 
designation does not have a significant effect on mvement.  Women’s only colleges are 
significant and positively related in Model 1D.  HBCUs, however, show a negative and 
significant relationship in Model 1A.  Four of the six regions (PL, SE, SW, and FW) 
consistently display a significant negative relationship in all models.  The Mid-East 
region is the only region to have a positive significant relationship in Model 1B, Model 
1C, and Model 1D.  SIZEC4 is significant and positively related in Models 1B, 1C, and 
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1D.  In addition, SIZEC2 shows significance and a positive relationship.  Catholicism is 
significant and negatively related in Models 1A and 1E while Evangelist Protestant 
denominations maintain a significant negative relationship in all models except Model 
1D.  Similar to the Division II model, MBB and WBB are significant in all models with 
the same positive and negative relationships respectively.  In comparison, FB is 
significant and positively related in all models exc pt Model 1A while BSB and MHKY 
are significant and positively related in Models 1B, C, and 1D.  Finally, all NAIA 
leaders have no significant relationship. 
In terms of interactions, private schools (PRIVATE*SumD3_PRIV) again show 
no significant relationship.  Women’s colleges (WOMEN*SumD3_WOMEN) have a 
significant and a positive relationship at the 99% confidence level in Model 1E.  HBCUs 
(BCU*SumD3_BCU) also have a significant and positive relationship in Models 1A (at 
the 99% level) and 1E (at the 95% level).  All regional interactions are significant at the 
99% level and positively related in both Model 1A and 1E.  Specifically, the Southeast 
region (SE*SumD3_SE) is the only interaction to maint in significance and a positive 
correlation throughout all models while the Plains region (PL*SumD3_PL) shows 
significance and a positive relationship at the 99% confidence level in Model 1B.  
Interactions involving medium sized schools (SIZEC3*SumD3_SIZEC3) as well as all 
religious interactions (CATH*SumD3_CATH, M_PROT*SumD3_MPROT, 
E_PROT*SumD3_EPROT) are significant and positively r ated in Models 1A and 1E.  
Finally, men’s hockey (MHKY*SumD3_MHKY) is the only sports based interaction to 
have a significant positive relationship in Models 1A and 1E. 
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Table 6-5 - Division III Movement 















N/A INTERCEPT -6.59* 3.26 -8.22***  2.21 -5.87** 2.20 -4.95 3.55 -8.09 5.43 
N/A TREND 0.05 0.09 0.03 0.06 -0.03 0.06 -0.07 0.10 0.06 0.14 
Indicator 
PRIVATE 0.02 0.35 0.49 0.33 0.78 0.39 0.67 0.43 0.61 0.47 
WOMENS --- --- --- --- --- --- 1.61***  0.44 0.51 0.61 
BCU -1.47** 0.58 -0.18 0.43 0.15 0.41 0.13 0.45 -0.94 0.56 
ME -0.20 0.33 0.88** 0.30 1.14***  0.29 1.36***  0.35 0.67 0.43 
GL -1.25***  0.35 -0.66 0.34 -0.60 0.33 -0.72* 0.36 -1.08** 0.39 
PL -2.66*** 0.41 -1.91***  0.33 -1.62***  0.30 -1.85***  0.33 -2.72***  0.40 
SE -1.98*** 0.33 -1.55***  0.31 -1.46***  0.30 -1.71***  0.33 -2.07***  0.36 
SW -2.57*** 0.47 -1.97***  0.44 -1.85***  0.40 -2.19***  0.48 -2.96***  0.62 
FW -1.83*** 0.39 -0.73* 0.32 -0.83** 0.30 -0.91** 0.31 -2.48***  0.46 
SIZEC2 -0.12 0.44 1.23* 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.80 0.62 0.60 0.67 
SIZEC3 -0.64 0.38 0.97 0.56 0.78 0.54 0.71 0.56 0.16 0.58 
SIZEC4 --- --- 1.68** 0.66 1.71** 0.63 1.74** 0.67 0.86 0.74 
CATH -1.26***  0.38 0.25 0.28 0.04 0.26 0.29 0.35 -1.22* 0.51 
M_PROT -0.20 0.30 0.15 0.29 0.64 0.27 0.34 0.30 -0.39 0.39 
E_PROT -2.13*** 0.39 -0.67* 0.31 -0.53* 0.32 -0.56 0.32 -1.71***  0.45 
FB 0.25 0.26 0.58* 0.25 1.12***  0.27 0.96***  0.29 0.66* 0.32 
MBB 2.13***  0.60 1.47** 0.50 1.59** 0.56 1.78** 0.60 2.23***  0.66 
WBB -1.46***  0.36 -1.39***  0.37 -1.24***  0.36 -1.56***  0.44 -1.89***  0.46 
BSB 0.52 0.33 1.13***  0.32 0.45 0.34 0.92* 0.42 0.74 0.44 
MHKY 0.36 0.38 1.29***  0.26 1.34***  0.28 1.30***  0.29 0.46 0.39 
DUER 0.53 3.45 1.30 1.92 -0.05 1.71 0.18 1.93 2.60 3.31 
FRITZ 0.89 2.49 0.62 1.41 -0.29 1.35 -1.14 1.97 1.09 2.97 
FARRIS 0.65 1.84 0.20 1.24 -0.07 1.17 -1.48 1.73 0.82 2.38 
CHASTEEN 0.49 1.36 0.73 0.82 0.35 0.88 0.27 1.55 0.60 1.70 
BAKER 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.60 1.21 0.72 -0.05 1.03 1.38 1.09 
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(Table 6.5 continued) 
















Sum Y1 0.11 0.36 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
Sum Y2 --- --- 1.28* 0.56 --- --- --- --- -0.14** 0.05 
Sum Y3 --- --- --- --- -0.68 0.72 --- --- -0.11* 0.05 
SumY2Y3 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.15 0.81 0.09 0.22 
SumD3_Private -0.15 0.19 0.06 0.26 -0.18 0.31 -0.12 0.27 0.20 0.35 
SumD3_Women --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.85 0.48 -0.56 0.51 
SumD3_BCU 0.21 0.42 0.12 0.34 0.93** 0.36 0.08 0.30 0.22 0.23 
SumD3_ME -0.22 0.21 -0.09 0.20 -0.01 0.23 -0.02 0.22 0.09 0.21 
SumD3_GL -0.02 0.25 0.01 0.34 0.14 0.32 -0.09 0.30 0.13 0.21 
SumD3_PL -0.06 0.24 -0.03 0.35 -0.03 0.34 -0.16 0.34 0.36 0.34 
SumD3_SE -0.01 0.26 -0.14 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.21 0.38 -0.14 0.21 
SumD3_SW -0.26 0.21 0.07 0.32 -0.23 0.34 -0.39 0.29 0.15 0.30 
SumD3_FW -0.19 0.28 -0.08 0.31 -0.33 0.37 0.05 0.32 -0.11 0.32 
SumD3_SizeC2 0.29 0.38 -1.19** 0.47 0.39 0.59 -0.07 0.55 -0.11 0.32 
SumD3_SizeC3 0.01 0.31 -1.25* 0.51 0.06 0.67 -0.28 0.59 -0.05 0.37 
SumD3_SizeC4 --- --- -1.58** 0.63 0.50 0.71 -0.25 0.64 -0.51 0.50 
SumD3_Cath -0.26 0.19 0.32 0.20 -0.10 0.22 0.37 0.20 0.02 0.21 
SumD3_MPROT -0.21 0.23 -0.34 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.05 0.23 -0.15 0.22 
SumD3_EPROT -0.32 0.30 -0.21 0.23 -0.34 0.20 -0.10 0.19 -0.21 0.29 
SumD3_FB -0.10 0.11 0.23* 0.10 0.22 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.05 0.13 
SumD3_MBB -0.15 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.07 0.36 0.70* 0.32 0.29 0.27 
SumD3_WBB 0.08 0.13 -0.06 0.15 0.24 0.15 0.25 0.22 -0.05 0.22 
SumD3_BSB 0.03 0.24 -0.31 0.21 -0.09 0.27 -0.66* 0.29 -0.29 0.20 




0.06 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.06 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 
Womens* 
SumD3_Women 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 0.62 0.55 1.31** 0.41 
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(Table 6.5 continued) 





Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  




BCU*SumD3_BCU 0.76*** 0.21 0.21 0.27 -0.24 0.31 -0.06 0.18 0.27* 0.12 
ME*SumD3_ME 0.52*** 0.11 -0.08 0.10 -0.21* 0.10 -0.18* 0.08 0.01 0.06 
GL*SumD3_GL 0.46*** 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.11** 0.04 
PL*SumD3_PL 0.68*** 0.12 0.32** 0.13 -0.06 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.38***  0.07 
SE*SumD3_SE 0.45*** 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.14***  0.04 
SW*SumD3_SW 1.39*** 0.19 0.98***  0.22 1.03***  0.22 0.69***  0.13 0.71***  0.13 
FW*SumD3_FW 0.93*** 0.15 0.08 0.25 0.37* 0.18 0.23 0.12 0.72***  0.12 
SizeC2* 
SumD3_SizeC2 
0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.06 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.01 0.03 
SizeC3* 
SumD3_SizeC3 
0.23***  0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07** 0.03 
SizeC4* 
SumD3_SizeC4 
--- --- -0.74 0.77 -0.74 0.84 -0.55 0.56 0.40 0.30 
CATH* 
SumD3_CATH 
0.96***  0.19 -0.25 0.17 -0.06 0.19 -0.18 0.16 0.35** 0.14 
M_PROT* 
SumD3_MPROT 
0.19** 0.07 0.09 0.07 -0.14 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.10* 0.04 
E_PROT* 
SumD3_EPROT 
1.58***  0.25 0.03 0.34 -0.22 0.31 -0.08 0.18 0.50** 0.16 
FB*SumD3_FB 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.12* 0.06 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 
MBB*SumD3_MBB -0.05 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.03 
WBB*SumD3_WBB 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.07* 0.03 
BSB*SumD3_BSB 0.06 0.04 -0.04 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.02 
MHKY* 
SumD3_MHKY 
0.72***  0.14 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.17 0.05 0.06 0.26***  0.07 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Model Two – Overall Model 
This dissertation also investigates if a reclassification from the NAIA to the 
NCAA had a significant effect on a university’s applications.  From 1973 to 2012, 264 
universities transitioned from the NAIA to Division II and 233 schools moved to 
Division III, believing the action would increase the school’s applications.  To analyze 
this potential Reclassification Effect, a panel regression model was implemented on the 
total number of applications a university received in the current year.  This information 
was collected from all schools that were members of the NAIA since the organization’s 
inception in 1937 through the IPEDS database.  Completed IPEDS surveys containing 
application data from these schools can be obtained from 2003 to 2012.   
While IPEDS records were not collected before 1984, the model accounts for 
schools that moved between 1937 and 2002 through an independent variable that 
monitors for the age a university has been associated with the NCAA (NCAA_AGE).  A 
squared term for NCAA age (NCAA_AGE2) is included in the model to determine if 
there is a quadratic relationship between the dependent variable (LN_APP) and 
NCAA_AGE.  The final data set included 8,495 university-year observations from 2003 
to 2012. Two variations of Model Two were estimated.  The first model, Model 2A, 
predicts the effect that an association with the NCAA has on applications for schools that 
were previous members of the NAIA since its inception in 1937.  Model 2B, on the other 
hand, estimates the same effect on previous members of the NAIA moving to the NCAA 
after 1973 when Division II and III were created.   




Table 6.6 displays the summary statistics for universiti s utilized in Model 2A.  In 
the sample, the average age of the universities (AGE_UNIV) analyzed is 107 years.  The 
sample includes a large quantity of private schools (66.2%) while only 7.4% of the 
sample is classified as HBCUs and 2.3% as women’s only colleges.  The Catholic 
religion is associated with 12.5% of the sample while 22.8% is associated with a 
Mainline Protestant denomination, 13.1% are affiliated with an Evangelist Protestant, and 
0.3% with a religious affiliation classified as other.   
In terms of schools associated with the Common Application membership 
association (CMAPP), 13.1% of observations utilize th  Common Application.  The 
average student to faculty ratio (SF_RATIO) is 27.27, and average undergraduate tuition 
(QT_UGRAD) ranges between the Top 50th and Top 75th Quantiles. A large majority of 
the schools (78.7%) possess a graduate school program (GRAD) and have graduate 
tuition (QT_GRAD) averaging above the Top 75th Quantile.  The average number of 
sports offered (SPT_OFFR) by each university in the sample is 14 while NCAA_AGE, 
on average, is 19 years.  In terms of titles won by the revenue-generating sports, 7.5% of 
schools have a title in football (FB_TITLE), 12.5% have a championship in men’s 
basketball (MBB_TITLE), and 12.0% have titles in women’s basketball (WBB_TITLE).  
Finally, 0.8% of the observations are in first year of NCAA membership (YEAR1), 0.8% 
in their second year (YEAR2), 0.9% in their third year (YEAR3), 0.7% in their fourth 
year (YEAR4), 0.8% in their fifth year (YEAR5), 1.0% in their sixth year (YEAR6), 
1.2% in their seventh year (YEAR7), 1.1% in their eighth year (YEAR8), 1.3% in their 
ninth year (YEAR9), and 1.5% in their tenth year of NCAA membership (YEAR10). 
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Table 6-6 - Summary Statistics for Model 2A
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min  Max Median 
Age of University 107 41 1 320 112 
Private 0.66 0.47 0 1 1 
HBCU 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 
Women’s 0.02 0.15 0 1 0 
Catholic 0.13 0.33 0 1 0 
Mainline Protestant 0.23 0.42 0 1 0 
Evangelist Protestant 0.13 0.34 0 1 0 
Other Religious Affiliation 0.00 0.06 0 1 0 
Common Application 0.14 0.35 0 1 0 
Student/Faculty Ratio 27.27 14.94 4.15 235.70 24.67 
Undergraduate Tuition 2.50 1.43 0 5 3 
Graduate Program 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 
Graduate Tuition 2.38 1.58 0 5 2 
Sports Offered 14 5 0 27 15 
Football Titles 0.08 0.26 0 1 0 
Men’s Basketball Titles 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 
Women’s Basketball Titles 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 
Age of NCAA Association 19 20 0 76 14 
NCAA – Year One 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Two 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Three 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Four 0.01 0.08 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Five 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Six 0.01 0.10 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Seven 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Eight 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Nine 0.01 0.12 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Ten 0.02 0.12 0 1 0 
Observations n = 8,495 
 
Table 6.7 displays the summary statistics for universiti s utilized in Model 2B.  In 
the sample, AGE_UNIV is approximately 102 years.  Similar to Model 2A, Model 2B 
includes a large quantity of private schools (73.4%) and small quantities of HBCUs 
(3.4%) and women’s only colleges (3.2%) as women’s o ly colleges.  The Catholic 
religion is associated with 14.6% of the observations while 23.7% of the sample is 
associated with a Mainline Protestant denomination and 15.9% is affiliated with an 
Evangelist Protestant, and 0.4% with a religious affiliation classified as other.   
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Table 6-7 - Summary Statistics for Model 2B
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min  Max Median 
Age of University 102 41 1 233 104 
Private 0.73 0.44 0 1 1 
HBCU 0.03 0.18 0 1 0 
Women’s 0.03 0.18 0 1 0 
Catholic 0.15 0.35 0 1 0 
Mainline Protestant 0.24 0.43 0 1 0 
Evangelist Protestant 0.16 0.37 0 1 0 
Other Religious Affiliation 0.00 0.06 0 1 0 
Common Application 0.11 0.32 0 1 0 
Student/Faculty Ratio 28.18 16.47 4.15 235.69 25.17 
Undergraduate Tuition 2.50 1.35 0 5 3 
Graduate Program 0.76 0.43 0 1 1 
Graduate Tuition 2.23 1.57 0 5 2 
Sports Offered 13 6 0 26 14 
Football Titles 0.06 0.23 0 1 0 
Men’s Basketball Titles 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 
Women’s Basketball Titles 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 
Age of NCAA Association 10 12 0 40 5 
NCAA – Year One 0.01 0.10 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Two 0.01 0.10 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Three 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Four 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Five 0.01 0.10 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Six 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Seven 0.01 0.12 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Eight 0.01 0.12 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Nine 0.02  0.13 0 1 0 
NCAA – Year Ten 0.02 0.13 0 1 0 
Observations n = 6,225 
 
Approximately 11% of observations utilize the Common Application.  The average 
student to faculty ratio is 29.48, and undergraduate tui ion ranges between the Top 50th 
and Top 75th Quantiles.  Similar to the Model 2A sample, a large majority of the schools 
(75.9%) sampled possess a graduate school program with tuition averaging above the 
Top 75th Quantile.  The average number of sports offered by each university in the 
sample is 13, and the average length of NCAA associati n is 10 years.  Approximately 
6% of schools have won titles in football, 12% have championships in men’s basketball, 
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and 11% have titles in women’s basketball.  Finally, 1.1% of the sample is in their first 
year of NCAA membership, 1.1% in their second year, 1.1% in their third year, 0.9% in 
their fourth year, 1.0% in their fifth year, 1.2% in their sixth year, 1.4% in their seventh 
year, 1.4% in their eighth year, 1.6% in their ninth year, and 1.8% in their tenth year of 
NCAA membership.   
Table 6.8 provides the number of observations located in the IPEDS geographic 
regions in both Model 2A and 2B.  The Rocky Mountai region has the lowest amount of 
observations in both models (2.69% in Model 2A sample; 2.66% of Model 2B sample).  
The New England region is the second smallest region for both models (5.48% in Model 
2A; 5.24% of Model 2B) followed by the Southwest region (8.08% for Model 2A; 9.10% 
for Model 2B).  The largest number of observations are located within the Southeast 
region for both models (31.05% in Model 2A; 30.01% in Model 2B) followed by the 
Great Lakes region (16.52% in Model 2A; 16.44% in Model 2B), the Plains region 
(13.47% of Model 2A; 14.68% of Model 2B), the Mid- East region (13.01% in Model 
2A; 12.45% in Model 2B), and the Far West region (9.69% in Model 2A; 9.53% in 
Model 2B).  In terms of the religious affiliation, 49.28% of Model 2A’s observations and 
55.26% of Model 2B’s observations possess a religious affiliation while 36.36% of 
Model 2A and 39.56% of Model 2B are associated with a Protestant affiliation.  
Specifically, the Mainline Protestant denominations are the highest affiliated religion 
(22.80% in Model 2A; 23.66% in Model 2B) followed by the Evangelist Protestant 
denominations (13.09% in Model 2A; 15.90% in Model 2B) and Catholicism (12.50% in 
Model 2A; 14.64% in Model 2B).  Most of the schools found in both samples are 
considered small according to the Carnegie Foundation (59.12% in Model 2A; 66.98% in 
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Table 6-8 - University Tabulations for Model Two 














NE 468 5.51 328 5.24 
ME 1,110 13.07 780 12.45 
GL 1,390 16.36 1,030 16.44 
PL 1,140 13.42 920 14.68 
SE 2,650 31.19 1,880 30.01 
SW 690 8.00 570 9.10 
RM 230 2.71 160 2.66 
FW 827 9.74 597 9.53 
Religious  
Affiliations 
CATH 1,065 12.54 917 14.64 
M_PROT 1,946 22.91 1,482 23.66 
E_PROT 1,116 13.14 996 15.90 
BL_PROT 40 0.47 30 0.48 
OTH_CHR 10 0.12 10 0.16 
OTH_REL 26 0.31 26 0.42 
Size 
SIZEC1 249 2.93 219 3.50 
SIZEC2 5,036 59.28 4,196 66.98 
SIZEC3 2,560 30.14 1,530 24.42 
SIZEC4 670 7.65 320 5.11 
 
Model 2B).  Medium sized schools occupy 30.11% of Mdel 2A’s sample and 24.42% of 
Model 2B’s sample.  Very few schools identify themslves as a large or very large 
university (7.85% in Model 2A; 5.11% in Model 2B) or as not classified by the Carnegie 
Foundation (2.92% in Model 2A; 3.50% in Model 2B).   
Correlation Coefficients 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 provide the correlation coeffici nts for all variables utilized in 
Models 2A and 2A.  A correlation above 0.8 or below -0.8 may indicate an issue of 
multicollinearity (Straub, 1989).  According to the tables, most correlations fall within 
this range with the exception of two: the correlation between the lagged application total 
(LN_APPt-1) and the dependent variable (LN_APPt); and the years of NCAA association 
for a university (NCAA_AGE) and its squared term (NCAA_AGE2).  These correlations 
were expected to be above the threshold due to the nature of log transformation  
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Table 6-9 - Correlation Matrix for Reclassification Effect - Model 2A 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
# Name                 
2 LN_APPt-1 -0.89                
3 AGE_UNIV -0.25 0.03               
4 PRIVATE -0.30 0.26 -0.04              
5 BCU 0.12 -0.22 -0.09 -0.20             
6 WOMENS -0.04 0.02 -0.16 0.00 0.04            
7 CATH -0.07 0.09 0.04 -0.37 0.01 -0.05           
8 M_PROT -0.03 0.07 -0.13 -0.46 -0.01 -0.02 0.48          
9 E_PROT -0.10 0.09 0.02 -0.43 0.02 0.05 0.45 0.50         
10 OTH_REL -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.11        
11 CMAPP 0.15 -0.08 -0.14 -0.12 0.05 -0.03 0.09 0.15 0.15 0.04       
12 SF_RATIO -0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.15 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.04      
13 QT_UGRAD 0.09 -0.18 0.04 -0.51 0.30 -0.09 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.26 0.13     
14 GRAD -0.08 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.07 -0.07 -0.13 0.00 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.21    
15 QT_GRAD 0.05 -0.08 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.33 -0.77   
16 SPT_OFFR 0.10 -0.28 -0.17 -0.04 0.21 0.26 -0.08 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 -0.03 -0.09 -0.10 0.10  
17 FB_TITLE 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 
18 MBB_TITLE 0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 
19 WBB_TITLE 0.05 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.07 
20 NCAA_AGE 0.10 -0.17 0.04 0.10 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.25 
21 NCAA_AGE2 0.00 0.08 -0.11 -0.02 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.16 
22 RANGE5 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.06 
23 RANGE10 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.06 
24 YEAR1 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
25 YEAR2 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.04 
26 YEAR3 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 
27 YEAR4 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 
28 YEAR5 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
29 YEAR6 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 
30 YEAR7 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
31 YEAR8 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
32 YEAR9 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 
33 YEAR10 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 
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(Table 6.9 continued) 
Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
# Name                 
18 MBB_TITLE -0.04                
19 WBB_TITLE -0.03 -0.10               
20 NCAA_AGE -0.02 0.03 0.04              
21 NCAA_AGE2 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.92             
22 RANGE5 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.13 -0.08            
23 RANGE10 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.00 N/A           
24 YEAR1 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.06 N/A N/A          
25 YEAR2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09 -0.05 N/A N/A 0.12         
26 YEAR3 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.03 N/A N/A 0.03 0.12        
27 YEAR4 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.02 N/A N/A 0.02 0.03 0.13       
28 YEAR5 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.01 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.13      
29 YEAR6 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.13     
30 YEAR7 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 N/A N/A 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.14    
31 YEAR8 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.14   
32 YEAR9 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14  
33 YEAR10 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.05 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.14 
Note1: INTERCEPT = 1. 
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Table 6-10 - Correlation Matrix for Reclassification Effect - Model 2B 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
# Name                 
2 LN_APPt-1 -0.90                
3 AGE_UNIV -0.28 0.07               
4 PRIVATE -0.32 0.29 -0.06              
5 BCU 0.17 -0.26 -0.16 -0.20             
6 WOMENS -0.02 0.01 -0.19 -0.01 0.06            
7 CATH -0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.36 -0.03 -0.05           
8 M_PROT -0.01 0.05 -0.14 -0.42 -0.04 -0.02 0.49          
9 E_PROT -0.09 0.09 0.02 -0.41 0.00 0.05 0.47 0.51         
10 OTH_REL -0.03 0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.12        
11 CMAPP 0.13 -0.06 -0.16 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.03       
12 SF_RATIO -0.02 -0.07 0.04 -0.17 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.04 0.03      
13 QT_UGRAD 0.12 -0.22 0.03 -0.50 0.31 -0.11 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.27 0.14     
14 GRAD -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 0.13 -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 0.07 -0.10 0.19    
15 QT_GRAD 0.02 -0.07 0.12 0.10 -0.06 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.29 -0.80   
16 SPT_OFFR 0.13 -0.29 -0.18 -0.06 0.19 0.29 -0.10 - .16 -0.11 -0.09 0.03 -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 0.12  
17 FB_TITLE 0.05 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 -0.06 
18 MBB_TITLE 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.07 
19 WBB_TITLE 0.08 -0.09 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.08 
20 NCAA_AGE 0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.17 
21 NCAA_AGE2 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 
22 RANGE5 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 -0.07 
23 RANGE10 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.04 0.02 -0.05 
24 YEAR1 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 
25 YEAR2 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.05 
26 YEAR3 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 0.00 .01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 
27 YEAR4 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 
28 YEAR5 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 
29 YEAR6 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
30 YEAR7 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.00 .00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 
31 YEAR8 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
32 YEAR9 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 .01 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.00 
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(Table 6.10 continued) 
Variable 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 
# Name                 
18 MBB_TITLE -0.05                
19 WBB_TITLE -0.04 -0.11               
20 NCAA_AGE 0.02 0.01 0.01              
21 NCAA_AGE2 -0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.93             
22 RANGE5 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03            
23 RANGE10 0.02 0.03 0.06 -0.15 0.23 N/A           
24 YEAR1 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 -0.03 N/A N/A          
25 YEAR2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 N/A N/A 0.15         
26 YEAR3 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 N/A N/A 0.04 0.14        
27 YEAR4 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.04 N/A N/A 0.02 0.04 0.16       
28 YEAR5 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.05 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.15      
29 YEAR6 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.07 0.10 N/A N/A 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.17     
30 YEAR7 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.10 0.13 N/A N/A 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.18    
31 YEAR8 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.12 0.14 N/A N/A 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.18   
32 YEAR9 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.17 N/A N/A 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.18  
33 YEAR10 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 0.17 N/A N/A 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.18 
Note1: INTERCEPT = 1. 
Note2: RANGE5, RANGE10 and YEAR variables were included in separate models and thus do not have a correlation. 
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(LN_APPt-1 and LN_APPt) and squared manipulation of an independent variable 
(NCAA_AGE and NCAA_AGE2). 
Results 
Table 6.11 presents the results from the panel regression models for Models 2A 
and 2B for the first five years of NCAA association while Table 6.12 shows the results  
Table 6-11 - Reclassification Effect - 5 Years 
 Model 2A Model 2B 
Variable β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  Β 
Std.  
Err.  β 
Std.  
Err.  
INTERCEPT 0.79***  0.04 0.79***  0.04 0.98***  0.05 0.98***  0.05 
LN_APPt-1 0.87***  0.01 0.87***  0.01 0.84***  0.01 0.84***  0.01 
AGE_UNIV -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.14***  0.02 -0.14***  0.02 -0.19***  0.02 -0.19***  0.02 
BCU 0.14***  0.02 0.14***  0.02 0.27***  0.03 0.27***  0.03 
WOMENS 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
CATH 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
M_PROT 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
E_PROT 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
OTH_REL -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.07 
CMAPP 0.05***  0.01 0.05***  0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
SF_RATIO 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 
GRAD 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
QT_GRAD 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01***  0.00 0.01***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.01***  0.00 
FB_TITLE -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 
MBB_TITLE 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
WBB_TITLE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
NCAA_AGE 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00***  0.00 -0.00***  0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5 0.04* 0.02 --- --- 0.04 0.02 --- --- 
YEAR1 --- --- 0.08* 0.04 --- --- 0.07 0.04 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.02 0.04 --- --- 0.02 0.04 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.06 0.04 --- --- 0.05 0.04 
YEAR4 --- --- 0.01 0.04 --- --- 0.01 0.05 
YEAR5 --- --- 0.03 0.04 --- --- 0.02 0.05 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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for both models for the first ten years of membership.  According to both tables, several 
university specific variables show significance.  Applications received in the prior year 
show high significance and a positive relation in both models.  Private school designation 
is significant and negatively related while HBCUs are significant and positively related.   
Table 6-12 - Reclassification Effect - 10 Years 
 Model 1A Model 1B 
Variable β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  Β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  
INTERCEPT 0.79***  0.04 0.79***  0.04 0.98***  0.05 0.98***  0.05 
LN_APPt-1 0.87***  0.01 0.87***  0.01 0.84***  0.01 0.84***  0.01 
AGE_UNIV -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.14***  0.02 -0.14***  0.02 -0.19***  0.02 -0.19***  0.02 
BCU 0.14***  0.02 0.14***  0.02 0.27***  0.03 0.27***  0.03 
WOMENS 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 
CATH 0.03* 0.02 0.03* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
M_PROT 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
E_PROT 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
OTH_REL -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.08 
CMAPP 0.05***  0.01 0.05***  0.01 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
SF_RATIO 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 
GRAD 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
QT_GRAD 0.01** 0.00 0.01***  0.00 0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01***  0.00 0.01***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 
FB_TITLE -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02 
MBB_TITLE 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
WBB_TITLE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
NCAA_AGE 0.00***  0.00 0.00***  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00***  0.00 -0.00***  0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE10 0.03* 0.01 --- --- 0.04* 0.02 --- --- 
YEAR1 --- --- 0.08* 0.04 --- --- 0.08 0.04 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.02 0.04 --- --- 0.02 0.04 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.06 0.04 --- --- 0.05 0.04 
YEAR4 --- --- 0.01 0.04 --- --- 0.01 0.05 
YEAR5 --- --- 0.03 0.04 --- --- 0.03 0.05 
YEAR6 --- --- 0.03 0.04 --- --- 0.04 0.04 
YEAR7 --- --- 0.02 0.03 --- --- 0.02 0.04 
YEAR8 --- --- 0.03 0.03 --- --- 0.05 0.04 
YEAR9  --- --- 0.04 0.03 --- --- 0.04 0.04 
YEAR10 --- --- 0.01 0.03 --- --- 0.01 0.04 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Catholicism is the only religious denomination to show significance and a positive 
relationship in Model 2A.  Compared to Model 2B, however, both Catholicism and 
Mainline Protestant denominations are significant and positive.  A positive and 
significant relationship is shown with schools utilizing the Common Application and 
possessing a high student/faculty ratio.  Both QT_UGRAD and QT_GRAD are 
significant and positively related.   
In terms of athletic department characteristics, Table 6.12 notes a positive and 
significant relationship for the number of sports offered (SPT_OFFR) and length of 
NCAA membership (NCAA_AGE) in Model 2A.  Model 2B shows a similar relationship 
for SPT_OFF but only displays a positive relationship for NCAA_AGE within the 95% 
confidence level.  Furthermore, according to Table 6.12, a significant relationship could 
not be found for NCAA_AGE in Model 2B.  Finally, Model 2A reports a positive and 
significant relationship within the 95% level for the first five (RANGE5) and first ten 
years (RANGE10) of NCAA membership, particularly in a school’s first year of 
membership (YEAR1).  Model 2B, on the other hand, shows RANGE5 has no 
significance while RANGE10 has a significant and positive relationship.  When each 
individual year is parceled out, however, no year variables in Model 2B are significant. 
Model Two - Geographic Regions 
 In addition to the overall model, the dissertation estimates if a Reclassification 
Effect is region specific using the same model variations.   
Summary Statistics 
Table 6.13 displays the summary statistics for all schools contained in the data set 
and utilized in Model 2A based upon geographic region.  On average, the Far West 
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Table 6-13 - Summary Statistics by Geographic Region for Model 2A 


















AGE_UNIV 115 38 107 43 109 40 117 33 110 45 95 35 98 33 91 39 
PRIVATE 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.74 0.44 0.75 0.43 0.65 0.48 0.59 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.74 0.44 
BCU 0 0 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.09 0.19 0.39 0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 
WOMENS 0 0 0.04 0.19 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.17 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.15 
CATH 0.04 0.20 0.19 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.17 0.37 0.05 0.22 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.35 
M_PROT 0.04 0.20 0.10 0.30 0.22 0.42 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47 0.24 0.43 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.32 
E_PROT 0.04 0.19 0.06 0.23 0.15 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.17 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.23 0.42 
OTH_REL 0 0 0.01 0.07 0 0 0.02 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CMAPP 0.39 0.49 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.26 0.09 0.28 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.28 0.45 
SF_RATIO 29.92 15.67 27.96 10.18 29.20 14.69 28.99 24.75 24.58 12.05 29.10 12.08 30.85 15.91 25.28 10.25 
QT_UGRAD 2.67 1.60 2.76 1.32 2.97 1.14 2.36 1.40 2.03 1.34 1.80 1.30 2.47 1.47 3.53 1.43 
GRAD 0.79 0.41 0.91 0.28 0.84 0.37 0.66 0.47 0.73 0.45 0.83 0.38 0.77 0.42 0.88 0.33 
QT_GRAD 2.49 1.80 3.08 1.25 2.56 1.54 1.59 1.37 2.12 1.61 2.17 1.27 2.66 1.74 3.15 1.56 
SPT_OFFR 14 6 15 5 15 6 16 4 14 5 12 5 15 4 13 6 
FB_TITLE 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.36 0.04 0.20 
MBB_TITLE 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.31 
WBB_TITLE 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.10 0.30 
NCAA_AGE 23 18 25 18 21 22 13 18 20 20 13 16 23 23 15 18 
YEAR1 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0 0 0.01 0.10 
YEAR2 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0 0 0.00 0.07 
YEAR3 0.01 0.11 0.02 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR4 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR5 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR6 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.15 0 0 0.01 0.12 
YEAR7 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.15 0 0 0.01 0.11 
YEAR8 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16 0 0 0.02 0.13 
YEAR9 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.17 0 0 0.03 0.16 
YEAR10 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 0 0 0.02 0.13 
Observations n = 468 n = 1,110 n = 1,390 n = 1,140 n = 2,650 n = 680 n = 230 n = 827 
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region has the youngest universities (91 years old) f lowed by the Southwest (95 years 
old) and Rocky Mountain (98 years old) regions.  The oldest universities are found in the 
Plains region (117 years old) followed by the New England region (115 years old) and 
the Southeast region (110 years old).  The Great Lakes nd Far West regions have the 
highest concentration of private schools (74% respectiv ly) while the Rocky Mountain 
region has the least amount (39%). A majority of HBCUs are found in the Southeast 
region (19%) followed by the Southwest (6%) and Mid-East regions.  The New England, 
Rocky Mountain, and Far West regions do not have any HBCUs during the sample 
period.  Similarly, the New England, Southwest, andRocky Mountain regions do not 
possess any women’s only institutions in the sample.  The remaining regions have 
approximately 3% of observations that are women’s oly institutions.  Catholic affiliated 
schools are primarily found in the Great Lakes (22%), Mid-East (19%), and Plains 
regions (17%).  Schools affiliated with a Mainline Protestant denomination occupy 34% 
of the schools in the Plains region, 32% in the Southeast region, and 24% in the 
Southwest region.  The Far West region has the highest population of schools affiliated 
with an Evangelist Protestant religion (23%).  Only the Plains region (2%) and Mid-East 
region (1%) have schools in the sample that are affiliated with a religion designated as 
other.   
Approximately 39% of New England schools in the sample implement the 
Common Application.  The lowest region utilizing the Common Application is the Plains 
region (8% of sample).  The highest student/faculty ra io, on average, is found among the 
Rocky Mountain region schools (30.85) while the lowest ratio is among the Southeast 
region schools (24.58).  The highest undergraduate t ition quantile is found in the Far 
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West region schools and ranges between the Top 50th and Top 25th Quantiles.  In 
comparison, Southwest region schools’ undergraduate t ition range between the Top 90th 
and Top 75th Quantiles.  Mid-East schools have the highest population of graduate 
schools (91%) and charge around the Top 50th Quantile for graduate tuition.  The Plains 
region has the lowest amount of graduate schools (66%) and cost ranges between the Top 
90th and Top 75th Quantiles.  Most of the regions have schools that sponsor 
approximately 14 sports except for schools in the Plains region, which sponsors about 16 
sports, and the Far West schools, which sponsor 13.  In terms of championships, Rocky 
Mountain schools have won the most football championships (15%) while the Far West 
has won the least (4%).  Men’s basketball championships are primarily won by schools in 
the New England region (15%), while women’s basketball championships are won by 
schools located in the Great Lakes and Rocky Mountain regions (13%).  Finally, schools 
in the Mid-East region have the longest association with the NCAA on average (25 years) 
while Plains and Southeast schools have shorter tenu es (13 years respectively). 
All regions except the Rocky Mountain region have 1% of schools in their first 
year of NCAA membership.   The second year also show  all regions except the Rocky 
Mountain and Far West regions with 1% of observations in their second year of NCAA 
membership.  The Mid-East region has the highest amount of schools in their third year 
(3%) of NCAA affiliation.  All regions except the Great Lakes and Rocky Mountain have 
1% of observations as fourth year NCAA members.  The Southwest region possesses the 
highest amount of schools in their fifth year of NCAA membership (2%) and shares the 
highest amount of sixth year members with the New England region (2% respectively).  
The Mid-East and Southwest regions have the highest amount of observations (2% 
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respectively) in their seventh year of NCAA affiliation.  The largest amounts of schools 
in their eighth year of membership are located in the Mid-East, Southwest, and Far West 
regions (2% respectively).   Schools in their ninth year of membership are primarily 
found in the Southwest and Far West regions (3% respectively).  The New England 
region has the highest amount of observations within the tenth year of NCAA 
membership (4%).  The Rocky Mountain region is the only region to not have any 
observations within the first ten years of NCAA membership. 
Table 6.14 displays the summary statistics for all schools contained in the data set 
and utilized in Model 2B based upon geographic region.  Similar to the results found in 
Table 6.13, the Far West region has the youngest universities (79 years old) followed by 
the Southwest and Rocky Mountain regions (95 years old respectively).  The oldest 
universities are found in the Plains region (114 years old) followed by the New England 
region (109 years old) and the Southeast region (105 years old).  Approximately 83% of 
Great Lakes schools are considered private, the most found in any region.  The smallest 
amount of private schools is located in the Rocky Mountain region (50%).  About 9% of 
the Southeast schools are HBCUs while 5% of Mid-East schools are women’s only 
institutions. Catholic affiliated schools are primarily found in the Great Lakes (27%), 
Mid-East (24%), and Plains regions (18%).  Schools affiliated with a Mainline Protestant 
denomination occupy 36% of the schools in the Southeast region, 29% in the Plains 
region, and 27% in the Southwest region.  The Far West region has the highest 
population of schools affiliated with an Evangelist Protestant religion (30%).  Similar to 
Table 6.13, the Plains region (2%) and Mid-East region (1%) are the only regions with 
schools affiliated with a religion designated as other.  
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Table 6-14 - Summary Statistics by Geographic Region for Model 2B 
 New England Mid-East Great Lakes Plains Southeast Southwest 
Rocky 


































AGE_UNIV 109 33 98 42 103 42 114 34 105 43 95 36 95 35 79 36 
PRIVATE 0.60 0.49 0.73 0.44 0.83 0.37 0.76 0.43 0.74 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.70 0.46 
BCU 0 0 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.09 0.28 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 0 
WOMENS 0 0 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.20 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.18 
CATH 0.06 0.24 0.24 0.43 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.13 0.34 
M_PROT 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.32 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.45 0.06 0.24 0.09 0.28 
E_PROT 0.05 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.18 0.38 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37 0.15 0.36 0.13 0.33 0.30 0.46 
OTH_REL 0 0 0.01 0.09 0 0 0.02 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 


























QT_UGRAD 2.93 1.44 2.95 1.21 2.94 1.03 2.17 1.28 2.15 1.30 1.82 1.36 2.62 1.34 3.18 1.37 
GRAD 0.70 0.46 0.89 0.31 0.83 0.37 0.65 0.47 0.68 0.47 0.79 0.41 0.73 0.45 0.88 0.33 
QT_GRAD 2.23 1.79 2.88 1.29 2.37 1.42 1.55 1.35 2.00 1.65 2.08 1.34 2.54 1.75 3.03 1.52 
SPT_OFFR 13 7 14 5 14 6 15 4 13 5 12 5 14 4 11 6 
FB_TITLE 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.10 0.30 0.02 0.13 
MBB_TITLE 0.10 0.30 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 
WBB_TITL
E 
0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.10 0.29 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 
NCAA_AGE 17 14 17 12 9 12 6 10 10 11 7 9 10 10 7 11 
YEAR1 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 0 0 0.01 0.12 
YEAR2 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR3 0.02 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR4 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR5 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.13 0 0 0.01 0.08 
YEAR6 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16 0 0 0.01 0.10 
YEAR7 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.16 0 0 0.01 0.09 
YEAR8 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0 0 0.01 0.11 
YEAR9 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.04 0.19 0 0 0.03 0.16 
YEAR10 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.19 0 0 0.01 0.11 
Observations n = 328 n = 780 n = 1,010 n = 910 n = 1,880 n = 560 n = 160 n = 597 
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Most schools that implement the Common Application are found within the New 
England region (38%) while the lowest amount of Common Application users are located 
in the Plains region (5%).  The highest student/faculty ratio, on average, can be found 
among the Plains region schools (34.66), and the low st ratio is located in the Southeast 
region schools (25.20).  The Far West region schools charge undergraduate tuition around 
the Top 50th Quantile which, have the lowest undergraduate tuitions, averaging around 
the Top 75th Quantile.  The Mid-East region has the highest population of graduate 
school programs (89%) and graduate tuition averages round the Top 50th Quantile.  The 
Plains region has the lowest amount of graduate school programs (66%) and cost ranges 
between the Top 90th and Top 75th Quantiles.  Unlike the results found in Table 6.13, 
each region possesses more variability in terms of number of sports sponsored.  Schools 
in the Plains region, on average, sponsor more sports (15) while Far West schools 
sponsor the least (11).  Schools in the Plains region win more championships in football 
(10%) and women’s basketball (12%) while teams in the Rocky Mountain region win 
championships in both football (10%) and men’s basketball (14%).  Unlike Table 6.13, 
New England schools had longer associations with the NCAA (17 year) compared to the 
Mid-East regional schools (16 year).   The Plains region (6 year) has the youngest 
members on average.  
All regions except the Rocky Mountain region have 1% of schools that are in their 
first year of NCAA membership.  The Mid-East region has the highest amount of schools 
in their second year (2%) and third year (3%) of NCAA affiliation and shares the highest 
amount in the fourth year with the New England region (2% respectively).  These two 
regions, along with the Southwest region, possess the highest amount of schools in their 
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fifth and sixth years of NCAA membership (2% respectively each year).  Schools in their 
seventh of NCAA affiliation are mostly found in the Mid-East and Southwest regions 
(3% respectively).  Schools in their eighth, ninth, and tenth years of NCAA membership 
are primarily found in the Southwest region (3% in year eight; 4% in years nine and ten).  
Similar to Table 6.13, the Rocky Mountain region is the only region to not have any 
observations within the first ten years of NCAA membership. 
Results 
Tables 6.15 and 6.16 present the results from Model 2A for each region for the 
first five years and first ten years of NCAA association respectively.  Because the Rocky 
Mountain region has no schools associated with the NCAA during their first 10 years, a 
model was not estimated for this region.  According to both tables, all regions show a 
positive and significant relationship for applications received in the prior year.  The Great 
Lakes region is the only region to show a significant nd negative relationship for the age 
of the university (AGE_UNIV).  The private school designation is significant and 
negatively related in all regions except for the New England and Plains regions.  The 
Mid-East and Southwest regions are the only regions with HBCUs that did not show a 
positive and significant relationship for BCU.  Women’s only schools are significant at 
the 95% level and positively related only in the Far West region.  Schools affiliated with 
Catholicism and found in the Great Lakes and Far West regions show a significant and 
positive relationship while Mainline Protestant affiliated institutions in the Great Lakes 
region have a positive significant relationship.  Evangelist Protestant affiliated schools 
have a significant negative relationship in the New England and Mid- East regions and a 
positive and significant relationship in the Great L kes and Far West regions.   
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Table 6-15 - Reclassification Effect by Region - Model 2A (Five Years) 






















INTERCEPT 0.86*** 0.14 0.87*** 0.14 0.87*** 0.10 0.86*** 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.71*** 0.10 
LN_APPt-1 0.84*** 0.02 0.84*** 0.02 0.86*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.01 0.96*** 0.01 0.96*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.02 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.00 0.05 -0.00 0.05 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.08* 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 -0.09 0.04 
BCU --- --- --- --- 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.17* 0.07 0.17* 0.07 0.77*** 0.09 
WOMENS --- --- --- --- -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 
CATH -0.11 0.07 -0.11 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.09*** 0.03 0.09*** 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
M_PROT -0.06 0.07 -0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 0.08*** 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
E_PROT -0.49*** 0.08 -0.49*** 0.08 -0.07* 0.04 -0.08* 0.04 0.06* 0.03 0.06* 0.03 -0.04 0.04 
OTH_REL --- --- --- --- 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.10 --- --- --- --- -0.04 0.07 
CMAPP 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09** 0.03 0.09** 0.03 0.01 0.04 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
GRAD 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 -0.11* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 
QT_GRAD 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.0  0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
FB_TITLE 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 
MBB_TITLE -0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
WBB_TITLE -0.01 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.05* 0.03 
NCAA_AGE 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5 0.04 0.05 --- --- 0.02 0.03 --- --- 0.04 0.05 --- --- 0.03 0.04 
YEAR1 --- --- 0.09 0.12 --- --- 0.11 0.08 --- --- -0.02 0.09 --- --- 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.01 0.11 --- --- -0.06 0.06 --- --- 0.04 0.08 --- --- 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.08 0.09 --- --- 0.08 0.06 --- --- 0.14 0.12 --- --- 
YEAR4 --- --- -0.01 0.09 --- --- -0.07 0.07 --- --- 0.09 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR5 --- --- 0.03 0.08 --- --- 0.03 0.07 --- --- -0.04 0.15 --- --- 
Observations n = 468 n = 1,110 n = 1,390 n = 1,140 
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(Table 6.15 continued) 






















INTERCEPT 0.71*** 0.10 0.90*** 0.07 0.90*** 0.07 1.26*** 0.15 1.25*** 0.15 2.41*** 0.23 2.54*** 0.24 
LN_APPt-1 0.86*** 0.02 0.86*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.01 0.77*** 0.02 0.77*** 0.02 0.56*** 0.03 0.58*** 0.03 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.09 0.05 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.15 0.09 -0.15 0.09 -0.90*** 0.11 -0.91*** 0.11 
BCU 0.76*** 0.10 0.11*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 --- --- --- --- 
WOMENS 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 --- --- --- --- 0.51* 0.22 0.51* 0.22 
CATH 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.25** 0.09 0.24** 0.09 
M_PROT -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 
E_PROT -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.39*** 0.10 0.38*** 0.10 
OTH_REL -0.04 0.07 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CMAPP 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.13 0.08 -0.13 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.07 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.14*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.03 
GRAD 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.02 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.15 0.12 -0.15 0.12 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
SPT_OFFR 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
FB_TITLE -0.06* 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
MBB_TITLE 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
WBB_TITLE 0.05* 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
NCAA_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5 --- --- 0.05 0.04 --- --- 0.14* 0.07 --- --- 0.03 0.10 --- --- 
YEAR1 0.04 0.08 --- --- 0.07 0.07 --- --- 0.30* 0.13 --- --- 0.15 0.14 
YEAR2 0.06 0.08 --- --- 0.04 0.08 --- --- 0.27 0.16 --- --- 0.06 0.20 
YEAR3 0.13 0.11 --- --- 0.04 0.07 --- --- 0.04 0.16 --- --- -0.14 0.20 
YEAR4 -0.05 0.10 --- --- 0.02 0.08 --- --- 0.16 0.15 --- --- -0.20 0.20 
YEAR5 -0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.06 0.07 --- --- -0.01 0.11 --- --- -0.07 0.17 
Observations n = 1,140 n = 2,650 n = 680 n = 827 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
    
354 
 
Table 6-16 - Reclassification Effect by Region - Model 2A (Ten Years) 






















INTERCEPT 0.86*** 0.14 0.87*** 0.14 0.89*** 0.10 0.88*** 0.10 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.70*** 0.10 
LN_APPt-1 0.84*** 0.02 0.84*** 0.02 0.86*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.01 0.96*** 0.01 0.96*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.02 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.01 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.11*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.09* 0.04 -0.09* 0.04 -0.08 0.05 
BCU --- --- --- --- 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.16* 0.07 0.16* 0.07 0.77*** 0.09 
WOMENS --- --- --- --- -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.07 
CATH -0.10 0.07 -0.12 0.08 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.10** 0.03 0.10** 0.03 -0.00 0.04 
M_PROT -0.06 0.07 -0.07 0.07 -0.03 0.03 -0.02* 0.03 0.09** 0.03 0.09** 0.03 -0.01 0.04 
E_PROT -0.49*** 0.08 -0.49*** 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.08 0.04 0.07** 0.03 0.07** 0.03 -0.04 0.04 
OTH_REL --- --- --- --- 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.10 --- --- --- --- -0.04 0.07 
CMAPP 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09** 0.03 0.09** 0.03 0.01 0.04 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02* 0.01 
GRAD 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 -0.11* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 
QT_GRAD 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
FB_TITLE 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.06* 0.03 
MBB_TITLE -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 
WBB_TITLE -0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.05* 0.03 
NCAA_AGE 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE10 -0.00 0.04 --- --- -0.02 0.02 --- --- 0.06 0.04 --- --- 0.07* 0.03 
YEAR1 --- --- 0.08 0.12 --- --- 0.10 0.08 --- --- -0.01 0.09 --- --- 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.00 0.11 --- --- -0.07 0.06 --- --- 0.05 0.08 --- --- 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.07 0.09 --- --- 0.07 0.06 --- --- 0.14 0.12 --- --- 
YEAR4 --- --- -0.02 0.09 --- --- -0.09 0.07 --- --- 0.10 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR5 --- --- -0.00 0.08 --- --- 0.02 0.07 --- --- -0.03 0.15 --- --- 
YEAR6 --- --- -0.08 0.08 --- --- 0.05 0.06 --- --- 0.00 0.12 --- --- 
YEAR7 --- --- 0.12 0.09 --- --- -0.07 0.05 --- --- 0.18 0.11 --- --- 
YEAR8 --- --- -0.00 0.09 --- --- -0.06 0.06 --- --- -0.01 0.10 --- --- 
YEAR9  --- --- 0.04 0.08 --- --- -0.08 0.06 --- --- 0.12 0.09 --- --- 
YEAR10 --- --- -0.06 0.07 --- --- -0.00 0.06 --- --- 0.04 0.09 --- --- 
Observations n = 468 n = 1,110 n = 1,390 n = 1,140 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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(Table 6.16 Continued) 






















INTERCEPT 0.70*** 0.10 0.90*** 0.07 0.91*** 0.07 1.25*** 0.13 1.25*** 0.13 2.41*** 0.23 2.63*** 0.24 
LN_APPt-1 0.86*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.01 0.86*** 0.01 0.78*** 0.02 0.78*** 0.02 0.60*** 0.03 0.57*** 0.03 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.08 0.04 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.10*** 0.03 -0.16 0.08 -0.16 0.08 -0.90*** 0.11 -0.93*** 0.11 
BCU 0.77*** 0.09 0.11*** 0.02 0.11*** 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.07 --- --- --- --- 
WOMENS 0.02 0.07 -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04 --- --- --- --- 0.51* 0.22 0.53* 0.23 
CATH -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.25** 0.09 0.25** 0.10 
M_PROT -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 
E_PROT -0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.39*** 0.10 0.37*** 0.10 
OTH_REL -0.04 0.07 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CMAPP 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.14 0.07 -0.14 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.08 
SF_RATIO 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.02 0.01 0.02* 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.14*** 0.02 0.14*** 0.03 
GRAD 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.15 0.12 -0.16 0.12 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 
SPT_OFFR 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.01** 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
FB_TITLE -0.06* 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
MBB_TITLE 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.05 
WBB_TITLE 0.05* 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
NCAA_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 
NCAA_AGE2 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE10 --- --- 0.02 0.02 --- --- -0.02 0.04 --- --- 0.02 0.07 --- --- 
YEAR1 0.04 0.08 --- --- 0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.29* 0.13 --- --- 0.15 0.14 
YEAR2 0.06 0.08 --- --- 0.04 0.08 --- --- 0.26 0.16 --- --- 0.05 0.20 
YEAR3 0.14 0.11 --- --- 0.04 0.07 --- --- 0.02 0.16 --- --- -0.17 0.20 
YEAR4 -0.04 0.10 --- --- 0.02 0.08 --- --- 0.15 0.15 --- --- -0.25 0.20 
YEAR5 -0.01 0.09 --- --- 0.06 0.07 --- --- -0.01 0.11 --- --- -0.15 0.19 
YEAR6 0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.05 0.07 --- --- -0.04 0.10 --- --- -0.14 0.13 
YEAR7 0.04 0.09 --- --- -0.01 0.06 --- --- -0.07 0.09 --- --- 0.03 0.14 
YEAR8 0.24** 0.09 --- --- 0.03 0.06 --- --- -0.06 0.09 --- --- -0.03 0.13 
YEAR9  0.08 0.10 --- --- 0.03 0.06 --- --- -0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.05 0.12 
YEAR10 0.10 0.09 --- --- -0.04 0.05 --- --- -0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.07 0.10 
Observations n = 1,140 n = 2,650 n = 680 n = 827 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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 Schools located in the Great Lakes region that utilize the Common Application 
show a positive and significant relationship within the 95% confidence level.  The New 
England, Southeast, and Far West regions are the only regions to not possess a positive 
and significant relationship for a student/faculty ratio.  The Far West region shows a 
significant and a positive relationship at the 99% confidence level for QT_UGRAD while 
the Southeast region only has a significant positive relationship at the 95% confidence 
level.  The Mid-East region shows a negative and significant relationship for schools with 
a graduate school program.  However, QT_GRAD has a significant positive relationship 
in the Mid-East.  All regions report a positive and significant relationship for SPT_OFFR 
except for the New England region.  The Plains region displays a negative significant 
relationship for FB_TITLE and a positive significant relationship for WBB_TITLE.  
NCAA_AGE is positively significant in all regions except for the Mid-East, Great Lakes, 
and Plains regions.  Finally, only the Southwest region showed a positive significant 
relationship for RANGE5, specifically YEAR1.  The same positive relationship is found 
in Table 6.16.  In addition, the Plains region also sh ws a positive and significant 
relationship for YEAR8.  All other regions showed no significant relationships for the 
association variables. 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 present the results from Model 2B and also do not include 
the Rocky Mountain region.  According to both tables, all regions show a positive and 
significant relationship for applications received in the prior year.  The Great Lakes 
region reports a significant and negative relationship for the age of the university, while 
the Southwest region shows a significant positive relationship for university age.  All 
regions except for schools found in the New England, Plains, and Southwest regions have
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Table 6-17 - Reclassification Effect by Region - Model 2B (Five Years) 






















INTERCEPT 1.10*** 0.19 1.11*** 0.19 1.32*** 0.13 1.32*** 0.13 0.28* 0.13 0.28* 0.13 0.73*** 0.12 
LN_APPt-1 0.78*** 0.03 0.78*** 0.03 0.79*** 0.02 0.79*** 0.02 0.96*** 0.02 0.96*** 0.02 0.85*** 0.02 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 -0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.07 -0.13*** 0.04 -0.13*** 0.04 -0.10* 0.05 -0.10* 0.05 -0.10 0.05 
BCU --- --- --- --- 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.23* 0.11 0.23* 0.11 0.79*** 0.10 
WOMENS --- --- --- --- -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.08 
CATH -0.14 0.09 -0.13 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 0.04 0.01 0.05 
M_PROT -0.14 0.09 -0.15 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
E_PROT -0.49*** 0.09 -0.48*** 0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.05 
OTH_REL --- --- --- --- 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.13 --- --- --- --- -0.03 0.08 
CMAPP 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.04* 0.02 -0.04* 0.02 0.04** 0.01 
GRAD -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.08 -0.17** 0.06 -0.17** 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
FB_TITLE 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.07* 0.03 
MBB_TITLE -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 
WBB_TITLE -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.08** 0.03 
NCAA_AGE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5 0.03 0.07 --- --- -0.03 0.04 --- --- 0.02 0.06 --- --- 0.04 0.05 
YEAR1 --- --- -0.01 0.16 --- --- 0.09 0.09 --- --- -0.03 0.10 --- --- 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.01 0.13 --- --- -0.09 0.07 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.09 0.11 --- --- 0.01 0.07 --- --- 0.10 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR4 --- --- 0.01 0.11 --- --- -0.10 0.08 --- --- 0.05 0.15 --- --- 
YEAR5 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- -0.02 0.08 --- --- -0.08 0.16 --- --- 
Observations n = 328 n = 780 n = 1,010 n = 910 
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(Table 6.17 Continued) 






















INTERCEPT 0.73*** 0.12 1.12*** 0.10 1.12*** 0.10 1.43*** 0.17 1.43*** 0.17 2.60*** 0.28 2.73*** 0.29 
LN_APPt-1 0.85*** 0.02 0.83*** 0.01 0.83*** 0.01 0.74*** 0.02 0.74*** 0.02 0.56*** 0.03 0.55*** 0.03 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.10 0.05 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.17 0.09 -0.17 0.09 -1.04*** 0.14 -1.06*** 0.14 
BCU 0.79*** 0.10 0.22*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 --- --- --- --- 
WOMENS 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 --- --- --- --- 0.54* 0.25 0.53* 0.26 
CATH 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.24 0.14 
M_PROT -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.24 0.15 0.22 0.16 
E_PROT -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.55*** 0.13 0.54*** 0.14 
OTH_REL -0.03 0.08 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CMAPP -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.08 -0.12 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.11 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.04** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.18*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 
GRAD -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.19 0.15 -0.18 0.15 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 
SPT_OFFR 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
FB_TITLE -0.07* 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.18 
MBB_TITLE 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11* 0.05 0.11* 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.07 
WBB_TITLE 0.08** 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.07 
NCAA_AGE 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5 --- --- 0.05 0.04 --- --- 0.07 0.07 --- --- 0.08 0.12 --- --- 
YEAR1 0.05 0.08 --- --- 0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.26 0.14 --- --- 0.21 0.16 
YEAR2 0.07 0.09 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.13 0.18 --- --- 0.14 0.24 
YEAR3 0.12 0.12 --- --- 0.03 0.07 --- --- -0.09 0.18 --- --- -0.14 0.26 
YEAR4 -0.04 0.12 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.10 0.16 --- --- -0.21 0.25 
YEAR5 -0.03 0.10 --- --- 0.08 0.08 --- --- -0.06 0.12 --- --- -0.08 0.22 
Observations n = 910 n = 1,880 n = 560 n = 597 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Table 6-18 - Reclassification Effect by Region - Model 2B (Ten Years) 






















INTERCEPT 1.13*** 0.19 1.12*** 0.19 1.36*** 0.13 1.36*** 0.14 0.28* 0.13 0.28* 0.13 0.73*** 0.12 
LN_APPt-1 0.78*** 0.03 0.78*** 0.03 0.78*** 0.02 0.78*** 0.02 0.96*** 0.02 0.96*** 0.02 0.85*** 0.02 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.14*** 0.04 -0.14*** 0.04 -0.11* 0.05 -0.11* 0.05 -0.09 0.05 
BCU --- --- --- --- 0.18 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.23* 0.12 0.23* 0.12 0.79*** 0.10 
WOMENS --- --- --- --- -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.08 
CATH -0.15 0.09 -0.14 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.09* 0.04 0.09* 0.04 -0.01 0.05 
M_PROT -0.14 0.09 -0.14 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.08* 0.04 0.08* 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
E_PROT -0.47*** 0.09 -0.47*** 0.10 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.02 0.05 
OTH_REL --- --- --- --- 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.13 --- --- --- --- -0.03 0.08 
CMAPP 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10* 0.05 0.10* 0.05 -0.01 0.05 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03* 0.02 -0.03* 0.02 0.03** 0.01 
GRAD -0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.16** 0.06 -0.16** 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.04 
QT_GRAD 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 
FB_TITLE 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 -0.07* 0.03 
MBB_TITLE -0.00 0.04 -0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 -0.00 0.03 0.04 0.03 
WBB_TITLE -0.01 0.05 -0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.08** 0.03 
NCAA_AGE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01* 0.00 -0.01* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
NCAA_AGE2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE10 0.05 0.06 --- --- -0.06 0.03 --- --- 0.04 0.04 --- --- 0.07 0.04 
YEAR1 --- --- 0.00 0.16 --- --- 0.07 0.09 --- --- -0.02 0.10 --- --- 
YEAR2 --- --- 0.03 0.14 --- --- -0.11 0.07 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 
YEAR3 --- --- 0.11 0.11 --- --- -0.01 0.07 --- --- 0.11 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR4 --- --- 0.03 0.11 --- --- -0.12 0.08 --- --- 0.06 0.15 --- --- 
YEAR5 --- --- 0.06 0.10 --- --- -0.04 0.08 --- --- -0.07 0.17 --- --- 
YEAR6 --- --- 0.06 0.10 --- --- 0.01 0.07 --- --- -0.01 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR7 --- --- 0.16 0.10 --- --- -0.10 0.06 --- --- 0.11 0.14 --- --- 
YEAR8 --- --- 0.05 0.11 --- --- -0.08 0.07 --- --- 0.00 0.13 --- --- 
YEAR9  --- --- 0.06 0.10 --- --- -0.10 0.07 --- --- 0.11 0.11 --- --- 
YEAR10 --- --- -0.02 0.10 --- --- -0.03 0.07 --- --- 0.05 0.11 --- --- 
Observations n = 328 n = 780 n = 1,010 n = 910 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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(Table 6.18 Continued) 






















INTERCEPT 0.73*** 0.12 1.12*** 0.10 1.13*** 0.10 1.43*** 0.17 1.43*** 0.17 2.63*** 0.29 2.82*** 0.29 
LN_APPt-1 0.85*** 0.02 0.83*** 0.01 0.83*** 0.01 0.75*** 0.02 0.75*** 0.02 0.56*** 0.03 0.53*** 0.04 
AGE_UNIV 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.09 0.05 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.13*** 0.03 -0.19* 0.10 -0.19* 0.10 -1.04*** 0.14 -1.06*** 0.14 
BCU 0.79*** 0.10 0.22*** 0.04 0.22*** 0.04 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.11 --- --- --- --- 
WOMENS 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05 --- --- --- --- 0.54* 0.26 0.55* 0.27 
CATH -0.01 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.26 0.14 0.24 0.14 
M_PROT -0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.23 0.15 0.22 0.16 
E_PROT -0.02 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.55*** 0.13 0.54*** 0.14 
OTH_REL -0.03 0.08 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
CMAPP -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.13 0.08 -0.13 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.11 
SF_RATIO 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.03** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.02** 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.18*** 0.03 0.18*** 0.03 
GRAD -0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 -0.18 0.15 -0.18 0.15 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 
SPT_OFFR 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01*** 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.01* 0.00 0.05*** 0.01 0.05*** 0.01 
FB_TITLE -0.07* 0.03 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.01 0.07 -0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.18 
MBB_TITLE 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.11* 0.05 0.11* 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.05 0.07 
WBB_TITLE 0.08** 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.07 
NCAA_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03* 0.01 0.03* 0.01 
NCAA_AGE2 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE10 --- --- 0.03 0.03 --- --- -0.03 0.04 --- --- 0.07 0.10 --- --- 
YEAR1 0.06 0.08 --- --- 0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.25 0.14 --- --- 0.21 0.16 
YEAR2 0.07 0.09 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.12 0.18 --- --- 0.14 0.24 
YEAR3 0.13 0.12 --- --- 0.03 0.07 --- --- -0.11 0.18 --- --- -0.16 0.26 
YEAR4 -0.03 0.12 --- --- 0.03 0.09 --- --- 0.08 0.16 --- --- -0.25 0.26 
YEAR5 -0.01 0.10 --- --- 0.09 0.08 --- --- -0.08 0.12 --- --- -0.17 0.25 
YEAR6 0.04 0.10 --- --- 0.09 0.08 --- --- -0.07 0.10 --- --- -0.15 0.21 
YEAR7 0.02 0.10 --- --- -0.00 0.07 --- --- -0.07 0.10 --- --- 0.16 0.24 
YEAR8 0.23* 0.11 --- --- 0.08 0.07 --- --- -0.04 0.09 --- --- 0.06 0.20 
YEAR9  0.07 0.11 --- --- 0.04 0.07 --- --- -0.07 0.08 --- --- 0.13 0.18 
YEAR10 0.10 0.11 --- --- -0.04 0.06 --- --- -0.06 0.08 --- --- 0.09 0.17 
Observations n = 910 n = 1,880 n = 560 n = 597 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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a significant and negative relationship with the private school designation.  Similar to 
Tables 6.15 and 6.16, the Mid-East and Southwest regions did not show a positive and 
significant relationship with BCU.  Women’s only colleges have a significant and 
positive relationship at the 95% level in the Far West region only.  Unlike Model 2A, 
Tables 6.17 and 6.18 showed that only the Great Lakes region show a significant positive 
relationship for schools affiliated with Catholicism and Mainline Protestant 
denominations.  Evangelist Protestant denominations,  the other hand, have a negative 
and significant relationship in the New England region and a positive significant 
relationship in the Far West region.   
Like Tables 6.15 and 6.16, schools in the Great Lakes region using the Common 
Application show significance at the 95% level and  positive relation.  The New 
England, Southeast, and Far West regions do not have a positive and significant 
relationship with the student/faculty ratio.  The Southeast region continues to have a 
positive significant relationship at the 95% confidence level for QT_UGRAD while the 
Far West region possesses the same 99% significant positive relationship.  The Mid-East 
region shows a negative and significant relationship for schools with graduate school 
programs but a positive and significant relationship for QT_GRAD.  All regions except 
the New England region show a positive and significant relationship for SPT_OFFR.  
The Far West region is the only region to show significance for sports championships 
(FB_TITLE is negative; WBB_TITLE is positive).  The Mid-East region displays a 
significant and negative relationship for NCAA_AGE while the Plains region reports a 
positive relationship.  Finally, the only region to show significance within the first 10 
years of NCAA membership is the Plains region, specifically YEAR8. 
    
362 
 
Model Two - NCAA Division 
Finally, the dissertation analyzes if NCAA divisional alignment can create a 
Reclassification Effect for universities joining either Division II or III.  Opposed to the 
prior model variations, the dissertation only reviews schools moving from the NAIA to 
either Division II or III since the creation of both divisions in 1973.   
Summary Statistics 
Table 6.19 displays the summary statistics for universities analyzed by division.  
According to the results, the average age for schools associated with Division II is 104 
years while Division III is 108 years.  The Division III sample has a larger sample of 
private schools (74%) and women’s colleges (3%) while t e Division II sample has more 
HBCUs (9%).  On average, Division III has more Catholic affiliated (14%) and Mainline 
Protestant affiliated schools (26%) than Division II (Catholic, 14%; Mainline Protestant, 
26%).  However, both divisions have the same amount f Evangelist Protestant affiliated 
schools (15%) and religious affiliations classified as other (0.4%).  More Division III 
schools utilize the Common Application (16%) than Division II schools (9%), while 
Division II schools have larger student/faculty ratios (28.12) compared to Division III 
members (26.79).  Division III schools have undergraduate tuitions ranging between the 
Top 50th and Top 75th Quantiles while Division II schools are closer to the Top 75th 
Quantile.  Division II schools have more graduate school programs (79%) and charge 
tuitions around the Top 50th Quantile.  Division III schools have a higher average 
number of sports programs (14) as well as a longer association with their chosen division 
[8 years (D3_AGE) versus 6 years (D2_AGE)].  However, both divisions have won 
approximately the same number of championships in football (7%), men’s basketball 
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Table 6-19 - Summary Statistics by NCAA Division 
 Division II Division III 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Min Max Median Mean Std. Dev Min Max Median 
Age of University 104 41 1 320 109 108 42 1 320 112 
Private 0.62 0.48 0 1 1 0.73 0.44 0 1 1 
HBCU 0.09 0.28 0 1 0 0.06 0.24 0 1 0 
Women’s 0.02 0.14 0 1 0 0.03 0.17 0 1 0 
Catholic 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 0.14 0.34 0 1 0 
Mainline Protestant 0.19 0.39 0 1 0 0.26 0.44 0 1 0 
Evangelist Protestant 0.15 0.36 0 1 0 0.15 0.36 0 1 0 
Other Religious Affiliation 0.00 0.06 0 1 0 0.00 0.06 0 1 0 
Common Application 0.09 0.28 0 1 0 0.16 0.37 0 1 0 
Student/Faculty Ratio 28.12 15.64 4.15 235.70 25.22 26.79 15.70 4.15 235.70 24.03 
Undergraduate Tuition 2.26 1.37 0 5 2 2.68 1.43 0 5 3 
Graduate Program 0.79 0.41 0 1 1 0.76 0.42 0 1 1 
Graduate Tuition 2.35 1.55 0 5 2 2.32 1.63 0 5 2 
Sports Offered 13 5 0 27 14 14 6 0 27 15 
Football Titles 0.07 0.26 0 1 0 0.07 0.25 0 1 0 
Men’s Basketball Titles 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 0.12 0.33 0 1 0 
Women’s Basketball Titles 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 0.11 0.31 0 1 0 
Age of Division Association 6 11 0 40 0 8 12 0 40 0 
Division – Year One 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 0.00 0.06 0 1 0 
Division – Year Two 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 0.00 0.07 0 1 0 
Division – Year Three 0.01 0.08 0 1 0 0.00 0.07 0 1 0 
Division – Year Four 0.01 0.08 0 1 0 0.00 0.07 0 1 0 
Division – Year Five 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 0.01 0.08 0 1 0 
Division – Year Six 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 0.01 0.08 0 1 0 
Division – Year Seven 0.01 0.10 0 1 0 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
Division – Year Eight 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
Division – Year Nine 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
Division – Year Ten 0.01 0.11 0 1 0 0.01 0.09 0 1 0 
Observations n = 6,282 n = 6,271 
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 (12%) and women’s basketball (12% for Division II and 11% for Division III).  Finally, 
both samples contain approximately 1% of schools within each of the first ten years of 
membership within their respective division. 
Results 
Table 6.20 presents the results for the Division II sample while Table 6.21 
analyzes the Division III sample.  Both tables include results for the first five and first ten 
years of division membership.  According to Table 6.20, schools within Division II 
showed a significant and positive relationship for applications received in the prior year.  
Private schools have a negative significant relationship while HBCUs shows a positive 
significant relationship.  Catholic affiliated Division II schools maintain positive 
significance at the 99% confidence level while Mainline Protestant Division II colleges 
have a positive relationship at the 95% confidence lev l.  Division II schools using the 
Common Application maintained a positive and significant relationship.  In addition, 
Division II schools have a significant and positive relationship at the 99% level with 
SF_RATIO and beyond the 99% level with QT_UGRAD.  Unlike prior models, graduate 
school programs did not show significance.  For athletic department variables, the 
number of sports offered show a positive and significant relationship.  However, there is 
no significance for Division II schools winning football, men’s basketball, or women’s 
basketball championships won or length of Division II affiliation (D2_AGE).  Finally, 
schools within the first five years (RANGE5_D2) or first ten years (RANGE10_D2) of 
Division II membership show no significance. 
Similar to Table 6.20, Table 6.21 shows a significant and positive relationship for 
Division III schools with LN_APPt-1.  Division III private schools have a negative 
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Table 6-20 - Reclassification Effect for Division II 
 5 Year Range 5 Year Ind. 10 Year Range 10 Year Ind. 
Variable β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  
INTERCEPT 0.78***  0.05 0.78***  0.05 0.78***  0.05 0.78***  0.05 
LN_APPt-1 0.87***  0.01 0.87***  0.01 0.87***  0.01 0.87***  0.01 
AGE_UNIV -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.18***  0.02 -0.18***  0.02 -0.18***  0.02 -0.18***  0.02 
BCU 0.17***  0.02 0.17***  0.02 0.17***  0.02 0.17***  0.02 
WOMENS 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
CATH 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 0.06** 0.02 
M_PROT 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
E_PROT 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
OTH_REL -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.09 
CMAPP 0.09***  0.02 0.09***  0.02 0.09***  0.02 0.09***  0.02 
SF_RATIO 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 
GRAD 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 
QT_GRAD 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 
FB_TITLE -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
MBB_TITLE 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 
WBB_TITLE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D2_AGE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
D2_AGE_SQ -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
RANGE5_D2 0.01 0.03 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
RANGE10_D2 --- --- --- --- -0.01 0.02 --- --- 
YEAR1_D2 --- --- 0.02 0.05 --- --- 0.02 0.05 
YEAR2_D2 --- --- -0.00 0.05 --- --- -0.00 0.05 
YEAR3_D2 --- --- 0.10 0.06 --- --- 0.10 0.06 
YEAR4_D2 --- --- 0.00 0.06 --- --- -0.00 0.06 
YEAR5_D2 --- --- -0.05 0.05 --- --- -0.05 0.05 
YEAR6_D2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.01 0.05 
YEAR7_D2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.01 0.05 
YEAR8_D2 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.01 0.05 
YEAR9_D2 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.05 0.04 
YEAR10_D2 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.04 0.04 
Observations n = 6,282 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
significant relationship while Division III HBCUs possess a positive significant 
relationship.  Unlike Table 6.20, Table 6.21 notes only Catholic affiliated schools have a 
significant positive relationship at the 95% confidence level.  However, Division III  
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Table 6-21 - Reclassification Effect for Division III
 5 Year Range 5 Year Ind. 10 Year Range 10 Year Ind. 
Variable β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  β 
Std. 
Err.  
INTERCEPT 0.87***  0.05 0.87***  0.05 0.87***  0.05 0.87***  0.05 
LN_APPt-1 0.85***  0.01 0.85***  0.01 0.85***  0.01 0.85***  0.01 
AGE_UNIV -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
PRIVATE -0.20***  0.02 -0.20***  0.02 -0.20***  0.02 -0.20***  0.02 
BCU 0.21***  0.02 0.21***  0.02 0.21***  0.02 0.21***  0.02 
WOMENS 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03 
CATH 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 0.04* 0.02 
M_PROT 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
E_PROT 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 
OTH_REL -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.08 
CMAPP 0.07***  0.02 0.07***  0.02 0.07***  0.02 0.07***  0.02 
SF_RATIO 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 
QT_UGRAD 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 0.03***  0.01 
GRAD -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02 
QT_GRAD 0.02***  0.01 0.02***  0.01 0.02***  0.01 0.02***  0.01 
SPT_OFFR 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 0.02***  0.00 
FB_TITLE 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
MBB_TITLE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
WBB_TITLE 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
D3_AGE -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
D3_AGE_SQ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
RANGE5_D3 -0.03 0.03 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
RANGE10_D3 --- --- --- --- 0.00 0.02 --- --- 
YEAR1_D3 --- --- -0.02 0.07 --- --- -0.02 0.07 
YEAR2_D3 --- --- -0.07 0.07 --- --- -0.07 0.07 
YEAR3_D3 --- --- -0.01 0.06 --- --- -0.01 0.06 
YEAR4_D3 --- --- -0.02 0.06 --- --- -0.02 0.06 
YEAR5_D3 --- --- -0.03 0.06 --- --- -0.02 0.06 
YEAR6_D3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.02 0.05 
YEAR7_D3 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.01 0.05 
YEAR8_D3 --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.00 0.05 
YEAR9_D3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.04 0.05 
YEAR10_D3 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.04 0.05 
Observations n = 6,271 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
schools using the Common Application show a positive significant relationship.  In 
addition, Division III schools have a positive and significant relationship at the 99% level 
for SF_RATIO and beyond the 99% level for QT_UGRAD.  Graduate school programs 
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do not show significance while QT_GRAD is significant nd positively related.  The 
number of sports offered by Division III schools shows a positive and significant 
relationship.  However, no other athletic department variable has any significance, 
including length of Division III affiliation (D3_AGE).  Finally, schools within the first 
five years (RANGE5_D3) and first ten years (RANGE10_D3) of Division III 
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Chapter 7 – Discussion 
This chapter discusses the significant implications from the statistical results 
provided in Chapter 6.  First, the dissertation discus es Model One’s results through 
Model 1E as it estimates all independent variables id ntified in the analysis.  The 
significant results from Tables 6.4 and 6.5 will be analyzed within the basis of the 
theoretical framework and historical findings provided.  From this analysis, the 
dissertation interprets the findings from Model Two, hich analyzes if a university’s 
decision to change athletic associations has an effect on the number of applications a 
university receives in a given year.  Model Two’s re ults are discussed through the 
theoretical framework provided as well as its congruencies with Model One’s findings. 
University Movement 
 Since the creation of Divisions II and III in 1973, the NCAA has foreseen a 
substantial growth in membership, while depleting counts can be observed for the NAIA 
(Wilson, 2005).  Both Washington (2004-05) and Smith et al. (2013) explained certain 
social identities can be utilized to predict the like hood of colleges moving from the 
NAIA to the NCAA.  While successful in identifying certain characteristics, both studies 
do not analyze the strategy universities may employ when considering change of athletic 
affiliation.  The following sections discuss the significant findings for each social identity 
utilized as an independent variable in Model One. 
Private Colleges 
 According to Table 6.1, 76.2% of the observations are identified as private 
institutions.  While the designation is the most prominent in the sample, Model One 
shows the private school characteristic has no significa t effect on the likelihood of 
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movement to either Division II or III.  The lack ofsignificance for the private school 
identity may relate to the high frequency of private schools contained in the sample.  Rao 
et al. (2000) suggested if a social characteristic i  prevalent among group members, the 
probability of defection from an in-group to an out-group would significantly decrease.  
Thus, if a private school chooses to depart the NAIA (i.e., the in-group) for Division II or 
III (i.e., the out-groups), then other private schools will not be affected by the departure 
since many private schools are still associated with the NAIA. However, many of the 
colleges contained in the sample carry additional identities that may be more significant 
than their private school designation. 
Women’s Colleges 
 Similar to its process with African American athletes and HBCUs, the NAIA 
wanted to create a welcoming environment for women’s sports and especially for 
women’s only colleges.  In comparison, the NCAA spent most of the 1970s in court to 
halt Title IX’s implementation in intercollegiate athletics (Falla, 1981).  However, the 
NCAA would quickly transform from “fighter” to “provider” in 1980 when the 
organization approved the sponsorship of women’s championships for Division II and III 
in the 1981-82 fiscal year (“A Calm Convention”, 1980).  The NAIA, now in the 
unfamiliar role of follower, quickly responded to the NCAA’s policy by offering 
championships in nine different women’s sports beginning in 1980 (Wilson, 2005).  
While not the first organization to officially provide women’s sports, the NAIA was the 
first to see the benefit of providing athletic opportunities to women in intercollegiate 
athletics.  Its efforts in this area correlate with Suchman’s (1995) definition of influential 
pragmatic legitimacy since the NAIA provided college athletic governance to an 
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underrepresented body of constituents despite any potential favorable exchange.  
Unfortunately, the NCAA’s decision to provide four new committee positions for women 
on the NCAA Council (“Delegates Focus on Four Key”, 1981; “NCAA Yields to 
Women”, 1981) may have coerced women’s schools to leave the NAIA.  Model One 
notes that women’s colleges were more likely to leave for the NCAA regardless of 
division in response to other women’s colleges departing.  Similar to HBCUs, the 
women’s colleges likely saw themselves as a collectiv  group and sought to maintain this 
identity while joining the NCAA (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Taylor & McKirman, 1984). 
Historically Black Colleges and Universities 
 One of the greatest contributions the NAIA provided intercollegiate sports in the 
United States was the integration of African Americans athletes and HBCUs.  Schools 
from the New England region considered withdrawing from the 1948 NIBT tournament 
due to an unofficial rule that prevented African American players from participating in 
games (Stooksbury, 2010).  As news spread about the controversy, the NAIA was met 
with another potential boycott calling for the removal of the 1948 NIBT Champion from 
the 1948 Olympic basketball trials (“Olympic Committeeman Suggests U.S. Trials”, 
1948).  Although the U.S. was unsettled about race (Katz, 1990; Katz & McLendon, 
1988; Land, 1977), much of the North began to take a moral stand against discrimination 
(Stooksbury, 2010).  The NCAA also criticized the NAIA regarding the ban on African-
American players, although, the NCAA may have had an ulterior motive to become the 
predominant facilitator of college sport governance (Washington & Ventresca, 2008).  
Facing these outside pressures, the NAIA redressed this unwritten rule and allowed 
African American players to participate. The acceptance of African American players led 
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HBCUs to seek membership within an athletic associati n.  Duer and the Executive 
Committee worked diligently to craft a solution that would suit all parties involved 
(Wilson, 2005).  Helping matters, indirectly, was the NCAA’s lack of movement as the 
association did not have a plan to help integrate HBCUs into its membership (Katz & 
McLendon, 1988).   
While these moves may have been controversial at the time, the NAIA, as a 
governing body of intercollegiate athletics, provided services that society determined as 
proper although these needs were not facilitated by most in the organizational field.  
Thus, the NAIA established its moral legitimacy defin d as the organization doing what 
society at large views as the correct way to conduct b siness (Cashore, 2002).  
Furthermore, according to Suchman’s (1995) sub-types of legitimacy, the NAIA 
established consequential and procedural moral legitimacy through these actions.  
Consequential moral legitimacy notes that organizations should be judged by their 
accomplishments while procedural moral legitimacy reviews an organization’s 
procedures through what is accepted by society (Suchman, 1995).   
As time progressed, however, the relationship betwen the NAIA and HBCUs 
began to weaken.  According to Land (1977), the NASC’s desire to have HBCUs and 
their officials on NCAA committees compelled Duer and the Executive Committee to 
alter policies to appease HBCUs to remain within the NAIA.  While the NASC did not 
want to undermine the NAIA, the organization altered substantial policies that may have 
impacted the NAIA’s membership counts during the last 30 to 40 years.  As such, Model 
One suggests schools classified as HBCUs are more likely to leave the NAIA for the 
NCAA after other HBCUs depart for the NCAA.  Although both Table 6.4 and 6.5 note 
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significance for HBCUs movement, HBCUs are more likly to join Division II as 
opposed to Division III.  Nevertheless, the strategic decision of which NCAA division to 
join may be based upon the school’s decision makers and the benefits that can be 
obtained in each specific division.  In addition, these schools continue to maintain the 
HBCU identity while adopting the characteristics of the division with which the decision 
makers choose to associate.  Essentially, while the HBCUs are individual, the schools 
operate collectively through the shared race identity while assimilating within their new 
group setting (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Taylor & McKirman, 1984).  
Geographic Location 
 Glückler (2007) argued the location or place of an organization will make a 
resounding difference in regards to social identity.  Washington (2004-05) analyzed a 
geographic component through a university’s conference affiliation, which may or may 
not be based on physical location.  Smith et al. (2013) altered Washington’s (2004-05) 
definition of geography to study if the physical location of schools had a significant effect 
on the likelihood of movement.  Despite these differences in definition, both studies 
noted geography can be a determinant of the likelihood of movement.  Specifically, 
Smith et al. (2013) noted schools found in the Southeast and Mid-East regions were less 
likely to move while colleges located in the New England and Rocky Mountain regions 
were more likely to move.  They suggested the population of schools in a given region 
was a catalyst in the likelihood of movement.  In other words, colleges in the Southeast 
region were less likely to move from the NAIA to the NCAA because of the larger 
population of schools in the region.  In comparison, schools located in the New England 
and Rocky Mountain regions would move more frequently (Smith et al., 2013).  
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 While Smith et al. (2013) found drastic differences among the eight regions, 
Model One shows movement from the NAIA to the NCAA regardless of division is more 
likely to occur in all regions.  This difference in f dings may relate to actual number of 
schools moving in a given year.  Although an area’s total population of a region may be 
important, Table 6.2 highlights the number of schools moving is a fraction of a region’s 
total population.  For example, the Southeast region has the highest amount of 
observations in the sample (n = 6,493) and the highest total amount of schools moving 
from the NAIA to Division II (n = 110) or Division III (n = 36).  In other words, the 
general population of a region may not be a significant factor to deter schools from 
defecting.  Instead, schools appear to be influenced more by prior defectors and their 
strategic choice of divisional alignment.  Therefor, when a specific movement strategy is 
implemented, a geographic region will not deter schools from staying in their current in-
group.   
While geography does not discourage college movement, some regions have a 
higher likelihood of movement than others.  As an example, schools found in the 
Southeast region will move with less frequency to the NCAA in comparison to the other 
regions.  Furthermore, schools in the Great Lakes and Rocky Mountain regions are more 
likely to move to Division II with similarly located schools while Southwestern schools 
show tendencies to move to Division III.  These findings support the claims made by 
several officials from schools proclaiming the lack of opponents in close proximity as a 
decision for their departure from the NAIA to the NCAA (“SOSU Leaves NAIA for 
NCAA”, 1994).  The specific division these schools decide to align with may also be a 
contributing factor as universities may move in groups in order to maintain relationships 
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and rivalries based on geography as well as previous c nference affiliation (“Solon: 
Oklahoma Schools Should”, 1999; Washington, 2004-05).   
Carnegie Size Classification 
 During the initial stages of the NIBT, Emil Liston believed certain schools would 
not be recognized by the NCAA for their efforts in postseason play as well as committee 
recognition when compared to their larger counterparts (Hoover, 1958).  By providing a 
service to the smaller schools that went unnoticed by the NCAA, the NAIA established 
its legitimacy within the organizational field of college sports.  After collaborating with 
several university coaches and athletic directors, Liston and the Executive Committee 
designed the proper foundation to support college athletic governance to smaller 
institutions, deviating from the existing social norms of the time (Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 
2005).  By providing governance to a group of schools that were neglected by the NCAA, 
the NAIA established its cognitive legitimacy within the organizational field of 
intercollegiate athletics.  Aldrich and Fiol (1994) defined cognitive legitimacy as “the 
spread of knowledge about a new venture” (p. 648).  Specifically, the various individuals 
involved with the development of the NIBT and the NAIB showed tremendous 
excitement toward a venture that would provide governmental services to colleges 
lacking strong ties to the NCAA. Both Cashore (2002) and Suchman (1995) noted 
cognitive legitimacy is a combination of society’s ability to comprehend and take 
elements for granted for an organization in order to obtain legitimacy opposed to any 
form of formal evaluation.  In terms of the instituon of intercollegiate athletics, Liston 
and several members of the Executive Committee understood the organizational field and 
    
375 
 
sought to extend the institution in a desirable, prope , and appropriate manner.  Thus, the 
NAIA was able to achieve cognitive legitimacy within intercollegiate athletics. 
As the NAIA achieved success in the 1940s and 1950s and began establishing its 
identity, the NCAA began altering its policies in order to attract small colleges as full 
members.  Although a direct competitor, the NCAA validated the NAIA when the NCAA 
adopted procedures to facilitate college sport governance to smaller colleges as well as 
provide financial support and create postseason contests that mimicked the NIBT (Falla, 
1981; Wilson, 2005). The NCAA’s newly found interest in non-traditional members 
caught the interest of many schools associated with the NAIA during this time, including 
those classified as large or very large by the Carnegie Foundation.  According to Tables 
6.4 and 6.5, large or very large schools were more likely to transition from the NAIA to 
Division II when similar size schools moved but didnot transition to Division III.  
Intuitively, the results in Tables 6.4 and 6.5 are not surprising as the NCAA was 
developed and traditionally known to accommodate larger schools (Falla, 1981; Forbes, 
1955; Hoover, 1958; Wilson, 2005).  Thus, larger schools would more likely want to be 
associated with the higher division and potentially join Division I in the future to 
associate with other larger schools affiliated with the NCAA.  Furthermore, Division III 
was viewed as a direct competitor to the NAIA as the division supported smaller schools 
and would deter larger schools from joining (Washingto , 2004-05).  However, Model 
One also shows that small or very small schools are also more likely to transfer to 
Division II while Division III has no significant effect on schools.  Finally, medium size 
schools were more likely to move to the NCAA with ot er medium schools regardless of 
division.   
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While the results show that movement to Division II is more likely than Division 
III, a school’s divisional alignment decision may depend upon each school’s budgetary 
concerns.  Huggins (1996) noted NAIA member schools were more comfortable with 
Division III’s rule barring athletic financial aid opposed to the limits on aid that the 
NAIA imposed on members.  Division II, on the other and, offered more opportunities 
to provide financial aid to student-athletes.  Thus, decision makers may choose to enter a 
division that best aligns with their school’s philosophies on financial aid.  Furthermore, 
Leitner (1990) argued schools moved to the NCAA because of the higher dues paid by 
NAIA members.  At the time, Southeastern Oklahoma State University Athletic Director 
noted that membership dues for Division II were $900 compared to the $3,500 to $4,000 
required by the NAIA (“SOSU Leaves NAIA For”, 1994).  Division III membership fees 
were also similarly priced.  Finally, one could also argue the choice of division for small 
and medium size schools can be related to how decision makers of these schools view 
their institution and how their organization can receive the most benefit within the 
NCAA.  
Religious Affiliation 
 In the college movement literature, religious affiliat on produced mixed results.  
Washington (2004-05) found schools with a religious affiliation are more likely to 
transfer from the NAIA to the NCAA while Smith et al. (2013) noted there was no 
substantial effect.  While these results are varied, Smith et al. (2013) argued the 
“conflicting results may be due to the difference in aggregating the religious 
denominations to several broad religious categories” (p. 35).  Thus, the present 
dissertation provided a narrower definition of denominations to determine if religious 
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affiliation affects college movement.  Model One notes that schools affiliated with 
Catholicism or an Evangelist Protestant denominatio are more likely to move to the 
NCAA when similar schools make the move regardless of division.  Mainline Protestant 
schools, on the other hand, are more likely to transfer to Division III instead of Division 
II.  The Mainline Protestant schools may have sought to break away from the other 
religious groupings in order to join Division III.  According to Taylor and McKirnan 
(1984), this process involved adopting characteristics based upon linguistic, cultural or 
other modifiable dimensions.  Arguably, the Mainline Protestant schools could have 
modeled their culture to Division III schools in orde  to enhance their identity.  From a 
historical standpoint, the NAIA’s decision to provide competition on Sundays in 1971 
(Wilson, 2005) may have influenced religious affiliated universities to consider 
transitions.  While the NCAA also provided Sunday competition, the waiver to allow 
Sunday competition caused these institutions to potentially no longer see the 
distinctiveness of the NAIA within intercollegiate athletics.   
Sponsored Sports 
 The NAIB was the first organization to create a basketball tournament for 
colleges only.  The success of the NIBT led the organization to begin exploring the 
potential expansion of sport offerings to better serve the demands of their growing 
membership.  Thus, in the early 1950s, the NAIB changed its name to the NAIA to 
reflect this change.  Much of this demand was center d on the desire to incorporate 
football in the NAIA.   This demand allowed the NAIA to become the first college sports 
organization to directly sponsor a championship game (Wilson, 2005).  By supplying its 
members with their demands, the NAIA achieved pragmtic legitimacy from an exchange 
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perspective.  The firm also displayed consequential moral legitimacy through the creation 
of the postseason football playoff for NAIA members.  Through these achievements, the 
NAIA continued to find ways to differentiate themselves from the NCAA.   
Thus, one can rationally argue schools sponsoring certain sports may or may not 
be influenced by other schools with these sports.  However, some sports were proven to 
not have a substantial effect on movement.  Specifically, football, men’s and women’s 
basketball, and baseball were found to not have a substantial effect on the likelihood of 
movement to Division III.  Men’s hockey, on the other hand, was found to influence 
schools to transition from the NAIA to Division III when other schools sponsoring men’s 
hockey moved.  This result is understandable as there ar  fewer schools that sponsor 
men’s hockey when compared to the other four sports.  Therefore, one can reasonably 
assume these schools would be influenced by one another t  move in order to maintain 
their hockey program and potential rivalries.  Men’s hockey is also a strong predictor of 
movement to Division II and possibly causes more teams to join Division II rather than 
Division III.  Furthermore, football and women’s basketball were found to have a 
significant and positive effect on movement to Division II but at a much smaller rate 
when compared to men’s hockey.   
Previous literature has not explored individual sports as an identity.  Instead, 
Washington (2004-05) identified the number of sports that a school competes in as a 
social identity based upon what Friedland and Alford (1991) described as a sports logic.  
A sports logic is a type of institutional logic for universities and their athletic departments 
which provides a set of material practices and develops appropriate and acceptable 
courses of action (Friedland & Alford, 1991; Washington & Ventresca, 2004).  Schools 
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possessing a stronger sports logic were more likely to join an association that provides a 
more visible sports presence (Washington, 2004-05).  Washington’s (2004-05) finding 
corresponds with the NCAA Bylaws requiring member schools to sponsor a minimum 
number of sports based upon their affiliated division (NCAA Division II Manual, 2011a; 
NCAA Division III Manual, 2011b).  However, university decision makers often consider 
movement based upon the success of the revenue-generating sports (e.g., football, men’s 
basketball; Fulks, 2011; Kahn, 2007) and potential revenue-generating sports (e.g., 
women’s basketball, baseball, men’s hockey) opposed to the total number of sports 
offered (Dwyer et al., 2010).  Thus, university decision makers should consider the 
ramifications of their overall athletic department when basing their decision to move to 
the NCAA and specific division on the individual revenue-generating sports. 
NAIA Leadership 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, the term institution has been defined by several 
scholars and taken on several dimensions (Greenwood et al., 2008; Hasse & Krücken, 
2011; Hirsch, 1975; Jennings et al., 2013; Jepperson, 1991; Washington, 2004-05).  The 
present dissertation adopted the definition designed by Jennings et al. (2013), who 
defined  an institution is “the routinized, taken for granted sets of ideas, beliefs, and 
actions used in society, which includes both formal and informal institutions, and macro 
and micro institutional patterns” (p. 2).  This definition differs from earlier work in 
institutional theory as past scholars have defined an institution as an entity (Greenwood et 
al., 2008), industry sectors (Hasse & Krücken, 2011), or state agencies (Hirsch, 1975; 
Washington, 2004-05).  However, work in institutional theory shows that the presence of 
coercive, mimetic, and normative pressure as well as the desire to achieve legitimacy 
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stretches beyond a single firm or entity (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977).  Thus, the present dissertation considers th governance of intercollegiate athletics 
to be the institution of influence for all entities affiliated with the organizational field of 
college athletics.  
Throughout the history of the NAIA, there was continuous conflict with the 
NCAA in regards to membership.  Both organizations a d their leaders were engaged in 
constant defense of their practices in order to establi h and maintain their legitimacy 
within the institution.  Thus, both the NAIA and the NCAA implemented institutional 
strategies through efforts to establish membership rules and procedures to establish 
standards of practice (Lawrence, 1999; Washington, 2004-05).  As an example, the NAIA 
originally competed with the NCAA for membership by providing an outlet for schools 
the NCAA identified as lower-status schools (Washingto , 2004).  When the NAIA 
gained success and established legitimacy as a governing body, the NCAA altered its 
membership rules to attract lower-status schools by creating the College Division in 1958 
and later Division II and III in 1973 (Falla, 1981; Washington, 2004).  The NAIA 
responded to the NCAA’s practices by inviting Canadian schools to become members 
(Land, 1977; Wilson, 2005) and embracing women’s sport  and supporting the AIAW 
after the passing of Title IX in 1972 (NAIA Executive Committee, 1972). 
The NAIA was able to combat the NCAA during much of its early history due to 
the efforts of Emil Liston and A. O. Duer, the organization’s first two Executive 
Secretaries (Wilson, 2005).  Both men possessed a vision and framework that provided 
the NAIA with a significant competitive advantage over the NCAA.  In addition, the 
NAIA also gained much from the character and charisma of both Liston and Duer 
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including personal moral legitimacy (Suchman, 1995).  Both Liston and Duer received 
tremendous praise from many within the organizationl field.  Duer explicitly was 
labeled as the “Guiding Light” of the organization during his 23 years as Executive 
Secretary (Sambol, 1975).  By embracing the leadership style of both Liston and Duer, 
the NAIA was able to establish specific standards of practice when faced with troubling 
issues including gambling, integration, Olympic representation, and overall governance 
of the organization.   
As time progressed, however, leadership of the NAIA changed drastically.  After 
Duer’s retirement in 1975, many significant changes w re made regarding the NAIA’s 
standards of practice.  Arguably, the prominent example can be found with James 
Chasteen’s appointment as CEO in the 1990s.  Without warning, Chasteen upset several 
members when he announced the organization was moving its offices as well as the 
NIBT from Kansas City to Tulsa (Blum, 1995).  In addition, Chasteen was at the 
forefront to replace the traditional district system in favor of an affiliated conference 
system (“Reorganization for the N.A.I.A.”, 1993).  These dramatic changes upset many 
NAIA members and played a tremendous factor toward their departure to the NCAA.  As 
such, Table 6.4 and 6.5 noted schools considering a move to Division II were less likely 
to move when Duer was leader of the NAIA while Divis on III movement was not 
affected by the leadership of the NAIA.  In comparison, schools were likely to move to 
Division II after Chasteen was named CEO of the NAIA.  The results also showed that 
schools were likely to move to Division II during Steve Baker’s tenure as CEO.  Baker 
had much work to do to correct the mistakes of previous leaders and create a new 
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standard of practice that would retain the traditional values of the NAIA.  Thus, some of 
the movement during his tenure as leader may not be as a result of his actions. 
Summary 
The results from Model One show social identities can predict or prohibit the 
likelihood of movement from the NAIA to the NCAA Division II or III.  Due to the 
prevalence of the private designation, private institutions are not affected by the 
movement of other private schools. In comparison, women’s only institutions and 
HBCUs move collectively as a group when one defector with either social characteristic 
moves into the NCAA.  However, HBCUs are more likely to join Division II over 
Division III while women’s only schools have no preference.  Schools located in the 
seven geographic regions considered are likely to move with peer schools reclassifying 
from the NAIA to the NCAA regardless of division.  Larger institutions are more likely 
to join Division II due to their potential desire to reclassify again to Division I.  Mainline 
Protestant denomination affiliated schools are likely to move to Division III as a group in 
order to maintain their distinct identity.  Schools sponsoring men’s hockey move to 
Division II more often in order to keep their competitive rivalries.  Finally, NAIA 
member schools were less likely to reclassify to the NCAA when Duer was Executive 
Secretary and more likely to leave the NAIA when Chasteen was CEO. 
Reclassification Effect 
 Several researchers argued universities and their athletic departments share a 
symbiotic relationship where schools receive substantial benefits based upon the success 
of the athletic programs (Beyer & Hannah, 2000; Goff, 2000; Tomasini, 2005; Weaver, 
2010).  These benefits can come in the form of increased quantity and better quality of 
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student applications and enrollment (Castle & Kostelnik, 2011; McCormick & Tinsley, 
1987; Mixon & Ressler, 1995; Mixon & Hsing, 1994; Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004; 
Pope & Pope, 2009; Toma & Cross, 1998), alumni donati s (Humphreys & Mondello, 
2007; Stinson & Howard, 2007;  Tucker, 2004), gate receipts and attendance (Beyer & 
Hannah, 2000; Goff, 2000), and school spirit (Hansen, 2011; Krenz, 2012; Tomasini, 
2005).  However, most of these studies only analyze university benefits in correlation to 
athletic success without consideration for other athletic department decisions.  Thus, this 
dissertation analyzes if a change in athletic associati n has an effect on a university’s 
application total in a given year.   
Overall Model 
 Through a qualitative analysis of nine universitie that moved from the NAIA to 
the NCAA, Smith (2011) noted these schools chose to l ave the NAIA due to its 
deteriorating reputation and join the NCAA for branding opportunities to help with 
recruiting.  Several university athletic administrato s have shared similar concerns.   Both 
William Jewell College President David Sallee and Azusa Pacific University Athletic 
Director Bill Odell noted the move to relocate to the NCAA from the NAIA was highly 
beneficial to their school’s programs and encouraged individuals unaware of their 
campuses to research their school, apply, and enroll (Palmer, 2011).  According to the 
results from Tables 6.11 and 6.12, these claims appear to be correct.  Model 2A estimated 
schools beginning their association with the NCAA receive a slight increase in 
applications during their first year of membership with the organization.   
After the first year, a Reclassification Effect could not be found in schools that 
had an association with the NAIA since its inception in 1937.  These results are 
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consistent with other studies that suggest schools receive a small increase in applications 
after a successful athletic campaign (Mixon & Resslr, 1995; Murphy & Trandel, 1994; 
Pope & Pope, 2009).  However, when schools that moved from the NAIA to the NCAA 
since 1973 are considered, the first ten years of membership within the NCAA is 
insignificant.  The results from Model 2B are consistent with the findings of Friedler 
(2007) and Tomasini (2005), who noted that an internal move in the NCAA showed no 
significant gains for reclassifying schools.  Instead, schools that decided to reclassify to a 
higher NCAA division received similar numbers in terms of applications and financial 
support when compared to their prior affiliation    
While initial reclassification was shown to briefly increase applications (Model 
2A) or show no effect (Model 2B), both Table 6.11 and 6.12 show the longevity of 
NCAA membership can positively affect the number of total applications a school 
receives.  While the increase in applications may be small (1% or less), the results show 
overall membership within the NCAA does create an increase in applications.  This small 
benefit may be based on Smith’s (2011) argument the NCAA brand itself encourages 
universities to consider a reclassification within the membership association.  Although 
these results are favorable toward reclassification,   u iversity decision makers should be 
cautious as any potential increases in applications may not offset the actual costs of 
reclassification. Furthermore, the short duration of the Reclassification Effect also 
suggests membership within the NCAA alone may not establish or improve a school’s 
legitimacy within the organizational field.  A school reclassifying may retain its original 
identity regardless of the move, leading society to not recognize a move as an innovation 
(Tomasini, 2005). 




 The overall model was subdivided by geographic regions to determine if a 
Reclassification Effect varies by region.  The final d ta set of 8,495 university-year 
observations was separated by their individual region.   All regions except for the Rocky 
Mountain region contained member institutions within the first ten years of their NCAA 
membership.  Thus, the Rocky Mountain subdivision model was not estimated.  Tables 
6.15 and 6.16 display the results for Model 2A based upon the first five years and ten 
years of NCAA membership respectively. According to the findings, the Southwest 
region was the only region to show results similar to the overall model.  These findings 
also correlate with the results from Model One as schools from the Southwest region 
show higher tendencies to transfer from the NAIA to the NCAA.  However, a small 
increase in applications only occurs within the first year of membership of the NCAA, 
comparable to the overall model.  The only other region to show a positive relationship 
was the Plains region, according to Table 6.16.  Schools from the Plains region within 
their eighth year of NCAA membership will receive an increase in applications but not 
before or after.  Similar to the Southwest region, the Plains region significance is 
consistent with the findings from Model One schools.   
While these are positive results, these findings drastically differ from Smith et al. 
(2013), who suggested that schools in the New England and Rocky Mountain regions 
were more likely to move to the NCAA.  Again, the Rocky Mountain region has been 
removed from this analysis, and Tables 6.15 and 6.16 show no significant gains in 
applications for New England schools moving from the NAIA to the NCAA within their 
first few years.  Instead, both tables show schools in the New England region, as well as 
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the Southeast, Southwest, and Far West regions, do ten  to get increases in applications 
due to their association with the NCAA.  While there is no gain in the first ten years, 
these regions are receiving additional applications based upon their longevity with the 
NCAA, supporting Smith et al.’s (2013) findings. 
When schools moving from the NAIA to the NCAA before 1973 are removed 
from each sample, Model 2B shows different results.  According to Tables 6.17 and 6.18, 
no region showed any significant application gains within the first five years of NCAA 
membership.  However, the Plains region continued to show an increase in applications 
for schools in their eighth year of NCAA association.  Both tables also show differing 
results in relation to Tables 6.15 and 6.16 for NCAA association, specifically the Mid-
East region.  In relation to Model One, schools considering reclassification due to their 
regional peers should be cautious regarding this move as schools tend to receive fewer 
applications after reclassification.  These findings support the work of Friedler (2007) 
and Tomasini (2005) who again argued that a reclassification may not provide the 
expected results of university decision makers.  In addition, Tables 6.17 and 6.18 noted 
the Far West region schools tended to receive more applications due to their NCAA 
membership.  These findings are consistent with Model One as schools found in the Far 
West region tend to reclassify when other regional schools move from the NAIA to the 
NCAA. 
NCAA Division 
 In terms of specific divisional movement, the dissertation analyzed schools that 
maintained a membership between 1973 and 2012 with the NAIA and moved to the 
NCAA.  According to Tables 6.20 and 6.21, which display the results for Division II and 
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III respectively, there are no significant results determined for schools within the first five 
or first ten years of membership in either division.  Furthermore, both tables also show 
longevity in either division has no effect on applicat ons.  In other words, an athletic 
department considering a move to either Division II or II may or may not see an effect 
on university applications.  These findings are parallel to a claim made by Tomasini 
(2005), who suggested that schools reclassifying from Division II or III to Division I-FCS 
are still similar to their Division II or III contemporaries.  One can infer that for schools 
transitioning from the NAIA to Division II or III may retain an identity that mirrors their 
prior association.  These results also show while a g neral move to the NCAA can help 
universities receive additional applications due to the organization’s image and branding 
(Smith, 2011), the specific division movement may nullify any potential application 
benefits. 
Summary 
Model 2A shows schools receive an increase in applications within the first year 
of joining the NCAA.  However, the Reclassification Effect disappears after this first 
year.  When pre-1973 movers are removed from the sample, however, Model 2B shows 
that a Reclassification Effect does not occur. Instead, both Model 2A and 2B note the 
longevity of membership provides a small increase in applications. From a geographical 
region standpoint, institutions found in the Southwest receive a nominal increase in 
applications in the first year of NCAA membership.  Similar to the overall model, Model 
2B shows no immediate Reclassification Effect could be determined for any region 
within the first year of NCAA membership.  Furthermore, NCAA affiliation length 
provides application increases for schools located in all regions except the Plains region.  
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Finally, the NCAA divisional membership models show a Reclassification Effect could 
not be determined for schools within their first year of membership or longevity of 
affiliation with either division.
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
Universities considering movement from the NAIA to the NCAA believe that the 
move would provide substantial benefits and establish the school’s legitimacy as a viable 
institution (Knoke, 1985; Yang, Su, & Fam, 2012).  As noted by Smith et al. (2013), 
“many of the schools transitioning from the NAIA to the NCAA maintain a characteristic 
set that is based on the ideals and characteristics stemming from university beliefs” (p. 
35).   These beliefs stemmed from the rationalized myth of intercollegiate athletics, 
where the NCAA is viewed as the predominant college sports athletic association (Getz 
& Siegfried, 2010; Falla, 1981).  Through the adoption of a rationalized myth, an 
organization can potentially increase its legitimacy s well as its survival prospects within 
the organizational field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977).  Thus, many NAIA members engaged 
in a social mobility strategy as elements from the institution of intercollegiate athletic 
governance influenced the organization’s identity (Rao et al., 2000).  Specifically, these 
universities and their decision makers identified crtain discrepancy cues within the 
NAIA to influence their decision to reclassify.  Furthermore, university officials believed 
their organization’s current identity was not congruent with the identity of the NAIA and 
a change was needed (Foreman & Whetten, 2002).   
Within the college movement literature, Washington (2004; 2004-05) argued 
schools are more likely to move the NCAA based upon the number of strong ties that a 
school may have with other members in the organization.  Originally, the NCAA did not 
facilitate intercollegiate athletic governance to some smaller schools, leading to the 
NAIA’s establishment.  Through an analysis of the history of the NAIA, we can see the 
NCAA altered its membership strategies and operating standards (i.e., institutional 
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strategies) after the NAIA found success with these smaller schools.  The NAIA’s results 
led to the creation of the College Division in 1958 as well as Divisions II and III in 1973, 
which provided a governance institution within the NCAA for previously identified 
lower-status schools (Washington, 2004).   
Table 8.1 shows the significant results from Model One, indicating certain 
identities act as identity discrepant cues and potentially lead schools to move to Division 
II and III.  Specifically, groups with shared characteristics, such as the HBCUs, women’s  
Table 8-1 – Model One Significant Results 
 Division II  Division III  
Significance Variable Relationship Variable Relationship 
At 95% 
DUER Negative Sum Y3 Negative 





--- --- WBB*SumD3_WBB Positive  
At 99% 



























Sum Y3 Negative PL*SumD3_PL Positive 
WOMENS* 
SumD2_WOMEN 
Positive SE*SumD3_SE Positive 
BCU*SumD2_BCU Positive SW*SumD3_SW Positive 
ME*SumD2_ME Positive RM*SumD3_RM Positive 





SW*SumD2_SW Positive --- --- 
RM*SumD2_RM Positive --- --- 
FW*SumD2_FW Positive --- --- 
E_PROT* 
SumD2_EPROT 
Positive --- --- 
WBB*SumD2_WBB Positive --- --- 
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colleges and religious schools, may be inclined to move as a group in order to maintain 
their collective identities while also adopting the characteristics of their new affiliation 
(Hogg & Terry, 2000; Taylor & McKirman, 1984).  Finally, schools sponsoring men’s 
hockey are more likely to join either division due to the low number of NAIA schools 
sponsoring hockey.  These individual schools appear to possess a strong sport logic in 
relation to men’s hockey and will position their prog am with the best interests in mind 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991).  Thus, specific sports programs can influence a university’s 
social mobility strategy as a repositioning to an association that holds certain sports to 
higher accord. 
While university decision makers may consider movement based upon identity 
discrepant cues, these characteristics may be aligned with the ideals of a specific division.  
For example, schools choosing to depart the NAIA for Division III may have migrated to 
that division due to its ban on athletic financial aid or Division II for increased 
opportunities to provide aid to athletes.  However, schools may consider movement with 
no distinction for division.  As an example, schools in the Southeast region are likely to 
make a move to either Division II or III, but not at the same frequency as schools in the 
Rocky Mountain region moving to Division II or the Southwest region moving to 
Division III.  Schools classified as large or very large are more likely to join Division II 
and less likely to join Division III due to Division III’s reputation as a haven for smaller 
schools.  Religious affiliated institutions are more likely to join Division III while 
HBCUs and women’s colleges prefer to join Division II in order to maintain their 
respective group settings.  
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Although certain identities can influence a university to change their athletic 
affiliation, university decision makers should not c nsider the move under a false contest.  
According to Table 8.2, schools will receive an increase in applications upon joining the 
NCAA in the first year of membership.  After the first year, however, an application 
increase may not be realized in future years.  Thus, university officials should be cautious 
when considering reclassification as the perceived benefits through NCAA association 
may not be fully realized.  Furthermore, despite a university’s attempt to alter its social 
identity in relation to the NAIA, the school could still retain its identity as an NAIA 
member despite its new affiliation.  Finally, the potential benefits that a university may 
receive could be offset by the actual costs of joining the NCAA. 
Table 8-2 – Model Two (Overall Model) Significant Results 
 Model 2A Model 2B 
Significance Variable Relationship Variable Relationship 
At 95% 
RANGE5 Positive RANGE10 Positive 
RANGE10 Positive AGE_UNIV Negative 
YEAR1 Positive CATH Positive 
CATH Positive M_PROT Positive  
--- --- QT_GRAD Positive 
--- --- NCAA_AGE Positive 
At 99% QT_GRAD Positive --- --- 
Beyond 99% 
LN_APPt-1 Positive LN_APPt-1 Positive 
PRIVATE Negative PRIVATE Negative 
BCU Positive BCU Positive 
CMAPP Positive CMAPP Positive 
SF_RATIO Positive SF_RATIO Positive 
QT_UGRAD Positive QT_UGRAD Positive 
SPT_OFFR Positive SPT_OFFR Positive 
NCAA_AGE Positive --- --- 
 
The present dissertation highlights the active use of various institutional strategies 
centered on social mobility to connect with social identity.  Institutional strategies are 
strategies implemented by firms with the goal of defending actions deemed legitimate by 
both external and internal parties.  Throughout the history of the NAIA, several strategies 
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were designed to acquire membership that focused on both adapting to the norms of 
society and the norms of the organizational field.  As an example, the NAIA approved 
HBCUs for full membership after society began to focus on eliminating discrimination 
and embracing integration.  Through the change in institutional strategy, the NAIA 
deemed and defended HBCUs as legitimate members of their organization and 
establishing the firm’s identity as an innovator in the field of college athletics.  This 
change caused many universities within the organization l field to change their affiliation 
and enhance their social identity. 
The present dissertation also acknowledges several practical measures 
organizations can utilize for their pursuit of legitimacy.  From an internal legitimacy 
perspective, the NAIA authority and governance provided evidence of pragmatic 
organizational legitimacy.  Specifically, the NAIA’s annual meetings, the redistricting of 
the association following the addition of historically black institutions, and regular 
expansion of the championship schedule (e.g., golf,football, hockey, tennis, cross 
country, track & field, and wrestling) provide assement by the organization to develop 
legitimacy.  Thus, firms should utilize a form of decentralized management to provide 
stakeholders with a means to become engaged with daily operative activities as well as 
creating opportunities for members to participate in the structural design of the firm. 
Organizations can gain legitimacy, from an external perspective, by challenging 
the status quo of society opposed to accepting the norm.  As an example, the NAIA 
achieved cognitive legitimacy through the promotion of their handling of the gambling 
and HBCU membership as well as their Olympic representation defense.  Such 
opportunities were made possible because smaller schools were previously dismissed by 
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the NCAA.  Next, the rebranding of an association (i.e., NAIB to NAIA) or brand name 
itself can help firms acquire legitimacy within their organizational field.  Washington 
(2004) proposed “membership changes, while not the catalyst for the institutional change, 
are often good markers of the change; when the membership has changed, then the 
institution must have changed” (p. 409). Notable markers identified by Washington 
(2004) include changes to organizational mission statement, organizational leadership, 
and headquarter location. The rebranded NAIA establi hed an important niche within 
intercollegiate athletics and accommodated specific interest association-based 
innovations that helped remove the previous basketball affiliated title (i.e., NIBT and 
NAIB) and to build a name more inclusive of a larger more diverse membership. 
This dissertation also demonstrates ‘first-mover’ innovations can help in the 
development of legitimacy, highlighting the importance of differentiating oneself from 
competing firms while being similar enough to confer judgment upon the organization.  
For example, unique postseason events (e.g., expanded basketball tournament and 
football playoff/championship game), embracing HBCUs and Canadian schools as 
association members, and producing media publications (i.e., NAIA News) that report on 
the activities of the association and its members all serve as useful tools.  Specifically, 
several scholars emphasized the media exists as a critic l external agent because of their 
status as an entity responsible for reporting on activities either against or with social 
norms (Baum & Powell, 1995; Boyle, 2001; Deephouse & Suchman, 2008).  The 
coverage provided on the aforementioned innovations provides adequate examples of the 
NAIA’s ability to recognize social pressures and opp rtunities to help the public and 
industry peers view them as legitimate.  Further, the dissertation acknowledges the 
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importance of organizational or association-based mia products (e.g., NAIA News) and 
the creation of offices/personnel (e.g., NAIA media st ff and full-time Director of 
Publicity) to help maintain or improve the accruement of organizational legitimacy 
during the acquisition phase of membership.  Wilson (2005) showed that the NAIA 
appeared to decline in legitimacy after 1973 as several major media outlets did not 
provide adequate coverage of the association’s numerous events and the association did 
less to promote itself due to continued financial dfficulties 
The dissertation also supports Ashforth and Gibbs’s (1990) research, who 
previously cautioned groups could be very aggressiv in attempting to create 
organizational legitimacy.  This dissertation’s contribution emerges out of the conflict 
and struggle for members that occurred between the NAIA and NCAA when they 
engaged in a special type of institutional strategy (i.e., competitive membership strategy) 
to establish organizational legitimacy at the expense of the other.  Within this point, the 
dissertation argues that competitive membership strategy should be recognized as a 
distinct and important component of the institutional strategy for other interest based 
associations.  For example, the hiring and firing of leaders; the construction of new or the 
renovation of existing facilities; and the decision t  remain affiliated with a particular 
interest based association or reclassify to a competing interest based association as certain 
courses of action to elevate and execute various competitive membership initiatives.  
As noted earlier, higher education administrators regularly demonstrate a distinct 
appreciation for intercollegiate athletics through institutional and financial support and 
allow the athletic department great autonomy to develop their own strategy when 
entrenched with the goals of the university (Dwyer et al., 2010; Weaver, 2010).  With 
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other interest-based associations, individual organizations have the power to disassociate 
themselves with their current interest based associati n should they feel that another 
association aligns better with their goals and objectiv s.  Such membership rules and 
norms can be used to delineate the exclusionary boundaries of institutional membership 
and the space that members can operate or utilize.  Th  dissertation argues interest-based 
associations should restrict admission of firms if legitimacy is positively related to the 
group’s exclusivity but to embrace a larger set of variable members if cultural 
mechanisms establish standards that are not coercive or likely to impose mimetic 
pressures to comply with other industry standards.  In addition, the need for external 
resources causes firms to quickly adopt the rules pr cribed by the leading actors within 
the organizational field.   
Furthermore, this dissertation extends the social identity literature by noting that 
legitimacy can influence firms to engage in social mobility.  While Rao et al. (2000) 
argued movement can be influenced by the focal organization’s affiliations to group 
members and defectors, social mobility alone nay not help a firm obtain legitimacy.  
Instead, institutions will continuously implement strategies in order to establish and 
maintain their legitimacy within their respective institution.  These institutional strategies 
are conducted to influence the mobility of firms to their association using an 
organization’s social identity as a means to attract new members.  This dissertation 
concludes that the social mobility that firm engages in may have to do more with the 
social identity of the affiliation opposed to the ind vidual firms within the association.   
Finally, the present dissertation contributes to the college movement literature to 
note that specific division movement is dependent on the individual characteristics of 
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each university.  Wilson (2005) noted the NAIA closely mirrored Division III based on 
similar policies and the number of schools leaving the NAIA for Division III.  However, 
this dissertation shows potential movement from the NAIA to the NCAA varied based on 
the social identities of each university.  Thus, university decision makers must analyze 
what is in the best interests of their organization before engaging in a social mobility 
strategy for social enhancement.  The dissertation lso provides the college movement 
literature a quantitative model to estimate the benefits predicted by university officials.   
The results of the dissertation reduce the mixed fin ings that have been discovered by 
prior college movement studies and can be adopted in o future studies. 
Limitations 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, the accuracy of the IPEDS database may be called into 
question.   While most of the data collected was analyzed for validity and reliability, the 
database may contain certain errors from the initial collection process by the third-party.  
Furthermore, Chapter 5 also has small issues of validity due to the lack of preservation of 
NAIA primary documents.  While newspapers and other periodicals were used to provide 
historical accuracies, certain information that may provide further insight to the decision 
making process may be lost. 
A potential limitation of Model Two involves endogenous variables.  According 
to Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995), an endogenous variable is a variable that can be 
influenced by of the forces that influence the outcme under review.  In other words, an 
explanatory variable is correlated with the equation error term.  When variables are 
considered endogenous, an OLS regression may provide biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the causal effect of the explanatory va iable.  Bound, Jaeger, and Baker 
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(1995) noted a common strategy for dealing with endogenous variables is to utilize an 
exogenous instrument.  Exogenous instruments separat  the variance of the endogenous 
independent variable into exogenous and endogenous components.  Once partitioned, the 
exogenous component of the endogenous independent variable is used within the 
estimation (Bound et al., 1995).  In other words, an exogenous instrument predicts values 
for the potential endogenous variable.  These predict  values are then used as a 
regressor in the full model.   
Coates and Humphreys (2005) and Feddersen, Manning, and Borcherding (2006) 
corrected a potential issue of endogenous variables wh n these studies identified the age 
of the stadium may be endogenous.  To adjust for this potential issue, both Coates and 
Humphreys (2005) and Feddersen, Manning, and Borcherding (2006) enabled a separate 
dummy variable for every year following the opening of a new stadium.  Within the 
Flutie Effect literature, Pope and Pope (2009) noted endogenous variables may impact 
the results of their study since they showed that enrollments increased after sport success, 
especially for football schools.  However, Pope andPope (2009) did not offer a 
suggestion as to correcting for an endogenous variable.  This dissertation identified that 
application fee was an endogenous variable.  When applic tion fee was included in 
Model Two, the variable was shown to be significant d positively related.  The 
relationship explains if a school charges a high application fee a school charges, then the 
school will receive increases in applications.  This result violates the economic principle 
of price elasticity where a higher price on goods creates a large change in quantity 
(Friedman, 1973).  Based on this result, the dissertation notes application fee may be an 
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endogenous variable.  However, an exogenous instrumental variable for application fees 
could not be determined, and application fees were removed from Model Two. 
 Another potential concern for Model Two is that fixed effects were not controlled 
for and do not capture changes in the quality of schools over time.  The reason for not 
controlling for these effects in the original specification was that problems of 
multicollinearity surfaced, causing the removal of several key identification variables 
including private school designation.  Many studies on higher education include some 
form of control for private schools (Mixon, 1995; Mixon & Hsing, 1994; Mixon, 
Trevino, & Minto, 2004; Pope & Pope, 2009).  Thus, the dissertation did not control for 
university fixed effects. 
Future Areas of Research 
Throughout the preparation of this dissertation, several future avenues of research 
were identified that would further the history of the NAIA and advance institutional 
theory within the realm of sport management.  These future studies are divided according 
to the different methodologies utilized in this dissertation: historical and empirical. 
Historical Track 
In Chapter 5, this dissertation studied the history of the NAIA to determine if 
certain events in its history explain the reclassification of schools to the NCAA.  During 
the analysis, however, several events highlighted how t e NAIA was able to establish its 
legitimacy as an institution of intercollegiate athle ic governance and alter its institutional 
strategy to attract new members.  Furthermore, the analysis also showed how the NCAA 
viewed the NAIA and what specific strategies the NCAA implemented to validate the 
NAIA’s innovations.  Future studies could further explore the membership history as 
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certain events occurred such as the acceptance of Canadian schools or the sponsorship of 
women’s sports.  In addition, various national and world events including wars, economic 
conditions, and governmental issues may also contribute to the membership history of the 
NAIA. 
The dissertation analyzed the NAIA through the theoretical lens of legitimacy.  
However, the organization can also be reviewed through the related concepts of status 
and reputation.  As discussed in Chapter 2, status is an agreed-upon ordering of social 
actors (Washington & Zajac, 2005), and reputation is the predicted expectations of a firm 
based upon past performances (Ferguson, Deephouse, & Ferguson, 2000; Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005).  While an organiz tion cannot lose its legitimacy, 
its status and reputation can be impacted through the actions of the firm.  Thus, future 
research could explore which events caused society to view the NAIA with a diminished 
status.  In addition, reputation studies can provide explicit details on the economic and 
political environment that contributed to the loss f membership in the later years of the 
NAIA. 
The NAIA’s greatest strength during its early years was its leadership.  Both Emil 
Liston and A. O. Duer were successful during their r spective tenures as Executive 
Secretary.  Liston help found the NIBT and the NAIB based on the recommendations 
from his college coach and athletic director peers (Wilson, 2005).  Through his guidance, 
the NIBT grew from a small 8-team tournament to a 32-team national event during World 
War II (Stooksbury, 2010).  Liston also supported the expansion of the NAIB to include 
additional sports.  When Liston tragically passed away, Duer was appointed as Executive 
Secretary and continued to expand on Liston’s vision of providing intercollegiate sport 
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governance to smaller schools.  In addition, Duer secured the firm’s position with 
Olympic committee representation when invited to Washington to discuss the 
AAU/NCAA amateur conflict and potential solutions (Land, 1977).  Liston and Duer 
were great leaders for the NAIA based on their success with the organization.  Future 
studies could review the biographical history of both men from their coaching tenures at 
Baker University and Pepperdine University, respectiv ly, as well as their specific 
leadership styles in relation to their respective tenures as NAIA Executive Secretary. 
Another potential avenue for future research is the traditional district system the 
NAIA implemented from its inception to the 1990s.  Unlike the current affiliated 
conference system, the NAIA aligned its member schools according to their geographic 
area in the country (Hoover, 1958).  Some districts contained multiple states while others 
were comprised of a single or even half of a single state.  The district system provided the 
NAIA members a form of decentralized management that provided schools the ability to 
self-govern and associate with the overall organization as its decision makers saw fit.   
Chapter 5 touched on some of the issues such as redistricting during integration of 
HBCUs, but future studies can explore the functionality of the district system and how a 
decentralized management system can be useful for intercollegiate athletics. 
Speaking of integration, one of the greatest innovati ns the NAIA provided 
college sports was the facilitation of intercollegiate athletic governance to African 
American players and HBCUs.  The genesis of African-American integration in college 
sports was the controversy of the unwritten rule banning African-American players from 
participating in the NIBT (Wilson, 2005).  Through the removal of this rule, the NAIA 
established its legitimacy in college athletics andled to strong race relations between the 
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NAIA and the NASC.  While the NAIA integration process was discussed in Chapter 5, 
major points of interest could be further researched, including the NCAA’s initial 
response to HBCU requests for membership and the NASC’s push for committee 
representation.  Furthermore, additional analysis could provide details to the districting 
process the NAIA developed when HBCUs were first accepted as members. 
Along with integration, many delegates pushed for the addition of football 
because that was positioned as necessary to maintain the membership versus their 
alternative option of moving fully to the NCAA (Hoover, 1958).  Specifically, NAIA 
delegates agreed to sponsor a postseason football playoff to decide its national champion 
to differentiate itself from the NCAA’s usage of postseason bowl games (Wilson, 2005). 
Its development, however, was not met without controve sy.  The NAIA Championship 
game faced troubling issues including poor game attendance and inferior playing 
conditions (“3,000 Holiday Tickets Sold”, 1958; “Suncoast Blackout Set”, 1958).  
Furthermore, several racial issues occurred during the early years of the football 
championship which may have halted the growth of the event (Beck, 1961; “May Drop 
Ban on Negros”, 1960; “Segregation Issue Pops on Eve”, 1960).  Future research could 
explore the early years of the NAIA playoff and determine what factors helped or 
hindered the first football playoffs in college football. 
Future research could explore the NAIA’s role within the AAU/NCAA amateur 
conflict.  While Chapter 5 discussed Duer’s proposal for Olympic representation, the 
amateur conflict itself has several parties involved and led to the creation of the Amateur 
Sports Act of 1978.  The conflict lasted approximately wo decades with several 
individuals and organizations, including the Presidnt of the United States, attempting to 
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appease both the AAU and the NCAA (Land, 1977).  Although Chapter 5 briefly notes 
the NAIA sided with the AAU, further analysis of the conflict can show what 
contributions the NAIA received from the AAU for their support and how the Amateur 
Sports Act impacted all intercollegiate athletic and amateur governing bodies. 
Empirical Track 
During its early years as an organization, the NAIA was an innovator of college 
athletics.  From creating the first college only basketball championship tournament to 
providing intercollegiate sport governance to smaller schools, the NAIA created several 
innovative concepts that other organizations adopted.  As these innovations spread 
throughout the social system, firms face pressure to incorporate the practice (Boxenbaum 
& Jonsson, 2008).  Thus, the organizational field engages in the practice known as 
diffusion (Strang & Soule, 1998).  Diffusion shares a close relationship with both 
legitimacy and institutionalization as the pressure to adopt practices may cause a firm to 
alter its identity in order to match similar, successful, and prestigious organizations 
(Greve, 1996; 1998; Haverman, 1993).   However, the ability to adopt new innovations 
requires an organization to have the motivation to pursue the change as well as the skill to 
realize it (Weber, Davis, & Lounsbury, 2009).  As time progresses and innovations 
spread through an organizational field, the process evolves into a ‘taken-for-granted’ 
form and establishes legitimacy for firms incorporating the process (Schneiberg & 
Lounsbury, 2008).   
The concept of diffusion can be applied to the NAIA history in order to explore 
types of diffusion the NAIA and intercollegiate athletics implemented throughout the 
NAIA’s history.  One specific type of diffusion that should be researched is innovation 
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diffusion, as the concept allows scholars to explore all trends that occur throughout the 
development of the process (Bale, 2001).  Future res arch could explore the growth of 
college basketball tournaments after the NAIA began the NIBT or the expansion of 
international college sports governance after the admission of Canadian schools. 
Another area of research involves the change of authoritative power in the NAIA 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s.  At this time, university presidents took an active 
role in the affairs of the NAIA by establishing the COP to act similar to a college board 
of trustees (Wilson, 2005).  However, as the COP got more engaged, they began to take 
more interest in the overall day-to-day operations, i terfering with the NEC’s assigned 
role.  By the early 1990s, the COP took control of all operations from the NEC.  
Although the COP had good intentions, NAIA officials feared a university president 
would not have the time to oversee the athletic organization.  Furthermore, Wilson (2005) 
noted most schools departing the NAIA between 1986 and 1994 were a direct result of 
university president turnover, with newer university presidents having more familiarity 
with the NCAA than the NAIA.  While this may be speculation by Wilson (2005), further 
research on university movement during the 1986 power shift may explain why 
universities left the organization for the NCAA.  Furthermore, a regression analysis can 
be performed to determine the likelihood of movement based on the experience of a new 
university president. 
In terms of college movement, Model One can analyze if the diffusion of 
movement is influenced by a narrower definition of geography.  Although the IPEDS 
regions encompass much of the country, a place-specific profile conveys regional 
differences and contingencies for economic development (Bathelt & Glückler, 2005; 
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Sayer, 2000).  Several researchers have identified how organizations are influenced by 
local communities and their environmental conditions (Ackermann, 2002; Marquis & 
Battilana, 2009), governance (Davis & Greve, 1997), historical traditions (Marquis, 
2003), and purchasing preferences (Lounsbury, 2007; Molotch, Freudenberg, & Paulsen, 
2000).  To explore the differences in geography, future research could incorporate the 
alignment of divisions during the course of the District System’s use in the NAIA to 
determine if particular districts possessed a likelihood of movement.   
 Model One could also be applied to the NCAA to determine if identity discrepant 
cues exist for schools to consider movement between divisions.  The model could also be 
adjusted to incorporate an additional control variable to monitor the movement of former 
NAIA members moving within the NCAA.  Furthermore, Model One can also be 
expanded to analyze identity discrepant cues with Division I and specifically Division I-
FBS in terms of conference movement.  Finally, the model can be modified to predict the 
likelihood of reverse movement, or a return to a smller division (i.e., Division I-FCS to 
Division II; Division II to Division III) or a reclassification from the NCAA to the NAIA. 
 The dissertation utilized Model Two to determine a Reclassification Effect on the 
total applications a university receives after reclassifying from the NAIA to the NCAA.  
Future research could explore this same effect but hrough a measurement of enrollment 
instead of applications.  Specifically, Model Two can be modified to measure the 
Reclassification Effect on the total amount enrollment, undergraduate enrollment, and 
graduate enrollment.  Similar to some Flutie Effect studies measuring quality of 
enrollment (Castle & Kostelnik, 2011; McCormick & Tinsley, 1987; Mixon & Hsing, 
1994; Mixon & Ressler, 1995; Mixon, Trevino, & Minto, 2004; Pope & Pope, 2009; 
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Toma & Cross, 1998), Model Two could estimate the potential effect on the quality of 
student enrollment after a reclassification from the NAIA to the NCAA. In addition, the 
Reclassification Effect model could determine if movement between NCAA divisions or 
NCAA conferences provides an increase in the quantity and quality of both applications 
and enrollment.  Finally, the model could also analyze if an athletic association 
reclassification provides an impact on athlete recruiting in revenue-generating sports, the 
hiring of faculty and staff (i.e., professors), and the hiring of coaches among schools 
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